Full Opinion

Filed 11/10/26 P. v. Fromuth CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F089709 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. F24905291) v. RYAN FROMUTH, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Francine Zepeda, Judge. Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica C. Leal, Brian A. Segal and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- Defendant Ryan Fromuth was charged with two counts of failure to update his annual sex offender registration (Pen. Code, 1 § 290.012, subd. (a) [counts 1 & 2]). Following trial, the jury found him guilty as charged. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of two years: a mitigated term of 16 months on count 1 and a consecutive eight months (one-third the middle term) on count 2. On appeal, defendant makes several contentions. First, the evidence did not sufficiently support either of his convictions. Second, in view of statutory language in the Sex Offender Registration Act (§ 290 et seq.) requiring a registrant to give information “as required on the Department of Justice annual update form” (§ 290.012, subd. (a)) and “as shall be required by the Department of Justice” (§ 290.015, subd. (a)(1)), the Legislature unconstitutionally delegated lawmaking authority to an administrative agency in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Finally, as to count 2, criminalization of defendant’s valid signature on the annual registration form violated his due process and First Amendment rights. The Attorney General concedes the evidence did not sufficiently support defendant’s conviction on count 1 and this conviction should be reversed. We accept these concessions. On the other hand, we conclude substantial evidence supported defendant’s conviction on count 2. In addition, we decline to consider defendant’s constitutional claims as we are not “ ‘absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.’ ” (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1079, fn. 4.) STATEMENT OF FACTS On March 5, 2014, defendant was convicted of felony child luring (§ 288.4, subd. (b)). As a result, he is subject to lifetime registration pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. 1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Penal Code. 2. The Department of Justice’s “SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION [¶] CHANGE OF ADDRESS/ANNUAL OR OTHER UPDATE” form (hereafter 8102 form) consists of six pages. (Boldface omitted.) The first two pages contain fields for a registrant’s biographical information. Pages 3 through 5 itemize 27 separate “registration requirements” 2 a “registrant is required to read and initial.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) Page 6 sets forth a “Privacy Notice” required by Civil Code section 1798.17. (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) At the bottom of each page is a signature line and a thumbprint box. The appellate record contains 8102 forms completed by defendant in July 2021 and May 2023. For each form, he signed and thumb printed all six pages and initialed the 27 registration requirements on pages 3 through 5. I. Count 1 On August 1, 2023, defendant went to the sex offender registration office at the Fresno County satellite jail. He filled out an intake form and a registering officer copied the responses therefrom onto an 8102 form. Defendant “signed and provided a thumbprint on [p]ages 1 and 2” but “refus[ed] to initial the requirements on [p]ages 3, 4, and 5, or sign or thumbprint those additional pages.” Detective Ressler, a member of the sexual assault unit that monitors sex offender registrants in Fresno, was summoned to the office. Relying on “[h]aving prior interactions with [defendant],” Detective Ressler tried to convince him to complete the 8102 form, but to no avail. Because defendant “was still within his five business days to 2 These “registration requirements” (boldface & capitalization omitted) advised of (1) various provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act, e.g., registration of individuals enrolled as students or employed at institutions of higher learning (§§ 290.009, 290.01), registration of individuals with multiple residences (§ 290.010), registration of transients (§ 290.011), annual registration updates (§ 290.012), change-of- address notification (§ 290.013), and change-of-name notification (§ 290.014); (2) other state statutory provisions, e.g., collection of DNA samples (§§ 296, 296.2); and (3) federal law requirements. 3. register” (see at p. 6 & fn. 3, post), Detective Ressler “advised him that his registration would not be complete that day but he had additional time to still come in.” Defendant left but did not return within the aforementioned time. On August 17, 2023, Detective Ressler “wrote a police report” and “authored an arrest warrant.” II. Count 2 On August 1, 2024, defendant returned to the registration office. Detective Ressler, who was again summoned to the office, advised defendant “he now had a warrant for his arrest” for his failure to update his annual registration in 2023. The detective emphasized he “didn’t want to arrest [defendant]” and “would look past 2023” if defendant “complete[d] the [2024] form correctly, including the signature, thumbprint, initials, as required, and photograph.” Defendant, who was confrontational, filled out an intake form and a registering officer copied the responses therefrom onto an 8102 form. Defendant “signed [p]ages 1 and 2 only” and refused to complete the rest of the form. Detective Ressler warned defendant he would be arrested if he did not continue, but defendant remained uncooperative. After defendant was arrested, Detective Ressler examined the 8102 form and observed defendant signed “fuck the police” on pages 1 and 2. At August 13 and September 13, 2024 hearings held in connection with the purported 2023 violation, the trial court ordered defendant to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant did not do so. On September 25, 2024, Detective Ressler wrote a report related to the purported 2024 violation and recommended an additional criminal charge. DISCUSSION I. Standard of review “To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains [substantial] evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which 4. a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955.) We “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “We need not be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; we merely ask whether ‘ “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Tripp, supra, at p. 955, italics omitted.) “This standard of review … applies to circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances, plus all the logical inferences the [trier of fact] might have drawn from them, reasonably justify the [trier of fact]’s findings, our opinion that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” (Ibid.) “Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the [trier of fact], it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis what[so]ever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Redmond, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 755.) “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 632.) II. Analysis a. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims “Beginning on his or her first birthday following registration or change of address, the person shall be required to register annually, within five working days of his or her 5. birthday,[ 3] to update his or her registration with the entities described in subdivision (b) of Section 290.[ 4] At the annual update, the person shall provide current information as required on the Department of Justice annual update form, including the information described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a) of Section 290.015.” (§ 290.012, subd. (a).) Section 290.015, subdivision (a) specifies in part: “(1) A statement in writing signed by the person, giving information as shall be required by the Department of Justice and giving the name and address of the person’s employer, and the address of the person’s place of employment if that is different from the employer’s main address. “(2) The fingerprints and a current photograph of the person taken by the registering official. “(3) The license plate number of any vehicle owned by, regularly driven by, or registered in the name of the person. “(4) A list of all Internet identifiers actually used by the person, as required by Section 290.024.[ 5]” “[A] person who is required to register under the [Sex Offender Registration A]ct based on a felony conviction … who willfully violates any requirement of the act … is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years.” (§ 290.018, subd. (b).) “ ‘[T]he terms “willful” or 3 Defendant’s birthday is July 29th. 4 The sex offender “shall register with the chief of police of the city in which the person is residing, or the sheriff of the county if the person is residing in an unincorporated area or city that has no police department, and, additionally, with the chief of police of a campus of the University of California, the California State University, or community college if the person is residing upon the campus or in any of its facilities .…” (§ 290, subd. (b).) 5 “ ‘Internet identifier’ means any electronic mail address or user name used for instant messaging or social networking that is actually used for direct communication between users on the Internet in a manner that makes the communication not accessible to the general public.” (§ 290.024, subd. (b)(1).) 6. “willfully,” when applied in a penal statute, require only that the illegal act or omission occur “intentionally,” without regard to motive or ignorance of the act’s prohibited character.’ [Citation.] ‘Willfully implies no evil intent; “ ‘it implies that the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing and is a free agent.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 85; see § 7, subd. (b)(1) [“ ‘Willfully,’ when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.”].) Defendant contends “there was insufficient evidence that [he] failed to register pursuant to section 290.012 as alleged in counts one (2023) and two (2024).” (Capitalization omitted.) In particular, he argues “a registrant satisfies his duty of annually registering pursuant to the [Sex Offender Registration] Act by completing pages one and two of the … 8102 [form] only” and “he was not required to acknowledge the ‘27 requirements’ on pages three through five as they are not required under the [Sex Offender Registration] Act for purposes of the annual registration requirement.” In the respondent’s brief, the Attorney General recognizes a “basis for the section 290.012[,] subdivision (a), conviction” for “the August 2023 incident” “was [defendant]’s refusal to read and acknowledge (by providing his initials) the 27 advisements on the [8102] form .…” He “concedes that [defendant]’s refusal to read and acknowledge (by initialing) the 27 advisements on the [8102] form in 2023 did not constitute a failure to annually update his registration under section 290.012, subdivision (a)” because this provision “does not specify any advisement that must be provided to and acknowledged by the registrant for the annual update of sex offender registration.” The Attorney General also concedes “[defendant]’s conviction [on count 1] for violating section 290.012, subdivision (a), in 2023 should be reversed .…” We accept these concessions. 7. On the other hand, we conclude substantial evidence supported defendant’s conviction on count 2. As noted, at an annual update, the offender must provide—among other things—“[a] statement in writing signed by the person, giving information as shall be required by the Department of Justice and giving the name and address of the person’s employer, and the address of the person’s place of employment if that is different from the employer’s main address” (§ 290.015, subd. (a)(1)) and “fingerprints and a current photograph of the person taken by the registering official” (id., subd. (a)(2)). (See § 290.012, subd. (a).) The record—viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution—establishes defendant was aware of these requirements, having completed the 8102 form in its entirety on at least two occasions (in July 2021 and May 2023) and signed his name and provided his thumbprint on the first two pages of the 8102 form on August 1, 2023. By contrast, on August 1, 2024, he only signed “fuck the police” on the first two pages of the 8102 form. Even under threat of arrest, defendant flatly refused to complete the rest of the form. (See People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 [“Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act without knowing what act is required to be performed.”].) Assuming, arguendo, the “fuck the police” signature somehow satisfied the statutory requirement, defendant still violated section 290.012, subdivision (a) because his thumbprint was not taken. Defendant retorts on appeal he “did not provide a thumbprint in 2024 … because he was arrested before the agency could take his thumbprint.” Yet, the record establishes he had ample opportunity after his arrest to rectify this omission. Before count 2 was added on September 25, 2024, at hearings held on August 13 and September 13, 2024, the trial court explicitly ordered defendant to register. He elected not to do so. Thus, a rational trier of fact could have found—beyond a reasonable doubt—defendant willfully failed to update his annual sex offender registration in 2024. 8. b. Constitutional claims “As a general rule, ‘we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1079, fn. 4; see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Assn. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”]; Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230 [“ ‘ “Court[s] will not decide constitutional questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues of the case.” ’ ”]; People v. Marsh (1984) 36 Cal.3d 134, 144 [“[C]ourts should not decide constitutional questions unless compelled to do so.”].) i. Unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority As noted, section 290.012, subdivision (a) reads in part: “At the annual update, the person shall provide current information as required on the Department of Justice annual update form, including the information described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a) of Section 290.015.” Section 290.015, subdivision (a)(1) reads in part: “A statement in writing signed by the person, giving information as shall be required by the Department of Justice .…” Defendant contends this language “provides a floor but no ceiling” and “[t]his lack of a ceiling or any procedural safeguards is an unlawful delegation of [legislative] authority because it provides no definite direction to the Department of Justice.” We need not decide this constitutional question to dispose of the matter before us. First, as to count 1, we accept the Attorney General’s concessions the evidence did not sufficiently support defendant’s conviction and this conviction should be reversed. Second, as to count 2, substantial evidence establishes defendant willfully violated the 9. statutory thumbprint requirement (§ 290.015, subd. (a)(2)), which is a “floor” requirement and not the product of the unconstitutional delegation alleged by defendant. ii. Due process and First Amendment violations Defendant contends the “fuck the police” signature on the 2024 form was valid given section 290.012 “has no specific provisions regarding the form of signature on the annual registration forms” and “the Due Process Clauses and First Amendment protect [his] speech in signing his annual registration forms.” Again, we need not decide this constitutional question to dispose of the matter before us. As discussed, we uphold defendant’s conviction on count 2 because—even assuming the validity of the “fuck the police” signature—substantial evidence establishes defendant willfully violated the statutory thumbprint requirement. DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction on count 1 is reversed, the judgment of conviction on count 2 is affirmed, and the sentence is vacated. The matter is remanded for resentencing on count 2. DETJEN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: MEEHAN, J. SNAUFFER, J. 10.