Com. v. Dibert, J.

J-A20006-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JUSTIN ANDREW DIBERT : : Appellant : No. 1472 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 9, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-29-CR-0000002-2024 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2026 Justin Andrew Dibert appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County, after being convicted of one count each of driving under the influence (DUI)—general impairment,1 DUI— highest rate,2 and careless driving.3 After careful review, we affirm. On November 20, 2023, Dibert reported for work as a Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) trooper. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/25/24, at 5-6. Dibert had recently been assigned to the McConnellsburg barracks. See id. at 15. Around 3:00 p.m., Trooper Matt Rader called Corporal Dylan Gelvin, the shift supervisor at the McConnellsburg barracks, and informed him that he ____________________________________________ 1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). 2 Id. at § 3802(c). 3 Id. at § 3714(a). J-A20006-26 had observed Dibert having trouble parking and backing up his pick-up truck. See id. at 5, 47-48. Around 3:30 p.m., Corporal Gelvin saw Dibert in the parking lot, now in a PSP vehicle, and went to speak with him. See id. at 5. Corporal Gelvin spoke with Dibert for fifteen to twenty minutes, during which Corporal Gelvin introduced himself, told Dibert that another trooper had observed him having trouble parking his vehicle, and asked Dibert if he had any alcohol that day, the night prior, or over the weekend.4 See id. at 7-8. Dibert responded that he had not but told Corporal Gelvin that he has a hard time around Veteran’s Day. See id. Corporal Gelvin did not smell an odor of alcohol on Dibert during this conversation but did observe that his speech was slow and slurred. See id. at 29. Corporal Gelvin then informed Sergeant Melissa Sneath, his supervisor, about his interaction with Dibert and the concerns that Trooper Rader had relayed to him. See id. at 9, 46-47. Based on this information, Sergeant Sneath used a PSP computer system to determine which patrol vehicle Dibert was in and saw that the vehicle was stationed in an odd location.5 See id. at 47-49. Sergeant Sneath, reaching the end of her shift and wanting to check in on Dibert, left the barracks around 4:10 p.m., drove by the intersection where Dibert’s vehicle had last registered on the PSP program, and saw his ____________________________________________ 4 November 20, 2023 was a Monday. 5 Sergeant Sneath considered the location “kind of odd” because it was “not an intersection or an area of road where troopers would usually sit to monitor traffic or to run radar[.]” Id. at 49. -2- J-A20006-26 patrol vehicle in a pull-off area outside the travel lane. See id. at 50-51. Sergeant Sneath turned her car around, drove back in the direction of Dibert’s vehicle, and pulled up parallel with it. See id. at 51. Sergeant Sneath could see Dibert sitting in his car but could not see his entire face; Dibert’s body was turned towards the passenger side, and Sneath could only see the left side of his face and the back of his neck. See id. at 51. Sergeant Sneath waited for thirty seconds, during which Dibert did not appear to notice her presence. See id. Sergeant Sneath then drove back toward the station and called Corporal Gelvin, telling him what she had seen and asking him to radio Dibert to return to the station. See id. at 51.6 Once Sergeant Sneath was told that Dibert had made it back to the station, she and Corporal Gelvin watched Dibert via surveillance cameras in the parking lot and waited for Dibert to come into the barracks.7 See id. at 11, 53. Dibert did not enter after a couple of minutes, so they went out to his car to meet him. See id. Sergeant Sneath approached Dibert’s driver’s side door and asked Dibert to come into her office. See id. at 53. Sergeant Sneath and Corporal Gelvin observed that Dibert was slow to exit his vehicle, but he did not otherwise stumble or have difficulty getting out of the car. See id. at 12, 53. Sergeant Sneath testified that Dibert could have refused Sergeant ____________________________________________ 6 When asked on cross-examination whether Dibert could have refused the radio to return to the office, Sergeant Sneath testified that “[i]t would be unusual if a trooper did that.” Id. at 69. 7 Sergeant Sneath was out of uniform and in plain clothes at this time. Id. at 59-60. Corporal Gelvin remained in his PSP uniform. -3- J-A20006-26 Sneath’s initial request to exit his vehicle and come into the station, but that his refusal would have resulted in disciplinary action or other ramifications. See id. at 69-70. Sergeant Sneath, Corporal Gelvin, and Dibert then went into Sergeant Sneath’s office, closing the door behind them for privacy. See id. at 12, 57- 58. Sergeant Sneath did not request that any other troopers stand at the door or inside the office. See id. at 60. No one told Dibert that he was not free to leave the barracks at this point. See id. at 54. Sergeant Sneath’s reason for bringing Dibert in to talk was “first and foremost for his welfare[,]” because Dibert told Corporal Gelvin that he struggled around Veteran’s Day and because she saw him “sleeping or at least not cognizant of his surroundings” in his patrol vehicle. See id. at 55. In her office, Sergeant Sneath sat behind her desk with Dibert seated in a chair across from her and Corporal Gelvin seated on a couch off to the side. See id. at 15-16, 58. Sergeant Sneath explained to Dibert that she was concerned for his well-being. See id. at 58. Dibert explained that he had stress around Veteran’s Day and Memorial Day, and that he felt that he did not have anyone to talk with about that stress. See id. at 58-59. Dibert also stated that he had a problem but did not elaborate further. See id. at 59. Sergeant Sneath and Corporal Gelvin tried to get him to talk about this problem, asking whether they could help him and how he was feeling. See id. Corporal Gelvin thought Dibert seemed apprehensive about answering -4- J-A20006-26 their questions and found Dibert’s speech to be “low and almost whispery.” Id. at 16. At one point, after the three had been talking for roughly twenty to thirty minutes about Dibert’s background, Dibert was asked8 if he had consumed any alcohol the night before. See id. at 59. Dibert initially said that he did not have alcohol the previous night before eventually admitting that he had been drinking at his sister’s house the night prior but had stopped by 9 p.m., when his mother drove him home. See id. at 17. Sergeant Sneath and Corporal Gelvin asked Dibert how many drinks and what kind of drinks he had consumed. See id. at 59. Dibert did not provide a direct answer, saying he did not recall. Id. 17, 59. When asked to describe how the interview progressed, Sergeant Sneath explained: I mean, the tone remained conversational. It wasn’t confrontational. It was—there was no yelling or screaming or raised voices. I think it was pointed out to him that his speech was slurred, his speech was slow and he was taking awhile to respond to the questions. I think it was pointed out to him, hey, these are all indicators that you might have been drinking, you know, have you had anything to drink. He was asked more than once. ____________________________________________ 8 Neither Sergeant Sneath nor Corporal Gelvin specified who asked the question. See id. at 16, 59. -5- J-A20006-26 Id. at 61. Sergeant Sneath asked Dibert if he would submit to either a preliminary blood test (PBT)9 or a blood test, both of which Dibert declined. See id. at 18, 61. Corporal Gelvin asked why he would not submit to either test, and Dibert responded that he was afraid of what the results would be. Id. at 61-62. Corporal Gelvin asked Dibert if he was still intoxicated and Dibert stated that he should not be at work. Id. at 18, 63. These responses led Sergeant Sneath to believe that “the reason for [Dibert’s] behavior is because he’s under the influence of alcohol, not a stressor or PTSD or something like that.” Id. at 62. After Dibert stated that he should not be at work, Sergeant Sneath requested Dibert step out of the office, change into his civilian clothes, and sit with another trooper, Trooper Ellis,10 in the barracks conference room. See id. at 18-19. Sergeant Sneath called her supervisor, Captain Thomas Hertlein, and told him about the situation and why she thought Dibert was under the influence. See id. at 18, 63, 71-72. Captain Hertlein decided that the interview would proceed as a DUI investigation, and that Corporal Gelvin would administer the standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs).11 Id. at 18, 63-64. ____________________________________________ 9 A PBT is used to measure blood alcohol concentration (BAC). See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/24, at 5. 10 Trooper Ellis’ first name is not stated in the record. 11 Sergeant Sneath testified that she spoke with Captain Hertlein several times during the discussion with Dibert, but she could not state with specificity when each call occurred throughout and what was relayed during each call. See id. at 63, 72. -6- J-A20006-26 Before administering the SFSTs, Corporal Gelvin had Dibert change from his uniform into his plain clothes. See id. at 19. Trooper Ellis returned with Dibert to Sergeant Sneath’s office, where Corporal Gelvin administered the SFSTs. See id. at 19-20, 64. The SFSTs included the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), walk-and-turn, and one-leg stand tests. See id. at 20. Corporal Gelvin observed several indicators of impairment and relayed these observations to Sergeant Sneath. See id. at 20, 64. Corporal Gelvin asked Dibert if he would submit to a PBT, Dibert agreed, and the test was positive for alcohol. See id. at 20-21. Sergeant Sneath testified that Dibert could have chosen to leave the interview at any time, but his leaving may have triggered disciplinary action, and the situation would have been documented and forwarded along the proper channels. See id. at 70. At no point was Dibert advised of his Miranda12 rights or that he could refuse to speak with Sergeant Sneath. See id. at 73. Sergeant Sneath and Corporal Gelvin again called Captain Hertlein, who contacted Major Matthew Nickey, who assigned Trooper Curtis Killian from the PSP Chambersburg barracks to conduct a DUI investigation of Dibert. See id. at 21, 64. Sergeant Sneath walked Dibert to the conference room and had no further interactions with him. See id. at 65. When Trooper Killian arrived, Corporal Gelvin provided him with the background on Dibert’s situation—what occurred between Trooper Rader ____________________________________________ 12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -7- J-A20006-26 informing Corporal Gelvin that Dibert was struggling to park and Trooper Killian’s arrival at the barracks—and explained to him the indicators of intoxication he observed during the SFSTs. See id. at 21, 79-81. Trooper Killian was informed that different troopers had kept Dibert under observation the entire time he was at the barracks to prevent him from consuming alcohol while the situation unfolded. See id. at 89. Trooper Killian spoke with Dibert in a separate room off of the barracks kitchen, identified himself, and explained why he was there. See id. at 82. During this interaction, Trooper Killian detected an odor of alcohol coming from Dibert. See id. at 89-90. Dibert was never placed in handcuffs throughout the encounter. See id. at 82, 84. Trooper Killian asked if Dibert was willing to take a blood test, which Dibert agreed to. See id. Trooper Killian read Dibert the DL-26B form,13 which Dibert signed, acknowledging that Trooper Killian read him the form verbatim. See id. ____________________________________________ 13 The Commonwealth entered the DL-26B form, which contains the following warnings that must be read to an arrestee suspected of driving under the influence and subject to a blood test: It is my duty as a police officer to inform you of the following: 1. You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code. 2. I am requiring that you submit to a chemical test of blood. 3. If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused a chemical test or were previously convicted (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A20006-26 Trooper Killian, Corporal Gelvin, and Dibert left the barracks and went to the Fulton County Medical Center. See id. at 84. Dibert reiterated his consent and underwent a blood draw. See id. at 85. Trooper Killian was provided with the results, which indicated a low-end range BAC of .153. See id. at 86;14 Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, Fulton County Medical Center Blood Alcohol Test Report. Following the results of the blood test, Trooper Killian prepared an affidavit of probable cause and the criminal complaint underlying the instant matter. See id. at 86. Trooper Killian did not read Dibert his Miranda rights prior to or after the blood draw. See id. at 84. ____________________________________________ of driving under the influence, your operating privilege will be suspended for up to 18 months. If your operating privilege is suspended for refusing chemical testing, you will have to pay a restoration fee of up to $2,000 in order to have your operating privilege restored. 4. You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or you remain silent when asked to submit to a blood test, you will have refused the test. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, DL-26B Form (emphasis added). These warnings are referred to as the O’Connell warnings. See Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989). 14 The trial court opinion and testimony both incorrectly identify Dibert’s low- end range BAC of .118. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/24, at 7 (“The result of the test from FCMC’s lab was between .118% and .153% blood alcohol concentration”); N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/25/24, at 86 (Trooper Killian testifying that high-end range was “.118 percent”). The Fulton County Medical Center Blood Alcohol Test Report clearly indicates a low-end range of .153% high-end range of .188%. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, Fulton County Medical Center Blood Alcohol Test Report. -9- J-A20006-26 After charges were filed, the then-Fulton County District Attorney, Travis Kendall,15 and Corporal Gelvin had a discussion regarding the blood sample taken at the Fulton County Medical Center. See id. at 41. District Attorney Kendall advised Corporal Gelvin to have the blood sent for additional testing at NMS Laboratories. See id. Corporal Gelvin requested the additional testing by NMS Laboratories, which resulted in a report indicating a BAC of .173 plus or minus .011. See id. at 42; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3, NMS Laboratories Report, 12/5/23. On November 22, 2023, the Commonwealth charged Dibert with DUI— general impairment, DUI—high rate,16 and careless driving. On December 8, 2023, the Commonwealth amended the complaint, withdrawing the charge for DUI—high rate and replacing it with DUI-highest rate. Dibert filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on March 14, 2024, seeking suppression of evidence and dismissal of the DUI—highest rate charge. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on June 25, 2024. On November 5, 2024, the trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial on July 31, 2025, after which the trial court convicted Dibert of DUI—general impairment, ____________________________________________ 15Travis Kendall was the District Attorney for Fulton County at the time of Dibert’s arrest but retired at the end of 2023. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/24, at 7 n.58. Eric Weisbrod is the current District Attorney of Fulton County. See id. 16 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3802(b). - 10 - J-A20006-26 DUI—highest rate,17 and careless driving. On September 9, 2025, the trial court sentenced Dibert to six months of restrictive probation.18 Dibert timely appealed on October 2, 2025. Both Dibert and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Dibert raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the [] trial court erred in denying [Dibert]’s motion to suppress for an unlawful detention in the parking lot of the barracks? More specifically, whether [Dibert] was subjected to an investigative detention without reasonable suspicion? 2. Whether the [] trial court erred in denying [Dibert]’s motion to suppress for an unlawful detention at the barracks when [Dibert] was ordered into [Sergeant Sneath]’s office? More specifically, whether [Dibert]’s detention at the [b]arracks was an arrest that was not supported by probable cause? 3. Whether [Dibert]’s statements were involuntary pursuant Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)[,] because [Dibert] had the option to lose his livelihood or incriminate himself? 4. Whether [Dibert]’s statements should be suppressed because he was not provided his Miranda rights after being taken into custody and interrogated? More specifically, whether the fact he was a police officer negates the need for Miranda? 5. Whether [Dibert]’s [SFSTs] should be suppressed because they constituted an involuntary search? ____________________________________________ 17 The DUI offenses merged for the purposes of sentencing. 18 The sentence contained an additional restrictive condition of thirty days of electronic monitoring with alcohol monitoring, or, in the alternative, if electronic monitoring was not available in Bedford County, seventy-two hours in the Bedford County Correctional Facility. - 11 - J-A20006-26 6. Whether [Trooper] Killian lacked probable cause to arrest [Dibert]? 7. Whether [Dibert]’s blood test should be dismissed because his consent was not voluntary? 8. Whether Count 2 should be dismissed because it is a product of selective prosecution[?] More specifically, whether the Commonwealth took arbitrary actions based on [Dibert]’s status as a law enforcement officer? See Appellant’s Brief, at 9-11 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). In his first two issues, Dibert alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was subject to an illegal detention in the parking lot and an illegal arrest inside the barracks. See id. at 27-34. Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] findings[.] Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 307 A.3d 742, 745–46 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted; brackets in original). We maintain de novo review of the suppression court’s legal conclusions. See Commonwealth v. Joyner, 348 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2025). Dibert first argues Corporal Gelvin subjected him to an unlawful detention in the parking lot of the barracks. See Appellant’s Brief, at 27-30. Dibert claims he was “compelled, pursuant to [PSP] regulations, to answer - 12 - J-A20006-26 questions posed to him and to follow all orders by those of higher rank and authority[.]” Id. at 28. Dibert contends that, when Corporal Gelvin initiated the first parking lot interaction and asked him questions related to his use of alcohol, he was unable to leave or refuse to answer the questions because he was subordinate to Corporal Gelvin. See id at 30. Dibert claims that Corporal Gelvin lacked reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot at this time. See id. Therefore, according to Dibert, during this interaction, he was subject to an unlawful detention, and any evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed. See id. The trial court concluded that the initial parking lot interaction did not reach the level of an investigatory detention. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/24, at 11.19 The trial court reasoned that Corporal Gelvin was charged with ensuring the safety of the troopers under his command, wanted to introduce himself to Dibert, and testified that Dibert was free to leave the conversation and not prevented from leaving by PSP regulations. See id. at 11-12. “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Cook, [] 735 A.2d 673, 675 ([Pa.] 1999) (citation omitted). “Not every encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen constitutes a seizure warranting constitutional protections.” Commonwealth v. Adams, [] 205 A.3d 1195, 1199 ([Pa.] ____________________________________________ 19 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion the trial court incorporates and relies upon the reasoning set forth in its opinion denying Dibert’s omnibus pretrial motion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/24, at 4-7 (unpaginated). Accordingly, we cite the trial court’s November 7, 2024 opinion. - 13 - J-A20006-26 2019). “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Id., quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434[ ] (1991). There are three types of interactions between the police and private citizens: mere encounter, investigative detention, and arrest. See [Commonwealth v.] Hicks, 208 A.3d [916,] 927 [(Pa. 2019)]. A mere encounter “does not constitute a seizure . . . and requires no particular suspicion of criminality[.]” Id. An investigative detention, on the other hand, “constitutes a seizure of a person, and to be constitutionally valid[,] police must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Adams, 205 A.3d at 1200 (citation omitted). An arrest is also, of course, a seizure, “and must be supported by probable cause.” Id. (citation omitted). While “[n]o bright lines separate these types of encounters,” the United States Supreme Court and this Court have endorsed “an objective test by which courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter.” Id. (citation omitted). This test considers whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, [] 97 A.3d 298, 303 ([Pa.] 2014). A “reasonable person” under this test is one who is “innocent of any crime[.]” Commonwealth v. Livingstone, [] 174 A.3d 609, 621 ([Pa.] 2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, [] 378 A.2d 835, 840 ([Pa.] 1977). “[W]hat constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” Lyles, 97 A.3d at 303, quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573–74[ ] (1988). Commonwealth v. Foster, 356 A.3d 747, 758 (Pa. 2026). The test for whether a mere encounter has risen to the level of an investigative detention, often referred to as the “‘free to leave test,’ requires the court to determine ‘whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence - 14 - J-A20006-26 and go about his business.’” See Adams, 205 A.3d at 1200 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437). When analyzing whether a seizure occurred or whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, courts may consider the following non-exclusive list of factors: the number of officers present during the interaction; whether the officer informs the citizen they are suspected of criminal activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and the questions asked. Although no single factor controls our analysis, both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have held that the approach of a police officer followed by questioning does not constitute a seizure. Joyner, 348 A.3d at 236–37 (citations and quotations omitted). With respect to the show of authority needed to escalate an encounter into a detention, the circumstances must present some level of coercion, beyond the mere fact of the police officer’s role, that conveys a demand for compliance or threat of tangible consequences from refusal. See Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 544 (Pa. Super. 2019). Otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. Commonwealth v. Jones, 266 A.3d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624–25 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative detention must be “based upon specific and articulable facts . . . that criminality is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Zhahir, [] 751 A.2d 1153, 1156 ([Pa.] 2000), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. [1,] 21, 30[ ] [(1968)]. The police must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18[ ] - 15 - J-A20006-26 (1981). This is not a particularly demanding standard. “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380[ ] (2020), quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397[ ] (2014). “The reasonable suspicion inquiry ‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy[.]” Id. at 381[,] quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274[ ] (2002). The assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists “requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances[.]” Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1156. This totality is based on all facts, and “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676. The investigative detention must be “justified at its inception[;”] circumstances arising after the suspect was detained cannot retroactively provide a lawful basis for the stop. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1156, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20[.] Foster, 356 A.3d at 758–59. We find support in the record for the trial court’s factual findings and turn to our de novo review of its legal conclusions. Taking into account the circumstances surrounding the first parking lot interaction, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the encounter did not rise to the level of an investigative detention. Corporal Gelvin was the only officer present during the interaction in the barracks parking lot. See N.T. 6/25/24, at 7-8. Corporal Gelvin did not inform Dibert that he was suspected of criminal activity. See id. Corporal Gelvin did not testify as to his demeanor or tone during the conversation but did state that he started the conversation by introducing himself because he had not met Dibert before, that he thought the conversation “ended well[,]” and that he “was under the impression that [] Dibert would come in and try to meet some guys” due to it being one of - 16 - J-A20006-26 Dibert’s first shifts at the barracks. Id. at 8. The conversation lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. See id. at 7. The interaction between Corporal Gelvin and Dibert, from the perspective of a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, did not rise to the level of an investigative detention; instead, it was a relatively innocuous conversation between a supervising officer and his supervisee. While Corporal Gelvin did ask Dibert questions about potential alcohol use, the approach of an officer, followed by questioning, does not constitute a seizure. See Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, at 303, 305–06 (no investigative detention where officers asked defendant his reasons for sitting on steps of vacant building and requested identification). This remains the case even where the questions relate to potential criminal conduct. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 355 A.3d 383, 391–92 (Pa. Super. 2026) (en banc) (no investigative detention where two officers asked defendant if he was okay, exited their vehicles and approached defendant, asked if defendant had any weapons, and asked if he had a permit to carry a firearm); Young, 162 A.3d at 529 (no investigative detention where three officers asked defendant “what he was doing” and “if he had anything on his person that could harm [the officers]”). Although Dibert argues that his status as a subordinate trooper to Corporal Gelvin and the existence of the PSP regulations rendered the encounter an investigative detention, we disagree. On the contrary, we consider a discussion between a state trooper and his supervisor to be inherently less coercive than a discussion between a state trooper and a - 17 - J-A20006-26 member of the public. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621 (taking into account “consideration of the realities of everyday life, particularly the relationship between ordinary citizens and law enforcement”). As for the PSP regulations, they were not entered into evidence, and the testimony as to their relevance to the interview was mixed. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/25/24, at 23 (Corporal Gelvin answering affirmatively when asked if PSP administrative regulations require troopers to truthfully answer questions asked by superior officer); see id. at 29 (Corporal Gelvin testifying PSP regulations did not prevent Dibert from ending and leaving interaction). Regardless, we decline to give an internal PSP regulation the force of law that Dibert asks of us, particularly when no explicit reference was made to the regulations or Dibert’s obligations thereunder during the interview.20 Accordingly, as the circumstances would not have indicated to a reasonable person in Dibert’s position that he was not free to leave, the initial parking lot interaction remained a mere encounter. See Foster, supra. Dibert next claims that he was subject to an unlawful arrest at the barracks after being ordered to return to the barracks and subjected to questioning by Sergeant Sneath and Corporal Gelvin. See Appellant’s Brief, at 31-34. The key difference between an investigative detention and a custodial one is that the latter “involve[s] such coercive conditions as to constitute the ____________________________________________ 20 We emphasize that neither Sergeant Sneath nor Corporal Gevin invoked, mentioned, or pressured Dibert with the PSP regulations. - 18 - J-A20006-26 functional equivalent of an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.3d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995)). Put otherwise, in determining whether an individual was in custody, the “ultimate inquiry is . . . whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” See Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 90 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (citations omitted)). The standard for determining whether a police encounter is custodial “is an objective one, with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person interrogated rather than the strictly subjective view of the troopers or the person being seized [and] must be determined with reference to the totality of the circumstances.” Pakacki, 901 A.2d at 987 (quoting Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085– 86 (Pa. 1993)). An interaction that begins as an investigative detention may develop into a custodial detention. Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa. Super. 2023). When determining whether an encounter is investigative or custodial in nature, relevant factors include, inter alia: the cause for the detention, the detention’s length, the detention’s location, whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, whether physical restraints were used, whether the police used or threatened force, and the character of the investigative methods used to confirm or dispel the suspicions of the police. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v Clinton, 905 A.2d at 1026, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2006)). A “custodial interrogation” has been defined as questioning initiated - 19 - J-A20006-26 by the police after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way. See Spence, 290 A.3d at 314–15. An interrogation occurs when the police should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. See id. at 315. Here, Dibert posits he was subject to an unlawful arrest after his supervisors directed him to enter the barracks and interviewed him, asking whether he was under the influence of alcohol. See Appellant’s Brief, at 32- 33. Dibert alleges it was only after he was subject to an unlawful interrogation that it was determined he may have operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and, accordingly, his arrest was unconstitutional. See id. at 34. The trial court found that the encounter between Sergeant Sneath, Corporal Gelvin, and Dibert was not a custodial detention until Dibert admitted that he probably should not have reported for duty. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/24, at 17. As the trial court analyzed, it was, up until that point, a work- related conversation intended to determine if Dibert was fit for duty and nothing more. See id. Accordingly, the trial court held Dibert was not subject to an arrest without probable cause. See id. at 15-16. We find support in the record for the trial court’s factual findings and turn to our de novo review of its legal conclusions. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the reasonable impression conveyed to Dibert throughout the encounter, we hold that Dibert was not subject to a custodial detention until Trooper Killian read him the DL-26B and informed him that he - 20 - J-A20006-26 was under arrest.21 See Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1086 (Pa. 1993) (holding police encounter non-custodial until defendant formally arrested). Most instructive is our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983). In Ziegler, the appellee, a Philadelphia police officer, became the subject of a homicide investigation after his pursuit and apprehension of a speeding driver ended with the driver’s death. See id at 56–57. The appellee’s supervising lieutenant questioned him over the radio and in person regarding the encounter, asking how the decedent had been shot and confronting him regarding the fact that his gun had been fired. See id. at 57. The lieutenant then ordered the appellee to report to the police department staff inspector headquarters with another officer accompanying him. See id. The appellee met his lieutenant at the staff inspector headquarters. See id. The lieutenant offered to telephone the appellee’s family since, under department regulations, he could not make any phone calls himself. See id. Appellee’s gun was also taken for ballistics tests. See id. At approximately 6:40 p.m., the staff inspector arrived and began questioning appellee. Between then and midnight, the appellee gave oral and written statements to ____________________________________________ 21 While we do not agree with the trial court’s determination as to when the encounter turned into a custodial detention and interrogation, an appellate court may uphold an order of a lower court for any valid reason appearing from the record. See Ario v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 965 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Pa. 2009). - 21 - J-A20006-26 the staff inspector and drew a sketch illustrating where the events occurred leading to the altercation. See id. The appellee was never given Miranda warnings. See id. The appellee