Full Opinion

Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Hills CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Butte) THE PEOPLE, C104570 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 25CF00833) v. ADRIAN KEVIN HILLS, JR., Defendant and Appellant. After defendant Adrian Kevin Hills, Jr., was charged with multiple felonies in connection with an altercation with his then-girlfriend (the victim), he called and wrote to a mutual acquaintance about the victim’s potential upcoming testimony. Based on those communications, a jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade her from testifying. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation for three years. On appeal, Hills argues his conviction for attempted dissuasion is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm. BACKGROUND Hills and the victim dated for six to eight months. Over the course of their relationship, they fought “sometimes.” On at least one occasion, he was violent with the victim and “threw [her] around.” During one fight, she called the police. She considered getting a restraining order against him but decided not to after he said he would “ruin” 1 her if she did. Previously, he had also threatened to get the victim “kicked out” of her apartment and have her child “taken away.” Late one night in November 2024, Hills entered the victim’s apartment through her bedroom window and “tossed [her] around a little bit” “all over the house.” The victim called 911 and a neighbor called the police. Hills was arrested that same night. Four days later, Hills called the victim from jail half an hour before his arraignment. He told her he was taking his case all the way to trial and that she was going, too. She responded, “I don’t want to do any … I don’t want any of this. No, I’m cool. I just want you to stay away from me.” He replied, “Well, then you got to let them know.” After this call, at his arraignment, Hills was served with a domestic violence restraining order prohibiting him from contacting the victim. He called her once more before ceasing direct contact. Three months later, on the eve of Hills’ preliminary hearing, Hills called a mutual friend of his and the victim’s. Hills talked about the victim’s description of the incident. The friend asked, “She can’t retract nothing? She can’t do nothing?” Hills responded, “I’m going to tread lightly on that, but of course.” The friend said, “from what [the victim] said, she’s not going to court or nothing.” Hills responded that he had not “talked to her, because you know they listening,” then said, “it’s like … I win,” “She’s their only evidence,” and “If that’s the case, then, all right, then. It’s a matter of time, then this shit go away.” Hills also said he would write to the friend. In that letter, Hills wrote: “* means important.” “Well here[’]s the thing. If she doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good. If she happens to come to court hopefully she recants and is on my side.* … If anything* she told me to come through the window … . That[’]s what she wanted me to do*. That would help drop that charge. [¶] We need to work on getting these charges dropped … . [¶] Do what you can but tread lightly cause they are sensitive. Maybe tell them I[’]m facing 20 years and something should be done on my favor. Or them just stay away from the situation. … 2 [¶] They can also plead the 5th if they happen to show up to court. That shouldn[’]t hurt me. This needs to go away*.” The friend understood “they are sensitive” as referring to the victim. The following day, the date of Hills’ preliminary hearing, Hills called the friend again, twice. In the first conversation, Hills told the friend, “we got to be easy on the phone, you know what I’m saying,” “Come on, bro. Just do what you can, bro,” and “Like that word that you mentioned yesterday, the R word,” “[i]f they can R word, you know what I’m saying?” The friend understood Hills’ “Come on, bro. Just do what you can, bro” as asking him to speak with the victim. At trial, the friend said he could not recall what Hills was referring to with “the R word,” but did not think it meant “retracting.” In the second conversation that day, Hills said, “Come on, bro. You know what I’m saying? I sent you one of the birdies, but just do what you got to do. Know what I’m saying?” The friend replied that the victim “was not elaborating, not doing nothing,” and “They just pretty much fishing at this point.” Hills said, “They said the window was closed when they checked it. I’m like, man. At the end of the day, this shit got to get … You know what I’m saying,” and “Shit got to get fixed, bro.” Then, later in the conversation, Hills said, “they’re trying to make it bad, bro,” and “I low key- Shit got to be done, bro. You know what I’m saying,” “[l]ike, from your end?” The friend, understanding Hills as asking him to reach out to the victim, responded, “Yeah. Like I said, I’ll definitely reach out, you feel me,” and “I’m not going to push it like that to where, oh, shit, no.” Not wanting to be “involved in the situation,” the friend did not reach out to the victim on behalf of Hills after the conversation. 3 A jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (Pen. Code,1 § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) and misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 243, subd. (a)(1)) and not guilty of several felonies. The trial court placed Hills on formal probation for three years, suspended imposition of sentence for the attempted dissuasion, and sentenced Hills to 90 days with credit for time served for the misdemeanor. Hills timely appealed. DISCUSSION Hills’ sole challenge on appeal is that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for attempting to dissuade the victim from testifying. The People disagree and so do we. In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (Ibid.) Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits a person from “[k]nowingly and maliciously attempt[ing] to prevent or dissuade a witness or victim from attending or giving testimony at a trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law,” regardless of whether that attempt is successful. (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); see id., subd. (d).) Because “[t]he very nature of this crime is solicitation,” a defendant may violate section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) by soliciting a third party to convey his wishes to the victim instead of 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 4 directly conveying those wishes to her himself. (People v. Foster (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 331, 336.) In determining whether an unlawful attempt at dissuasion has occurred, we consider both the dissuading action or statement itself and the circumstances under which the defendant made it. (People v. Wahidi (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 806.) “If the defendant’s actions or statements are ambiguous, but reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future consequence of dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.” (Ibid.) Here, the record shows Hills repeatedly stressed his need for the victim to either avoid testifying or change her story, and also repeatedly attempted to solicit that friend to convince her on his behalf. He wrote or told the friend things such as, “If she doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good,” “Maybe tell them … just stay away from the situation,” “Do what you can but tread lightly cause they are sensitive,” “Come on, bro. Just do what you can, bro,” and “Shit got to be done, bro. You know what I’m saying,” “[l]ike, from your end?” The context surrounding these statements supports the jury’s finding that Hills made the statements in a “knowing[] and malicious[]” attempt to dissuade her from testifying. Shortly before making these statements, Hills emphasized the importance of the victim’s testimony to the mutual friend, saying that if the victim was not going to court, “it’s like … I win,” “She’s their only evidence,” and “If that’s the case, then, all right, then. It’s a matter of time, then this shit go away.” Prior to those conversations, Hills also encouraged the victim “to let them know” she did not want to be involved in his trial. Viewed in the context of these conversations, as well as Hills’ repeated violence towards the victim and prior threats to “ruin” her, have her evicted, and cause her child to be “taken away,” there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Hills knowingly and maliciously attempted to dissuade the victim from testifying. (See § 136; People v. Wahidi, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) 5 Although Hills suggests his statements are, if anything, reasonably construed as attempting to convince the victim to retract her previous statements—and were therefore punishable under a different statute—the record indicates that Hills wanted and intended for their mutual friend to convince the victim not to testify. Hills’ statements in his letter that, “If she doesn[’]t cooperate or come to court at all I[’]ll be good,” “Maybe tell them … just stay away from the situation,” and “They can also plead the 5th if they happen to show up to court” all support the jury’s finding that Hills specifically intended to dissuade the victim from testifying. Moreover, because a defendant may harbor dual intents that bring him or her within the meaning of more than one statutory provision (People v. Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 933), the evidence showing Hills’ intent to also persuade the victim to change her testimony does not weaken the evidence supporting the jury’s finding. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Hills violated section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. /s/ EARL, P. J. We concur: /s/ KRAUSE, J. /s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J. 6