Full Opinion

Filed 10/27/27 P. v. Saavedra CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, G065655 v. (Super. Ct. No. 22WF1124) NELSON ANIBAL SAAVEDRA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed. Jill Kent, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Nelson Anibal Saavedra of multiple sexual offenses against two minors. At sentencing, the trial court imposed two consecutive terms of 25 years to life and three concurrent life terms. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, appellate counsel identified two potential issues to assist in our independent review. After an examination of the entire record and appointed counsel’s Wende/Anders brief, we find no reasonable arguable issues. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) The judgment is affirmed. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Saavedra was charged in an amended information with 12 sexual offenses against two girls (A.A. and K.A.) who were under the age of 14.1 As to five of the offenses, two factors in aggravation were alleged pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) and (a)(11). A jury found him guilty of one count of lewd and lascivious acts (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) as to A.A. and two counts of the same as to K.A.2 As to A.A., Saavedra was also found guilty of sexual penetration with a child who was 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)), lewd and lascivious act by force or fear (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), and lesser included offenses of simple assault (§ 240), battery (§ 242), and sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). The jury also found true enhancements based on multiple victims (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(4)) and that at least one victim was under the age of 14 at the time (§ 667.61, subds. 1 A.A. are the initials preferred by A.A. so we will use the same. 2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 (j)(2) & (e)(4)). After a bench trial, the trial court found two of the aggravating factors, the vulnerability of the victims (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)) and that Saavedra took advantage of a position of trust and confidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)), to be true. The trial court sentenced Saavedra to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life and three concurrent life terms. Saavedra was also sentenced to six months with credit for time served of six months as to one of the lesser included offenses. Saavedra timely appealed. FACTS When A.A. was about six years old, Saavedra began dating the mother of A.A. and K.A. (collectively the girls). K.A. is A.A.’s younger sister. Initially, A.A. felt safe around Saavedra; she felt like “he was trying to get to know [her] and [her] sister a little bit more.” But when A.A. was about seven years old, she woke up to Saavedra rubbing his hands against her chest and his penis against her vagina. Saavedra told A.A. not to tell anyone. A.A. complied because at the time she did not know his behavior was abnormal. After this initial incident, A.A. recounted similar occurrences around the same year when A.A. was “either half asleep or had just gone to sleep,” but she could not provide specific details. Saavedra would also put what A.A. assumed to be Saavedra’s penis in her butt or vagina while she was trying to sleep. A.A. testified these sexual assaults occurred “almost every time” Saavedra came to their house, which was once every week or two. When A.A. was eight years old, she stayed in a hotel with her family and Saavedra. A.A. shared a bed with Saavedra whilst K.A. slept with their mother in a separate bed. While A.A. was trying to sleep, Saavedra removed her pants, she felt something go up her butt, pain, and wetness. 3 When A.A. started sixth grade, A.A. and her family moved with Saavedra to a different city, where A.A. said the sexual assaults continued but with less frequency. A.A. indicated when she started sixth grade, Saavedra would also grab her breasts sometimes over and sometimes under her clothing. A.A. was around 12 years old at the time. The first time Saavedra tried to touch K.A. was when K.A. was seven years old. K.A. and Saavedra were lying in bed fully clothed. Saavedra told K.A. to turn away from him causing K.A. to think Saavedra was going to give her a gift. Instead, Saavedra pulled K.A. close to him, unbuckled his pants, and tried to sodomize her. K.A. tried, unsuccessfully, to pull away from him three separate times. Saavedra finally released K.A. when she told Saavedra she had to use the restroom. Saavedra told K.A. not to tell anyone. When K.A. was 10 years old, she also woke up to find Saavedra rubbing her chest. Shortly after K.A.’s first incident with Saavedra, K.A. told A.A. what Saavedra had done to her. A.A. shared with K.A. what had happened to A.A. as well. The girls then told their mother in general terms what Saavedra had done. Their mother told A.A. not to tell anyone. A.A. recalled her mother then driving them to Saavedra’s house where her mother had a conversation with Saavedra while the girls waited in a separate room. After that conversation, A.A. says the subject was never brought up again. K.A. remembered their mother taking her and A.A. to Saavedra’s house after they told their mother what Saavedra had done. K.A. recalled being in the same room with Saavedra when her mother told him about touching K.A., which Saavedra admitted to having done “a little bit.” The mother did not call the police. 4 The mother testified when she confronted Saavedra about what the girls told her, the girls told her their story about Saavedra touching them was not true. The girls’ mother continued dating Saavedra and he continued to come over to their house every week or so. After telling their mother about the abuse, the girls reported the abuse stopped for about a year. Then when A.A. was in the fourth grade, the sexual assault gradually started up again. A.A. indicated when she was ten there was more than one occasion that Saavedra did the same as before by putting his penis in her butt or vagina while she was sleeping. A.A. did not report the renewed abuse as she did not want either K.A. or herself to get in trouble. When A.A. entered middle school, a friend convinced her to report the abuse to a school police officer. A police investigation ensued; the girls and their mother were interviewed. Police also interviewed Saavedra. During Saavedra’s interview with the police, he denied any wrongdoing. When asked about any touching incidents with A.A., Saavedra said he “roughhouses” with the girls. He told the police he and the girls would “play a game where they pants each other.” He also reported an incident when A.A. pushed herself against his penis and grabbed it while he was sleeping. He told the officer he responded by pushing A.A. away and then turned away from her. Saavedra indicated A.A. would often sit on his lap and rub his penis which caused him to get an erection. He reported initially feeling uncomfortable, but then he would just let her do it. Additionally, with respect to K.A., Saavedra told the officer K.A. alleged she had sex with him, but that was a misunderstanding as Saavedra had only hugged K.A. from behind. 5 Saavedra was subsequently arrested and a search of his cell phone revealed 41 pictures and six videos of the girls sleeping.3 Jody Ward, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified for the prosecution as an expert on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Ward indicated she did not know any of the facts or allegations in Saavedra’s case. Ward explained CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool but a pattern of behaviors children exhibit when they have been sexually abused. She testified the five components of CSAAS are: (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delayed unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction and recantation. Ward stated not all sexually abused children will exhibit all of these behaviors. DISCUSSION Saavedra’s appellate counsel suggests we consider two potential issues in our independent review of the record: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Saavedra’s statements to law enforcement;4 and (2) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of guilt. At trial, Saavedra objected to the admission of his prearrest statements to the police. He argued his statements were inadmissible as he had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of his 3 Some of these photos were shown to the jury during trial and admitted into evidence. 4 Appellate counsel suggests we review whether Saavedra’s “pre- arrest statement” was “properly admitted as having been voluntarily given,” but Saavedra objected only to the admissibility of his statements on the issue of whether he was subjected to a custodial interrogation and not whether his statements were involuntary. 6 Miranda5 rights. In deciding this issue, the trial court heard testimony from the interviewing officer and reviewed the video and audio recording as well as the corresponding transcript of Saavedra’s interview. For purposes of Miranda and its advisement requirements, an interrogation is custodial “when ‘a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394–395.) “‘Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] When reviewing a trial court’s determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must “apply a deferential substantial evidence standard” [citation] to the trial court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, “a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.”’” (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 395.) Considering the circumstances surrounding Saavedra’s interrogation, we cannot say the evidence is sufficient to show a reasonable person in Saavedra’s position would not have felt free to terminate the questioning and leave. As the trial court noted, “there were some aspects of the interview that were—that made it seem a little more like they—it’s not something that he could say no to.” But the court ultimately found, “They’re out . . . in the open, they’re not at a police station or an interview room. And the officer herself is being, I think, fairly respectful.” The court did not err in finding Saavedra was not subjected to custody for purposes of Miranda. 5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. 7 In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of Saavedra’s guilt, we “‘“‘“must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”’”’” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) The standard is the same under the state and federal due process clauses. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269.) “We presume ‘“in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier [of fact] could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.’” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251.) We must accept logical inferences the jury might have drawn from that evidence. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) Unless it is clearly shown that “‘on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict,’ the conviction will not be reversed.” (People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.) Applying this standard of review to the record here, we find substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. We have otherwise reviewed the record in accordance with our obligations under Wende and Anders, and we find no other arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.) 8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. MOTOIKE, P. J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, J. DELANEY, J. 9