Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 549 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-25-492 MICHAEL ROBERTS Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT. V. SOUTHERN DISTRICT [NO. 42BCR-24-83] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE JERRY DON RAMEY, JUDGE AFFIRMED BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge A Logan County jury convicted Michael Roberts of obstructing governmental operations, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102(a)(1) (Repl. 2024), a Class C misdemeanor, on appeal from district court. The circuit court imposed the jury’s recommended sentence, a $400 fine. Roberts appeals to this court, arguing the conviction violated his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions in article 2, section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. Roberts was aggrieved by something the Booneville Police Department had done. On 22 February 2024, he turned up at city hall for a meeting with Ed Baker, Booneville’s mayor. Benjamin Villareal, the police chief, attended the meeting too. Details of the meeting and Roberts’s grievance were excluded at trial; in proffered testimony, Roberts said Villareal had come into his backyard without a warrant to take photos of evidence, breaking his “right of courage.” 1 A more significant fact is where Chief Villareal went after the meeting: a door across from the public restroom near the lobby that opens into a controlled-access hallway within the police department. The hallway leads to the armory, evidence storage, and the jail itself. Misdemeanor files are stored in file cabinets in the hall. Detainees pass through for booking. That door is normally closed and locked. But voices were raised in the meeting room nearby—Roberts’s voice, specifically. Gayleen West, the Booneville city clerk, testified that when things “started to get loud,” she propped open the door to the secured hallway so she could get help quickly if needed. When the meeting ended, Chief Villareal returned to the police department through the open door. Roberts followed him through. Surveillance video from the hallway shows Mayor Baker, Chief Villareal, and some off-duty and plainclothes officers talking with Roberts. Mayor Baker and Chief Villareal told him repeatedly that the hallway was for authorized personnel only and asked him to leave. A door that opens into the same hallway from the police-department lobby reads “Authorized Personnel Restricted Area,” and an officer opened the door to show him the sign. Roberts wouldn’t budge. He said it was public property. He took a seat on the bench where detainees are processed and announced he intended to stay. 1 Presumably he meant “curtilage.” Roberts continued, “When I brought up courage, he acted like he didn’t even know what it was.” 2 By about the ten-minute point in that discussion, Mayor Baker had concluded that Roberts wanted to be arrested. “He had no reason to be in the hallway,” he testified, and “couldn’t explain any reason why he wanted to be in there.” The mayor stepped over to Chief Villareal and proposed to leave Roberts alone in the hallway. “Any reasonable person will calm down” and leave in twenty or thirty minutes, he continued, “and we won’t have to arrest him” and risk his becoming violent. Chief Villareal closed off access to areas deeper in the department and set officers in the dispatch area to monitor Roberts. Roberts stayed in the hallway for about three hours, forty minutes. In proffered testimony, he said he was hoping to force a response to his grievance from Chief Villareal: “If you stick around long enough, somebody’s going to reply to you.” Disneyland the hallway was not, however; the video shows Roberts awkwardly pacing, having conversations on his cell phone, and taking photos of some maps on the wall. Cindy Gandy, a juvenile officer who uses the secured hallway to escort juvenile defendants, testified that because you need an escort or a key fob to enter the hallway, the office doors inside are usually left open. When she walked into the hallway February 22, all the doors were closed. “It was very strange,” she said. Gandy saw Roberts in the hall, and it concerned her because the identities of juvenile offenders are confidential. She met with two families that day, and they needed police escorts through the hallway. She couldn’t escort the children to the restroom for drug testing as she usually would or talk to the arresting officers because Roberts was there. “There shouldn’t be anybody else around besides officers in the back of the police department,” she said. 3 Roberts was eventually foiled by a call of nature. Around 3:10 p.m., he left the hallway to use the restroom. He tried to return afterward, but the door was locked. Roberts left the building then. About two months later, the State charged him by criminal information with obstructing governmental operations. After the circuit court denied Roberts’s motion for directed verdict, he took the stand to testify in his own defense. He explained that the morning of February 22, Mayor Baker and Chief Villareal had called an end to their meeting without offering a resolution for his grievance. But Roberts wasn’t done “meeting” yet. He followed Chief Villareal out of city hall and through an open door into the secured hallway. Though the door into that hallway from the police-department lobby bore a “Restricted Access” sign, the door from the city-hall lobby was unmarked. Roberts testified that he didn’t know he wasn’t supposed to enter. But when he did, “several people in the next few minutes start[ed] hollering” at him that it was for authorized personnel only. Roberts disagreed with them. “I said, ‘There’s no signs,’” he testified. “I just walked right in here from City Hall and you-all are telling me it’s authorized personnel only. And I say ‘No it’s not.’” His admission that as many as five police officers told him it was a restricted area led to this exchange: PROSECUTOR: And so you think that just because it’s not contained, that gives you the right to walk in and stay there for three and a half, three hours and forty-one minutes? DEFENDANT: If it’s an area that needs to be secured, it’s their job to secure it, not mine. PROSECUTOR: And what do you think five police officers standing around telling you, “This is a secured area,” what do you think that is? Maybe them trying to secure it? 4 DEFENDANT: Do you always believe everything everybody tells you? I don’t. Roberts renewed his motion for directed verdict at the close of his case and proffered two jury instructions we will discuss in a moment. He filed a timely appeal from his conviction. * Roberts’s arguments on appeal all relate in some way to his contention that he was prosecuted for exercising his right under both the federal and state constitutions to petition for the redress of grievances. We start with the text of the statute involved, emphasizing the provisions directly at issue but including others as an interpretive cue: (a) A person commits the offense of obstructing governmental operations if the person: (1) Knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of any governmental function; (2) Knowingly refuses to provide information requested by an employee of a governmental agency relating to the investigation of a case brought under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and is the physical custodian of the child in the case; (3) Fails to submit to court-ordered scientific testing by a noninvasive procedure to determine the paternity of a child in a case brought under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.; (4) Falsely identifies himself or herself to a law enforcement officer or a code enforcement officer; or (5) Having received in person service of a subpoena issued by a judge or a court clerk, knowingly fails to appear to testify at a trial or court hearing in a criminal matter. .... (c) This section does not apply to: (1) Unlawful flight by a person charged with an offense; 5 (2) Refusal to submit to arrest; (3) Any means of avoiding compliance with the law not involving affirmative interference with a governmental function unless specifically set forth in this section; or (4) Obstruction, impairment, or hindrance of what a person reasonably believes is a public servant’s unlawful action. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Repl. 2024). Roberts contends, as he did in his motions for directed verdict, that the State had to prove both that he “obstruct[ed], impair[ed], or hinder[ed] the performance of any governmental function” under paragraph (a)(1) and that his conduct amounted to “affirmative interference with a governmental function” to avoid the exception in paragraph (c)(3), but the State failed to do so. A “governmental function” is “any activity that a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of any governmental unit he or she serves.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-101(6) (Repl. 2024). Further, Roberts contends he should have been able to argue to the jury in closing that when he refused to leave the secured hallway, he was exercising his constitutional rights; and that the court should have given a justification instruction that “he was petitioning the Government for the redress of grievances as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 2 Section 4 of the Arkansas Constitution.” The State defends the sufficiency of evidence on both statutory points. It also argues that, though Roberts’s proffered jury instructions were not correct and complete statements of law, and the court should have denied them on that basis regardless, the constitutionality of applying section 102 to this conduct was properly a matter for the court, not an issue for the jury to decide. 6 * Some of Roberts’s arguments graze a meritorious point; but none ultimately lands. First the good. Roberts grounded his free-speech arguments in article 2, section 4 of the Arkansas Constitution, not just the First Amendment. That was smart; the Arkansas provision includes a distinct textual basis to claim it recognizes a stronger right to petition government for the redress of grievances: The right of the people . . . to petition, by address or remonstrance, the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged. Ark. Const. art. 2, § 4 (emphasis added). To remonstrate can include giving ’em what ’fer. 2 Other courts have assumed (but not decided) this express “right to remonstrate” broadens the scope of protection. Roe v. Graham, No. 2:09-cv-98-DPM, 2010 WL 4916328 (E.D. Ark. 23 Nov. 2010) (Marshall, J.); see also Graham v. Cawthorn, 2013 Ark. 160, at 16, 427 S.W.3d 34, 46 (right was not “clearly established” for qualified-immunity analysis). What good would a right to remonstrate be if it protected people for speaking only what the government wanted to hear, when it wanted to listen? If Roberts had lingered in a public part of the police station, we might need to decide how much broader in scope it is. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 2 Often with deadly consequences. Ringer v. State, 74 Ark. 262, 85 S.W. 410 (1905) (deadly shooting after storekeeper remonstrated with drunken hoodlums for shooting at his chickens and each other on Christmas); Adams v. State, 160 Ark. 405, 254 S.W. 832 (1923) (landowner brought rifle used to shoot and kill tenant for protection when he went to remonstrate with tenant about plowing up his corn); Lasater v. State, 133 Ark. 373, 198 S.W. 122 (1917) (father stabbed daughter’s disapproved suitor to death in scuffle after remonstrating with him about persistent courting attempts); Rogers v. State, 152 Ark. 40, 237 S.W. 435 (1922) (brother-in-law who persisted in pasturing cattle in disputed meadow, and was shot and killed in attempt to evict them, had stabbed the defendant’s father during an earlier attempt to remonstrate with him and evict the cows). 7 has held that an officer lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest an onlooker under section 102 for videotaping his mother’s workplace arrest and asking questions of police, because it is “fundamental that a lawful arrest may not ensue where the arrestee is merely exercising his First Amendment rights.” Willis v. Mills, 141 F.4th 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2010)). Merely distracting officers with his presence while obeying their lawful commands would not establish liability either, the court held. Id. at 913; accord Keeton v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 53, 729 S.W.3d 572. But Roberts was in a restricted-access part of the police station—a harder row to hoe. Enforcing existing restrictions on access to a government-owned building where government employees are present is a “governmental function” under section 102(a)(1). See RB v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 377 (affirming delinquency adjudication for obstruction where juvenile detainee refused to return to his room for more than two hours, preventing detention officer from securing facility). A prosecution for knowingly “obstruct[ing], impair[ing], or hinder[ing] the performance” of that function by remaining where the defendant knows he is not allowed should ordinarily raise no actionable free-speech concerns. It is well settled in federal constitutional law that “the need to safeguard the normal functioning of public facilities is a ‘substantial government interest’ sufficient to warrant reasonable restrictions on even ‘pure speech,’ let alone symbolic conduct.” United States v. Bader, 698 F.2d 553, 555 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)). In Adderley, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed trespass convictions for college students who had blocked a jail driveway used only for jail purposes to protest the 8 arrests of fellow students. A sheriff ordered the arrests after the protestors disobeyed his ten- minute warning to disperse, issued as custodian of the jail. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 45–46. The Court rejected the students’ reliance on Edwards v. South Carolina, where it had held that prosecutions under a vague breach-of-peace statute for peacefully demonstrating on statehouse grounds “infringed the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.” 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). The statehouse grounds in Edwards had been open to the public; the jail driveway in Adderley was not. The Court concluded: The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. . . . The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47–48. We see nothing in article 2, section 4 that would justify a different conclusion under our state constitution. 3 Finally, the circuit court instructed the jury that to find Roberts guilty of obstructing governmental operations, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knowingly 3 Of course, Roberts was not charged with trespass. Section 5-54-102(a)(1) prohibits obstructing the performance of a lawful governmental function anywhere. We could find no Arkansas criminal statute that specifically prohibits refusing to obey an established access restriction within a public building. That might have informed how to interpret “avoiding compliance with the law” and “affirmative interference” in paragraph (c)(3). Paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) remove from the scope of liability two kinds of conduct that might otherwise fit the description in paragraph (a)(1), seemingly because it is specifically prohibited by other statutes. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-54-103(b) (Repl. 2024) (refusal to submit to arrest) & - 125 (Repl. 2024) (fleeing). 9 instructed, impaired, or hindered any governmental function.” 4 Roberts contends the jury should also have been instructed that (1) his behavior in the secured hallway involved protected activity petitioning for the redress of grievances; and (2) to convict, the jury also had to find that he engaged in “affirmative interference” with a governmental function conducted inside the hallway, like booking. The surveillance video shows Roberts pacing, sitting, and talking on the phone within the secured-access hallway for more than three hours after Booneville’s mayor and police chief (among others) told him he was not allowed there. On this point, the testimony supports a law enforcement de-escalation decision, not acquiescence. And as our decision in RB, supra, implied, enforcing lawful restrictions on access within a government building is itself a governmental function. Defying those access restrictions is not a constitutionally protected way to petition the government under either the federal or state constitution. And refusing to leave a secured area despite a lawful command to do so is not, in our view, the kind of passive or private “means of avoiding compliance with the law” contemplated by paragraph (c)(3). 5 So assuming for argument’s sake that either issue could have been a proper consideration for the jury in a different case—because it is easier—the circuit court 4 The instruction included the definition of “knowingly” from Ark. Code Ann. § 5- 2-202(2)(A) (Repl. 2024) and “[g]overnmental function” from Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54- 101(6) (Repl. 2024). 5 Despite the many differences between Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 and its Model Penal Code inspiration, we agree with the commentary on the corresponding MPC exception that “[j]udgments about appropriate sanctions for passive failure to perform or evasive behavior not involving affirmative interference with government should be made in discrete contexts.” Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 242.1 cmt. 6 (1980). In the discrete context this case presents, we find no error. 10 could not have erred by refusing to give those instructions in this one. E.g., Jimenez v. State, 83 Ark. App. 377, 128 S.W.3d 483 (2003). Affirmed. BARRETT and BROWN, JJ., agree. Knutson Law Firm, by: Gregg A. Knutson, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 11