Michael Roberts v. State of Arkansas
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 549
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-25-492
MICHAEL ROBERTS Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE LOGAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT.
V. SOUTHERN DISTRICT
[NO. 42BCR-24-83]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE JERRY DON RAMEY,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
A Logan County jury convicted Michael Roberts of obstructing governmental
operations, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102(a)(1) (Repl. 2024), a Class C misdemeanor, on
appeal from district court. The circuit court imposed the jury’s recommended sentence, a
$400 fine. Roberts appeals to this court, arguing the conviction violated his rights under
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions
in article 2, section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
Roberts was aggrieved by something the Booneville Police Department had done.
On 22 February 2024, he turned up at city hall for a meeting with Ed Baker, Booneville’s
mayor. Benjamin Villareal, the police chief, attended the meeting too. Details of the
meeting and Roberts’s grievance were excluded at trial; in proffered testimony, Roberts
said Villareal had come into his backyard without a warrant to take photos of evidence,
breaking his “right of courage.” 1
A more significant fact is where Chief Villareal went after the meeting: a door across
from the public restroom near the lobby that opens into a controlled-access hallway within
the police department. The hallway leads to the armory, evidence storage, and the jail itself.
Misdemeanor files are stored in file cabinets in the hall. Detainees pass through for booking.
That door is normally closed and locked. But voices were raised in the meeting room
nearby—Roberts’s voice, specifically. Gayleen West, the Booneville city clerk, testified that
when things “started to get loud,” she propped open the door to the secured hallway so she
could get help quickly if needed.
When the meeting ended, Chief Villareal returned to the police department through
the open door. Roberts followed him through. Surveillance video from the hallway shows
Mayor Baker, Chief Villareal, and some off-duty and plainclothes officers talking with
Roberts. Mayor Baker and Chief Villareal told him repeatedly that the hallway was for
authorized personnel only and asked him to leave. A door that opens into the same hallway
from the police-department lobby reads “Authorized Personnel Restricted Area,” and an
officer opened the door to show him the sign. Roberts wouldn’t budge. He said it was
public property. He took a seat on the bench where detainees are processed and announced
he intended to stay.
1
Presumably he meant “curtilage.” Roberts continued, “When I brought up
courage, he acted like he didn’t even know what it was.”
2
By about the ten-minute point in that discussion, Mayor Baker had concluded that
Roberts wanted to be arrested. “He had no reason to be in the hallway,” he testified, and
“couldn’t explain any reason why he wanted to be in there.” The mayor stepped over to
Chief Villareal and proposed to leave Roberts alone in the hallway. “Any reasonable person
will calm down” and leave in twenty or thirty minutes, he continued, “and we won’t have
to arrest him” and risk his becoming violent. Chief Villareal closed off access to areas deeper
in the department and set officers in the dispatch area to monitor Roberts.
Roberts stayed in the hallway for about three hours, forty minutes. In proffered
testimony, he said he was hoping to force a response to his grievance from Chief Villareal:
“If you stick around long enough, somebody’s going to reply to you.” Disneyland the
hallway was not, however; the video shows Roberts awkwardly pacing, having
conversations on his cell phone, and taking photos of some maps on the wall.
Cindy Gandy, a juvenile officer who uses the secured hallway to escort juvenile
defendants, testified that because you need an escort or a key fob to enter the hallway, the
office doors inside are usually left open. When she walked into the hallway February 22,
all the doors were closed. “It was very strange,” she said. Gandy saw Roberts in the hall,
and it concerned her because the identities of juvenile offenders are confidential. She met
with two families that day, and they needed police escorts through the hallway. She couldn’t
escort the children to the restroom for drug testing as she usually would or talk to the
arresting officers because Roberts was there. “There shouldn’t be anybody else around
besides officers in the back of the police department,” she said.
3
Roberts was eventually foiled by a call of nature. Around 3:10 p.m., he left the
hallway to use the restroom. He tried to return afterward, but the door was locked. Roberts
left the building then. About two months later, the State charged him by criminal
information with obstructing governmental operations.
After the circuit court denied Roberts’s motion for directed verdict, he took the
stand to testify in his own defense. He explained that the morning of February 22, Mayor
Baker and Chief Villareal had called an end to their meeting without offering a resolution
for his grievance. But Roberts wasn’t done “meeting” yet. He followed Chief Villareal
out of city hall and through an open door into the secured hallway. Though the door into
that hallway from the police-department lobby bore a “Restricted Access” sign, the door
from the city-hall lobby was unmarked. Roberts testified that he didn’t know he wasn’t
supposed to enter.
But when he did, “several people in the next few minutes start[ed] hollering” at him
that it was for authorized personnel only. Roberts disagreed with them. “I said, ‘There’s
no signs,’” he testified. “I just walked right in here from City Hall and you-all are telling
me it’s authorized personnel only. And I say ‘No it’s not.’” His admission that as many as
five police officers told him it was a restricted area led to this exchange:
PROSECUTOR: And so you think that just because it’s not contained, that
gives you the right to walk in and stay there for three and a
half, three hours and forty-one minutes?
DEFENDANT: If it’s an area that needs to be secured, it’s their job to secure
it, not mine.
PROSECUTOR: And what do you think five police officers standing around
telling you, “This is a secured area,” what do you think that
is? Maybe them trying to secure it?
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DEFENDANT: Do you always believe everything everybody tells you? I
don’t.
Roberts renewed his motion for directed verdict at the close of his case and proffered two
jury instructions we will discuss in a moment. He filed a timely appeal from his conviction.
*
Roberts’s arguments on appeal all relate in some way to his contention that he was
prosecuted for exercising his right under both the federal and state constitutions to petition
for the redress of grievances. We start with the text of the statute involved, emphasizing
the provisions directly at issue but including others as an interpretive cue:
(a) A person commits the offense of obstructing governmental operations if the
person:
(1) Knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of any governmental
function;
(2) Knowingly refuses to provide information requested by an employee
of a governmental agency relating to the investigation of a case brought under
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and is the
physical custodian of the child in the case;
(3) Fails to submit to court-ordered scientific testing by a noninvasive
procedure to determine the paternity of a child in a case brought under Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.;
(4) Falsely identifies himself or herself to a law enforcement officer or a
code enforcement officer; or
(5) Having received in person service of a subpoena issued by a judge or a
court clerk, knowingly fails to appear to testify at a trial or court hearing in a
criminal matter.
....
(c) This section does not apply to:
(1) Unlawful flight by a person charged with an offense;
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(2) Refusal to submit to arrest;
(3) Any means of avoiding compliance with the law not involving affirmative
interference with a governmental function unless specifically set forth in this section; or
(4) Obstruction, impairment, or hindrance of what a person reasonably
believes is a public servant’s unlawful action.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 (Repl. 2024).
Roberts contends, as he did in his motions for directed verdict, that the State had to
prove both that he “obstruct[ed], impair[ed], or hinder[ed] the performance of any
governmental function” under paragraph (a)(1) and that his conduct amounted to
“affirmative interference with a governmental function” to avoid the exception in paragraph
(c)(3), but the State failed to do so. A “governmental function” is “any activity that a public
servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of any governmental unit he or she
serves.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-101(6) (Repl. 2024). Further, Roberts contends he should
have been able to argue to the jury in closing that when he refused to leave the secured
hallway, he was exercising his constitutional rights; and that the court should have given a
justification instruction that “he was petitioning the Government for the redress of
grievances as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 2 Section 4 of the Arkansas Constitution.”
The State defends the sufficiency of evidence on both statutory points. It also argues
that, though Roberts’s proffered jury instructions were not correct and complete statements
of law, and the court should have denied them on that basis regardless, the constitutionality
of applying section 102 to this conduct was properly a matter for the court, not an issue for
the jury to decide.
6
*
Some of Roberts’s arguments graze a meritorious point; but none ultimately lands.
First the good. Roberts grounded his free-speech arguments in article 2, section 4 of the
Arkansas Constitution, not just the First Amendment. That was smart; the Arkansas
provision includes a distinct textual basis to claim it recognizes a stronger right to petition
government for the redress of grievances:
The right of the people . . . to petition, by address or remonstrance, the
government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged.
Ark. Const. art. 2, § 4 (emphasis added). To remonstrate can include giving ’em what ’fer. 2
Other courts have assumed (but not decided) this express “right to remonstrate” broadens
the scope of protection. Roe v. Graham, No. 2:09-cv-98-DPM, 2010 WL 4916328 (E.D.
Ark. 23 Nov. 2010) (Marshall, J.); see also Graham v. Cawthorn, 2013 Ark. 160, at 16, 427
S.W.3d 34, 46 (right was not “clearly established” for qualified-immunity analysis). What
good would a right to remonstrate be if it protected people for speaking only what the
government wanted to hear, when it wanted to listen?
If Roberts had lingered in a public part of the police station, we might need to decide
how much broader in scope it is. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
2
Often with deadly consequences. Ringer v. State, 74 Ark. 262, 85 S.W. 410 (1905)
(deadly shooting after storekeeper remonstrated with drunken hoodlums for shooting at his
chickens and each other on Christmas); Adams v. State, 160 Ark. 405, 254 S.W. 832 (1923)
(landowner brought rifle used to shoot and kill tenant for protection when he went to
remonstrate with tenant about plowing up his corn); Lasater v. State, 133 Ark. 373, 198
S.W. 122 (1917) (father stabbed daughter’s disapproved suitor to death in scuffle after
remonstrating with him about persistent courting attempts); Rogers v. State, 152 Ark. 40,
237 S.W. 435 (1922) (brother-in-law who persisted in pasturing cattle in disputed meadow,
and was shot and killed in attempt to evict them, had stabbed the defendant’s father during
an earlier attempt to remonstrate with him and evict the cows).
7
has held that an officer lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest an onlooker under
section 102 for videotaping his mother’s workplace arrest and asking questions of police,
because it is “fundamental that a lawful arrest may not ensue where the arrestee is merely
exercising his First Amendment rights.” Willis v. Mills, 141 F.4th 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2010)). Merely distracting officers
with his presence while obeying their lawful commands would not establish liability either,
the court held. Id. at 913; accord Keeton v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 53, 729 S.W.3d 572.
But Roberts was in a restricted-access part of the police station—a harder row to
hoe. Enforcing existing restrictions on access to a government-owned building where
government employees are present is a “governmental function” under section 102(a)(1).
See RB v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 377 (affirming delinquency adjudication for obstruction
where juvenile detainee refused to return to his room for more than two hours, preventing
detention officer from securing facility). A prosecution for knowingly “obstruct[ing],
impair[ing], or hinder[ing] the performance” of that function by remaining where the
defendant knows he is not allowed should ordinarily raise no actionable free-speech
concerns. It is well settled in federal constitutional law that “the need to safeguard the
normal functioning of public facilities is a ‘substantial government interest’ sufficient to
warrant reasonable restrictions on even ‘pure speech,’ let alone symbolic conduct.” United
States v. Bader, 698 F.2d 553, 555 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)).
In Adderley, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed trespass convictions for
college students who had blocked a jail driveway used only for jail purposes to protest the
8
arrests of fellow students. A sheriff ordered the arrests after the protestors disobeyed his ten-
minute warning to disperse, issued as custodian of the jail. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 45–46.
The Court rejected the students’ reliance on Edwards v. South Carolina, where it had held
that prosecutions under a vague breach-of-peace statute for peacefully demonstrating on
statehouse grounds “infringed the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights of free
speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.” 372 U.S.
229, 235 (1963). The statehouse grounds in Edwards had been open to the public; the jail
driveway in Adderley was not. The Court concluded:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. . . .
The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of
its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.
Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47–48. We see nothing in article 2, section 4 that would justify a
different conclusion under our state constitution. 3
Finally, the circuit court instructed the jury that to find Roberts guilty of obstructing
governmental operations, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he “knowingly
3
Of course, Roberts was not charged with trespass. Section 5-54-102(a)(1) prohibits
obstructing the performance of a lawful governmental function anywhere. We could find
no Arkansas criminal statute that specifically prohibits refusing to obey an established access
restriction within a public building. That might have informed how to interpret “avoiding
compliance with the law” and “affirmative interference” in paragraph (c)(3). Paragraphs
(c)(1) and (2) remove from the scope of liability two kinds of conduct that might otherwise
fit the description in paragraph (a)(1), seemingly because it is specifically prohibited by other
statutes. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-54-103(b) (Repl. 2024) (refusal to submit to arrest) & -
125 (Repl. 2024) (fleeing).
9
instructed, impaired, or hindered any governmental function.” 4 Roberts contends the jury
should also have been instructed that (1) his behavior in the secured hallway involved
protected activity petitioning for the redress of grievances; and (2) to convict, the jury also
had to find that he engaged in “affirmative interference” with a governmental function
conducted inside the hallway, like booking.
The surveillance video shows Roberts pacing, sitting, and talking on the phone
within the secured-access hallway for more than three hours after Booneville’s mayor and
police chief (among others) told him he was not allowed there. On this point, the testimony
supports a law enforcement de-escalation decision, not acquiescence. And as our decision
in RB, supra, implied, enforcing lawful restrictions on access within a government building
is itself a governmental function. Defying those access restrictions is not a constitutionally
protected way to petition the government under either the federal or state constitution.
And refusing to leave a secured area despite a lawful command to do so is not, in our view,
the kind of passive or private “means of avoiding compliance with the law” contemplated
by paragraph (c)(3). 5 So assuming for argument’s sake that either issue could have been a
proper consideration for the jury in a different case—because it is easier—the circuit court
4
The instruction included the definition of “knowingly” from Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
2-202(2)(A) (Repl. 2024) and “[g]overnmental function” from Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-
101(6) (Repl. 2024).
5
Despite the many differences between Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102 and its Model
Penal Code inspiration, we agree with the commentary on the corresponding MPC
exception that “[j]udgments about appropriate sanctions for passive failure to perform or
evasive behavior not involving affirmative interference with government should be made in
discrete contexts.” Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 242.1 cmt. 6 (1980). In the
discrete context this case presents, we find no error.
10
could not have erred by refusing to give those instructions in this one. E.g., Jimenez v. State,
83 Ark. App. 377, 128 S.W.3d 483 (2003).
Affirmed.
BARRETT and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Knutson Law Firm, by: Gregg A. Knutson, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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