Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 17, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 25-8043 WADE EARL SCHEAR, Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (D.C. No. 2:24-CR-00136-KHR-1) _________________________________ Kimberly A. Rufe of Alderman Law Office, Fort Collins, Colorado (William D. Lunn of William D. Lunn, Attorney at Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with her on the briefs) for Defendant- Appellant. Mackenzie R. Morrison, Assistant United States Attorney (Darin D. Smith, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. _________________________________ Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ HARTZ, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Defendant Wade Earl Schear was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. He appeals the district court’s denial of Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 2 his motions to suppress the methamphetamine found in a search of the vehicle he was driving. He contends that law-enforcement officers improperly relied on information from a confidential informant. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. The reliance was justifiable and the search of Defendant’s vehicle was therefore supported by probable cause. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background In early 2024 the informant in this case was arrested in Wyoming after police found him with methamphetamine and a firearm. To avoid prosecution, he agreed to assist the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). The informant told DCI that he purchased methamphetamine from a man named Ronald Fox, and that Fox obtained his methamphetamine from Defendant. The informant made two controlled purchases of methamphetamine from Fox in Casper, Wyoming, at the residence Fox shared with Defendant’s aunt. The informant also provided DCI with Defendant’s address in Gillette, Wyoming, and photographs of Defendant’s Dodge Ram truck parked outside Fox’s residence. DCI confirmed this information through vehicle-registration records and through data from a GPS tracker on Defendant’s truck (placed pursuant to a warrant), which showed the vehicle at Fox’s residence. And the informant correctly identified the subject of a photograph as being Defendant. The GPS tracker also showed the truck stopping near several suspected drug houses. These included Fox’s residence, two locations previously searched under 2 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 3 warrants for drug-related activity, and the home of a man with an active arrest warrant whom DCI had labeled a known drug user. On June 21, 2024, the informant told DCI that earlier that day Defendant had borrowed the informant’s Volkswagen with plans to drive to Colorado, purchase methamphetamine, and return to Wyoming. GPS trackers provided confirmation, showing Defendant’s truck travel to the informant’s workplace and the Volkswagen then traveling south toward Colorado. 1 A DCI agent obtained a warrant to search the Volkswagen from a Wyoming state court. That evening the GPS tracker showed the Volkswagen travel south into Colorado and stop for the night. From the informant DCI learned that Defendant stayed the night because the diesel vehicle began experiencing mechanical issues after Defendant filled it with gasoline. The next morning the tracker showed the Volkswagen traveling back north toward Wyoming. But it was moving slowly and made several stops, indicating that the mechanical issues persisted. DCI agents were unsure whether the search warrant for the Volkswagen could be served outside of Converse County, Wyoming. And because of the slow rate of travel and frequent stops, the agents worried that the vehicle would not make it out of Platte County, Wyoming, and into Converse County. They contacted the Platte County Sheriff’s Department, informed them that there was a search warrant for the 1 DCI received consent from the informant to place a GPS tracker on his vehicle. DCI also obtained a warrant to monitor location data from the tracker for the period in which Defendant was borrowing the vehicle. 3 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 4 Volkswagen, relayed the vehicle’s location, and asked them to try to make a traffic stop of the vehicle on their own grounds to protect the investigation. Platte County Sheriff’s Deputy Cody Keller made the stop. He observed the Volkswagen with its hazard lights on, emitting smoke and traveling about 20 miles per hour on a stretch of road with a 70 mile-per-hour speed limit. After pulling it over, Keller had a trained dog perform a sniff around the vehicle, and the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. Keller requested that Defendant exit the Volkswagen, which was then searched by deputies. On the front passenger seat they found a backpack containing about two pounds of methamphetamine. Defendant was arrested and admitted to traveling to Colorado to obtain methamphetamine. B. Procedural Background Defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. He filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the Volkswagen stop, arguing that law enforcement stopped and searched him and the Volkswagen without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. He later filed a second motion, which challenged the sufficiency of the search warrant. 2 The district court denied the motions, ruling on three alternative grounds that the search was lawful. First, it held that the warrant was valid and supported by probable cause. Second, it held that the officers’ good-faith reliance on the warrant 2 At the hearing on Defendant’s motions to suppress, the government waived any reliance on the dog’s alert to justify the search. 4 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 5 precluded suppression of the evidence. Finally, it held that regardless of the warrant, law enforcement had probable cause to stop and search the Volkswagen for controlled substances under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Defendant was convicted at trial and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. On appeal he challenges only the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress. II. ANALYSIS “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment recognizes “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” and the reasonableness of a search “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381– 82 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the government relies on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which allows law-enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle “if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband.” United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2012). 5 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 6 Probable cause exists if “under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains contraband or evidence.” Id. A “fair probability” is one on which “reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, under the collective-knowledge doctrine, the officer who conducts a vehicle search “does not need to be aware of the facts establishing probable cause, so long as he is acting on instructions delivered by an officer who has probable cause.” Benard, 680 F.3d at 1210. Defendant argues that law enforcement, even collectively, lacked probable cause to search the Volkswagen because the informant was not reliable. Defendant points out that the informant had a criminal record, had recently been arrested, and was facing a possible lengthy sentence, which can provide a motive to lie. See United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009). He also argues that the informant’s inability to arrange a controlled methamphetamine purchase from Defendant further weighs against credibility. But such concerns are only one factor in weighing the totality of the circumstances. After all, probable cause is often predicated on information from informants with unsavory pasts. Our role is to make a “balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983). That balance tilts squarely toward crediting the informant in this case. 6 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 7 Because the informant professed personal knowledge of Defendant’s drug trafficking, the issue before us boils down to the informant’s credibility. And there was significant support for credibility. When corroboration was attempted, his tips were generally corroborated. Police relied on his information to successfully coordinate two controlled buys of methamphetamine. The informant accurately described Defendant’s address and vehicle, identified Defendant from a photograph, and provided photographs of Defendant’s vehicle at Fox’s residence. Defendant’s travel to locations tied to drug activity further supported the informant’s claims. In particular, the two days leading up to Defendant’s arrest produced strong support for the informant’s reliability. The informant said that Defendant would borrow his Volkswagen on a specific date and drive to Colorado to pick up drugs. On that date, GPS trackers showed Defendant’s truck travel to the informant’s location, then showed the informant’s Volkswagen travel south to Colorado. The informant also said that Defendant was having vehicle issues and would spend the night in Colorado before returning to Wyoming with the drugs. And the tracker showed the Volkswagen staying in Colorado for the night, then heading north the next morning— traveling slowly and frequently stopping, consistent with continuing mechanical problems. The information about the Volkswagen’s mechanical issues also demonstrated that the informant was in contact with Defendant. Finally, the observation of the Volkswagen traveling 20 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour zone, emitting smoke with its hazard lights on, fully confirmed the informant’s statement about the mechanical problems. 7 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 8 Defendant argues that Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), stands for the proposition that an uncorroborated tip from an informant, without more, is insufficient for probable cause. But the evidence relied upon by DCI and the Platte County Sheriff’s Office was substantially more than a single uncorroborated anonymous letter, which the Court in Gates suggested would be insufficient. See id. at 227. Contrary to Defendant’s view, the holding in Gates is actually quite supportive of the district court’s ruling here. Gates held that under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed in view of facts quite similar to the facts in this case. An anonymous handwritten letter claimed that Susan and Lance Gates had been purchasing drugs in Florida to sell in Illinois. See id. at 225. The letter alleged that on a certain date, Susan would drive from Illinois to Florida and leave her vehicle to be loaded with drugs. See id. Then “in a few days,” the letter claimed, Lance would fly to Florida and drive the vehicle back to Illinois. Id. Two days after the letter claimed Susan would leave for Florida, police observed Lance board a flight to Florida. See id. at 226. On arrival he took a taxi to a hotel room registered to Susan, and the next morning a federal agent observed Lance and an unidentified woman driving north in a vehicle with Illinois plates registered to Lance. See id. Based on this information an Illinois state judge issued a search warrant for the Gates’s vehicle and residence, which was executed early the next morning when they arrived at their home. See id. at 226–27. 8 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 9 The Supreme Court held that this information was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. See id. at 246. It explained that “[t]he corroboration of the letter’s predictions that the Gates’ car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive the car north toward [Illinois] all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the informant’s other assertions also were true.” Id. at 244. The Court reasoned that “[b]ecause an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other facts—including the claim regarding the Gates’ illegal activity.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stressed how the tip “contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.” Id. at 245. One could infer that the informant had obtained information from the Gateses or from someone familiar with their “not entirely ordinary travel plans,” and if “the informant had access to accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable information of the Gateses’ alleged illegal activities.” Id. This “suffice[d] for the practical, common-sense judgment called for in making a probable cause determination.” Id. at 244. The evidence found sufficient in Gates closely parallels evidence here. An informant claimed that Defendant would drive to Colorado on a certain date, pick up methamphetamine, then return to Wyoming. The informant later said that the Volkswagen was malfunctioning. Police corroborated this information by observing Defendant drive to Colorado when the informant claimed he would, then drive back 9 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 10 (very slowly) to Wyoming the next day. As in Gates this “accurate information as to the travel plans” of Defendant suggested personal knowledge on the part of the informant, and raised a “not unlikely” inference that the informant “also had access to reliable information” about Defendant’s “alleged illegal activities.” Id. at 245. Moreover, additional evidence here that was not present in Gates further supports probable cause, including Defendant’s presence at multiple suspected drug houses, the informant’s reports that Defendant had previously travelled to Colorado to obtain drugs, and the informant’s statement that he had seen Defendant with a large bag of methamphetamine. Because the Supreme Court found the evidence in Gates sufficient to find probable cause, the totality of the evidence regarding Defendant must also be sufficient. Defendant argues that the information police relied on could have had potentially innocent explanations and therefore could not have served as a basis for probable cause. True, we have held that “‘easily obtained facts,’” United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245), like “an accurate description of a suspect’s readily observable location and appearance . . . without more,” are insufficient to show an informant’s knowledge of criminal activity, id. at 1297. But the information provided by the informant here went well beyond easily obtained facts. And if an informant accurately describes “future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted,” or offers details otherwise creating a “fair probability” that the informant has personal knowledge of a suspect’s illegal activities, the evidence is probative even if the activities have 10 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 11 potentially innocent explanations. Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46; see id. at 243 n.13. Tellingly, in Gates the only corroborating information—like flying to Florida, staying at a hotel, and driving north—was “ordinary innocent activity.” Id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court’s holding in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), further undermines Defendant’s argument. In Draper, cited with approval in Gates, 462 U.S. at 242, an informant whom a federal narcotics agent considered “accurate and reliable” based on six months of providing tips “from time to time” alleged that the defendant was trafficking heroin. Draper, 358 U.S. at 309. The informant claimed the defendant was a 27-year-old Black man with a light brown complexion who was 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighed about 160 pounds, habitually “walked really fast,” would arrive in Denver from Chicago by train on the morning of either September 8 or 9, and would be wearing a light-colored raincoat, brown slacks, and black shoes and carrying a “tan zipper bag.” Id. at 309 & n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The informant also claimed the defendant would be transporting heroin. See id. at 309. When encountered by law enforcement at Denver Union Station on the morning of September 9, the defendant exited a train from Chicago, had “the exact physical attributes” the informant alleged, wore “the precise clothing described,” carried a “tan zipper bag,” and walked “fast” toward an exit. Id. at 309–310 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although none of the information corroborating the informant’s tip in Draper had anything to do with criminal activity, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13 (“all of the corroborating detail established in Draper[] was of entirely innocent 11 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 12 activity”), the Court held that “with every other bit” of the informant’s information verified, police had “reasonable grounds” to believe that the “remaining unverified bit” of information—that the defendant had heroin with him—“was likewise true.” Draper, 358 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause was therefore present to stop and search the defendant. So too here. Driving to Colorado and quickly returning, being present near suspected drug houses, and suffering mechanical problems with a vehicle could all be innocent events. But given all the pieces of the informant’s information that were verified, police had a reasonable basis to believe that the remaining unverified claim—that Defendant was transporting methamphetamine—was likewise true. See Draper, 358 U.S. at 313. Finally, we recognize that there was no direct confirmation of various events reported by the informant, such as his seeing Defendant with unlawful drugs or claiming that Defendant had recently driven to Colorado and returned with methamphetamine. And officers tried to have the informant conduct a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Defendant, but no purchase was made. What is needed, however, is not total confirmation of every report; all that probable cause requires is sufficient corroboration for a reasonable officer to credit the informant. Indeed, even when statements by an informant turn out to be untrue, information from the informant can still establish probable cause. For example, in Gates the anonymous letter contained an incorrect prediction: it said that Susan Gates would drive to Florida and fly back to Illinois, when in reality she remained in Florida and 12 Appellate Case: 25-8043 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 13 drove back with her husband. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued in dissent that this “material mistake” undermined the letter’s reliability. Id. at 293. But the majority said that “[t]he corroboration of the letter’s predictions that the Gateses’ car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive the car north” was sufficient. Id. at 244. Here, although some of the informant’s assertions were never corroborated, a number of them were corroborated, and none of the informant’s assertions proved incorrect. The Supreme Court found the evidence in Gates sufficient even when the tip contained inaccuracies, so we have no difficulty holding that the informant’s tips supported probable cause to search the Volkswagen. III. CONCLUSION Because officers had probable cause, the automobile exception permitted a warrantless search of the vehicle. Hence, regardless of the warrant’s validity or the officers’ good-faith reliance on the warrant—which we need not address—the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 13