Michael Rilonza Jaeger v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 0193-25-4 MICHAEL RILONZA JAEGER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Bernhard Opinion Issued November 4, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY Thomas D. Horne, Judge Designate (Renee Berard; Renee Berard Law, PC, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM A jury convicted Michael Rilonza Jaeger of malicious wounding. On January 13, 2025, the trial court sentenced Jaeger to four years in prison, with three years of post-release supervision. On appeal, Jaeger argues that the trial court wrongly admitted hearsay statements of the victim after erroneously finding that Jaeger had rendered her unavailable by inducing her to testify that he had not harmed her. Jaeger also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he acted with malice and with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill. We hold that * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. the trial court’s admission of the victim’s statements, if error, was harmless, and Jaeger did not preserve his sufficiency claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.2 BACKGROUND Loudoun County deputies Richard Dau and James Laverty were dispatched on the afternoon of September 19, 2023, to a townhouse, responding to “a call that came out for a female stating that a male at the residence had broken her jaw.” Given the reported “assault with injuries,” the deputies went to secure the scene. Jaeger and Most D. Yasmin were the only people in the townhouse. Jaeger met the officers at the doorway but refused to step outside when they told him they needed to check on Yasmin’s condition and investigate her claim. Laverty wanted to handcuff Jaeger while they investigated, but he resisted and tried to hit Dau. Laverty was concerned that Jaeger would attempt to barricade himself in a bedroom (perhaps with Yasmin) or retrieve a weapon. Dau used his taser to “initiate a warning arc,” but he ultimately had to use the taser twice to subdue Jaeger as they struggled at the door. Yasmin “was slurring, and [Dau] could see an obvious facial disfigurement and dried blood on [her] face.” Yasmin “was very dazed, very injured, not able to speak clearly, and [Laverty] saw that she . . . was very swollen and had fresh blood on her face.” Laverty took two photographs of Yasmin at the townhouse. As Laverty was taking the photos, Yasmin told him that she had argued with Jaeger “over a phone, and that he pushed her in the back room, and he punched her.” Another officer took 11 pictures of Yasmin at the scene. Mary Beth Henry, an EMT who had also responded to the 911 call, helped Yasmin into an ambulance for transport to the emergency room. Henry testified that “most of [Yasmin’s] injuries 2 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). -2- seemed to be to her face. She was very swollen, she was bleeding.” Henry asked Yasmin routine questions to determine what had happened and what treatment might be warranted. Yasmin told Henry that she had forgotten her cellphone and “went back to get it, and he just went crazy. I have never seen him like this before. He started hitting me, and I didn’t know what to do.” Henry later determined that Yasmin was referring to Jaeger, her boyfriend. The Commonwealth introduced the 911 call at trial. During the call Yasmin said: “My boyfriend got angry and he hit me. . . . He just hit me just hard, but my nose and my jaw is broken. Please. I am bleeding so bad. I cannot stop it.”3 Later, Yasmin repeated that Jaeger had hit her “just hard” and “too hard.” At one point during the call Jaeger took the phone from Yasmin and told the dispatcher that it “was just a misunderstanding” and that he “didn’t touch her.” At the hospital, Dau took two additional photos of Yasmin after she had been cleaned up. The Commonwealth introduced all the photos of Yasmin. Laverty asked Yasmin several questions so that he could fill out a lethality assessment program form. Based on her response that Jaeger had previously threatened to kill her as well as the severity of her injuries, Laverty assessed Yasmin as high risk for future domestic violence. Megan Pirowski, a nurse practitioner, treated Yasmin upon her admission to the ICU. Pirowski recommended a CT scan of Yasmin’s facial bones because of “significant swelling to the right side of her face,” and she also saw “significant bruising and swelling along the entire right side of the face.” As part of her routine treatment protocol, Pirowski asked Yasmin how she had been injured, and she responded that she had been “struck multiples times in the face by her significant other’s fist.” Pirowski documented this information in a note to Yasmin’s medical chart. 3 At a pretrial hearing the Commonwealth, without objection, introduced an “unofficial transcript” as a “guide” to the call. Jaeger did not object, so we will use and quote from that transcript in resolving this opinion. -3-  Dr. Benjamin Palachick was the attending doctor when Yasmin was admitted to the ICU and saw her that evening and the next day. Palachick recommended “close neuro monitoring” in the ICU because she had suffered a subdural hematoma. Palachick stated that the hospital routinely tested patients for the presence of alcohol in their blood shortly after arrival and that no alcohol was detected in Yasmin. The Commonwealth introduced four recorded phone calls Jaeger made from the local jail to Yasmin; two were made on September 22, 2023, a third on September 23, and the final one on September 25. In the first call, Jaeger said several times that he was “fucking sorry.”4 Jaeger also admitted that it was his “fault for hitting you” but that it was “the first time that ever happened to me. I’ve never in my life -- I’ll never do it again, not with a female. . . . I don’t know what happened, what came over me.” During the call, Yasmin repeatedly asserted that Jaeger had hit her with his fists and seriously injured her. In the second call, Jaeger again said repeatedly that he was “sorry” for what he had done and apologized for hitting Yasmin. Yasmin said that Jaeger could have killed her. At one point, Yasmin told Jaeger: “You punched me on my wrist, on my stomach. Even the pain I’m screaming and yelling and crying, you still . . . hitting me in my head, in my chest, in my chest, everywhere you hit me, bro.” Jaeger continued to apologize to Yasmin in the third call. But Jaeger also told Yasmin that if she did not “come to court . . . then everything will go away. . . . So as long as you don’t come to court, Yas, I’m going to beat this.” The final call continued in the same vein. Jaeger repeatedly said he was sorry for his actions, while Yasmin expressed anger at what he had done. Yasmin told Jaeger: “You’re definitely gone. You’re going to be in jail five, ten years.” 4 The transcript of a pretrial hearing on July 11, 2024, includes the recorded calls in their entirety. -4-  The Commonwealth’s final witness was Yasmin. As discussed below, she was declared an adverse witness. She stated that Jaeger was still her boyfriend, they had planned to marry, and she did not want him to remain in jail. Yasmin acknowledged that she had called 911 but claimed that after two days of drinking and arguing with Jaeger she went to the living room to retrieve her cellphone when “something happened” and she “found [her]self on the ground.” Yasmin asserted that there was “some confusion in [her] head at that moment” that made her think Jaeger “might have hurt” her. According to Yasmin, Jaeger had never assaulted or threatened her and there was “no way he would have hit” her. Yasmin maintained she was “completely fine” at the hospital and disputed the finding that she suffered a subdural hematoma. And she insisted that she had been drinking before she was injured, despite the finding at the hospital that there was no alcohol in her blood. Regarding her failure to mention her drinking in her preliminary hearing testimony, Yasmin said “[t]here’s a possibility [she] may have forgotten” about it. After the Commonwealth rested, the court denied Jaeger’s motion to strike. The defense rested without presenting any evidence, and the trial court denied Jaeger’s renewed motion to strike. The jury returned a verdict convicting Jaeger of malicious wounding but finding him not guilty of felony obstruction of justice. The court subsequently imposed a four-year sentence. ANALYSIS A. Admissibility of victim’s hearsay statements Determining the ‘“admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court,’ and an appellate court will not reject such decision absent an ‘abuse of discretion.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 487 (2020) (quoting Tirado v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 15, 26 (2018)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Bista v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 354, 370 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015)). “The abuse of discretion standard draws a line—or rather, demarcates -5- a region—between the unsupportable and the merely mistaken, between the legal error . . . that a reviewing court may always correct, and the simple disagreement that, on this standard, it may not.” Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 1, 10-11 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Reyes v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 133, 139 (2019)). “Hearsay is ‘a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’” Atkins v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 1, 7 (2017) (quoting Va. R. Evid. 2:801(c)). Hearsay evidence “‘is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions’ to the rule against hearsay.” Id. at 7-8 (quoting Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 6 (1999)). The party invoking an exception to the hearsay rule bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception applies. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 204, 207-08 (2006). Jaeger contends that the trial court wrongly held that he had rendered Yasmin unavailable to testify at trial and that he did so intending to prevent her testimony. Jaeger notes that Yasmin testified at the preliminary hearing, the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, and at trial. Supposedly, the trial court’s ruling “created an unprecedented category of witness unavailability: suspicion of lying.” At the preliminary hearing, Laverty and Dau gave testimony similar to their accounts at trial. The Commonwealth introduced the 911 call. At one point Yasmin stated: “My boyfriend got angry, and he hit me. I know he didn’t hit me this hard, but my nose and my jaw is broken.” During the call Jaeger told the dispatcher: “She pushed me, and I pushed her back. There’s nothing, it’s nothing.” Jaeger also claimed that he “didn’t hit her like that . . . I didn’t touch her, she’s just mad.” But Yasmin’s testimony at the preliminary hearing deviated significantly from what she had said in the 911 call and to the law enforcement officers and medical personnel shortly after -6- she was hurt. Yasmin said that Jaeger was her current boyfriend and they had been together for almost two years. Yasmin maintained that Jaeger had been upstairs and she “was downstairs where I found myself on the floor and I blacked out for a second. When I figured out I fell and hit myself, my face on the table.” Yasmin said she had been rushing inside, and “I must have tripped myself and fell and hit my nose to one of the objects” on the floor. Yasmin denied that any “interaction” with Jaeger caused her injuries. Yasmin called 911 because her nose was bleeding so she “wanted to check up and go to the hospital.” Later, the Commonwealth moved in limine to admit Yasmin’s hearsay statements on the ground of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The Commonwealth argued that Yasmin’s testimony at the preliminary hearing “was completely contradictory to her prior statements, and contrary to defendant’s admissions” and that Jaeger had induced her to commit perjury. So, Jaeger’s actions had rendered Yasmin “unavailable” to testify at trial, thus warranting admission of her hearsay statements. Jaeger opposed the motion, primarily on the ground that Yasmin was willing to testify at trial and thus was available, and that any pretrial assessment of her credibility would invade the province of the trier of fact. At a hearing on the motion, Dau testified that at the hospital Yasmin told him she and Jaeger were arguing in the living room and that when he pushed her, “she fell down, and then he started striking her in the face.” In her testimony, Yasmin again gave an exculpatory account of Jaeger’s actions. She claimed that she had been drinking on the two days before her injury and was “completely drunk” when she was hurt. According to Yasmin, she and Jaeger had been arguing and drinking, and she rushed into the townhouse to retrieve her phone. “So I rushed too much into myself. . . . My nose was bleeding. That’s the only thing. I blackout. I was gone for probably five, four seconds.” Yasmin insisted that Jaeger had never been violent with her. -7-  The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to admit Yasmin’s hearsay statements. The court held that the jail calls “clearly establish, certainly by a preponderance [of evidence], arguably by even greater than a preponderance . . . that Mr. Jaeger’s comments and entreaties to Ms. Yasmin were made for the purpose of procuring her nonpresence at trial or a change in her testimony.” Eschewing his normal effort “to use measured language” when rejecting a witness’s testimony, the trial judge said that “this may be the one instance where I can credibly say Ms. Yasmin was lying on the stand. It’s clear. I don’t believe one word of what she testified to.” Moreover, Yasmin’s testimony was “an amalgamation of incongruities,” and the photos demonstrated that she had been severely beaten by Jaeger. “That’s not a fall and that’s not a pass-out.” Finally, the court held that at trial the Commonwealth could call Yasmin outside the presence of the jury and if her testimony remained unchanged, “she’s unavailable.” If so, Yasmin’s hearsay statements could be admitted under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.5 At the start of the trial, before jury selection, Yasmin was asked if anything had changed since she testified at the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion. She responded: “There is nothing has been changed, no.” And it had not “changed” that she was not wounded. Given Yasmin’s responses, the court reaffirmed the pretrial ruling that Yasmin was unavailable, based on Jaeger’s forfeiture by wrongdoing.6 5 In its motion, the Commonwealth made “alternative requests” to declare Yasmin an adverse witness and admit her statements under various provisions of the Virginia Rules of Evidence. The court did not address any of these additional claims on the merits, for failure to brief them in the motion. The court did not foreclose the Commonwealth’s right to brief those issues or argue them at trial. 6 Insofar as the trial court’s provisional finding of unavailability at the pretrial hearing played a role in its ultimate determination at trial that Yasmin was unavailable, we note that Jaeger does not argue that the court should not have conducted the hearing or questioned Yasmin about her potential testimony. -8-  We need not, and do not, decide whether under the circumstances here the trial court rightly admitted Yasmin’s hearsay statements based on her unavailability because we hold that the best and narrowest ground to decide this case is harmless error. The Supreme Court has often said that the principle of “judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (quoting Swann, 290 Va. at 196). Indeed, Code § 8.01-678 mandates a harmless error review in all appeals, unless otherwise provided by statute. Commonwealth v. Kilpatrick, 301 Va. 214, 216 (2022). Code § 8.01-678 establishes the standard of review governing non-constitutional harmless error. Haas v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 465, 467 (2021). The statute provides that a case will not be reversed “[w]hen it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.”7 Code § 8.01-678. First, the photos taken of Yasmin shortly after she called 911 bore silent witness to the severe injuries she suffered, which were inconsistent with a mere fall or trip. Beyond this, Jaeger’s statements during the 911 call and jail calls were admissible as party admissions. “[A]n out-of-court statement by a criminal defendant, if relevant, is admissible as a party admission, under an exception to the rule against hearsay.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 597, 604-05 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Atkins, 68 Va. App. at 8). Indeed, Jaeger challenges only the admission of Yasmin’s statements. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the 911 call and Jaeger’s jail calls with Yasmin. Jaeger made numerous statements in those calls wholly at odds with Yasmin’s testimony of how she 7 Given that Yasmin testified at trial, there is no constitutional Confrontation Clause issue here. See Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 704 n.2 (2017); Jones v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 46, 52 (1996). And Yasmin’s 911 call did not implicate Jaeger’s right of confrontation. See Cody v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 638, 659-61 (2018) (victim’s statements during 911 call were not testimonial hearsay because she was “seek[ing] help and safety” from domestic violence). -9- was hurt; they provided substantial proof that he had inflicted the severe injuries depicted in the photos. In the 911 call, Jaeger told the dispatcher that it was “a misunderstanding” and “I didn’t hit her like that.” (Emphasis added). Jaeger acknowledged several times that he had pushed Yasmin. When the dispatcher asked if Yasmin was bleeding, Jaeger falsely reported that she was not and that she was “okay” and “fine.” The trier of fact could regard those false assurances as evincing Jaeger’s consciousness of guilt. See Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 548 (1991). Jaeger’s statements during the recorded jail calls were particularly probative of his guilt. Virtually his first words in the initial call were that he was “so fucking sorry.” When Yasmin complained that he had “fucked [her] whole life up” and caused her to lose her job, Jaeger apologized again. Indeed, the calls were replete with inculpatory statements: • “I did not mean to hit you like that”; • “Now, I didn’t even really hit you -- see I didn’t try to hit you hard if I -- I didn’t mean to hit you”; • “Look, my fault for hitting you man, but I -- man, that’s the first time that ever happened to me. . . . I’ll never do it again, not with a female. That’s just unbelievable. I don’t know what happened, what came over me”; and • “I’ve never hit you like this, ever. I never touched you before, never.” The remaining calls continued in the same vein. And Jaeger repeatedly apologized. In the second call, for example, Jaeger said, “I’m sorry for what I did” and promised he would “never do it again.” In the third call, Jaeger told Yasmin he had “made a mistake” and “didn’t mean to do that shit.” And he said, “I don’t know what the fuck was going through my mind . . . . If I could take it back, I would.” Jaeger told Yasmin in the final call that “I can’t say it enough that I’m sorry” and “I still don’t know why I would do something so stupid.” Jaeger admitted that he had “disrespect[ed] [Yasmin] like fucking shit and . . . I’m sorry. I can’t do that shit no more ever again.” Thus, wholly - 10 - apart from Yasmin’s statements after her injuries, Jaeger’s own admissible statements provided overwhelming proof of his criminal intent.8 Additionally, Jaeger’s own statements, together with the photos depicting her injuries, permitted the jury to infer that Yasmin’s testimony (which was the only exculpatory evidence presented by the defense) was untrue and offered to exonerate her boyfriend. And there was ample evidence otherwise discrediting her account. Among other things, Yasmin repeatedly said she had been drinking heavily in the 24 hours before her injuries, yet the analysis of her blood taken shortly after she was admitted to the ICU showed no alcohol. Yasmin also conceded that she had said nothing about drinking in her prior testimony but suggested that she may have “forgotten” to mention it. And Yasmin’s attempt to minimize the severity of her injuries—at one point disputing the medical finding that she had suffered a subdural hematoma and claiming that her only injury was a nosebleed—underscored her lack of credibility. In addition, Jaeger did not object to the admission of Yasmin’s medical records, which documented the statements she made to medical personnel. Those records contained Yasmin’s statements that Jaeger had punched her face “multiple times” and that he had “struck her with his fists” when he assaulted her. “It is a well settled and obviously sound general rule that an objection to evidence cannot be availed of by a party who has, at some other time during the trial, voluntarily elicited the same 8 Jaeger’s statements during the jail calls were also admissible on a second ground. As discussed previously, during the four phone calls Yasmin repeatedly accused him of injuring her, which caused her to lose her job and ruined her life. The “natural reaction of one accused of a crime is to deny the accusation if it is unjust or untrue.” Lynch, 272 Va. at 208 (quoting Knight v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 433, 436 (1954)). Yet with few exceptions Jaeger throughout the four calls apologized for his actions, explicitly or tacitly acknowledged he had struck Yasmin, and promised that it would never happen again. Because Jaeger heard and understood Yasmin’s accusations, had a fair opportunity to respond, and would have been expected to reply, his statements also were admissible under the adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule. See id. at 209. - 11 - evidence, or has permitted it to be brought out by his adversary without objection.” Burns v. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 Va. 354, 363 (1984) (quoting Whitten v. McClelland, 137 Va. 726, 741 (1923)). Our Supreme Court has explained that although [t]he rule finds its most frequent application in cases where the party making the objection afterwards introduces the same evidence, but it is properly and logically applicable in any case, regardless of the order of introduction, if the party who has brought out the evidence in question, or who has permitted it to be brought out, can be fairly held responsible for its presence in the case. Id. at 363-64 (quoting Whitten, 137 Va. at 741). Permitting evidence of the same character through the medical records waived Jaeger’s objection to the other hearsay statements. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 546, 557 (2020). In sum, the medical records, considered along with Jaeger’s repeated admissions of wrongdoing, provided overwhelming proof of his guilt and rendered the admission of cumulative evidence harmless. See McLean v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 200, 211 (2000). Thus, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s admission of Yasmin’s statements. B. Malice Jaeger also contends that the evidence failed to prove that he acted with the requisite malice and with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, sufficient to sustain his malicious wounding conviction. Jaeger points to Yasmin’s 911 call in which she said that he did not mean to hurt her so badly as well as his statements in several recorded jail calls that he did not mean to hit her that hard and that he was remorseful. And Jaeger cites Yasmin’s trial testimony that she had been drinking and tripped and fell, thus causing her injuries. “Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will. It may be directly evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and conduct which necessarily result in injury.” Doss v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 679, 685 (1996) (quoting Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 626, 631 (1993)). - 12 -  “Intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind which may, and often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in a particular case. The state of mind of an alleged offender may be shown by his acts and conduct.” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 535 (2002) (quoting Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836 (1979)). The record shows that Jaeger did not preserve his sufficiency arguments. Rule 5A:18. In a jury trial, the defendant preserves any sufficiency claim by a motion to strike addressed to the trial court; a closing argument, in contrast, is addressed to the jury and does not require the trial judge to determine whether the evidence fails as a matter of law. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 481 (1991) (en banc). After the Commonwealth rested, defense counsel said only: “Motion to strike.” When the trial judge inquired whether counsel “want[ed] to argue that or want me to rule on that promptly,” counsel replied: “We can hold off.” Then, after the parties discussed possible jury instructions, the court asked defense counsel if he wanted to renew his motion to strike.9 Counsel responded that he “would renew my Motion to Strike,” and the court denied the motion. Thus, Jaeger presented no argument to support either motion to strike. “Procedural-default principles require that the argument asserted on appeal be the same as the contemporaneous argument at trial.” Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019). “Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely—so that the trial judge would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)). Thus, a sufficiency argument at trial does not preserve a related but distinct sufficiency claim on appeal. See, e.g., Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 583-84 (1978) (motion to strike arguing that evidence did not prove conspiracy did not preserve appellate 9 The discussion of the jury instructions occurred at the end of the first day of the trial, while the court’s inquiry about a renewed motion to strike took place at the start of the second day. Thus, Jaeger had ample time to determine any grounds in a renewed motion to strike. - 13 - argument that it failed to prove multiple conspiracies). Given the record before us, we hold this claim defaulted under Rule 5A:18. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. - 14 -