People v. Ambriz CA4/1

Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Ambriz CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D088032 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. RIF2304982) v. JESSIE CORNEJO AMBRIZ, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Bernard J. Schwartz, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions. Annie Fraser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  Jessie Cornejo Ambriz appeals the judgment sentencing him to prison after a jury found him guilty of several felonies he committed against a dating partner. He raises claims of insufficient evidence, evidentiary error, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, sentencing error, and cumulative error. The parties request correction of clerical errors in the abstract of judgment. We reject Ambriz’s claims of error, affirm the judgment, and remand for correction of the abstract of judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts Ambriz began dating K.R. in September 2023. On an early date, he became jealous when she turned to look at another man who walked by and spoke to her. As the relationship progressed, Ambriz became increasingly jealous and asserted more control over K.R. Ambriz did not trust K.R. to be alone, accompanied her on errands, and even spent an entire shift with her at her workplace. Ambriz eventually began asserting physical control over K.R. When they were at a hotel in September 2023, he pulled her out of an elevator and shoved her towards their room. In October, Ambriz and K.R. were about to return from another trip when he shoved her into a restroom and grabbed her wrists tightly. He went to her house the following day to apologize. The relationship between Ambriz and K.R. deteriorated over the next several weeks. He made daily accusations about K.R. cheating on him even though they saw each other every day and exchanged text messages when they were apart. Ambriz became so intrusive that K.R. had to tell him to leave her workplace. 2  On November 13, 2023, K.R. went to Ambriz’s house to spend the night. When they awoke at approximately 7:00 a.m. the next morning, he wanted to have sexual relations, but she did not. Ambriz became angry. K.R. got out of bed, gathered her belongings, and headed for the door. He grabbed her by the waist, threw her on the bed, covered her mouth with one arm, and pressed his other arm against her neck. K.R. was scared and tried to scream but could not. She could barely breathe and began losing vision. After struggling on the bed, K.R. broke free and moved to a chair to catch her breath as Ambriz lay on the bed. When K.R. tried to leave the room a second time, Ambriz shoved her against a wall, squeezed her neck with both hands, and bit her nose. She began to see black. Ambriz eventually let go of K.R., and she moved away to catch her breath and felt dizzy and lightheaded. She looked out the window, cried out for help, and begged Ambriz to let her go. He forced her to kneel at the side of the bed and pushed her face onto the bed. K.R. became frightened because she could not breathe and again lost vision. When she was able to catch her breath, she said: “You’re going to kill me. You’re going to kill me. Please stop. Stop.” Ambriz responded: “ ‘That’s exactly what I’m going to do.’ ” He then stopped the attack. K.R. was so afraid for her life and desperate to get out of the room that to induce Ambriz to get off of her and let her go, she told him she loved him and would stay with him. Ambriz then said, “ ‘Yeah, that’s exactly what I like,’ ” and ordered her to perform fellatio. Afterwards, she moved to a chair to catch her breath. Ambriz told K.R. she “ ‘looked crazy’ ” and needed to wash her face if she wanted to leave. She went to the bathroom and saw blood on her nose and mouth. K.R. ran to the front door and found it locked. Ambriz followed her, dragged her back to his bedroom, and threw her on the floor. K.R. said 3 she was “really hurt this time” and asked him to take her to a hospital. Ambriz started to wash her face and said: “ ‘I don’t know how I could do that. Why would you make me do this.’ ” He said he would take K.R. home. K.R. estimated the entire sequence of arguments and violence at Ambriz’s house lasted approximately four hours. A surveillance camera recorded them as they left the house and headed toward his car at 11:24 a.m. on November 14, 2023. Ambriz drove toward K.R.’s house but did not stop when they got there. He told her he was going to take her to Tijuana and headed toward a freeway. K.R. waved out the window and cried out for help. A resident who heard the cries and saw the car pass by called 911 to report the incident. While Ambriz was driving on the freeway, K.R. realized her cell phone was in her bag and used it to call 911. She reported her location and told the operator that Ambriz had just beaten her and would not let her go. Ambriz exited the freeway and ordered K.R. out of the car. The 911 operator told her to go inside a restaurant and wait for police and paramedics to arrive. Police officer Eric Fox arrived at the restaurant and noticed bruises on K.R.’s neck and redness on her cheeks and neck and above her eyes. Paramedics then arrived and took K.R. to a hospital where photographs of her injuries were taken. A forensic nurse examiner examined K.R. and found abrasions around her left eye and on her nose; bruises on her nose, neck, left arm, and left knee; subconjunctival hemorrhages; and petechiae inside her mouth. The nurse concluded the injuries were consistent with strangulation and suffocation. Radiological studies showed no fractured or dislocated bones. K.R. was discharged from the hospital the same afternoon. K.R. spoke to Fox at the restaurant and at the hospital about what Ambriz had done to her. She told Fox “there were two instances where 4 [Ambriz] made statements that he was going to kill her.” The first one made her think, “ ‘Oh, my God. There’s no way he’s going to kill me. He’d go to jail. He couldn’t possibly do this.’ ” The second one made K.R. “more afraid,” and she “felt like, ‘Oh, my gosh. This is real. He could actually kill me.’ ” Shortly after K.R. had been discharged from the hospital, she telephoned Fox and told him “she wanted to drop all the charges,” even though “everything that she had told [him] about the incident that day was true,” because she “just wanted to break up” and “no longer wanted to deal with the case and go to court.” Beginning at approximately 10:30 p.m. on November 14, 2023, Ambriz sent K.R. a series of text messages. He urged her to “call the detective and drop everything,” stated he was “sorry for what happened,” and sent pictures of a necklace and other items he was going to send her. K.R. responded that she would contact the police. The text messages from Ambriz and similar ones from his cousin made her feel “even more pressured into dropping the charges.” The next day Fox arrested Ambriz. B. Proceedings The People charged Ambriz with torture (Pen. Code, § 206; subsequent undesignated section references are to this code), corporal injury of a dating partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), false imprisonment (§ 236), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)). On the corporal injury count, the People alleged he personally inflicted great bodily injury on K.R. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) Ambriz pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Ambriz moved in limine to cross-examine K.R. about her desire to become a citizen of the United States. He argued that she planned to have her family pay him a substantial sum to marry her, but once their 5 relationship broke down, she had a motive to claim falsely she was a victim of domestic violence so that she could obtain a visa allowing her to stay in the United States. The prosecutor opposed the motion on the grounds that the proposed questioning would be unduly prejudicial given the divisiveness of immigration issues and that Ambriz’s theory had no evidentiary foundation. Defense counsel stated that only his client or K.R. could confirm the theory and admitted he had no information about whether K.R. had applied for a U visa based on being a victim of a violent crime.1 The trial court stated that before Ambriz could question K.R. about her plan to become a U.S. citizen, “there’s got to be some foundation for it. … [Y]ou can’t just question [her] on the stand and say, ‘Isn’t it true that,’ and then never follow up with that, because it would leave the jury with an impression that she is not a U.S. citizen, and unless there’s some other relevance to it or some corroborative nature of that, it certainly would be prejudicial.” Because K.R.’s immigration status was “an extraordinarily touchy subject” and “certainly a prejudicial one,” the court ruled Ambriz could question her about it only after evidence was presented that she had offered him money for marriage or had applied for a visa based on domestic violence. The People moved in limine to present testimony from an expert witness to explain the behaviors of victims of intimate partner battering, including remaining in an abusive relationship and recanting, changing 1 A U visa provides legal status for a noncitizen who assists in the investigation of domestic violence or other crime in which the noncitizen is a victim. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U); People v. Morales (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 502, 506.) Information relating to a noncitizen who has applied for a U visa is generally confidential. (People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1267, fn. 1 (Castaneda-Prado).) 6 abuse narratives, or minimizing the abuse. Ambriz opposed the motion on the grounds the expert was not qualified; the proposed testimony had little relevance, would consume too much time, and could mislead the jury; and K.R. was not a recanting witness. The People responded that the expert was qualified and K.R. was a recanting witness because on the day of the incident she telephoned Fox and asked him to drop the charges. The trial court noted the fact that K.R. “report[ed] it and then recant[ed], want[ed] the charges dropped,” was relevant to believability, and the expert’s testimony about such behavior by domestic violence victims could help the jury evaluate her credibility. The court ruled the expert testimony would be admitted subject to a determination of the expert’s qualifications at a hearing should Ambriz request one. At trial, the People presented testimony from K.R., Fox, and the forensic nurse examiner to establish the facts summarized in part I.A., ante. On cross-examination of K.R., Ambriz pointed out inconsistencies between her trial testimony and what she told investigators about incidents of violence before the one on November 14, 2023, her prior testimony about use of marijuana on that date, and her prior statements to Fox about her fear that Ambriz was going to kill her and where he struck her on her body. On cross-examination of Fox, Ambriz tried to elicit a statement inconsistent with K.R.’s trial testimony that the incident lasted about four hours by asking whether she had told Fox that “the incident happened so fast.” The trial court sustained the People’s objection that the question was improper impeachment because Ambriz had not confronted K.R. with the inconsistency and given her an opportunity to deny or explain it. The People called Joseph Brown, a police officer who served several years as an investigator in domestic violence cases, as an expert on intimate 7 partner battering. He had no involvement in or knowledge of the case against Ambriz. Brown testified generally about domestic violence cases, including several “myths” associated with domestic violence. He said one such myth is that “a real victim would not stay in an abusive relationship” and gave several reasons why a battered person might do so. Brown said another myth is that “a real victim of domestic violence would not ask to drop the charges” and gave several reasons why a victim might make such a request. He testified that a victim of domestic violence usually does not report the first incident to police and does not leave the relationship until after multiple incidents. Ambriz did not testify or present evidence. The jury found Ambriz not guilty of torture but guilty of all other charges. It found not true the great bodily injury enhancement allegation attached to the charge of inflicting corporal injury on a dating partner. The trial court sentenced Ambriz to an aggregate prison term of seven years, four months. The court selected the kidnapping conviction for the principal term and imposed the low term of three years. (§ 208, subd. (a).) On the conviction of dissuading a witness, the court imposed a consecutive middle term of two years. (§§ 18, subd. (a), 136.1, subd. (a), 1170.15.) The court imposed consecutive terms of one-third of the middle term on the convictions of inflicting corporal injury on a dating partner (one year; §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 1170.1, subd. (a)), making a criminal threat (eight months; §§ 18, subd. (a), 422, subd. (a), 1170.1, subd. (a)), and false imprisonment (eight months; §§ 237, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (h)(1), 1170.1, subd. (a)). 8  II. DISCUSSION Ambriz attacks the judgment on multiple grounds. As we shall explain, none is persuasive. A. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Criminal Threat Conviction Ambriz challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of making a criminal threat. To support the threat, the People relied on the following exchange that occurred while Ambriz made K.R. kneel at the side of the bed in his bedroom and pushed her face into the bed: She stated, “You’re going to kill me,” and he responded, “ ‘That’s exactly what I am going to do.’ ” Ambriz contends this alleged threat was not so unequivocal, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution. We disagree. “[A]n essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment [is] that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 316.) On a constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 319.) We consider the entire record and presume in support of the verdict every fact the jury reasonably could have deduced from the evidence. (People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821.) We do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or reevaluate witness credibility. (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106 (Brown).) The testimony of a single witness, 9 if not physically impossible or inherently improbable, suffices to support a guilty verdict. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 827–828.) We must uphold the verdict unless there is no substantial evidence (i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value) to support an essential element of the crime. (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.) The element of the criminal threat offense for which Ambriz contends the evidence was constitutionally insufficient is that the threat was “on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, … so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) Whether a threat meets this statutory requirement depends largely on context. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 338–340; People v. Choi (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 753, 761–762.) “This includes the defendant’s mannerisms, affect, and actions involved in making the threat as well as subsequent actions taken by the defendant.” (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013.) The content and context here sufficed to bring the threat within the scope of section 422. When K.R. said, “You’re going to kill me,” Ambriz responded, “ ‘That’s exactly what I’m going to do.’ ” On its face, this exchange amounted to a clear and present threat by him to kill her. The context added to the clarity and immediacy of the threat. Immediately before that exchange, Ambriz was leaning over K.R. and pushing her face into his bed as she knelt at the bedside. She lost her vision, could not breathe, and feared for her life. Earlier the same morning, Ambriz grabbed her by the waist, threw her on the bed, and strangled her. K.R. lost her vision and could barely breathe during that episode as well. After he threatened to kill her, she tried to leave the house, but he dragged her back to his bedroom and 10 dropped her on the floor. Under these circumstances, Ambriz’s threat to kill K.R. was “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to [her], a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution.” (§ 422, subd. (a); cf. People v. Hester (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 630, 633, 635 [angrily yelling, “ ‘I’ll kill you,’ ” after attacking victim was criminal threat]; People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1215, 1221 [angrily saying, “ ‘I’m going to get you,’ ” in close proximity to victim “can be very intimidating and can carry an aura of serious danger”].) Ambriz argues the evidence was constitutionally insufficient because his “actions while making the threat were completely inconsistent with an unequivocal and immediate threat.” He relies on K.R.’s trial testimony that he stopped the attack right after he made the threat and Fox’s testimony that she told him that she did not think he was going to kill her. This testimony does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the criminal threat conviction. Ambriz’s temporary suspension of his violent attack on K.R. was not inconsistent with making a criminal threat. Section 422 targets “those who try to instill fear in others” (People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 913) by an “expression of an intent to inflict serious evil upon another person” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 863). Ambriz expressed an intent to kill K.R. in the course of a prolonged attack during which he strangled and suffocated her to the point where she temporarily lost vision, could not breathe, and reasonably feared for her life. His periodic pauses throughout the attack did not make the threat any less unequivocal or immediate. Nor does K.R.’s statement to Fox about her fear undermine the jury’s verdict. On cross-examination, Fox testified that K.R. told him “there were two instances … where [Ambriz] made statements that he was going to kill 11 her,” and “during the first time he made that statement, she was sitting there thinking, ‘Oh, my God. There’s no way he’s going to kill me. He’d go to jail. He couldn’t possibly do this.’ ” On redirect, Fox testified K.R. told him that after the second time Ambriz threatened to kill her, she was “more afraid” and “felt like, ‘Oh, my gosh. This is real. He could actually kill me.’ ” At trial, K.R. testified she was “really afraid for [her] life” when he said, “ ‘That’s exactly what I’m going to do,’ ” in response to her statement, “You’re going to kill me.” She also testified that she did not remember telling Fox that she thought Ambriz was not really going to kill her. It was for the jury to resolve any conflicts in this testimony about K.R.’s fear, and we must presume it did so in favor of the prosecution. (Brown, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 105–106.) B. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err by Excluding Impeachment Evidence Ambriz claims the trial court abused its discretion and violated his federal constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses with two rulings that excluded evidence that would impeach K.R. The first was the ruling prohibiting cross-examination of K.R. about an alleged plan to become a citizen of the United States by claiming to be a domestic violence victim. The second was the ruling disallowing cross-examination of Fox about an allegedly inconsistent statement by K.R. concerning the duration of the November 14, 2023 incident. We find no prejudicial error in either ruling. The trial court properly prohibited Ambriz from impeaching K.R. with questions about her alleged plan to become a United States citizen by claiming to be a domestic violence victim. “The proponent of the impeachment evidence must have a good faith basis for asking the question.” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 434.) Ambriz moved in limine for permission to cross-examine K.R. on the alleged plan that would expose her 12 motive to lie about the November 14, 2023 incident. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f) [jury may consider witness’s bias or motive in assessing credibility]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 193 [“an accused has a confrontational right to expose a witness’ bias or motive to lie”].) At the hearing on the motion defense counsel conceded he lacked a good faith basis for the proposed cross-examination, stating: “I don’t have any information, obviously, if she has applied for a visa for being a victim of a violent crime or any kind of U visa. I think those things are generally confidential and unable to obtain.” “Counsel must not be permitted … to ask groundless questions ‘to waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box.’ ” (People v. Eli (1967) 66 Cal.2d 63, 79.) “One of the dangers sought to be minimized by Eli was that of the question, based upon a paucity or total lack of factual support, which is asked with little or no hope of affirmative response and with the basic purpose of creating through innuendo that which cannot be established by proof.” (People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482, 502.) The line of cross- examination Ambriz sought to pursue presented that danger. “We are also aware there are certain subjects of such an inflammatory nature that it can be misconduct to ask about them without a factual basis.” (People v. Fatone (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1164, 1174.) One such subject is citizenship or immigration status, a divisive political issue around the time of Ambriz’s trial. The Legislature had recognized the inflammatory nature of the subject when it passed a law to prohibit disclosure of a person’s immigration status in a criminal action “unless the judge presiding over the matter first determines that the evidence is admissible in an in camera hearing.” (Evid. Code, § 351.4, subd. (a).) The law was an urgency measure “to immediately help protect undocumented residents of California and their ability to participate in the California justice system.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 12, 13 § 3.) Questioning K.R. about some alleged plan to obtain a visa by claiming to be a domestic violence victim, without a good faith basis to believe she had done so, would undermine those protections. It would also create “a danger one or more jurors might be inclined to view her unfavorably if they found out she could use her standing as a victim of abuse to gain a path to legal immigration status” and “would not have wanted to convict [Ambriz] if they thought doing so would be tantamount to granting [her] permanent status in the United States.” (People v. Villa (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1053–1054 (Villa).) The lack of a good faith basis for the cross-examination Ambriz proposed distinguishes this case from those on which he relies. In People v. Steele (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 222–223, the trial court erred by disallowing defense cross-examination of a witness about a prior conviction when the witness’s rap sheet, and the prosecutor’s statement that the witness admitted the conduct, supported a good faith belief that the witness suffered a prior conviction. In People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 123–124, a prosecutor spoke with the prosecutor in a prior case about a witness’s testimony in that prior case. In the previous case the witness admitted she had destroyed interview tapes. This provided a good faith basis for impeaching questioning of that witness in DeHoyos’s case about her handling of the tapes in the previous matter. In Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at page 1286, the witness’s admission at the preliminary hearing that she had tried to help her mother obtain a U visa provided a good faith basis for the defendant to cross-examine the witness on that subject at trial. Ambriz proffered nothing similar to provide a good faith basis for the questions he sought to ask K.R. 14  On this record, the trial court’s decision to disallow the proposed line of questioning was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability its admission would cause undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352; Villa, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) The decision also did not violate Ambriz’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; see Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403 [6th Amend. right to confront adverse witnesses applies to states through 14th Amend.].) A court may disallow cross-examination that lacks a good-faith basis and probably will cause undue prejudice. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 (Van Arsdall); People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 578–580; Villa, at p. 1051.)2 We conclude the trial court did not err by disallowing cross-examination of K.R. about her immigration status. We reach a different conclusion on the ruling prohibiting cross- examination of Fox about K.R.’s inconsistent statement about the duration of the November 14, 2023 incident. At trial K.R. testified that the “whole sequence of events and argument” at Ambriz’s house “lasted maybe four hours.” Ambriz sought to elicit testimony from Fox that K.R. told him “the 2 We reject the People’s argument that Ambriz forfeited the constitutional argument by not raising it in the trial court. The court’s discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to limit cross-examination is similar to its “wide latitude” under the confrontation clause to limit cross- examination to prevent prejudice. (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679.) “[N]o useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one that was properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon the trial court to consider the same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to that which would also determine the claim raised on appeal.” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 (Yeoman).) 15 incident happened so fast.” However, the trial court sustained the People’s objection that the question was improper impeachment because Ambriz had not previously confronted K.R. with the inconsistency and given her an opportunity to deny or explain it. That ruling was erroneous. Evidence of a statement by a witness that is inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony is admissible if the witness “was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement” while testifying or “has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action.” (Evid. Code, § 770, italics added; see id., § 1235 [evidence of witness’s inconsistent statement is not inadmissible hearsay if offered in compliance with Evid. Code, § 770].) “[Evidence Code s]ection 770 requires that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement at some point in the trial.” (In re Johnny G. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 543, 546, fn. 1, italics added.) “[U]nless the interests of justice otherwise require, Section 770 permits the judge to exclude evidence of an inconsistent statement only if the witness during his examination was not given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and he has been unconditionally excused and is not subject to being recalled as a witness.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B, pt. 2B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2019 ed.) foll. § 770, p. 175.) After K.R. finished her testimony, she was not excused unconditionally and was subject to recall. Because she could have been recalled to deny or explain any inconsistency in her statements about the duration of the incident, the trial court erroneously sustained the People’s objection to defense counsel’s question to Fox about the inconsistent statement. That error does not require reversal of the judgment. Exclusion of impeachment evidence is harmless if the witness was otherwise impeached 16 and the excluded evidence would not have given the jury a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility. (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 867; People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1105; People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 741, 752.) The jury could assess K.R.’s credibility by observing her throughout the course of her testimony. During cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly attacked her credibility by identifying inconsistencies between her trial testimony, prior statements to investigators, and preliminary hearing testimony. Impeachment with one more inconsistent statement, which concerned an unimportant issue in the case, namely, the duration of the November 14, 2023 incident, would not have painted a materially different picture of K.R.’s credibility. The erroneous exclusion of that statement was harmless. (Capistrano, at p. 867; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 337.) C. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective and the Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct Regarding Admission of Expert Testimony Ambriz raises two related claims of error concerning the admission of expert testimony on intimate partner battering. Ambriz accuses trial counsel of ineffective assistance for failing, after K.R. and Fox testified, to renew the objection that the expert testimony was inadmissible because K.R. had not recanted the domestic violence accusations. Ambriz accuses the prosecutor of misconduct for falsely telling the trial court at the hearing on motions in limine that K.R. had recanted and then using that falsehood as the foundation for the admissibility of the expert testimony. We reject both claims. 17  The prosecutor did not commit the misconduct alleged by Ambriz.3 It is misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate evidence or to use other deceptive tactics to try to persuade a court. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819, 823.) The prosecutor did not misstate evidence at the hearing on motions in limine when she described K.R. as “a recanting witness” for telephoning Fox “to ask the charges to be dropped.” K.R. did not “recant” in the strict legal sense, i.e., she did not “withdraw or renounce prior statements or testimony formally or publicly.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1523.) When asked at trial whether she “want[ed] to drop the charges because [she] made up what happened,” she responded, “No, not at all.” Fox testified that when K.R. telephoned him and said “she wanted to drop all the charges,” she also said “everything that she had told [him] about the incident that day was true.” But “recant” can be used in a broader sense to mean “to take back or disavow an opinion, declaration, or course of action.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1893, italics added.) The prosecutor accurately described K.R. as a “recanting witness” in this broader sense, because K.R. sought to stop the legal process she had started when she reported the incident to Fox. The court also used “recant” in the broader sense when it stated: “To the extent 3 We reject the People’s argument that Ambriz forfeited the prosecutorial misconduct claim by failing to object or to request a curative admonition when the misconduct occurred. Such steps are generally required to preserve a claim when misconduct occurs before a jury. (E.g., People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 426.) The misconduct of which Ambriz complains occurred during a motions in limine hearing held outside the presence of the jury. There, Ambriz opposed the People’s motion to admit expert testimony on the ground it was irrelevant because K.R. had not recanted her abuse allegations. The present claim essentially reasserts that opposition under a different legal theory and is not forfeited. (Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 117.) 18 that she reports it and then recants, wants the charges dropped, that certainly is something that typically does happen in domestic violence cases.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor did not deceive the court as to the basis on which she sought to admit expert testimony on intimate partner battering. Moreover, for expert testimony on that subject to be admissible, the victim need not have recanted in the strict legal sense. Such testimony is admissible to explain how physical, emotional or mental abuse affects “the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence.” (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (a).) Expert testimony about intimate partner battering is relevant to the victim’s credibility because it dispels common misconceptions about the behaviors of domestic violence victims that could cause the jury unjustifiably to take a negative view of the victim’s credibility. (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 293.) One such myth about which Brown testified is that “a real victim of domestic violence would not ask to drop the charges.” (See People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 907 [noting victim of intimate partner battering “may change her mind about prosecuting the abuser”].) To dispel that misconception, the People moved in limine to admit his testimony. Brown’s testimony was not erroneously admitted as a result of any misconduct by the prosecutor. We also reject Ambriz’s related claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the relevancy objection to admission of expert testimony on intimate partner battering after K.R. and Fox both testified her report of the incident was true. As we explained above, the testimony of K.R. and Fox that she asked him to drop all charges against Ambriz provided a sufficient foundation for, and made relevant, Brown’s expert testimony on the behavior of domestic violence victims. Any further objection to the relevancy of Brown’s testimony would properly have been overruled. Counsel does not 19 provide ineffective assistance by failing to make a meritless objection. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 309; People v. Melgoza (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 632, 652.) D. There Was No Sentencing Error Ambriz contends the trial court erred when it imposed a full consecutive prison term on the conviction of dissuading a witness. He cites the court’s remark at the sentencing hearing, “[P]ursuant to [section] 1170.[15], this does need to be consecutive,” as evidence the court did not understand it had discretion to impose a concurrent term. Ambriz says remand for the court to exercise its discretion is required. We are not persuaded. A trial court generally has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive prion terms on multiple convictions. (§ 669, subd. (a); People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262.) If the court imposes consecutive terms, it generally must impose one-third of the statutorily prescribed middle term for each subordinate term that runs consecutively to the principal term. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) Section 1170.15 creates an exception to this rule by providing that the “subordinate term for each consecutive offense that is a felony described in this section shall consist of the full middle term of imprisonment.” “The section does not require the trial court to impose a consecutive sentence, but instead indicates that if the trial court chooses consecutive sentencing it must impose a full-term sentence for the witness dissuasion count.” (People v. Woodworth (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1479, italics added.) The court was mistaken when it said that “pursuant to [section] 1170.[15], this does need to be consecutive.” (Italics added.) 20  That misstatement does not necessitate a new sentencing hearing, however. When “a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, ‘the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.) After the court selected the prison term for each conviction, it stated: “Court is choosing the terms to run consecutive, in that I do find that while this was one continuous transaction, nonetheless, the intent … and the application of force used were different with respect to each and every one of these actions that were taken.” The court thereby adopted, with some rephrasing, the rationale in the probation officer’s report for recommending that the court impose consecutive rather than concurrent prison terms. The report, which the court stated it had read and considered, referenced the court rule that lists factors relevant to the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent prison terms (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425). Because the record clearly demonstrates the court would have imposed a consecutive prison term on each conviction even had it known of its discretion to impose a concurrent term on the conviction of dissuading a witness, no remand for resentencing is required. E. There Was No Cumulative Error Ambriz contends that even if any one of the errors of which he complains was not preju