State of Washington v. Lonnie Vincent Boykin
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket41063-3
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
FILED
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 41063-3-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
LONNIE VINCENT BOYKIN, also ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
known as MICHAEL VINCENT )
BOYKIN, LONNIE LEE BOYKIN, and )
LONNIE V. BOYKIN, )
)
Appellant. )
STAAB, C.J. — Lonnie Vincent Boykin appeals the judgment and sentence
following a jury trial where he was convicted of failure to remain at the scene of an
accident. Boykin contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide a
clarifying instruction after a question from the jury demonstrated a clear
misunderstanding of the applicability of the necessity defense. The State argues that the
necessity defense instruction provided to the jury was sufficiently clear and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by referring the jury back to the instructions provided instead
of issuing a clarifying or supplemental instruction.
No. 41063-3-III
State v. Boykin
We affirm. The necessity defense instruction provided to the jury clearly
articulated that it applied to all of the charges. Further, one question from the jury does
not create an inference that the jury was confused about the application of the law.
BACKGROUND
Boykin was charged with four counts of second degree assault, one count of
failure to remain at the scene of an accident—injured person, and one count of third
degree malicious mischief.
At trial, the court provided 28 instructions, including an instruction on the defense
of necessity.
Jury instruction 26 stated:
Necessity is a defense to the crimes charged if
(1) the defendant reasonably believed the commission of the crime was
necessary to avoid or minimize harm;
(2) harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm resulting from
a violation of the law;
(3) the threatened harm was not brought about by the defendant; and
(4) no reasonable legal alternative existed.
The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that
you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is
more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has
established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 148 (emphasis added). Also relevant here, jury instructions 16
and 17 provided the law and to-convict instructions for the crime of failure to remain at
the scene (hit and run).
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During deliberations, the jury presented a question to the court: “Does number 26
instruction apply to instructions number 16 and number 17? Does number 26 apply to all
crimes?” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 2503; CP at 161.
The court asked defense counsel and the State how to reply to the question.
Defense counsel responded, “I would just point out that 26, it’s a defense to the crimes
charged if [sic]. So I would think it would apply to all the crimes.” RP at 2503.
Counsel further explained that she did not “really know what’s appropriate to tell the
jury, but just that, yes, [instruction 26] applies to all the crimes charged as stated in the
instruction.” RP at 2503-04.
The trial court stated it had “to be careful in how I phrase this [response]” and
considered directing the jury back to the instructions rather than just responding yes. RP
at 2504. Defense counsel responded “okay.” RP at 2505. The State requested the court
to answer the jury question by saying “[you] need[ ] to be considering all the instructions
as a whole.” RP at 2505. Defense counsel disagreed, stating the following concern:
[T]here’s a lot of jury instructions in this. And if they’re asking specifically
about Instruction 26, I think Instruction 26 is pretty clear that it answers
their question.
I know you can’t really point them to a specific thing. I’m just
concerned they’re going to go back and get, okay, well, we’ve got to go
back and read through all 28 instructions and figure out where the answer
is. But I know that’s your decision. I just don’t want the jury to get
confused by that.
RP at 2505-06.
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The court ruled that it would not “say re-read [instruction] 26” and instead would
answer the question by stating “you must consider the instructions as a whole, please re-
read your instructions.” RP at 2506. The court reasoned that if the jury re-read
instruction 26 they would be able to determine the answer to their question. Defense
counsel once again replied with “okay.” RP at 2506.
The court answered the jury: “You must consider the instructions as a whole.
Please refer to your written instructions.” CP at 161. The jury found Boykin not guilty
of third degree malicious mischief and the four counts of second degree assault, but it
returned a guilty verdict for failure to remain at the scene of an accident—injured person.
Boykin appeals.
ANALYSIS
Boykin contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide a
clarifying instruction after a question from the jury demonstrated a clear
misunderstanding of the applicability of the necessity defense. We disagree.
A. Error Preservation
As a preliminary matter, we consider whether the issue was preserved. Boykin
argues that his advocacy for a more direct answer to the jury question was sufficient to
constitute an objection on the record. We agree with the State that the issue is not
preserved, but we exercise our discretion to review the issue on appeal.
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An “appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised
in the trial court.” RAP 2.5(a) (emphasis added). This “rule reflects a policy of
encouraging the efficient use of judicial resources.” State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685,
757 P.2d 492 (1988). An objection to a trial court’s answer to a jury question is properly
preserved when it is “made a part of the record.” CrR 6.15(f)(1). However, the rule
“does not state how this must be done.” State v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58, 77, 292 P.3d 715
(2012). RAP 2.5(a) “allows, but does not require [the appellate court] to refuse to review
certain claims that an appellant failed to raise below.” State v. Kindell, 181 Wn. App.
844, 849, 326 P.3d 876 (2014). Ultimately, the appellate court “retain[s] discretion . . . to
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” Id. at 849.
Here, Boykin’s initial argument, coupled with his later acquiescence, was
insufficient to preserve his objection. See id. at 850. In State v. Kindell, the jury asked
the court whether illegally possessing a firearm constituted a crime against property. Id.
at 849. When discussing how to answer the jury question, Kindell asserted his argument
and the court disagreed. Id. at 849-850. Kindell then acquiesced to the court’s response
and did not object further but later renewed his initial argument in posttrial motions. Id.
at 850. This court ultimately held that “Kindell did not properly object to the trial court’s
response.” Id. at 850. Nevertheless, we exercised discretion to consider the argument on
appeal, noting that despite Kindell’s failure to properly preserve the objection, he initially
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disagreed with the court’s answer and then subsequently renewed his disagreement in
posttrial motions. Id.
Boykin indicated twice on the record that he was requesting a more direct
response to the jury question, but he later acquiesced to the court’s response and did not
object to the final response. Like Kindell, the initial argument coupled with later
acquiescence was not sufficient to satisfy RAP 2.5(a).
Boykin points to State v. Lindsay1 to support his position, but such reliance is
misplaced. In Lindsay, defense counsel moved for a mistrial due to prosecutorial
misconduct at the end of closing argument instead of in response to every instance of
misconduct. Id. at 431. The court found the objection was preserved because the motion
acted as a contemporaneous objection that gave the trial court an opportunity to correct
the problem before the jury deliberations commenced. Id. at 441. However, Lindsay is
inapposite because it centers around prosecutorial misconduct, not on a court’s obligation
to ensure the jury has a clear understanding of the law.
Boykin also argues that his objection was a standing objection sufficient to
preserve the issue for appeal. However, the standing objection doctrine is generally
applied in the context of evidentiary rulings where the court makes a final ruling on a
motion in limine and indicates that no further objections are needed. State v. Powell, 126
1
180 Wn.2d 423, 326 P.3d 125 (2014).
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No. 41063-3-III
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Wn.2d 244, 256, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). Here, the issue was not evidentiary, and Boykin
did not request a standing objection.
In sum, Boykin’s objection was not properly preserved; nevertheless, we exercise
our discretion to consider the argument on appeal because Boykin twice raised concerns
to the court below.
B. Jury Instruction Clarification
Boykin argues the court abused its discretion by failing to issue a clarifying
response to the jury after it demonstrated a clear misunderstanding of the law. The State
disagrees, arguing the jury instructions were sufficiently clear and the jury is presumed to
follow the instructions. We find no abuse of discretion.
A court’s decision on whether to give supplemental instructions to a jury is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Sutton, 18 Wn. App. 2d 38, 42-43, 489 P.3d
268 (2021). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” In re Det. of Taylor-Rose, 199 Wn. App.
866, 880, 401 P.3d 357 (2017).
“Generally, a court has no duty to provide a jury with additional instructions after
they have begun deliberating.” State v. Campbell, 163 Wn. App. 394, 402, 260 P.3d 235
(2011). Despite having no general duty to respond, a trial court has discretion to answer
questions posed by the jury or to give the jury further instructions during deliberations so
long as the instructions accurately state the law. Kindell, 181 Wn. App. at 850. Courts
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have also indicated that where the instructions given accurately state the law, the trial
court need not further instruct the jury. State v. Ng, 110 Wn.2d 32, 42-44, 750 P.2d 632
(1988).
In reviewing whether the instructions accurately state the law, we consider “‘the
context of the instructions as a whole,’ rather than viewing each instruction as an isolated
mandate.” Campbell, 163 Wn. App. at 400 (quoting State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 655,
845 P.2d 289 (1993)). “In order for jury instructions to be sufficient, they must be
‘readily understood and not misleading to the ordinary mind.’” Id. (quoting State v.
Dana, 73 Wn.2d 533, 537, 439 P.2d 403 (1968)). “Thus, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the challenged instructions, when read as a whole, led the jurors to a mistaken
belief.” Id.
On the other hand, “[w]hen it is apparent the jury does not understand the law, the
trial court may and should issue a supplemental written instruction.” Sutton, 18 Wn.
App. 2d at 43. However, a jury question in itself “does not create an inference that the
entire jury was confused, or that any confusion was not clarified before a final verdict
was reached.” Ng, 110 Wn.2d at 43. And neither the trial court nor the parties should
attempt to “inquire into the internal processes through which the jury reaches its verdict.”
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State v. Linton, 156 Wn.2d 777, 787, 132 P.3d 127 (2006). Instead, “it is presumed [that]
a jury follows the court’s instructions.” Sutton, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 44.
Here, when read as a whole, the jury instructions did not lead the jurors to a
mistaken belief. During deliberations, the jury asked the court whether the instruction on
necessity applied to all the charged crimes and specifically to the instructions for failure
to remain at the scene of an accident—injured person. Instruction 26 clearly states that
“necessity is a defense to the crimes charged.” CP at 148 (emphasis added). The “s” at
the end of the word “crimes” indicates that it is plural and thus encompasses all of the
crimes charged. Therefore, a close reading of the instruction plainly answers the jury’s
question: the necessity defense applied to all of the crimes charged, including failure to
remain at the scene of an accident, set forth in instructions 16 and 17. Because the jury
instructions clearly articulate the law and do not mislead the jury to an erroneous
understanding of the law, the court did not abuse its discretion by directing the jury back
to its instructions instead of issuing a supplemental instruction.
Nevertheless, Boykin contends the jury’s question indicated a “clear misunder-
standing of the law,” therefore obligating the court to issue a clarifying instruction.
Appellant’s Br. at 11. But this court has previously held that a jury’s misunderstanding
of the law is proved through “repeated jury questions.” State v. Backemeyer, 5 Wn. App.
2d 841, 850, 428 P.3d 366 (2018).
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No. 41063-3-III
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Here, the jury asked a single question to the court about the applicability of the
necessity defense. Under Backemeyer, this is insufficient to establish a clear
misunderstanding of the law that requires the trial court to issue a clarifying answer when
requested by counsel. Absent repeated questions from the jury, we presume the jury
followed the instructions provided and that all confusion was clarified before the final
verdict. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the court to refer the jury back to the
instructions instead of issuing a clarifying or supplemental instruction.
Finally, Boykin contends the inconsistent verdicts demonstrate a clear
misunderstanding of the instructions because the jury acquitted Boykin on all charges
except for failing to remain at the scene of an accident—injured person. This argument
fails because it relies on speculation that the jury found necessity as the basis for
acquittal. As stated above, we will not attempt to “inquire into the internal processes
through which the jury reaches its verdict.” Linton, 156 Wn.2d at 787. The jury was in
the best position to assess the evidence and determine whether Boykin committed the
crimes as charged and to what extent his asserted defense theories applied. And Boykin
does not challenge the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Thus, the fact the jury found
Boykin guilty of one crime and not the others does not establish that the jury was clearly
confused.
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No. 41063-3-III
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The court did not abuse its discretion by directing the jury back to the instructions
as a whole rather than issuing a clarifying response because the instructions were not
misleading and the jury did not demonstrate a clear misunderstanding of the law.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Staab, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
Hill, J.
_________________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
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