Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Levy Ernest Dunn, III, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-001413 Appeal From Greenville County G. D. Morgan, Jr., Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-472 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Senior Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Cynthia Smith Crick, of Greenville, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Levy Dunn appeals his conviction for domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (DVHAN) and his sentence of eighteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, Dunn argues the trial court erred in failing to rule on his motion for a mistrial and instead offering the alternative to proceed with only eleven jurors. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Watts, 321 S.C. 158, 167, 467 S.E.2d 272, 278 (Ct. App. 1996) ("To be preserved for appellate review, an issue must be both presented to and passed upon by the trial court."); id. ("If the issue is raised but not ruled on, it is not preserved for appeal."). Dunn moved for a mistrial based on an allegation that three jurors had engaged in premature deliberations. The trial court stated it would "decid[e] in a minute what [it was] going to do" and asked the parties whether they would agree to the court's dismissing the three jurors, replacing them with the two alternates, and continuing the trial with only eleven jurors under Rule 14 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure. Despite the trial court twice indicating it had not yet ruled on the motion, Dunn agreed to proceed with the eleven-member jury based on his "understanding" that the court was not inclined to grant a mistrial. When it issued its ruling, the trial court did not mention the mistrial motion. Dunn then agreed the court's ruling was clear, and when he renewed the mistrial motion after the verdict was rendered, the trial court ruled on the two other issues Dunn raised but did not reference the motion for a mistrial. Moreover, Dunn did not argue to the trial court that he would be harmed by proceeding with fewer than twelve jurors, and he signed a written agreement to proceed with eleven jurors. 1 See State v. Ward, 374 S.C. 606, 615, 649 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding a defendant's argument that testimony was inadmissible was unpreserved when, during trial, the defendant "specifically agreed that the testimony was admissible"). Accordingly, we hold this issue is not properly before this court. AFFIRMED.2 THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur. 1 We find Dunn's argument that he lacked a choice is without merit. 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.