Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Montuy CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F089628 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. MCR079318A) v. JOSEPH LUIS MONTUY, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J. LiCalsi, Judge. Courtney Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- INTRODUCTION A jury convicted defendant Joseph Luis Montuy of resisting an executive officer and related misdemeanor offenses after he disregarded an officer’s order at a checkpoint and drove away while officers pursued. The trial court placed him on a two-year term of probation. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court committed judicial misconduct by its comments to defense witnesses during their testimony and by dismissing a juror during deliberations who refused to apply the law. We affirm. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The District Attorney of Madera County filed an information on June 28, 2024, charging defendant with attempting to prevent an executive officer from performing a lawful duty by means of threats, force, or violence (Pen. Code,1 § 69, subd. (a); count 1); misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and misdemeanor evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a); count 3).2 Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges. A jury convicted defendant of all charges on March 6, 2025, after an eight-day trial. Defendant was tried with both Mary Rice and Manasseh Montuy3 who were present during the offenses and charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The jury failed to reach verdicts as to Rice and Manasseh, and the court declared a mistrial. On April 4, 2025, the court admitted defendant to a two-year term of probation and ordered him confined to the local jail for 180 days. The court also ordered defendant 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The information further alleged aggravating sentencing factors. However, these factors were not tried before the jury or court and were ultimately dismissed on April 25, 2025, three weeks after defendant’s sentencing hearing. 3 We refer to certain witnesses by their by their first names for clarity and convenience, because some of them share a last name. No disrespect is intended. 2. to pay $300 in restitution and stayed probation revocation restitution fines (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.44). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 7, 2025. FACTS The Madera Police Department set up a driver’s license and driving under the influence checkpoint at approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 29, 2023. The checkpoint was marked with a sign, a police trailer, and several patrol cars. Cones funneled 200 feet of the road into one lane. Detective Jacob Dunn and Officer Brandon Bianchi worked with approximately eight other officers and support staff. They wore clothing identifying themselves as police officers and performed driver’s license checks, looking for signs of drivers under the influence or anything else that was a potential crime, violation, or safety concern. At approximately 9:00 p.m., defendant drove to the checkpoint in a van accompanied by Rice (his wife) and Manasseh (his son). Defendant drove quickly past an officer who attempted to contact him. Detective Dunn then contacted defendant who refused to provide his driver’s license and threatened to file a lawsuit. Defendant claimed he was exercising his constitutional rights and that the police had no right to stop him. Defendant refused repeated requests by Dunn to provide his driver’s license. Dunn advised defendant that failure to produce his driver’s license would result in going to jail. Defendant told Dunn to “take [him] to jail” but refused to get out of his van. Dunn explained that defendant need only show his driver’s license, and defendant replied, “Then I will refuse.” Dunn was joined by his supervisor who similarly advised defendant that he was required to produce his driver’s license, but defendant continued to insist that it was not required. Defendant warned that if officers attempted to take him into custody, they would have a battle on the side of the road because defendant intended to defend himself. Defendant repeated that he would not comply with the law. Dunn instructed defendant a 3. final time to show his driver’s license and step out of the van. Dunn’s supervisor instructed defendant to pull his van into the adjacent parking lot, but defendant drove away. When defendant took off from the checkpoint without providing his driver’s license, Officer Bianchi pursued him in a marked vehicle to a fast-food parking lot a short distance away. Bianchi initially issued orders to defendant while defendant’s window was down. After defendant closed the window, Bianchi used the public announcement system to order defendant from the van. When defendant refused, Bianchi ordered the front passenger to exit the van. Dunn caught up to the chase in the parking lot as Bianchi used the loudspeaker to order the occupants of defendant’s van to “get out of the car and exit the vehicle.” When they did not, Bianchi and Dunn approached the driver’s door and commanded that defendant open it. When defendant failed to do so, Bianchi warned that he would break the window and subsequently used a baton to break the driver’s window. Officer Bianchi then reached in and opened the door, but defendant became combative and leaned back while swinging his closed fists at Bianchi and kicking out at him with his feet. Bianchi struck defendant in the thigh with the baton, and Officer Jesse Quintana deployed his taser at defendant when defendant grabbed the baton. Officers forcefully pulled defendant from the van. After defendant refused to come out of the van, Dunn approached the passenger side and instructed Rice to open her door so that he could unbuckle defendant’s seatbelt to assist in removing him from the van. Rice refused to comply despite approximately 10 such commands. Dunn then knocked on the rear window and instructed Manasseh to unlock his door, but he refused. Bianchi also requested Manasseh to exit the van a couple of times after defendant had been arrested, but he did not. After defendant was tased, Quintana ordered Rice and Manasseh from the van, but they again refused. 4. Defendant’s friend Heath Moayer, daughter Bettilyn Montuy, and uncle Arthur Montuy testified for defendant regarding their observations while at or near the fast-food restaurant during defendant’s encounter with police. They testified that they saw officers strike and break the driver’s window, hit defendant with a baton, tase him, and pull him from the van but did not see defendant strike or kick any officer. DISCUSSION I. The trial court’s instructions to defense witnesses were neither discourteous nor disparaging and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. A. Background Defense counsel asked Arthur to estimate his distance when observing defendant’s interaction with police. Arthur responded, “I was from here to the—the van was like where the hallway is.” The court stated, “I didn’t understand what he said.” Defense counsel repeated, “Where the hallway is. So beyond the doors of the courtroom.” The court replied, “I can only state that … the first doors to the courtroom are 41 feet.” A short time later, the court reporter also interrupted Arthur’s testimony to obtain clarification. During another answer, the court directed Arthur to “[s]low down.” Arthur responded, “He was almost incapacitated, the way I see it—the way I saw it.” The court again instructed, “Slow down.” The prosecutor objected to the answer as speculation, and the court replied, “I can’t even understand him.” Defense counsel then instructed, “You have to speak slower so—”; Arthur interrupted to state, “His head was down—”; the court said, “Sir,” and then directed, “Listen to me,” and repeated, “I said slow down.” Arthur acknowledged the court’s direction, and defense counsel explained to Arthur that he needed to slow down so the court reporter could take down his testimony. Arthur acknowledged her instruction, and defense counsel explained that only one person could speak at a time. Arthur replied, “Yes. Yes, ma’am.” The court then stated, “And wait a minute. [¶] The objection is sustained, and the testimony is stricken.” 5. After responding to a question by the prosecutor, the court advised Arthur, “We can’t hear you,” and Arthur repeated his answer. The prosecutor then asked, “[Y]ou were standing to the left of the driver side window and door; correct?” Arthur responded, “It was on the left side. Like I said, south, southwest. If the lady at the end is a window, I’m like—” and the court interrupted, “All right. No one is asking you a question.” Arthur stated, “I’m like this.” The court said, “Sir?” Arthur responded, “Yes, sir,” and the court explained, “No one is asking you a question.” Arthur responded, “I’m answering the question.” The court replied, “Don’t talk.” Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked if there were any parked cars, and Arthur acknowledged, “There were.” The prosecutor asked whether some of the parked cars were in front of defendant’s van. Arthur responded that there were two police cars behind defendant’s van that did not block Arthur’s view. The court advised Arthur, “That wasn’t the question, sir,” and asked, “Were there any parked cars in front?” Arthur responded, “In front of his [van], no.” The court explained, “He didn’t say anything about police cars, sir.” Arthur replied, “Well I answered the question. There were parked cars.” The court explained again, “Sir, the question was not that. He asked if there any parked cars in front of the [van].” Arthur replied, “No.” When Arthur interrupted the prosecutor’s next question to respond, the court directed Arthur to “[w]ait until the question is asked.” Defense counsel objected to the next question because she did not understand it. Arthur commented he did not understand the question and asked that it be repeated, but the court directed the parties to take the noon recess. After the break and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel noted that the court had admonished Arthur several times and advised the court that she had counseled Arthur to speak slowly and clearly. Counsel expressed concern as to the effect of the admonishments on the jury and asked the court to instruct the jury that “any admonishments that the Court has made not be taken into consideration in terms of credibility or evaluating the case.” The court denied the request and explained that 6. Arthur was not answering the questions after being instructed to do so, and the jury could consider those facts in assessing the witness’s credibility. Defense counsel replied, “Well, then I do have to just enter an objection to the level of tone and volume .…” The court explained that Arthur ignored the court’s directions until it raised its voice to a louder level to gain Arthur’s attention. The court described Arthur as insistent at telling his own story rather than responding to questions. Defense counsel described the court’s conduct as “essentially, yelling at a defense witness,” while the court did not admonish Detective Dunn in the same way although he “was kind of all over the place.” The court responded, “I raised my voice one time and, on my own, told him he didn’t answer the question.” During a subsequent recess, the court advised defense counsel that it “completely and wholeheartedly disagree[d]” with counsel’s use of the term “yelling” to describe the court’s comments to Arthur. Defense counsel agreed that the court raised its voice and apologized for using the term “yelling.” When Arthur returned to the witness stand, the court asked him to remember to respond to the question, stop talking, and listen when the court spoke. After responsively testifying to defendant’s statements after his arrest, Arthur started to describe the officer’s statements and actions when arresting defendant. The court instructed Arthur to stop as there was no question pending. The court then said, “That’s all, sir,” after Arthur responded affirmatively but then attempted to say more. After a hearsay objection to Arthur’s answer, he continued to speak as the court attempted to respond to the objection. The court said, “The answer is—”; Arthur responded, “Yes”; the court then said, “Sir. [¶] The answer—”; Arthur responded, “Then, yes”; and the court said, “Sir. I’m talking to you, sir.” The court sustained the objection, struck the answer, and explained to Arthur that the question called for a yes or no answer. Rice testified in her own defense. When asked whether anyone ordered her to get out of the van with the loudspeaker, Rice responded, “Their words are not repeatable here.” The court advised Rice that the answer called for a yes or no. When Rice later 7. attempted to answer a question that had not been completed, the court asked her to wait for the question to be asked. Rice again went beyond responding yes or no, and the court again requested that she just answer the question. Another time, the court requested Rice not to interject comments into her answer. Defense counsel did not object to the court’s comments or admonitions. B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of the case. (See Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904–905.) Judicial misconduct occurs when a trial judge strongly suggests to the jury he or she disbelieves the defendant’s case or otherwise favors the prosecution. (See Liteky v. United States (1994) 510 U.S. 540, 555–556; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1219 [“court commits misconduct if it creates the impression that it is denigrating the defense or otherwise allying itself with the prosecution”].) “ ‘The object of a trial is to ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate rules of law, in order that justice within the law shall be truly administered.’ [Citation.] To this end, ‘the court has a duty to see that justice is done and to bring out facts relevant to the jury’s determination.’ [Citation.] The trial court has a statutory duty to control trial proceedings, including the introduction and exclusion of evidence. [Citation.] As provided by section 1044, it is ‘the duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding the matters involved.’ ” (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237.) “However, ‘a judge should be careful not to throw the weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or against the defendant.’ [Citation.] [¶] Trial judges ‘should be exceedingly discreet in what they say and do in the presence of a jury lest they seem to lean toward or lend their influence to one side or the other.’ [Citation.] A trial 8. court commits misconduct if it ‘ “persists in making discourteous and disparaging remarks to a defendant’s counsel and witnesses and utters frequent comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not believed by the judge.” ’ ” (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1237–1238.) In reviewing a claim of judicial misconduct, “ ‘we must determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 (Snow).) C. Analysis Defendant argues that “the court engaged in a persistent pattern of discourteous and disparaging remarks directed at defense witnesses and defense counsel.” Defendant’s principle argument relies upon various interactions between the court and defense witness Arthur, including one in which the court raised its voice, and the court’s denial of defense counsel’s request for a curative instruction. Having reviewed the relevant record in this case, we conclude the trial judge’s conduct in front of the jury toward defense witnesses did not rise to a level of judicial misconduct or bias so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial. (See Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.) Rather, the record reflects the trial judge took valid actions on the identified occasions aimed at discharging the court’s duty to control the proceedings and enforce its rulings. (See ibid.; § 1044.) Turning to defendant’s complaints concerning the trial court’s interactions with Arthur and his trial counsel, we disagree with his assertion that the trial court made “discourteous remarks” to discredit the defense or to signal to the jury that the defense witness (or the defense) was obstinate or unworthy of belief. In fact, our independent review of the record shows that the court did not make remarks to disparage Arthur’s testimony, although it did express frustration that Arthur spoke too fast for it to understand when the prosecution asked it to rule on an objection. In our review of Arthur’s testimony, we also found many lengthy answers that did not respond to 9. counsel’s questions and contained irrelevant matter. The trial court was therefore justified in advising Arthur to speak slower and cutting him off to shorten his answers and prevent narrative responses. (See Evid. Code, §§ 350 [only relevant evidence is admissible], 765, subd. (a) [trial court has duty to exercise reasonable control over mode of interrogation of witness so as to make interrogation as rapid, distinct, and effective for ascertainment of truth as may be]; Estate of Martin (1915) 170 Cal. 657, 671 [court should limit testimony “within the well-defined bounds of materiality, relevancy, and competency”].) The court may have raised its voice to the witness, but the record shows Arthur continued to speak while the court attempted to gain his attention and provide instruction. The court felt it necessary to control the courtroom and raised its voice to be heard when Arthur continued to speak through the court’s attempts to direct him. Recognizing that our task is to determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant a fair trial (see Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78), we conclude that the trial judge’s conduct did not exceed that of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, or anger within the bounds of what judge’s sometimes display. (See Liteky v. United States, supra, 510 U.S. at pp. 555–556.) “Not establishing bias or partiality … are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as … judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune.” (Ibid.) Applying this standard here, we conclude the trial judge’s words and actions, viewed alone or collectively, do not convey allegiance to the prosecution or disdain for defense witnesses, which is necessary for us to find prejudicial error. As our Supreme Court has aptly stated, “While some of the court’s comments during the examination of [the witness] ‘would have been better left unsaid’ [citation], we do not believe the court’s behavior ‘was so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 81, third bracketed insertion 10. in original.) “The jury may well have received the impression that the court disliked counsel’s methods of examination, but not that the court disparaged or discredited [the party’s] favorable evidence itself.” (Id. at p. 82.) Our careful review of the trial court’s statements here failed to reveal any disparagement of the substance of Arthur’s or Rice’s testimony nor any suggestion that they were not credible. Defendant argues that the trial court similarly committed misconduct during Rice’s testimony. “However, he did not object to the trial court’s questioning, thus making the claim not cognizable on appeal.” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 350; accord, People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1320.) Forfeiture aside, we conclude the court did not engage in prejudicial misconduct. While Rice was testifying, the court instructed her at times to respond “yes” or “no” when her answers were nonresponsive, to wait for questions to be completed before answering, and to refrain from interjecting comments into her answers. These instructions were not discourteous and comported with the trial judge’s obligation to control the proceedings and enforce its rulings. (See Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78; § 1044.) Defendant argues that the court treated prosecution witness Detective Dunn differently when his testimony failed to respond to questions. Defendant has failed to cite any portion of the reporter’s transcript wherein Detective Dunn, unlike Arthur, disregarded the court’s attempts to curtail inadmissible testimony or instructions to respond to questions. Defendant relies upon defense counsel’s expressed opinion that the trial court treated prosecution witnesses differently, but that itself is not evidence that the court treated Detective Dunn any differently than defense witnesses. Our review of the reporter’s transcript shows that the court sustained several defense objections to Dunn’s testimony, but we found no incident in which Detective Dunn failed to listen to the court or disregarded the court’s instructions. For example, the court sustained an objection to Dunn’s testimony as nonresponsive. After a second objection, the court advised Dunn, “The question was, did you get in your [patrol] vehicle and pursue [the van]?” Dunn 11. testified that he got into the patrol vehicle but then continued to explain why it was not his assigned vehicle, at which time the court interjected, “Did you pursue the [van]?” The court sustained a later objection as nonresponsive and struck that part of the answer. During cross-examination, the court again interrupted Dunn’s response, “The question was, what was the parking lot that was referenced.” We also note that during Officer Quintana’s testimony, the court sustained an objection to an answer as nonresponsive and commented, “It’s all nonresponsive. Stricken again.” Defendant has failed to substantiate his argument that the court failed to treat prosecution and defense witnesses similarly. Defendant refers us to other parts of the reporter’s transcript as evidence of a pattern of disparaging the defense. For example, during defense counsel’s cross- examination of Dunn, she asked whether Dunn asked defendant what he meant when he said that he was exercising his constitutional rights. After Dunn testified that he did not inquire, defense counsel asked whether Dunn’s training about laws included the constitution. The prosecutor objected as irrelevant, and the trial court responded, “Sustained.” Defense counsel asked to be heard, and the court responded, “Sure. But the constitution—that’s not the issue here.” Defense counsel stated, “Well, that was what [defendant]’s question was.” The court replied, “Well, that’s his thought process, but that’s not the issue here.” Counsel responded, “Okay.” We do not agree that this interaction disparaged in any way either the defense or defense counsel. We find no evidence in the record to support defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s conduct as “ ‘needlessly belittl[ing] and reprimand[ing] witnesses,’ ” part of a “ ‘pattern of disparaging defense counsel and defense witnesses,’ ” or “ ‘conveying the impression that [it] favored the prosecution.’ ” (Third bracketed insertion in original.) Defendant also argues that the trial court’s comments created a chilling effect that “noticeably stifled defense counsel’s advocacy.” Defendant supports this conclusion with a single reference to a discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning an issue 12. with Juror No. 8. After questioning the juror, the court asked defense counsel if she had any comment. Defense counsel responded, “It’s difficult to say exactly what I’m hearing. I mean, I know he’s talking about his conscious [sic] and so on,” and concluded, “No, Your Honor. I don’t have anything to add.” We do not find that this interaction supports defendant’s conclusion that defense counsel’s advocacy was stifled, nor that the court’s conduct affected counsel’s decision not to oppose removal of Juror No. 8 in light of the juror’s clear statements that he would not follow the court’s instructions. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the judge’s behavior denied him the right to a fair trial.4 (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.) II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing Juror No. 8 after his inability to perform his duty appeared in the record as a demonstrable reality. A. Background When defendant was stopped at the checkpoint, he advised Detective Dunn, “I’m exercising my constitutional rights. You don’t have [the] right to stop me.” When directed to exit the van, defendant responded, “I’m exercising my constitutional rights.” Defendant also told Dunn, “[Y]ou don’t have [the] right to stop me when I haven’t broken the law.” He further claimed, “I know my rights.” Defendant later told Dunn, “You are supposed to respect my constitutional rights. You’re supposed to defend my constitutional rights and you’re not doing so.” The court instructed the jury that “[a] driver who is stopped at a roadside sobriety checkpoint must provide his or her driver’s license when requested by a peace officer. The peace officer is not required to advise the driver of the peace officer’s legal authority to request a driver’s license.” 4 Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALCRIM No. 3550 to not take anything the court had said or done during the trial to suggest what the jury’s verdicts should be. “We presume the jury followed [this] instruction[] and did not penalize [the] defendant because of the court’s response to [his trial counsel’s] misconduct.” (People v. Chong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 232, 245.) 13. While deliberating, at approximately 9:53 a.m. on March 5, 2025, a juror sent the following note: “Given that [Detective] Dunn testified when asked what the [purpose] of the checkpoint was[,] he said sobriety and then he added ‘anything[.]’ [I]f he admitted that, did it change the legality of the stop by making it a roadblock? [A]nd in the same train of thought, is Facebook really passing the requirement of proper notice? I’m concerned it wasn’t legal. The fact that in a short time while talking to [defendant], the line became so long they pressured him about it and mocked him by mentioning their constitutional rights.” The trial court noted that a sobriety checkpoint is presumed legal until shown otherwise by the defense, and the defense in this case had not proven its illegality. The court also noted defense counsel had argued that law incorrectly, but the prosecution failed to object. The court responded to the juror’s note: “You must assume that the sobriety checkpoint was legal. A driver who is stopped at a sobriety checkpoint must present to an officer his/her driver’s license when requested by the officer. There are no exceptions.” At approximately 11:31 a.m., the court notified the parties of a note from the jury: “Juror [No.] 8 due to his conviction + belief can’t carry on in good conscience his duty as a juror on this trial. He has stated[,] ‘If he is not able to consider a man’s inalienable rights, I can’t in good conscience be a part of the decision making process.” The jury requested that Juror No. 8 be released from his jury obligations. Under questioning of the court, the jury foreperson advised that Juror No. 8 was refusing to follow the court’s instructions and was substituting his own beliefs in place of the court’s instructions. Juror No. 8 became upset during deliberations because he could not “get past his beliefs related to witness testimony and video and his personal belief. And he couldn’t focus on the instructions.” He said, “If I’m not allowed to use my personal concerns and feelings related to civil rights, I can’t continue. I can’t do this anymore. I can’t do what I’m being asked.” 14. The court next questioned Juror No. 8 outside the presence of the other jurors. Juror No. 8 advised the court that he could not carry on his duty as a juror. The court inquired, “And I also understand that you can’t follow my instructions, and you want to—in its place—what you believe the law should be?” Juror No. 8 replied, “I don’t know that I would characterize it that way. I don’t claim to know more than you. I don’t claim to be in defiance of you. I only claim to be in command of my own conscious [sic].” He explained, “I can’t get past the fact that [defendant], from the jump, invoked his constitutional rights. He—he—he did. He said that and it was ignored. The answer was, ‘Show me your papers or I’ll kick your ass.’ ” The court asked whether Juror No. 8 understood that he was required to follow the court’s instructions. He responded that he did not understand. “And if you’re asking me to ignore what I know and to ignore that the People have inalienable constitutional rights, and you want me to convict a person who was—is trying to invoke those, I can’t, in good conscience, do that.” He added, “In my heart and in my soul, I’m not going to violate that. I can’t. I’m not—I can’t. I’m sorry. That’s my position. I don’t know how many other ways to say it.” Juror No. 8 claimed the court’s instructions conflicted with his conscience and his soul. Defense counsel commented that she had difficulty characterizing Juror No. 8’s comments, while a codefendant’s counsel commented that Juror No. 8 seemed to be deliberating as he had been asked to do and suggested sending him back in to deliberate. Counsel for the other codefendant suggested that Juror No. 8 be permitted to deliberate further and “then see if … he sticks to what he’s saying now or not.” The court commented, “Things got really heated to the point where my bailiff had to send them on a break. He just said that my instructions conflict with his conscious [sic] and his soul. Basically, he said that he can’t follow my instructions. He says he wants off the jury, so I’m going to excuse him.” The court then excused Juror No. 8 and substituted him with an alternate juror. 15. B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 1089 grants a trial court authority to discharge a juror: “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate .…” “A juror who ‘refuses to follow the court’s instructions is “unable to perform his duty” within the meaning of Penal Code section 1089.’ ” (People v. Salinas-Jacobo (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 760, 775.) “Although [a] court reviews for abuse of discretion a [trial] court’s ruling discharging a juror pursuant to section 1089 [citation], we have made clear that such review involves a ‘heightened standard [that] more fully reflects an appellate court’s obligation to protect a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process and to a fair trial by an unbiased jury.’ [Citations.] Specifically, the juror’s ‘inability to perform’ his or her duty ‘must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450, third bracketed insertion in original (Armstrong).) “Under the demonstrable reality standard, a reviewing court’s task is more ‘than simply determining whether any substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s decision.’ [Citation.] ‘A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is satisfied.… [¶] The demonstrable reality test entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review. It requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that [good cause for removing the juror is] established. It is important to make clear that a reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence under either test. Under the demonstrable 16. reality standard, however, the reviewing court must be confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied. [¶] In reaching that conclusion, the reviewing panel will consider not just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provides.’ ” (Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 450–451, first bracketed insertion added.) C. Analysis Defendant argues that Juror No. 8 was actually deliberating on the essential element of whether the officer was lawfully performing his duty and disagreed with the majority of jurors as opposed to refusing to follow the law. We disagree. In our view, “the juror’s ‘inability to perform’ his or her duty” appears “ ‘in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ ” (Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 450.) The court instructed the jury that a driver must present a driver’s license at a checkpoint and defendant told the officers that they could not constitutionally require him to do so. When a juror asked about the legality of the checkpoint in relation to defendant’s assertion of a constitutional right, the court unequivocally responded to the juror’s question that the sobriety checkpoint was legal, and a driver stopped at the checkpoint must present his driver’s license when requested by an officer. Only after receiving this response did the jury notify the court that Juror No. 8 expressed that he could not follow the court’s instructions. Juror No. 8’s own description of his mental process further supports the trial court’s conclusion that he was refusing to follow the law. When the court asked whether Juror No. 8 was unable to follow its instruction, Juror No. 8 claimed “to be in command of [his] own conscious [sic],” although he was not attempting to defy the court. He explained that he could not “get past the fact that [defendant], from the jump, invoked his constitutional rights” and was ignored, with the officers essentially responding, “show me your papers or I’ll kick your ass.” Juror No. 8’s statements demonstrate that he believed 17. defendant had the constitutional right to refuse to show his driver’s license in response to officer’s orders and Juror No. 8 could not follow the court’s instructions to the contrary. When the court attempted to clarify whether Juror No. 8 understood he was required to follow the court’s instructions, Juror No. 8 said that he did not understand and his conscience would not let him convict defendant because defendant was invoking his “inalienable constitutional rights.” These statements quite clearly indicate that Juror No. 8 believed that defendant could lawfully refuse to follow the officers’ orders based upon defendant’s constitutional rights, despite the court’s contrary instructions, because they conflicted with Juror No. 8’s conscience and “his heart and soul.” Maintaining, “That’s my position. I don’t know how many other ways to say it,” Juror No. 8 again claimed the court’s instructions conflicted with his conscience and his soul. Based upon Juror No. 8’s statements, the timing of his request to be excused from the jury so quickly after the court instructed the jury that defendant could not lawfully refuse the request to present his driver’s license, we find that the court relied upon evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that a demonstrable reality existed that Juror No. 8 believed defendant had a constitutional right to refuse the officers’ orders to present his driver’s license and was unable to follow the court’s instructions, which established good cause for his removal. (See Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 450–451.) 18. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. HILL, P. J. WE CONCUR: DESANTOS, J. SANDHU, J. 19.