People v. Montuy CA5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketF089628
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Montuy CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089628
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. MCR079318A)
v.
JOSEPH LUIS MONTUY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Ernest J.
LiCalsi, Judge.
Courtney Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and
William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Joseph Luis Montuy of resisting an executive officer
and related misdemeanor offenses after he disregarded an officer’s order at a checkpoint
and drove away while officers pursued. The trial court placed him on a two-year term of
probation. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court committed judicial misconduct
by its comments to defense witnesses during their testimony and by dismissing a juror
during deliberations who refused to apply the law. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Madera County filed an information on June 28, 2024,
charging defendant with attempting to prevent an executive officer from performing a
lawful duty by means of threats, force, or violence (Pen. Code,1 § 69, subd. (a); count 1);
misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and misdemeanor
evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a); count 3).2 Defendant pleaded
not guilty to the charges.
A jury convicted defendant of all charges on March 6, 2025, after an eight-day
trial. Defendant was tried with both Mary Rice and Manasseh Montuy3 who were
present during the offenses and charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace
officer. The jury failed to reach verdicts as to Rice and Manasseh, and the court declared
a mistrial.
On April 4, 2025, the court admitted defendant to a two-year term of probation
and ordered him confined to the local jail for 180 days. The court also ordered defendant
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The information further alleged aggravating sentencing factors. However, these factors
were not tried before the jury or court and were ultimately dismissed on April 25, 2025, three
weeks after defendant’s sentencing hearing.
3 We refer to certain witnesses by their by their first names for clarity and convenience,
because some of them share a last name. No disrespect is intended.
2.
to pay $300 in restitution and stayed probation revocation restitution fines (§§ 1202.4,
subd. (b), 1202.44).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 7, 2025.
FACTS
The Madera Police Department set up a driver’s license and driving under the
influence checkpoint at approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 29, 2023. The checkpoint
was marked with a sign, a police trailer, and several patrol cars. Cones funneled 200 feet
of the road into one lane. Detective Jacob Dunn and Officer Brandon Bianchi worked
with approximately eight other officers and support staff. They wore clothing identifying
themselves as police officers and performed driver’s license checks, looking for signs of
drivers under the influence or anything else that was a potential crime, violation, or safety
concern.
At approximately 9:00 p.m., defendant drove to the checkpoint in a van
accompanied by Rice (his wife) and Manasseh (his son). Defendant drove quickly past
an officer who attempted to contact him. Detective Dunn then contacted defendant who
refused to provide his driver’s license and threatened to file a lawsuit. Defendant claimed
he was exercising his constitutional rights and that the police had no right to stop him.
Defendant refused repeated requests by Dunn to provide his driver’s license. Dunn
advised defendant that failure to produce his driver’s license would result in going to jail.
Defendant told Dunn to “take [him] to jail” but refused to get out of his van. Dunn
explained that defendant need only show his driver’s license, and defendant replied,
“Then I will refuse.”
Dunn was joined by his supervisor who similarly advised defendant that he was
required to produce his driver’s license, but defendant continued to insist that it was not
required. Defendant warned that if officers attempted to take him into custody, they
would have a battle on the side of the road because defendant intended to defend himself.
Defendant repeated that he would not comply with the law. Dunn instructed defendant a
3.
final time to show his driver’s license and step out of the van. Dunn’s supervisor
instructed defendant to pull his van into the adjacent parking lot, but defendant drove
away.
When defendant took off from the checkpoint without providing his driver’s
license, Officer Bianchi pursued him in a marked vehicle to a fast-food parking lot a short
distance away. Bianchi initially issued orders to defendant while defendant’s window
was down. After defendant closed the window, Bianchi used the public announcement
system to order defendant from the van. When defendant refused, Bianchi ordered the
front passenger to exit the van.
Dunn caught up to the chase in the parking lot as Bianchi used the loudspeaker to
order the occupants of defendant’s van to “get out of the car and exit the vehicle.” When
they did not, Bianchi and Dunn approached the driver’s door and commanded that
defendant open it. When defendant failed to do so, Bianchi warned that he would break
the window and subsequently used a baton to break the driver’s window. Officer Bianchi
then reached in and opened the door, but defendant became combative and leaned back
while swinging his closed fists at Bianchi and kicking out at him with his feet. Bianchi
struck defendant in the thigh with the baton, and Officer Jesse Quintana deployed his
taser at defendant when defendant grabbed the baton. Officers forcefully pulled
defendant from the van.
After defendant refused to come out of the van, Dunn approached the passenger
side and instructed Rice to open her door so that he could unbuckle defendant’s seatbelt
to assist in removing him from the van. Rice refused to comply despite approximately
10 such commands. Dunn then knocked on the rear window and instructed Manasseh to
unlock his door, but he refused. Bianchi also requested Manasseh to exit the van a couple
of times after defendant had been arrested, but he did not. After defendant was tased,
Quintana ordered Rice and Manasseh from the van, but they again refused.
4.
Defendant’s friend Heath Moayer, daughter Bettilyn Montuy, and uncle Arthur
Montuy testified for defendant regarding their observations while at or near the fast-food
restaurant during defendant’s encounter with police. They testified that they saw officers
strike and break the driver’s window, hit defendant with a baton, tase him, and pull him
from the van but did not see defendant strike or kick any officer.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court’s instructions to defense witnesses were neither discourteous nor
disparaging and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
A. Background
Defense counsel asked Arthur to estimate his distance when observing defendant’s
interaction with police. Arthur responded, “I was from here to the—the van was like
where the hallway is.” The court stated, “I didn’t understand what he said.” Defense
counsel repeated, “Where the hallway is. So beyond the doors of the courtroom.” The
court replied, “I can only state that … the first doors to the courtroom are 41 feet.” A
short time later, the court reporter also interrupted Arthur’s testimony to obtain
clarification. During another answer, the court directed Arthur to “[s]low down.” Arthur
responded, “He was almost incapacitated, the way I see it—the way I saw it.” The court
again instructed, “Slow down.” The prosecutor objected to the answer as speculation,
and the court replied, “I can’t even understand him.” Defense counsel then instructed,
“You have to speak slower so—”; Arthur interrupted to state, “His head was down—”;
the court said, “Sir,” and then directed, “Listen to me,” and repeated, “I said slow down.”
Arthur acknowledged the court’s direction, and defense counsel explained to Arthur that
he needed to slow down so the court reporter could take down his testimony. Arthur
acknowledged her instruction, and defense counsel explained that only one person could
speak at a time. Arthur replied, “Yes. Yes, ma’am.” The court then stated, “And wait a
minute. [¶] The objection is sustained, and the testimony is stricken.”
5.
After responding to a question by the prosecutor, the court advised Arthur, “We
can’t hear you,” and Arthur repeated his answer. The prosecutor then asked, “[Y]ou were
standing to the left of the driver side window and door; correct?” Arthur responded, “It
was on the left side. Like I said, south, southwest. If the lady at the end is a window, I’m
like—” and the court interrupted, “All right. No one is asking you a question.” Arthur
stated, “I’m like this.” The court said, “Sir?” Arthur responded, “Yes, sir,” and the court
explained, “No one is asking you a question.” Arthur responded, “I’m answering the
question.” The court replied, “Don’t talk.”
Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked if there were any parked cars, and
Arthur acknowledged, “There were.” The prosecutor asked whether some of the parked
cars were in front of defendant’s van. Arthur responded that there were two police cars
behind defendant’s van that did not block Arthur’s view. The court advised Arthur, “That
wasn’t the question, sir,” and asked, “Were there any parked cars in front?” Arthur
responded, “In front of his [van], no.” The court explained, “He didn’t say anything
about police cars, sir.” Arthur replied, “Well I answered the question. There were parked
cars.” The court explained again, “Sir, the question was not that. He asked if there any
parked cars in front of the [van].” Arthur replied, “No.”
When Arthur interrupted the prosecutor’s next question to respond, the court
directed Arthur to “[w]ait until the question is asked.” Defense counsel objected to the
next question because she did not understand it. Arthur commented he did not
understand the question and asked that it be repeated, but the court directed the parties to
take the noon recess. After the break and outside the presence of the jury, defense
counsel noted that the court had admonished Arthur several times and advised the court
that she had counseled Arthur to speak slowly and clearly. Counsel expressed concern as
to the effect of the admonishments on the jury and asked the court to instruct the jury that
“any admonishments that the Court has made not be taken into consideration in terms of
credibility or evaluating the case.” The court denied the request and explained that
6.
Arthur was not answering the questions after being instructed to do so, and the jury could
consider those facts in assessing the witness’s credibility. Defense counsel replied, “Well,
then I do have to just enter an objection to the level of tone and volume .…” The court
explained that Arthur ignored the court’s directions until it raised its voice to a louder
level to gain Arthur’s attention. The court described Arthur as insistent at telling his own
story rather than responding to questions. Defense counsel described the court’s conduct
as “essentially, yelling at a defense witness,” while the court did not admonish Detective
Dunn in the same way although he “was kind of all over the place.” The court responded,
“I raised my voice one time and, on my own, told him he didn’t answer the question.”
During a subsequent recess, the court advised defense counsel that it “completely and
wholeheartedly disagree[d]” with counsel’s use of the term “yelling” to describe the
court’s comments to Arthur. Defense counsel agreed that the court raised its voice and
apologized for using the term “yelling.”
When Arthur returned to the witness stand, the court asked him to remember to
respond to the question, stop talking, and listen when the court spoke. After responsively
testifying to defendant’s statements after his arrest, Arthur started to describe the officer’s
statements and actions when arresting defendant. The court instructed Arthur to stop as
there was no question pending. The court then said, “That’s all, sir,” after Arthur
responded affirmatively but then attempted to say more.
After a hearsay objection to Arthur’s answer, he continued to speak as the court
attempted to respond to the objection. The court said, “The answer is—”; Arthur
responded, “Yes”; the court then said, “Sir. [¶] The answer—”; Arthur responded, “Then,
yes”; and the court said, “Sir. I’m talking to you, sir.” The court sustained the objection,
struck the answer, and explained to Arthur that the question called for a yes or no answer.
Rice testified in her own defense. When asked whether anyone ordered her to get
out of the van with the loudspeaker, Rice responded, “Their words are not repeatable
here.” The court advised Rice that the answer called for a yes or no. When Rice later
7.
attempted to answer a question that had not been completed, the court asked her to wait
for the question to be asked. Rice again went beyond responding yes or no, and the court
again requested that she just answer the question. Another time, the court requested Rice
not to interject comments into her answer. Defense counsel did not object to the court’s
comments or admonitions.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair trial in a fair
tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the
outcome of the case. (See Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904–905.) Judicial
misconduct occurs when a trial judge strongly suggests to the jury he or she disbelieves
the defendant’s case or otherwise favors the prosecution. (See Liteky v. United States
(1994) 510 U.S. 540, 555–556; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1219 [“court
commits misconduct if it creates the impression that it is denigrating the defense or
otherwise allying itself with the prosecution”].)
“ ‘The object of a trial is to ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate
rules of law, in order that justice within the law shall be truly administered.’ [Citation.]
To this end, ‘the court has a duty to see that justice is done and to bring out facts relevant
to the jury’s determination.’ [Citation.] The trial court has a statutory duty to control trial
proceedings, including the introduction and exclusion of evidence. [Citation.] As
provided by section 1044, it is ‘the duty of the judge to control all proceedings during the
trial, and to limit the introduction of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and
material matters, with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the truth
regarding the matters involved.’ ” (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237.)
“However, ‘a judge should be careful not to throw the weight of his judicial
position into a case, either for or against the defendant.’ [Citation.] [¶] Trial judges
‘should be exceedingly discreet in what they say and do in the presence of a jury lest they
seem to lean toward or lend their influence to one side or the other.’ [Citation.] A trial
8.
court commits misconduct if it ‘ “persists in making discourteous and disparaging
remarks to a defendant’s counsel and witnesses and utters frequent comment from which
the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not believed by the
judge.” ’ ” (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1237–1238.)
In reviewing a claim of judicial misconduct, “ ‘we must determine whether the
judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a
perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 (Snow).)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues that “the court engaged in a persistent pattern of discourteous
and disparaging remarks directed at defense witnesses and defense counsel.” Defendant’s
principle argument relies upon various interactions between the court and defense witness
Arthur, including one in which the court raised its voice, and the court’s denial of defense
counsel’s request for a curative instruction. Having reviewed the relevant record in this
case, we conclude the trial judge’s conduct in front of the jury toward defense witnesses
did not rise to a level of judicial misconduct or bias so prejudicial that it deprived
defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial. (See Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.)
Rather, the record reflects the trial judge took valid actions on the identified occasions
aimed at discharging the court’s duty to control the proceedings and enforce its rulings.
(See ibid.; § 1044.)
Turning to defendant’s complaints concerning the trial court’s interactions with
Arthur and his trial counsel, we disagree with his assertion that the trial court made
“discourteous remarks” to discredit the defense or to signal to the jury that the defense
witness (or the defense) was obstinate or unworthy of belief. In fact, our independent
review of the record shows that the court did not make remarks to disparage Arthur’s
testimony, although it did express frustration that Arthur spoke too fast for it to
understand when the prosecution asked it to rule on an objection. In our review of
Arthur’s testimony, we also found many lengthy answers that did not respond to
9.
counsel’s questions and contained irrelevant matter. The trial court was therefore
justified in advising Arthur to speak slower and cutting him off to shorten his answers
and prevent narrative responses. (See Evid. Code, §§ 350 [only relevant evidence is
admissible], 765, subd. (a) [trial court has duty to exercise reasonable control over mode
of interrogation of witness so as to make interrogation as rapid, distinct, and effective for
ascertainment of truth as may be]; Estate of Martin (1915) 170 Cal. 657, 671 [court
should limit testimony “within the well-defined bounds of materiality, relevancy, and
competency”].) The court may have raised its voice to the witness, but the record shows
Arthur continued to speak while the court attempted to gain his attention and provide
instruction. The court felt it necessary to control the courtroom and raised its voice to be
heard when Arthur continued to speak through the court’s attempts to direct him.
Recognizing that our task is to determine whether the judge’s behavior was so
prejudicial that it deprived defendant a fair trial (see Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78), we
conclude that the trial judge’s conduct did not exceed that of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, or anger within the bounds of what judge’s sometimes display. (See Liteky v.
United States, supra, 510 U.S. at pp. 555–556.) “Not establishing bias or partiality … are
expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the
bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as …
judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even
a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain
immune.” (Ibid.) Applying this standard here, we conclude the trial judge’s words and
actions, viewed alone or collectively, do not convey allegiance to the prosecution or
disdain for defense witnesses, which is necessary for us to find prejudicial error.
As our Supreme Court has aptly stated, “While some of the court’s comments
during the examination of [the witness] ‘would have been better left unsaid’ [citation], we
do not believe the court’s behavior ‘was so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] a fair, as
opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 81, third bracketed insertion
10.
in original.) “The jury may well have received the impression that the court disliked
counsel’s methods of examination, but not that the court disparaged or discredited [the
party’s] favorable evidence itself.” (Id. at p. 82.) Our careful review of the trial court’s
statements here failed to reveal any disparagement of the substance of Arthur’s or Rice’s
testimony nor any suggestion that they were not credible.
Defendant argues that the trial court similarly committed misconduct during Rice’s
testimony. “However, he did not object to the trial court’s questioning, thus making the
claim not cognizable on appeal.” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 350; accord,
People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1320.) Forfeiture aside, we conclude the
court did not engage in prejudicial misconduct. While Rice was testifying, the court
instructed her at times to respond “yes” or “no” when her answers were nonresponsive, to
wait for questions to be completed before answering, and to refrain from interjecting
comments into her answers. These instructions were not discourteous and comported
with the trial judge’s obligation to control the proceedings and enforce its rulings. (See
Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78; § 1044.)
Defendant argues that the court treated prosecution witness Detective Dunn
differently when his testimony failed to respond to questions. Defendant has failed to
cite any portion of the reporter’s transcript wherein Detective Dunn, unlike Arthur,
disregarded the court’s attempts to curtail inadmissible testimony or instructions to
respond to questions. Defendant relies upon defense counsel’s expressed opinion that the
trial court treated prosecution witnesses differently, but that itself is not evidence that the
court treated Detective Dunn any differently than defense witnesses. Our review of the
reporter’s transcript shows that the court sustained several defense objections to Dunn’s
testimony, but we found no incident in which Detective Dunn failed to listen to the court
or disregarded the court’s instructions. For example, the court sustained an objection to
Dunn’s testimony as nonresponsive. After a second objection, the court advised Dunn,
“The question was, did you get in your [patrol] vehicle and pursue [the van]?” Dunn
11.
testified that he got into the patrol vehicle but then continued to explain why it was not
his assigned vehicle, at which time the court interjected, “Did you pursue the [van]?”
The court sustained a later objection as nonresponsive and struck that part of the answer.
During cross-examination, the court again interrupted Dunn’s response, “The question
was, what was the parking lot that was referenced.” We also note that during Officer
Quintana’s testimony, the court sustained an objection to an answer as nonresponsive and
commented, “It’s all nonresponsive. Stricken again.” Defendant has failed to
substantiate his argument that the court failed to treat prosecution and defense witnesses
similarly.
Defendant refers us to other parts of the reporter’s transcript as evidence of a
pattern of disparaging the defense. For example, during defense counsel’s cross-
examination of Dunn, she asked whether Dunn asked defendant what he meant when he
said that he was exercising his constitutional rights. After Dunn testified that he did not
inquire, defense counsel asked whether Dunn’s training about laws included the
constitution. The prosecutor objected as irrelevant, and the trial court responded,
“Sustained.” Defense counsel asked to be heard, and the court responded, “Sure. But the
constitution—that’s not the issue here.” Defense counsel stated, “Well, that was what
[defendant]’s question was.” The court replied, “Well, that’s his thought process, but
that’s not the issue here.” Counsel responded, “Okay.” We do not agree that this
interaction disparaged in any way either the defense or defense counsel. We find no
evidence in the record to support defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s conduct
as “ ‘needlessly belittl[ing] and reprimand[ing] witnesses,’ ” part of a “ ‘pattern of
disparaging defense counsel and defense witnesses,’ ” or “ ‘conveying the impression
that [it] favored the prosecution.’ ” (Third bracketed insertion in original.)
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s comments created a chilling effect that
“noticeably stifled defense counsel’s advocacy.” Defendant supports this conclusion with
a single reference to a discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning an issue
12.
with Juror No. 8. After questioning the juror, the court asked defense counsel if she had
any comment. Defense counsel responded, “It’s difficult to say exactly what I’m hearing.
I mean, I know he’s talking about his conscious [sic] and so on,” and concluded, “No,
Your Honor. I don’t have anything to add.” We do not find that this interaction supports
defendant’s conclusion that defense counsel’s advocacy was stifled, nor that the court’s
conduct affected counsel’s decision not to oppose removal of Juror No. 8 in light of the
juror’s clear statements that he would not follow the court’s instructions.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the judge’s behavior denied him the right
to a fair trial.4 (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78.)
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing Juror No. 8 after his
inability to perform his duty appeared in the record as a demonstrable reality.
A. Background
When defendant was stopped at the checkpoint, he advised Detective Dunn, “I’m
exercising my constitutional rights. You don’t have [the] right to stop me.” When
directed to exit the van, defendant responded, “I’m exercising my constitutional rights.”
Defendant also told Dunn, “[Y]ou don’t have [the] right to stop me when I haven’t
broken the law.” He further claimed, “I know my rights.” Defendant later told Dunn,
“You are supposed to respect my constitutional rights. You’re supposed to defend my
constitutional rights and you’re not doing so.”
The court instructed the jury that “[a] driver who is stopped at a roadside sobriety
checkpoint must provide his or her driver’s license when requested by a peace officer.
The peace officer is not required to advise the driver of the peace officer’s legal authority
to request a driver’s license.”
4 Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALCRIM No. 3550
to not take anything the court had said or done during the trial to suggest what the jury’s verdicts
should be. “We presume the jury followed [this] instruction[] and did not penalize [the]
defendant because of the court’s response to [his trial counsel’s] misconduct.” (People v. Chong
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 232, 245.)
13.
While deliberating, at approximately 9:53 a.m. on March 5, 2025, a juror sent the
following note: “Given that [Detective] Dunn testified when asked what the [purpose] of
the checkpoint was[,] he said sobriety and then he added ‘anything[.]’ [I]f he admitted
that, did it change the legality of the stop by making it a roadblock? [A]nd in the same
train of thought, is Facebook really passing the requirement of proper notice? I’m
concerned it wasn’t legal. The fact that in a short time while talking to [defendant], the
line became so long they pressured him about it and mocked him by mentioning their
constitutional rights.” The trial court noted that a sobriety checkpoint is presumed legal
until shown otherwise by the defense, and the defense in this case had not proven its
illegality. The court also noted defense counsel had argued that law incorrectly, but the
prosecution failed to object.
The court responded to the juror’s note: “You must assume that the sobriety
checkpoint was legal. A driver who is stopped at a sobriety checkpoint must present to an
officer his/her driver’s license when requested by the officer. There are no exceptions.”
At approximately 11:31 a.m., the court notified the parties of a note from the jury:
“Juror [No.] 8 due to his conviction + belief can’t carry on in good conscience his duty as
a juror on this trial. He has stated[,] ‘If he is not able to consider a man’s inalienable
rights, I can’t in good conscience be a part of the decision making process.” The jury
requested that Juror No. 8 be released from his jury obligations. Under questioning of the
court, the jury foreperson advised that Juror No. 8 was refusing to follow the court’s
instructions and was substituting his own beliefs in place of the court’s instructions.
Juror No. 8 became upset during deliberations because he could not “get past his beliefs
related to witness testimony and video and his personal belief. And he couldn’t focus on
the instructions.” He said, “If I’m not allowed to use my personal concerns and feelings
related to civil rights, I can’t continue. I can’t do this anymore. I can’t do what I’m being
asked.”
14.
The court next questioned Juror No. 8 outside the presence of the other jurors.
Juror No. 8 advised the court that he could not carry on his duty as a juror. The court
inquired, “And I also understand that you can’t follow my instructions, and you want
to—in its place—what you believe the law should be?” Juror No. 8 replied, “I don’t
know that I would characterize it that way. I don’t claim to know more than you. I don’t
claim to be in defiance of you. I only claim to be in command of my own conscious
[sic].” He explained, “I can’t get past the fact that [defendant], from the jump, invoked
his constitutional rights. He—he—he did. He said that and it was ignored. The answer
was, ‘Show me your papers or I’ll kick your ass.’ ”
The court asked whether Juror No. 8 understood that he was required to follow the
court’s instructions. He responded that he did not understand. “And if you’re asking me
to ignore what I know and to ignore that the People have inalienable constitutional rights,
and you want me to convict a person who was—is trying to invoke those, I can’t, in good
conscience, do that.” He added, “In my heart and in my soul, I’m not going to violate
that. I can’t. I’m not—I can’t. I’m sorry. That’s my position. I don’t know how many
other ways to say it.” Juror No. 8 claimed the court’s instructions conflicted with his
conscience and his soul.
Defense counsel commented that she had difficulty characterizing Juror No. 8’s
comments, while a codefendant’s counsel commented that Juror No. 8 seemed to be
deliberating as he had been asked to do and suggested sending him back in to deliberate.
Counsel for the other codefendant suggested that Juror No. 8 be permitted to deliberate
further and “then see if … he sticks to what he’s saying now or not.” The court
commented, “Things got really heated to the point where my bailiff had to send them on a
break. He just said that my instructions conflict with his conscious [sic] and his soul.
Basically, he said that he can’t follow my instructions. He says he wants off the jury, so
I’m going to excuse him.” The court then excused Juror No. 8 and substituted him with
an alternate juror.
15.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1089 grants a trial court authority to discharge a juror: “If at any time,
whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or
becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform
his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the
court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate .…” “A
juror who ‘refuses to follow the court’s instructions is “unable to perform his duty”
within the meaning of Penal Code section 1089.’ ” (People v. Salinas-Jacobo (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 760, 775.)
“Although [a] court reviews for abuse of discretion a [trial] court’s ruling
discharging a juror pursuant to section 1089 [citation], we have made clear that such
review involves a ‘heightened standard [that] more fully reflects an appellate court’s
obligation to protect a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process and to a fair trial by
an unbiased jury.’ [Citations.] Specifically, the juror’s ‘inability to perform’ his or her
duty ‘must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2016)
1 Cal.5th 432, 450, third bracketed insertion in original (Armstrong).)
“Under the demonstrable reality standard, a reviewing court’s task is more ‘than
simply determining whether any substantial evidence in the record supports the trial
court’s decision.’ [Citation.] ‘A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the
light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in
reaching the conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the substantial
evidence test is satisfied.… [¶] The demonstrable reality test entails a more
comprehensive and less deferential review. It requires a showing that the court as trier of
fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that
[good cause for removing the juror is] established. It is important to make clear that a
reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence under either test. Under the demonstrable
16.
reality standard, however, the reviewing court must be confident that the trial court’s
conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied. [¶] In
reaching that conclusion, the reviewing panel will consider not just the evidence itself,
but also the record of reasons the court provides.’ ” (Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
pp. 450–451, first bracketed insertion added.)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues that Juror No. 8 was actually deliberating on the essential
element of whether the officer was lawfully performing his duty and disagreed with the
majority of jurors as opposed to refusing to follow the law. We disagree. In our view,
“the juror’s ‘inability to perform’ his or her duty” appears “ ‘in the record as a
demonstrable reality.’ ” (Armstrong, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 450.)
The court instructed the jury that a driver must present a driver’s license at a
checkpoint and defendant told the officers that they could not constitutionally require him
to do so. When a juror asked about the legality of the checkpoint in relation to
defendant’s assertion of a constitutional right, the court unequivocally responded to the
juror’s question that the sobriety checkpoint was legal, and a driver stopped at the
checkpoint must present his driver’s license when requested by an officer. Only after
receiving this response did the jury notify the court that Juror No. 8 expressed that he
could not follow the court’s instructions.
Juror No. 8’s own description of his mental process further supports the trial
court’s conclusion that he was refusing to follow the law. When the court asked whether
Juror No. 8 was unable to follow its instruction, Juror No. 8 claimed “to be in command
of [his] own conscious [sic],” although he was not attempting to defy the court. He
explained that he could not “get past the fact that [defendant], from the jump, invoked his
constitutional rights” and was ignored, with the officers essentially responding, “show me
your papers or I’ll kick your ass.” Juror No. 8’s statements demonstrate that he believed
17.
defendant had the constitutional right to refuse to show his driver’s license in response to
officer’s orders and Juror No. 8 could not follow the court’s instructions to the contrary.
When the court attempted to clarify whether Juror No. 8 understood he was
required to follow the court’s instructions, Juror No. 8 said that he did not understand and
his conscience would not let him convict defendant because defendant was invoking his
“inalienable constitutional rights.” These statements quite clearly indicate that Juror
No. 8 believed that defendant could lawfully refuse to follow the officers’ orders based
upon defendant’s constitutional rights, despite the court’s contrary instructions, because
they conflicted with Juror No. 8’s conscience and “his heart and soul.” Maintaining,
“That’s my position. I don’t know how many other ways to say it,” Juror No. 8 again
claimed the court’s instructions conflicted with his conscience and his soul.
Based upon Juror No. 8’s statements, the timing of his request to be excused from
the jury so quickly after the court instructed the jury that defendant could not lawfully
refuse the request to present his driver’s license, we find that the court relied upon
evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that a demonstrable
reality existed that Juror No. 8 believed defendant had a constitutional right to refuse the
officers’ orders to present his driver’s license and was unable to follow the court’s
instructions, which established good cause for his removal. (See Armstrong, supra,
1 Cal.5th at pp. 450–451.)
18.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DESANTOS, J.
SANDHU, J.
19.