Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 1 of 31 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11043 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JANA KANYADAN, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cr-00028-WMR-WEJ-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jana Kanyadan appeals his convictions and 90-month total sentence for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349. On appeal, he USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 2 of 31 2 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 raises six arguments. First, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment. Next, he maintains that we should set aside his guilty plea because the district court plainly erred by failing to ensure he understood the nature of his offenses and made improper statements at his pretrial hearing. Kanyadan also argues that the district court erred by applying a two-level so- phisticated-means enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), and a 14-level loss-amount enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H). Additionally, he claims that the district court erred by ordering him to pay the victim organization’s attorneys’ fees as part of the restitution order. Finally, Kanyadan asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Kanyadan was the Chief Information Officer of flooring manufacturer Mohawk Industries, Inc. (“Mohawk”), where he oversaw the information technology (“IT”) department. Around 2019 or 2020, the business began a large-scale IT project, and Mo- hawk hired several IT firms to supply consultants for it. In March 2022, Kanyadan and four of his subordinates, in- cluding Sivakumar Thiyagasamadram and Madhu Shivalin- gegowda, devised a plan to replace the IT firms. They created a 1 Kanyadan and his attorneys have moved for his attorneys to withdraw as counsel on appeal. Because we affirm Kanyadan’s convictions, we deny those motions as moot. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 3 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 3 company called Meta Technology Platforms, LLC (“Meta Tech”) and registered it with the Georgia Secretary of State, listing Thiyagasamadram’s wife as its organizer and Thiyagasamadram’s property as its principal address. Kanyadan also published a web- site for Meta Tech and set up a company e-mail account under Thiyagasamadram’s wife’s name. He then directed Thiyagasama- dram and Shivalingegowda to enroll Meta Tech as one of Mo- hawk’s consultant suppliers. After Meta Tech became an established supplier, Kanyadan instructed Mohawk’s IT department to move consultants from other suppliers to Meta Tech and onboard new suppliers through Meta Tech. Meta Tech supplied more consultants to Mohawk each month. To conceal their involvement in Meta Tech, Kanya- dan and his subordinates created fake Meta Tech employees with associated contact information, which they used to communicate with Mohawk and other consultants. Between May and October 2022, Meta Tech submitted over $3,000,000 in invoices to Mohawk, which included charges for work that had not been performed and software that had not been provided. Mohawk paid Meta Tech a total of $1,857,741.40. Mean- while, Kanyadan was using the money in Meta Tech’s bank ac- count to pay for his personal expenses, including various bills and dining and shopping outings. In the fall of 2022, Mohawk launched an internal investiga- tion that uncovered the fraud. As a result, it stopped issuing pay- ments to Meta Tech and terminated Kanyadan. Shortly thereafter, USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 4 of 31 4 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 Thiyagasamadram resigned and Mohawk terminated Shivalin- gegowda and the other employees involved in Meta Tech’s opera- tions. In September 2023, a federal grand jury returned an eight-count indictment against Kanyadan and other former Mo- hawk employees involved in the Meta Tech scheme. The indict- ment charged the defendants with one count of conspiring to com- mit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349 (“Count 1”); and seven counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2 (“Counts 2 through 8”). Each wire fraud count represented an invoice Meta Tech submitted to Mohawk from May 7, 2022 through August 3, 2022. A. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Kanyadan moved to dismiss the indictment for vindictive prosecution. He alleged that in 2022, he discovered that Mohawk’s Chief Human Resource Officer (“CHRO”) and another high-level employee had engaged in “financial misconduct.” Kanyadan re- ported the misconduct to Mohawk’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), who ordered an investigation. Soon after, the CHRO launched an investigation into Kanyadan’s role in Meta Tech. The investigation was led by the law firm Alston & Bird. Approxi- mately three months after Kanyadan was fired, he filed a complaint against Mohawk with the Occupational Safety and Health Admin- istration (“OHSA”). The Alston & Bird attorneys submitted a re- sponse to the complaint, which included information that was “vir- USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 5 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 5 tually identical” to information contained in a search warrant affi- davit in Kanyadan’s criminal case. The Federal Bureau of Investi- gation (“FBI”) agent who prepared the affidavit also had “parroted inaccurate information received from Mohawk and Alston & Bird.” Additionally, Kanyadan alleged that Alston & Bird had been heav- ily involved in the FBI’s investigation of Meta Tech. Against this backdrop, Kanyadan argued that his case was so “weak” it would not normally have been pursued, but Mohawk and its lawyers wanted him prosecuted so they could prevail in the OSHA case. Thus, he maintained that the FBI and United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) were “acting as a stalking horse for Mohawk and its lawyers,” demonstrating “vindictive prosecution” that warranted dismissing his charges. Kanyadan further asserted that he had presented sufficient evidence of the close connections between Mohawk, Alston & Bird, the FBI, and the USAO to war- rant an evidentiary hearing on his claim of vindictive prosecution. In response, the government argued that Kanyadan had not shown that the prosecutor harbored vindictive animus or prose- cuted Kanyadan solely because of that animus. It asserted that the prosecutor had no interest in the outcome of the OSHA proceeding and Kanyadan failed to establish that Mohawk had “prevailed upon” the prosecutor to prosecute Kanyadan. Furthermore, the government stated it had not been improper for the FBI agent to rely on information from Mohawk in preparing the search warrant affidavit. Finally, it argued that Kanyadan was not entitled to an USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 6 of 31 6 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 evidentiary hearing because he had not established that there was a reasonable doubt about the constitutionality of his prosecution. In reply, Kanyadan clarified that his motion to dismiss was not based on the prosecutor’s actual animus; instead, it was prem- ised upon a legal theory whereby Mohawk had “prevailed upon” the prosecutor to indict Kanyadan. Thus, he maintained, the gov- ernment was Mohawk’s “stalking horse.” The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) that Kanyadan’s motion to dismiss the indictment be de- nied. The magistrate judge found that Kanyadan failed to establish that Mohawk had prevailed upon the prosecutor and had presented insufficient evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The mag- istrate judge also noted that it would have been “surprising if the USAO had declined to prosecute” Kanyadan’s case given the mag- nitude of the fraud it involved, and stated that the FBI agent had properly relied on information from Mohawk in preparing the search warrant affidavit. Kanyadan objected to the R&R, arguing that the magistrate judge had erred by rejecting his “stalking horse theory of vindictiveness,” as Mohawk’s alleged animus was appar- ent. The government then filed a motion in limine, in which it sought to exclude evidence and arguments related to its decision not to charge other co-conspirators involved in the case. It also sought to exclude any arguments Kanyadan had raised in his mo- tion to dismiss the indictment for vindictive prosecution. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 7 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 7 At Kanyadan’s pretrial hearing, the district court denied Kanyadan’s motion to dismiss the indictment on many “of the same grounds” the magistrate judge set forth in the R&R. The court then discussed the government’s motion in limine. With re- spect to the evidence of the government’s charging decisions and Kanyadan’s vindictive prosecution arguments, the court stated that its impression of Kanyadan’s theory was that Mohawk only told the government about Kanyadan’s fraud after he filed the OSHA com- plaint, making the prosecutor Mohawk’s “[s]talking horse.” The court then made the following statement about that theory: Yeah. It’s going to be interesting to see if the jury be- lieves that that legitimate -- I rather doubt they’re not going to. That sounds like he got lawyered up and, you know, the best defenses and offense. I don’t think it’s probably going to stand the test of scrutiny, but be it as it may. The court ultimately granted the government’s motion as to the evidence of the government’s charging decisions and Kanyadan’s vindictive prosecution arguments but clarified that Kanyadan would be able to challenge Mohawk’s credibility and veracity through cross-examination. B. Change-of-Plea Hearing Three days before his trial was scheduled to begin, Kanya- dan pled guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. At the change-of-plea hearing, Kanyadan acknowledged that he had re- viewed and signed a document certifying that he was pleading USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 8 of 31 8 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 guilty. The district court placed Kanyadan under oath, explained what a change-of-plea hearing involved, and told Kanyadan to in- form the court if he did not understand any of the topics covered or questions asked during the proceeding. Kanyadan indicated that he would and confirmed that he had not consumed any drugs, al- cohol, or medicine in the previous 24 hours. He testified that he had received a bachelor’s degree in India, and his attorney noted that he had also earned a master’s degree in the United States. In response to the district court’s questioning, Kanyadan stated that he understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and proceed to trial. The district court then addressed Kanyadan’s trial-related rights, and Kanyadan acknowledged he was waiving them by pleading guilty. Kanyadan also confirmed that he had not been threatened or coerced into pleading guilty. Additionally, he stated that he had sufficiently considered his options and discussed his case with his attorneys, with whom he was satisfied. The govern- ment explained the charges, and Kanyadan stated that he under- stood he was pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and seven counts of wire fraud. Next, the government described the factual basis of the plea as follows. In March of 2022, Kanyadan and four of his subordi- nates created Meta Tech as part of “a scheme to steal money from Mohawk.” They concealed their involvement in the company by inventing fake Meta Tech employees, through whom they would communicate with Mohawk and other consultants. Kanyadan also used his position at Mohawk to direct business to Meta Tech. Over the course of several months, Meta Tech submitted more than USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 9 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 9 $3,000,000 in invoices to Mohawk, which included charges for work that was not performed and software that had not been pro- vided. Kanyadan and his co-conspirators maintained a spreadsheet to track the discrepancies between the hours the consultants worked, and the inflated hours Meta Tech billed to Mohawk. Kanyadan signed invoices that included costs Meta Tech had not incurred. Before it discovered the fraud, Mohawk paid Meta Tech $1,857,741.40. Throughout the conspiracy, Kanyadan used the money in Meta Tech’s bank account to pay for his personal ex- penses. In the fall of 2022, Mohawk discovered the scheme and fired Kanyadan and his co-conspirators. Following this presentation of the facts, Kanyadan’s counsel stated that he had “no material disagreement” with the govern- ment’s recitation. Kanyadan also agreed with the government’s description of his conduct. He admitted that he was guilty of every count in the indictment and the court found that there was a suffi- cient factual basis for Kanyadan to enter his guilty plea. The gov- ernment and court also addressed the penalties Kanyadan could face, which he acknowledged he understood. The court then found that Kanyadan understood the offenses with which he was charged, the consequences of his guilty plea, the evidence against him, and the possible penalties he faced. It further determined that his plea was free from coercion or threats. Thus, the court ac- cepted his plea and adjudged him guilty of all the counts in the in- dictment. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 10 of 31 10 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 C. Presentence Investigation Prior to sentencing, a probation officer prepared Kanyadan’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which included a descrip- tion of the government’s calculations of the loss amount from the fraud scheme. Meta Tech billed Mohawk a total of $3,016,011.40, of which Mohawk paid $1,857,741.40. 2 Of that $1,857,741.40, Meta Tech paid its consultants $1,037,164 and pocketed the remaining $820,577.40. Thus, the government alleged that $820,577.40 was the actual loss amount Mohawk sustained. With respect to the in- tended loss amount for the invoices Mohawk had not paid, the gov- ernment multiplied the value of those invoices—$1,158,270—by 44.17%, the percentage of the paid invoices Meta Tech had pock- eted. Therefore, the total loss amount was the sum of the actual and intended loss amounts, or $1,332,193.38. The PSI indicated that Mohawk’s losses for the purposes of restitution totaled $1,245,231.26, which included an actual loss amount of $856,177; $359,609.41 in expenses related to responding to the government’s investigation; and $29,444.85 for the preparation of a victim impact statement and other legal documents. Additionally, the PSI calculated a base offense level of seven for Kanyadan but applied a 14-level enhancement, pursuant to Sec- tion 2B1.1(b)(1)(H), because the loss amount exceeded $550,000. It also added a two-level enhancement, under Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), because the offense involved sophisticated means. 2 Mohawk did not pay the remaining amount because it discovered the fraud. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 11 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 11 The PSI then added a four-level enhancement for Kanyadan’s lead- ership role, and a two-level enhancement because he had abused a position of trust. The PSI declined to apply a reduction for ac- ceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 29. It also assigned Kanyadan a criminal history category of I because he had no criminal history. Based on an offense level of 29 and a crim- inal history category of I, Kanyadan’s guideline range was 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. Kanyadan objected to various aspects of the PSI, including several of its factual statements regarding his offense conduct. He also objected to the PSI’s calculation of the loss amount, asserting that it was incorrect to use the difference between the amount Meta Tech paid its consultants and the amount Meta Tech billed Mohawk because Mohawk would not have been able to obtain the “wholesale price” for the IT services anywhere. Instead, Kanyadan maintained that the loss amount should be calculated by multiply- ing the hourly rate Meta Tech charged by the number of hours billed for work that was not done, which would yield a total loss amount of $211,206. Additionally, he objected to the 14-level en- hancement on the basis that the loss amount was less than $250,000 when calculated correctly. Furthermore, Kanyadan objected to the two-level sophisticated-means enhancement, asserting that the of- fense “was a simple overbilling scheme.” Finally, he objected to the exclusion of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The government filed a sentencing memorandum, in which it argued that Kanyadan should be required to pay Mohawk USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 12 of 31 12 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 $985,166.66 in restitution for losses from the fraud scheme and ex- penses related to the government’s investigation and prosecution of Kanyadan, including attorneys’ fees, in accordance with the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). Kanyadan also filed a sentencing memorandum, reiterating that the government’s loss amount calculation was incorrect and thus, he should not re- ceive the 14-level enhancement recommended by the PSI. Moreo- ver, he maintained that Mohawk’s claimed expenses for restitution were excessive. D. Sentencing At sentencing, the district court heard the parties’ arguments on the calculation of the loss amount. The government acknowl- edged that the money Meta Tech paid to its consultants for the work they performed should not be included in the loss amount because it represented real value provided to Mohawk. However, the government asserted that the money Meta Tech retained was part of the loss amount because the costs Meta Tech incurred to run the fraud scheme had not benefited Mohawk. Kanyadan main- tained that the fair market value of the services Meta Tech pro- vided should be deducted from the loss amount because the busi- ness decision to use outside contractors for the IT project was le- gitimate and he and his co-conspirators had performed duties out- side of their normal responsibilities. The district court ultimately agreed with the government, overruled Kanyadan’s objection, and adopted the 14-level enhancement. It stated that, while Kanya- dan’s argument was not meritless, he was nevertheless stealing USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 13 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 13 from Mohawk because Mohawk could have performed the work Meta Tech did. The court also overruled Kanyadan’s objection to the two-level sophisticated-means enhancement. It found that Kanya- dan’s fraud scheme was not simple, as it required Kanyadan to cre- ate a company, generate and submit invoices to Mohawk while evading detection, and invent e-mail addresses and fictitious peo- ple. However, it granted Kanyadan a two-level reduction for ac- ceptance of responsibility, which lowered his total offense level to 27 and his guideline range to 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. The district court then heard arguments on Kanyadan’s sen- tence. Kanyadan requested a substantial downward variance, em- phasizing that his personal history and characteristics warranted a lower sentence. The government reasserted its arguments regard- ing restitution and highlighted the serious and deceitful nature of Kanyadan’s conduct. Kanyadan also allocuted. He stated that he regretted letting Mohawk’s CEO down and explained that he orig- inally started Meta Tech to complete the IT project on time, but his plan went off track when Meta Tech began overbilling Mo- hawk. The district court determined that a sentence exceeding the guideline range was appropriate, considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It rejected Kanyadan’s contention that his rea- sons for starting Meta Tech were altruistic and stated that Kanya- dan had not expressed remorse or taken accountability. The court also noted that Kanyadan’s personal history and characteristics USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 14 of 31 14 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 weighed in his favor, but the nature of his offense did not. Thus, it sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The court also ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $985,166.66. It stated that it had considered “all of the things that ha[d] occurred” at the hearing and explained that the above-guideline sentence was justified by Kanya- dan’s culpability and lack of remorse. The court later entered a separate judgment to this effect. Kanyadan’s appeal followed. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW Generally, we review a district court’s denial of an eviden- tiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2014). We also review a district court’s decision not to dismiss an indictment for vindictive prose- cution for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kendrick, 682 F.3d 974, 981 (11th Cir. 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion if, in making the decision at issue, it applies the incorrect legal standard or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003). We review challenges to restitution orders raised for the first time on appeal only for plain error. United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2022). “To establish plain error, a defendant must show there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). “When neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it, there can be no plain error in regard to that issue.” Id.; see also United States v. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 15 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 15 Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f the explicit lan- guage of the statute or rule does not specifically resolve the issue, and there is no precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court directly resolving it, there is no plain error.”). We also review unobjected-to violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 for plain error. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019. Rule 11(b) provides the procedures district courts must follow when accepting guilty pleas to ensure they are made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018). “These procedures are designed to address the three ‘core objectives’ necessary for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea: (1) that the defendant enters his plea free from coer- cion, (2) that he understands the nature of the charges, and (3) that he understands the consequences of his plea.” Id. A Rule 11 viola- tion constitutes plain error only when the district court’s plea col- loquy “involv[ed] not only violations of explicit requirements of Rule 11, but also violations that resulted in a total or almost total failure to address a Rule 11 core concern.” Id. at 1239-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence un- der an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Caldwell, 81 F.4th 1160, 1175 (11th Cir. 2023). “A sentence is procedurally un- reasonable if the district court miscalculated the relevant guideline range for a defendant.” Id. at 1184. We review the district court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines de novo, United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc), USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 16 of 31 16 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 and its “findings of fact related to the imposition of sentencing en- hancements, including a finding that the defendant used sophisti- cated means, for clear error,” United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009). We also review a district court’s determina- tion of the loss amount for clear error. United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). Under the clear error standard, we “will not disturb a district court’s findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com- mitted.” Clarke, 562 F.3d at 1165 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of a sen- tence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023). In accord- ance with this standard, we will vacate a sentence only if “we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION As we noted at the outset, Kanyadan makes six different ar- guments on appeal. We address, and reject, each one in turn. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 17 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 17 A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kanyadan a hearing on his motion to dismiss. On appeal, Kanyadan argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant him a hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment for vindictive prosecution. He maintains that Mohawk sought his criminal prosecution because he filed an OSHA complaint and the government agreed to prosecute him for that reason alone. Kanyadan contends that under this “stalking horse” theory, which he urges us to adopt, his indictment should have been dismissed. He also asserts that he was entitled to a hear- ing on his motion because he established reasonable doubt as to the government’s motivation for prosecuting him.3 In response, the government maintains that we should not adopt the “stalking horse” theory of vindictive prosecution, and states that Kanyadan has not alleged that the prosecutor harbored animus toward him. It further submits that, even if we adopted the “stalking horse” theory, the district court did not err by finding that Kanyadan failed to establish Mohawk’s vindictiveness, as he did not 3 Kanyadan also asserts that he did not waive the issue of his entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment by pleading guilty. We decline to address this issue because Kanyadan’s claim fails on the merits. USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 18 of 31 18 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 present objective evidence that Mohawk “prevailed upon” the gov- ernment to prosecute him or that Mohawk’s animus was the only reason for Kanyadan’s prosecution. Generally, courts lack authority to interfere with a decision to prosecute if the prosecutor has “probable cause to believe the accused has committed a crime.” United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006). However, under the doctrine of vin- dictive prosecution, a prosecution initiated for the purpose of retal- iating against a defendant for exercising his statutory or constitu- tional rights is prohibited by the Due Process Clause. United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 361 (11th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (providing that “while an individ- ual certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as cer- tainly may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right”). Where a presumption of vindictiveness does not apply, such as in the pre-trial context, a defendant must estab- lish actual vindictiveness. See Barner, 441 F.3d at 1316‒17. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refus- ing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Kanyadan’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Kanyadan acknowledges that we have not adopted a theory of vindictive prosecution based on animus harbored by a private third party. However, his motion to dismiss the indictment was entirely premised upon Mohawk’s alleged animus; he did not argue that the prosecutor himself charged Kanyadan in retaliation for exercising his statutory or constitutional rights or otherwise en- gaged in vindictive prosecution. Thus, Kanyadan was not entitled USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 19 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 19 to relief on his motion to dismiss the indictment because it was based on a legal theory that has not been accepted in this Circuit. Id. at 1315. As a result, the district court was not required to afford Kanyadan an evidentiary hearing on that motion, and it did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for one. Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1328. B. Kanyadan’s guilty plea should not be set aside because the district court complied with Rule 11. Kanyadan also asks us to set aside his guilty plea because the district court did not comply with Rule 11 for several reasons. However, Kanyadan did not raise any such objections at the change-of-plea hearing. Thus, we review his argument only for plain error. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019. First, Kanyadan asserts that the district court violated Rule 11(b)(1)(G) by allowing the government to inform him of the ele- ments of his offenses and by failing to ask him if he understood the nature of his charges. Rule 11(b)(1)(G) requires that the court “in- form the defendant of, and determine that the defendant under- stands,” “the nature of each charge to which the defendant is plead- ing.” Fed. R. Crim P. 11(b)(1)(G); see Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. However, there is no “mechanical rule for determining whether the district court adequately informed the defendant of the nature of the charges,” and a district court is not required to read a defend- ant the elements of an offense. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether a district court complied with Rule 11(b)(1)(G), the relevant inquiry is USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 20 of 31 20 Opinion of the Court 25-11043 “whether [the defendant] understood what he was admitting and that what he was admitting constituted the crime charged.” Id. at 1240 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Kanyadan has not established a Rule 11(b)(1)(G) vio- lation. The record demonstrates that Kanyadan understood the na- ture of the charges to which he was pleading guilty. At his change-of-plea hearing, Kanyadan agreed to inform the court if he did not understand any of the topics discussed or questions posed. He confirmed that he had discussed his case with his attorneys and articulated that he was pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and seven counts of wire fraud. Additionally, Kanyadan expressly agreed with the facts the government recited and admitted that he was guilty of every charge. Kanyadan also had two higher education degrees and was the CIO of a large com- pany, further supporting the conclusion he understood the nature of his charges. See id. at 1238 (explaining that the adequacy of a plea colloquy depends in part on “the defendant’s intelligence and sophistication”). Contrary to Kanyadan’s implications, the court was not required to read the elements of the charges. Id. It ac- cepted his guilty plea after confirming that Kanyadan had made it voluntarily and with knowledge of the charged offenses. That find- ing was not plainly erroneous. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019. Second, Kanyadan asserts that the district court made im- proper and coercive statements that implied that a jury would not believe his defense, which contributed to his decision to plead USCA11 Case: 25-11043 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 Page: 21 of 31 25-11043 Opinion of the Court 21 guilty. 4 Rule 11(c)(1) prohibits the district court from participating in discussions regarding a plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1); United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). In determining whether a Rule 11(c)(1) error affected a defendant’s substantial rights in the context of plain-error review, we evaluate “whether it was reasonably probable that, but for the district court’s exhortations, the defendant would have exercised his right to go to trial.” Harrell, 751 F.3d at 1236–37 (internal quotation marks omitted, alterations adopted). The specific facts and circum- stances of a case, such as whether the defendant later testified un- der oath that he was not coerced into pleading guilty, matter in analyzing whether a district court’s comment affected a defend- ant’s decision to plead guilty. United States v. Castro, 736 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, Kanyadan has not established that the district court plainly erred by commenting on Kanyadan’s theory that the gov- ernment prosecuted him at Mohawk’s urging after he filed his OSHA complaint. Although the district court expressed doubt as to whether the jury would believe this theory, it did so in the con- text of addressing the gov