United States v. Justin Dale Sigmon

USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 1 of 25 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-14236 ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JUSTIN DALE SIGMON, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20294-KMW-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. MARCUS, Circuit Judge: Justin Dale Sigmon appeals from his conviction, after trial by jury, for knowingly engaging in sexual contact with his nine-year- old daughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5). The charge stemmed from an incident during a family cruise to the Bahamas. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 2 of 25 2 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 During dinner in one of the ship’s dining rooms, Sigmon repeatedly reached under his daughter’s dress and rubbed her upper and inner thighs. Two concerned onlookers testified that Sigmon actually reached for her groin area, and one of them recorded Sigmon’s con- duct. On appeal, Sigmon raises two claims of error. First, he ar- gues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the mens rea element of the crime (i.e., “an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”). Sec- ond, he contends that the jury was exposed to prejudicial extrinsic evidence, namely, unredacted forfeiture allegations contained in the indictment. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we remain unpersuaded. The evidence against Sigmon -- including multiple video recordings, eyewitness accounts, and his own excul- patory denials -- was sufficient to prove the necessary intent be- yond a reasonable doubt. And while the jury was exposed to ex- trinsic evidence in the form of the unredacted forfeiture allega- tions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the government rebutted the presumption of prejudice arising from the exposure. We affirm. I. A. This sad story began when, in May 2023, Justin Sigmon, his wife (Ollea “Rita” Sigmon), and their two daughters (aged 15 and 9) took a four-day Carnival Cruise from Miami to the Bahamas. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 3 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 3 The cruise was meant to celebrate the Sigmons’ 25th wedding an- niversary. On the second night of the cruise, the family ate dinner in one of the ship’s dining rooms. Because it was a “formal” night, the family was dressed up; Sigmon’s younger daughter wore a knee-length dress. The first twenty-or-so minutes of the dinner passed unevent- fully. Then, as the family waited for their meals, Sigmon’s younger daughter got up off the chair next to him and climbed into her fa- ther’s lap. The family continued its conversation. After a few minutes passed, Sigmon reached his hand under his daughter’s dress and touched her upper and inner thighs. The daughter vig- orously pushed Sigmon’s hand away, and he desisted for about a minute. However, he then repeated the action, rubbing his daugh- ter’s upper and inner thighs for a little more than three-and-a-half minutes. Sigmon’s daughter pushed his hand away at least four more times during the critical minutes. The video also recorded the daughter crossing her legs about a minute-and-a-half into the incident. This did not prevent Sigmon from continuing to touch his daughter. In all, the entire episode lasted about five minutes. Sigmon’s actions did not escape detection. At the very next table over, two cruise patrons, Venus Burgess and Veronica Hill, noticed what was occurring. From their vantage point -- which was no more than a few feet from Sigmon’s table -- Sigmon was attempting to touch his daughter’s vaginal area in addition to USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 4 of 25 4 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 touching her inner thighs. Concerned about what she was witness- ing, Burgess discretely video-recorded the incident on her cell phone. Burgess subsequently provided her videos to Carnival’s cruise security personnel. Burgess’s videos led the security officers to pull surveillance footage taken in the dining room from their own CCTV system. After reviewing the footage, Rajesh Nala- wabe, the chief security officer on the vessel, decided to approach Sigmon. He pulled Sigmon aside while the family was attending a show, and he explained the nature of the complaint. During this exchange, Sigmon showed Nalawabe his police identification, which indicated that Sigmon was a Deputy Sheriff in Virginia. At that point, Nalawabe decided to disengage, leaving Sigmon and his family to continue the cruise. Nevertheless, Nalawabe contacted the Cruise Line’s duty investigator in Miami, who reported the matter to law enforcement authorities in the area. The complaint soon reached the FBI. Based on what they had learned, three officers with Customs and Border Protection were sent to meet the cruise ship when it returned to Miami. The officers escorted Sigmon to a secondary inspection area. As they walked to the secondary inspection area, Sigmon asked if they were detaining him because of the incident with his daughter, and “made a comment . . . that he was just trying to keep her warm.” The of- ficers collected Sigmon’s iPhone, and, with his consent, searched it. The phone contained approximately 10,000 photos, a large per- USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 5 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 5 centage of which were of the defendant’s younger daughter. No- tably, however, neither the CBP officers nor FBI agents found any child sexual abuse materials on Sigmon’s phone during their search. FBI agents, including Special Agent Daniel Lemaitre, inter- viewed Sigmon in the secondary inspection area. 1 Sigmon initially offered a benign explanation for his conduct, saying that he was just providing “fatherly love.” However, after the agents finished showing Sigmon a video of the incident, his tone changed, and he became defensive. He eventually admitted that his behavior was “inappropriate” and “didn’t look right.” However, he told the FBI agents that the touching was not sexual in nature. When the FBI agents pointed out that Sigmon had covered his genitals after his daughter got off his lap, Sigmon became angry and said that there was a “zero percent chance” he was aroused. After the interview, the FBI arrested Sigmon. B. About a month-and-a-half after his arrest, a federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Florida indicted Sigmon. The grand jury charged him in a single count: knowingly engaging in sexual contact with a person under 12 years old, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5). Importantly for purposes of this appeal, the 1 Sigmon waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed; this was not recorded. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 6 of 25 6 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 indictment also contained forfeiture allegations, which read this way: 1. The allegations of this Indictment are hereby re- alleged and by this reference fully incorporated herein for the purpose of alleging forfeiture to the United States of America of certain property in which the Defendant, Justin Dale Sigmon, has an interest. 2. Upon conviction of a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2244, as alleged in this Indict- ment, the Defendant shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253(a): a. Any visual depiction described in Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2251, 2251A, or 2252, or any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, or other matter which contains any such visual depiction, which was produced, transported, mailed, shipped or received in vi- olation of Title 18, United States Code, Chap- ter 110; b. Any property, real or personal, constituting or traceable to gross profits or other proceeds ob- tained from such offense; and c. Any property, real or personal, used or in- tended to be used to commit or to promote the commission of such offense or any property traceable to such property. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 7 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 7 All pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253(a) and the procedures set forth in Title 21, United States Code, Section 853, as incorporated by Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253(b). The statutory citations in the forfeiture allegations -- 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252 -- all reference various federal prohibi- tions relating to child pornography, but no reference was made to child pornography in the forfeiture provision. During the four-day trial, the government introduced sur- veillance footage from the cruise ship’s dining room. It also called seven witnesses, including Venus Burgess, Veronica Hill, Rajesh Nalawabe, and Daniel Lemaitre. Its three remaining witnesses were Dr. Jamie Dickson, a psychologist, Alberto Silva, one of the CBP officers who detained Sigmon, and Jasmine Rivera, an FBI fo- rensic examiner. Dr. Dickson testified about typical grooming be- havior and discussed various ways children can respond to sexual abuse. Silva discussed the CBP’s initial detention of Sigmon and the search of his phone. And the government introduced a variety of images and text messages taken from Sigmon’s phone in the course of Rivera’s testimony. The images included pictures of Sig- mon’s younger daughter sitting on Sigmon’s lap and photographs of the daughter bathing. At the conclusion of the government’s case, Sigmon unsuc- cessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Sigmon called eight de- fense witnesses, including himself. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 8 of 25 8 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 Sigmon acknowledged that he touched his daughter’s upper thigh. He vigorously denied, however, that he did so with the “in- tent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,” language drawn from the charge. He offered a variety of exculpatory claims, including, among many others, the following: (1) That he did not touch his daughter’s “bottom” or “private parts.” (2) That he “kn[ew] where [his] head was. [He] wasn’t touching anything inappropriate or hav[ing] any kind of sexual thoughts[.]” (3) That “there was nothing sexual going on.” (4) That “[t]here was no intent for any kind of trying to figure how to get sexual or gratified. The whole sex thing is -- [he] can’t even think about that. It’s not true.” (5) That “the whole thought of a sexual event is not even on the table[.]” (6) That he was “just rubbing [his daughter’s] leg as a caring dad, nothing more.” (7) That “[he] was distracted . . . [his] hand was too high, but it was nothing going on sexual.” USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 9 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 9 (8) That “[he’s] never even thought of [his] child in her life as sexual, so [he’s] not even going -- this is not a sexual event when [he’s] never even thought of her in a sexual way.” During another part of his testimony, Sigmon acknowl- edged that he had shown his police identification to cruise security personnel when he was confronted. He explained his action as “giv[ing] this guy that [he] never met before some perspective,” be- cause “[u]sually as a police officer, they are, you know, upstanding people.” He added that he had never possessed any child sexual abuse materials. Sigmon also offered the testimony of Dr. Mark Mills, a fo- rensic psychiatrist. Over the government’s objection, Dr. Mills ex- plained that he administered two tests of psychopathology to Sig- mon. He opined, “I feel fairly confident that I ruled out Mr. Sigmon having any kind of serious mental disorder that would lead poten- tially to the possibility of him having pedophilia. For other reasons, I don’t believe that he suffers from that disorder.” Sigmon’s wife followed Dr. Mills. She testified that her husband’s behavior was not inappropriate in context; that Sigmon did not touch their daughter’s genitals; and that she would not lie to protect him. Fi- nally, Sigmon offered a series of character witnesses, who attested to his positive reputation in the community. They explained, USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 10 of 25 10 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 among other things, that he was an honest man, and that they trusted Sigmon with their children. 2 At the close of all the evidence, the defendant renewed his Rule 29 motion, again to no avail. During closing argument, Sig- mon’s lawyer observed that FBI forensic investigators “looked . . . all over [Sigmon’s] phone” and “found nothing having to do with child pornography, nothing having to do with genitals, no images of any genitals or erections.” During her reply, the prosecutor countered this way: Defense counsel said there was no child pornography on his phone. The phone that he used for his personal use was a work phone. This man is No. 2 in the sher- iff’s office. He’s not going to have child pornography on his phone. He also said he deleted items on the cruise after cruise ship security confronted him. We don’t know what that is; and, unfortunately, we can’t recover all deleted information. We’ll never know. But if he had no child pornography on his phone ever, it wouldn’t be a surprise; right? Because he’s trying to make sure that he’s not discovered. The jury deliberated for about three hours before returning a guilty verdict. 2 The remaining defense witness was Special Agent Daniel Lemaitre, who the defense recalled to highlight a relatively minor inconsistency in his earlier tes- timony. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 11 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 11 C. Thirteen days later, the district court held a status confer- ence. It informed the parties that the jury may have seen an unre- dacted version of the indictment, which included the forfeiture al- legations. The Clerk of Court had a standing policy of redacting forfeiture allegations before sending the indictment into the jury room during the jury’s deliberation. However, when the clerk’s of- fice uploaded the jury materials to the docket in Sigmon’s case, it discovered that the indictment had not been redacted. The district court solicited briefing from the parties on how to handle the situ- ation, and it ordered an additional amicus brief from the Federal Public Defender. Sigmon subsequently filed a post-trial motion for a judg- ment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial based (in relevant part) on the jury’s exposure to the forfeiture allegations. 3 He ar- gued that the government had failed to establish the requisite mens rea, or in the alternative, that the mens rea evidence adduced was so weak that when measured against the unredacted forfeiture allega- tions, the verdict was fatally tainted. The Federal Defender also sought a new trial for Sigmon, arguing (1) that the jury had indeed seen the unredacted indictment, (2) that the district court must pre- sume prejudice from the exposure to extrinsic information, and (3) that the government could not carry its burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice. For its part, the government maintained 3 Sigmon raised two additional claims for a new trial based on the district court’s exclusion of evidence. He has not renewed them on appeal. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 12 of 25 12 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 that (a) the evidence -- particularly the video evidence -- was suffi- cient to convict Sigmon; (b) the jury was not exposed to extrinsic information; and (c) even if the jury was exposed, the exposure was harmless. Over the stated opposition of all parties (and the Federal De- fender), the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to de- termine whether the jury was exposed to the forfeiture allegations contained in the indictment. Eleven of the twelve jurors attended the hearing. The trial court provided each juror with the unre- dacted two-page indictment -- which included the forfeiture allega- tions -- and asked each of them, separately, “[d]o you recall reading or having read to you the entirety of the allegations in the indict- ment? That would be pages one through two.” Six of the jurors said they read the entire unredacted indictment. 4 The district court did not ask any further questions. Three months later, the district court issued an omnibus or- der denying Sigmon’s Rule 29 motion and his motion for a new trial. As for the jury exposure issue, the court determined that the jury had indeed been exposed to extrinsic evidence, thereby squarely placing the burden on the government to rebut the pre- sumption of prejudice. However, having invoked a four-part test set out by this Court, the district court concluded that Sigmon sus- 4 The district court counted seven jurors as having read the entire indictment -- our review of the transcript reveals only six. The precise number is imma- terial, however. Either way, many jurors saw the unredacted indictment. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 13 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 13 tained no prejudice. Among other things, the district court ob- served that the forfeiture allegations were not damaging to the de- fendant, because the jury could not have read them to refer in any way to child sexual abuse materials. It further observed that the trial witnesses had uniformly denied finding child sexual abuse ma- terials on Sigmon’s cell phone. Finally, as for the sufficiency claim, the district court observed that there was no legitimate explanation for Sigmon’s touching, on multiple occasions his daughter had tried to move her father’s hand away from her leg, and the district court concluded that his daughter was clearly uncomfortable. The trial court determined that, taking all the evidence in a light most favor- able to the government, sufficient evidence had been adduced to establish the defendant’s requisite intent to harass beyond a reason- able doubt. The district court sentenced Sigmon to a 24-month term of imprisonment, a ten-year term of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Sigmon timely appealed to this Court. II. We review a denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo. United States v. Hill, 119 F.4th 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2024). In doing so, we “review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and make all credibility determina- tions in support of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Hernandez, 167 F.4th 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). “[A] con- viction will be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 14 of 25 14 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation modified). The crime of abusive sexual contact with a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5), has three basic elements: (1) while in the special mari- time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the defendant (2) knowingly (3) engages, or attempts to engage, in “sexual con- tact” with a minor younger than 12 years old. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5). “Sexual contact” means “the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]” Id. § 2246(3). Sigmon claims that the evidence presented at trial was insuf- ficient to prove that he had “an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” He argues that the video itself offers no proof of his intent. We are unpersuaded. The federal courts have long held that a defendant’s mental state in a sex crimes case can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense. Thus, for example, in United States v. Lee, 232 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a conviction when the defendant entered a minor’s bed- room at night and touched her genital area. It required no addi- tional evidence of intent. Id. at 655–56. The court explained that “the jury may infer the defendant’s intent” when “the contact al- leged is . . . clearly sexual.” Id. at 655. It elaborated, “[v]iewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and in the absence of any USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 15 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 15 suggestion that the touching occurred in furtherance of a non-sex- ual purpose . . . such behavior implies its own intent.” Id. at 656. The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed that holding in United States v. Gal- lardo, 970 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2020), and in United States v. Hollow Horn, 523 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2008). Both cases involved (among other things) a defendant touching a minor victim’s genitals through the victim’s clothing. In each, the court concluded that the conduct itself was sufficient to allow a jury to infer the requisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gallardo, 970 F.3d at 1045; Hollow Horn, 523 F.3d at 885, 891. The Tenth Circuit’s case law is much the same. In United States v. Norman T., 129 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 1997), a juvenile defend- ant was charged with aggravated sexual abuse. The specific allega- tion was that he digitally penetrated the victim’s genital area. Id. at 1101. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish “an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” Id. at 1103–04. The appellate court rejected the claim, concluding that “[a] rational trier of fact could have found Norman T. acted with the required intent based on the circumstances surrounding the incident.” Id. at 1104. Thus, “[o]ne would be hard pressed to think of a reason he might have done this except [with the requisite intent].” Id. at 1104; see also United States v. Aguilar, 168 F.4th 1319, 1323–24, 1328–30 (10th Cir. 2026) (concluding that the circumstances “tend[ed] to ex- clude any purpose other than sexual gratification” when the de- fendant touched the victim’s breasts and vaginal area). USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 16 of 25 16 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 Finally, while our Court does not have a case directly on point, we too have long held that the defendant’s requisite mental state can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the of- fense. See, e.g., United States v. Vigil-Montanel, 753 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A defendant’s intent can be inferred from his conduct and all the surrounding circumstances.”); United States v. Roberson, 998 F.3d 1237, 1249 n.15 (11th Cir. 2021) (same). In this case, a ra- tional jury could have concluded, as it plainly did, from the sur- rounding circumstances that Sigmon had the requisite criminal in- tent. Eyewitnesses Burgess and Hill -- who had a better vantage point than the ship’s surveillance footage offered -- each testified that Sigmon rubbed his daughter’s thighs, and that his hand touched the girl’s groin area, not just her inner thighs. What’s more, the evidence adduced, both video and testimonial, revealed that on multiple occasions, the daughter moved her father’s hand away, and on one occasion, crossed her legs. Nevertheless, the de- fendant’s conduct continued. The jury credited the eyewitnesses and drew inferences from the videos it had seen, while flatly reject- ing Sigmon’s testimony to the contrary. Quite simply, the jury was free to discredit, as it did, the father’s legitimate explanation for his conduct, and determine that the defendant intended to abuse, hu- miliate, harass, or degrade the victim. Sigmon relies on United States v. Goldesberry, 128 F.4th 1183 (10th Cir. 2025), which held that “the government cannot prove mens rea simply by repeatedly proving actus re[a.]” Id. at 1200. But USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 17 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 17 the circumstances in the Goldesberry case were profoundly different from those at issue here. There, the defendant’s minor daughter climbed into his bed after having a nightmare. The defendant, who had been asleep, claimed that he thought that his daughter was his wife, and touched her “under her underwear.” Id. at 1186 (citation modified). The government offered no substantial proof of the de- fendant’s mens rea and the circumstances were unusual. The inci- dent occurred in a completely dark bedroom, the defendant had been asleep when the daughter entered, and there was no indica- tion that the defendant knew his wife had left the room and been replaced by his daughter. Id. at 1196–98. There was precious little, in context, that the government could rely on to yield a sufficient inference that defendant had the requisite mens rea. Here, in con- trast, the defendant illicitly touched his daughter over a five-minute period; his hand (as we’ve noted) was regularly pushed away; the dining room was brightly lit; eyewitnesses were seated nearby; and their testimony was unambiguous about how the child was touched. The government did not have to rely solely on the video ev- idence. It has also pointed to the testimony of Sigmon himself, which the jury had to reject in order to make the finding that it did. When a defendant takes the stand after the district court has denied a Rule 29 motion, he “waive[s] all objections to the court’s denial of [that] motion” and “[t]he reviewing court will examine all of the evidence, and not limit its review to the evidence presented in the case-in-chief.” United States v. Alejandro, 118 F.3d 1518, 1520–21 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Thomas, 8 F.3d 1552, 1558 n.12 (11th USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 18 of 25 18 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 Cir. 1993). It is well-established in this Circuit that “a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as sub- stantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Alejandro, 118 F.3d at 1521 (quoting United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995)). That rule has “‘special force’ where . . . highly subjective elements, such as intent, are to be proved.” Id. (quoting Brown, 53 F.3d at 315); see also United States v. Chalker, 966 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2020) (same). Sigmon repeatedly denied that his touching was inappropri- ate or sexual in any way. Indeed, at his counsel’s prompting, he specifically denied each component of the mens rea requirement. 5 5 During direct examination, the questioning went this way: Counsel: Justin, did you touch your daughter intending to abuse her? Sigmon: Absolutely not. I would never. Counsel: To humiliate her? Sigmon: No. Counsel: To harass her? Sigmon: No. Counsel: To degrade her? Sigmon: No. Counsel: To arouse her? Sigmon: No. Counsel: To gratify your sexual desire? Sigmon: Absolutely not. Counsel: Or the sexual desire of anyone? USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 19 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 19 As we’ve noted, the jury disbelieved Sigmon’s testimony, and was permitted to infer the opposite of what he said. United States v. Wil- liams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the jury, hearing [the Defendant’s] words and seeing [his] demeanor, was entitled to dis- believe the Defendant’s testimony and, in fact, to believe the oppo- site of what [he] said.”); see also Chalker, 966 F.3d at 1188 (similar). The evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict that the defendant had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5). III. “Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). Accordingly, if “jurors consider extrinsic evidence, a new trial is required if the evidence poses a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1219 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). We evaluate a claim that the jury was exposed to extrinsic evidence using a well-established burden-shifting framework. United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1182 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). First, the defendant has the burden of making a “colora- ble showing” that the jury was exposed to extraneous information. Id. If the defendant carries that burden, the court presumes preju- Sigmon: No. USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 20 of 25 20 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 dice, and the burden shifts to the government to show that the ju- rors’ consideration of extrinsic evidence was harmless to the de- fendant. Id. In making that determination, the court is required to consider all the circumstances, including “(1) the nature of the ex- trinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which it reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner of the court’s inquiry into the juror issues; and, (4) the strength of the govern- ment’s case.” Id. Since that determination is a “judgment call” and the district court “has a better vantage point,” Whatley, 719 F.3d at 1219, we review only for abuse of discretion the denial of a new trial based on the submission of extrinsic material to the jury. Id. The district court found that some jurors (at least six) had been exposed to the unredacted indictment, thereby shifting the burden to the United States to rebut the presumption of prejudice by showing that the unredacted indictment created no “reasonable possibility of prejudice.” The trial court concluded that the gov- ernment had properly rebutted the presumption. Sigmon urges us that the district court’s determination amounted to an abuse of dis- cretion, claiming that the trial court applied the wrong legal stand- ard and committed a clear error in judgment in balancing the rele- vant factors. 6 6 The government, for its part, argues that the district court need not have presumed prejudice in the first place. That argument is understandable, as “this Court, on at least two later occasions, has stated that prejudice is not pre- sumed even when jurors considered extrinsic evidence.” United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Because we conclude that the district court here did not abuse its discretion in finding that USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 21 of 25 24-14236 Opinion of the Court 21 We are unpersuaded. As for the first claim, the district court faithfully articulated the government’s burden and recounted the government’s arguments against prejudice at length. The court correctly applied the four factors we have considered, and it ex- plained that “based on the nature of the extrinsic evidence and the strength of the government’s case, the jury’s exposure to the unre- dacted indictment did not prejudice Sigmon.” The district court did not misstate the law. Nor did the district court commit a clear error of judgment in concluding that the government had rebutted the presumption of prejudice. The district court appropriately applied each of the four factors and concluded they pointed toward a finding of harm- lessness. Factors two and three require little discussion. Starting with factor two, the way the information reached the jury was innocu- ous. It was, after all, the district court -- rather than the government -- that sent the indictment in an unredacted form into the jury room. During a status conference, the court explained, “[t]ypically I give [the jury instructions, the verdict form, and the indictment] to the courtroom deputy, who typically gives it to counsel for view- ing, along with the exhibits that go into the jury room.” Perhaps the government rebutted the presumption of prejudice, we need not resolve whether the district court was correct to apply a presumption in the first in- stance. See id. at 1299 n.36; Siegelman, 640 F.3d at 1182 n.33; Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1305 n.9 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994). USCA11 Case: 24-14236 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 11/12/2026 Page: 22 of 25 22 Opinion of the Court 24-14236 the government or the defendant should have