Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 1 of 18 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-10547 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ERICK COLLINS, a.k.a. Big E, a.k.a. E, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cr-00098-RSB-CLR-5 ____________________ Before LAGOA, ANDERSON, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 2 of 18 2 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 Erick Collins appeals his convictions for conspiracy to pos- sess controlled substances with the intent to distribute and to dis- tribute and for possession of fentanyl with the intent to distribute. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. The government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance of the district court’s judgment, ar- guing that Collins did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on appeal and that his unconditional guilty plea waived his right to challenge all non-jurisdictional defects on appeal, including the dis- trict court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Collins responds that we should not hold him to his waiver for several reasons, including that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he reasonably believed he was preserving his right to appeal the denial of his mo- tion to suppress, that there is a substantial question if his counsel was competent, and that we should consider his argument due to Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). He also requests to sup- plement the record with an e-mail of his communications with the government before his plea below, that we remand for more pro- ceedings about the circumstances of the plea below, and that we provide him leave to file a supplemental brief as to why his plea was not knowing and voluntary. For the reasons discussed below, we grant the government’s motion, deny Collins’s requests, and affirm. I. Collins was arrested at a motel in Statesboro, Georgia, in March 2024. He was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 3 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 3 to distribute and to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, fentanyl, methamphetamine, oxycodone, and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1), and for possession of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 16) in October. During the pretrial proceedings, Collins filed motions to suppress statements he had made to law enforcement officers at the time of his arrest and to suppress the physical evidence obtained from the motel. After a hearing and supplemental briefing, the magistrate judge recommended granting Collins’s motion to suppress his statements but denying his motion to suppress the physical evi- dence. Collins objected, but the district court overruled his objec- tion and adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommenda- tions. Collins’s attorney apparently engaged in an e-mail exchange with the government, in which she stated that Collins “intends to enter a plea but preserve his appellate rights, so he would not like to enter into the government’s proposed agreement.” The e-mail exchange is not part of the record and was submitted to this Court as an exhibit on appeal. The government apparently responded by stating, “I understand your position,” but advised that a plea must be made on the record. Collins then entered a guilty plea without a plea agreement. The district court held a Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing and found that Collins knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty. However, Collins’s prior motions were not discussed at the change-of-plea hearing. USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 4 of 18 4 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 Collins later indicated in his sentencing memorandum that he had pled guilty without a plea agreement “to further litigate the issues presented in his pretrial motions” on appeal. At the sentenc- ing hearing, he asserted that he had not accepted the government’s plea agreement because he “felt like . . . [his] rights [were] violated.” His attorney also reiterated his desire to appeal. Collins was sen- tenced to a total of 120 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a five-year term of supervision. II. Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as in “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights de- nied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 We review whether a voluntary unconditional guilty plea waives a defendant’s ability to appeal adverse rulings of pre-trial motions de novo. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). However, when a defendant “fails to object to a Rule 11 violation in the district court, [we] review[]” the alleged violation for plain error only. United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir- cuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 5 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 5 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). “Under plain-error review, the defendant has the burden to show that there is (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). When “the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain er- ror where” our precedent and the Supreme Court’s precedent do not directly resolve it. United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1310 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). To meet the third prong, a defendant alleging “plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). If all three requirements are met, we may reverse only if “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public rep- utation of judicial proceedings.” Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349 (quota- tion marks omitted, alteration in original). Moreover, an appellant abandons a claim where he makes it only in passing reference or “in a perfunctory manner” without au- thority or argument in support. United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 1196, 1204 n.5 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). On ap- peal, issues not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed abandoned and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum- stances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Courts may also “resurrect” forfeited issues, which were not timely asserted, sua sponte in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 872 (quotation marks omitted). We have identified five situ- ations in which it may use its discretion to consider a forfeited issue: USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 6 of 18 6 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 (1) the issue involves a pure question of law and re- fusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party lacked an opportunity to raise the issue at the district court level; (3) the interest of substantial justice is at stake; (4) the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents signifi- cant questions of general impact or of great public concern. Id. at 873. Separate from the issue of abandonment, “[a] defendant’s unconditional plea of guilty, made knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit of competent counsel, waives all non-jurisdictional defects in that defendant’s court proceedings.” United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omit- ted, alteration adopted). “A defendant who wishes to preserve ap- pellate review of a non-jurisdictional defect while at the same time pleading guilty can do so only by entering a ‘conditional plea’” un- der Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Id. Rule 11(a)(2) provides: With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determina- tion of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). “The conditional plea must be in writing and must be consented to by the court and by the government.” USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 7 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 7 Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155. Thus, where the government does not pro- vide “express approval” for the defendant to plead conditionally, the plea is not conditional for Rule 11 purposes. Id. at 1156. Moreover, “[a] valid guilty plea also renders irrelevant—and thereby prevents the defendant from appealing—the constitution- ality of case-related government conduct that takes place before the plea is entered.” Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 182 (2018). Thus, non-jurisdictional issues waived by an unconditional guilty plea include the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983)); see also United States v. McCoy, 477 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a district court’s refusal to suppress evi- dence is non-jurisdictional and is waived by a guilty plea). However, a defendant’s entry of an unconditional guilty plea does not preclude relief on appeal if the defendant can show that his guilty plea was invalid. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1156-57. Under Rule 11, before a court can accept a guilty plea, it must inform the defendant of his rights should he plead not guilty, the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties, and the court’s obliga- tion to calculate his advisory guideline range and to consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(E), (G)–(M). The court must also explain that a guilty plea waives the defendant’s trial rights and must ensure that the plea is entered voluntarily and is supported by an adequate factual basis. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(F), (b)(2)–(3). Further, the court USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 8 of 18 8 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 must explain that the defendant can be prosecuted for perjury for testifying falsely under oath. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A). Thus, the appealability of a guilty plea depends on its valid- ity. For a guilty plea to be valid, the district court must, in accept- ing the defendant’s plea, “specifically address the three ‘core prin- ciples’” of Rule 11 by “ensuring that a defendant (1) enters his guilty plea free from coercion, (2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands the consequences of his plea.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). Regarding the first core principle, Rule 11(b)(2) elaborates that the court must ensure that the plea “did not result from force, threats, or prom- ises” not included in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). Whether the court has complied with the second core principle “varies from case to case depending on the complexity of the charges and the defendant’s intelligence and sophistication.” United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2018). To comply with the third core principle, the district court must in- form the defendant of the rights that he gives up by pleading guilty, including the court’s authority to impose certain punishments and the possibility of a perjury prosecution for false statements during the plea colloquy. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). “There is a strong presumption that the statements made during the [plea] colloquy are true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). In determining if the court met the core principles, we look to the entire record, not just the plea colloquy. See Presendieu, 880 USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 9 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 9 F.3d at 1239–40. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, the record on appeal consists of: “(1) the original papers and exhib- its filed in the district court; (2) the transcript of proceedings, if any; and (3) a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(a). We have indicated that for a Rule 11 error to substantially prejudice a defendant’s rights, it must be tantamount to the district court’s “total or almost total failure to address a Rule 11 core con- cern,” as distinct from a situation in which the court “adequately addressed the three core concerns but slipped-up and failed to cover explicitly one item in the Rule 11 list.” Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1355 (quotation marks omitted). For example, we have held that, even when the district court failed to inform the defendant of nu- merous Rule 11 items, all the omissions, even when taken together, did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because he ex- pressly admitted to his guilt without qualification, and there was no indication that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the Rule 11 errors. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1018–20. In Pierre, we held that the third core concern was not satis- fied, and that “[b]ecause Pierre entered—and the district court ac- cepted—[his] guilty plea only on the reasonable (but mistaken) be- lief that Pierre had preserved the speedy trial issues for appeal, his plea was, as a matter of law, not knowing and voluntary.” 120 F.3d at 1156–57. We explained that “[t]he plea colloquy unequivocally indicate[d] that Pierre intended to plead guilty on the condition that—and only after having been assured by the district court judge USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 10 of 18 10 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 that—he had preserved the speedy trial issues for appeal.” Id. at 1155. Hence, due to Pierre’s reasonable belief that he preserved the speedy trial issue for appeal, Pierre’s guilty plea violated a Rule 11 core concern, as “he could not have understood its conse- quences.” Id. at 1156–57. In concluding that Pierre’s belief was reasonable, we cited to Carrasco, which held that “‘Carrasco rea- sonably could have believed that her plea was conditional, based on both previous discussions with the assistant U.S. attorney and the ambiguous exchange in the courtroom.’” Id. at 1156 (quoting United States v. Carrasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986), over- ruled in part by United States v. Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007)). As a result, we vacated Pierre’s conviction and instructed the dis- trict court to offer him the opportunity to plead anew on remand, despite Pierre’s entry of an unconditional guilty plea. Id. at 1157. By contrast, in United States v. Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 903 (2025), we held that a defendant’s guilty plea waived his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion and that the plea was knowing and voluntary. Shadon Ed- wards pleaded guilty to the possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. at 1273–74. Edwards moved to suppress physical evidence, but the district court denied his motion. Id. at 1274. Edwards pled guilty through “a written plea agreement that neither expressly preserved nor expressly waived his right to appeal.” Id. At the change-of-plea hearing, the district judge found that Edwards knowingly, voluntarily, and in- telligently entered the plea, but that the colloquy did not address whether Edwards had forfeited his right to appeal the denial of the USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 11 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 11 suppression motion. Id. at 1274–75. At the sentencing hearing, “Edwards’s lawyer asked the judge to appoint separate counsel to appeal the earlier denial of the motion to suppress,” and the court “asked the lawyers whether there was a formal agreement.” Id. at 1275. Edwards’s counsel stated that he did not remember an ap- pellate waiver, and the court suggested that Edwards therefore had the right to appeal the suppression ruling. Id. On appeal, Edwards argued that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand that, as a conse- quence of his plea, he could not appeal the suppression ruling. Id. at 1275-76. However, under plain error review, we held that Ed- wards’s plea was knowing and voluntary, reasoning that Edwards did not point to any “statement by him, his lawyer, or the district judge” at the plea hearing that he did not understand the conse- quences of his plea or that he “wanted to—or thought he could— appeal the denied suppression motion.” Id. at 1277–78. We further reasoned that the district court’s remark at the sentencing hearing that Edwards had the right to appeal was “too little and too late,” as it indicated that all parties “had lost track of the details” of the plea and the sentencing hearing took place months after the plea hearing. Id. at 1278. We noted that “[a]t the sentencing hearing, the judge assumed that because the agreement didn’t contain an appeal waiver, Edwards could appeal the suppression order. But the judge hardly made any guarantees.” Id. We concluded that “[t]here is simply no basis in the record here for imputing back- wards, as it were, whatever was said at sentencing to show genuine USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 12 of 18 12 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 confusion at the earlier plea hearing.” Id. Additionally, we ex- plained that “nothing in Rule 11 or our caselaw requires a judge to proactively inform a defendant that by entering an unconditional plea he waives his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional matters.” Id. at 1278 n.3. More recently, in Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. at 727, the Supreme Court held that an appeal waiver is not enforceable when enforcing it “would result in a miscarriage of justice.” In Hunter, the Court noted that to set aside an appeal waiver based on a mis- carriage of justice is “a high bar,” requiring “the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” Id. “The error must be obvious,” and not an error that “a judge could rea- sonably make.” Id. The Court emphasized that the “high bar” was not “insurmountable,” but that appeal waivers would only be can- celed in “extreme cases,” that is, “when the justice system’s basic integrity is at stake.” Id. at 728. The Court declined to delineate all circumstances that satisfy the miscarriage of justice standard, but it specified three examples: (1) a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, (2) a sentence “infected with a blatant constitutional er- ror, such as” considering “a constitutionally impermissible factor (like race) or impos[ing] a constitutionally infirm condition of su- pervised release (like barring a defendant from becoming preg- nant),” and (3) a sentence imposed without “some minimum of civilized procedure,” as when the sentencing judge “refused to hold a hearing consonant with basic principles of law.” Id. (quota- tion marks omitted). USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 13 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 13 However, the prior panel precedent rule requires us “to fol- low a prior panel’s holding unless and until it is overruled or un- dermined to the point of abrogation by an opinion of the Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019). The rule must be applied whether or not “the later panel believes the prior panel’s opinion to be cor- rect, and there is no exception to the rule where the prior panel failed to consider arguments raised before a later panel.” Id. How- ever, we noted that “questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846, 853 (11th Cir. 2022) (alteration adopted, quotation marks omitted). Finally, we have stated “[t]he preferred means for deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion even if the record contains some indication of defi- ciencies in counsel’s performance.” United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, due to the lack of developed record on direct appeal, collateral pro- ceedings in the district court are the best forum to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (holding that “an ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal”). III. USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 14 of 18 14 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 As an initial matter, Collins does not expressly challenge the validity of his guilty plea or the competency of his counsel in his initial brief, so he has abandoned any argument on these matters. See Smith, 967 F.3d at 1204 n.5. Collins also has not persuasively argued that we should use our discretion to address whether his plea was knowing and voluntary, see Campbell, 26 F.4th at 871–73, but even if we did, or if Collins’s appeal implicitly preserved that challenge, the challenge still fails. As Collins did not object to a Rule 11 violation below, we review his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary for plain error. See Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349. In contrast to the facts of Pierre, Collins made no attempt at his change-of-plea hearing to preserve the suppression issue, nor did the district court assure him that he had done so. Cf. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1156–57. The district court also did not err by failing to inform Collins that he was waiving his right to appeal non-jurisdic- tional issues, as it was under no obligation to do so. See Edwards, 142 F.4th at 1278 n.3. Even if we were to consider counsel’s e-mail and the record evidence below, Collins did not have a “reasonable” belief that he had preserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to sup- press. See Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1156–57. The e-mail reveals that Col- lins sought to “preserve his appellate rights” by not entering the plea agreement, but it does not specify that Collins sought to pre- serve his right to appeal the motion to suppress ruling. For exam- ple, this statement could have been read as Collins seeking not to USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 15 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 15 enter a sentence appeal waiver, which are common in plea agree- ments. Thus it was not reasonable for Collins to take the govern- ment’s comment of understanding as proof that he would be able to challenge the motion to suppress ruling on appeal, when case law and Rule 11 explain that Collins’s guilty plea would waive all non-preserved, non-jurisdictional defects. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155; Class, 583 U.S. at 182; McCoy, 477 F.2d at 551; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Furthermore, the record reflects that Collins’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019. Moreover, Collins’s plea was not conditional for Rule 11 purposes because there was also no writing memorializing the con- ditional nature of the plea and the government did not provide ex- press approval for Collins to plead conditionally at the plea collo- quy. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155–56. While Collins’s later statements in the sentencing memorandum and at sentencing point to his belief that he would be able to appeal the motion to suppress, the lack of comments by the government and the district court, especially at the plea colloquy, mean this belief was likely unreasonable. Edwards, 142 F.4th at 1277–78. Accord- ingly, Collins has failed to show under the plain error standard that his plea was invalid. Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349. Collins also implies, without argument, in his response to the government’s motion that he may not have received compe- tent counsel. Assuming such a claim would justify the withdrawal of Collins’s guilty plea, he did not seek to do so below, nor did he allege ineffective assistance during the district court proceedings. USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 16 of 18 16 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Because he did not mention this claim in his initial brief, it is abandoned. Smith, 967 F.3d at 1204 n.5. In any event, we decline to reach the issue here because the “preferred means for deciding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion even if the record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s performance[,]” Patterson, 595 F.3d at 1328; see also Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504–05. Finally, Collins relies on Hunter to argue against our prece- dent holding that an unconditional guilty plea forecloses appellate review of a motion to suppress. As Hunter deals with express sen- tence appeal waivers, it cannot overturn our precedent pertaining to guilty pleas, with or without appeal waivers. Hunter, 608 U.S. at 727; McCoy, 477 F.2d at 551; Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198; Jackson, 55 F.4th at 853. Moreover, even if Hunter applied, Collins has not persua- sively argued that this case meets its miscarriage-of-justice stand- ard. Accordingly, because Collins entered a valid unconditional guilty plea, he waived all non-jurisdictional arguments on appeal, including his suppression challenge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155; McCoy, 477 F.2d at 551; Class, 583 U.S. at 182. Thus, the government is clearly correct, as a matter of law, that Collins’s unconditional guilty plea waived his right to appeal his denied motion to suppress. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion for sum- mary affirmance. IV. USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 17 of 18 26-10547 Opinion of the Court 17 We turn now to address Collins’s request to supplement the record with the e-mails between his attorney and the government. “We rarely enlarge the record on appeal to include material not before the district court which has labored without the benefit of the proffered material.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000). However, we do “have the inher- ent equitable power to allow supplementation of the appellate rec- ord if it is in the interests of justice.” Id. “This is a matter left to our discretion” and is decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. When deciding whether to grant a motion to supplement the record, “[a] primary factor” we consider “is whether acceptance of the prof- fered material into the record would establish beyond any doubt the proper resolution of the pending issues.” Id. As noted above, Collins abandoned any argument that his plea was not knowing and voluntary by failing to raise it in his ini- tial brief, see Smith, 967 F.3d at 1204 n.5, and even if we considered the email in support of that argument, it does not “establish beyond any doubt the proper resolution of the pending issues[,]” CSX Transp., Inc., 235 F.3d at 1330. Accordingly, we DENY Collins’s request to supplement the record. 2 2 We also deny Collins’s request to file a supplemental brief as to whether his plea was knowing and voluntary under Pierre. Supplemental briefs may not be filed without our leave. 11th Cir. R. 28-1 I.O.P.5. We may “call for supple- mental briefs on specific issues.” Id. And parties may be permitted to submit supplemental authority on “intervening decisions or new developments” re- garding issues already properly raised in the initial briefs. United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted), overruled in USCA11 Case: 26-10547 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 18 of 18 18 Opinion of the Court 26-10547 AFFIRMED. part by United States v. Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Even when an issue is not raised in the initial brief, if there is an inter- vening decision of the Supreme Court on an issue that overrules a Supreme Court decision or one of our published decisions and provides the appellant with a new claim or theory, an “appellant will be allowed to raise that new claim or theory in a supplemental or substitute brief provided that he files a motion to do so in a timely fashion after (or, as in this case, before) the new decision is issued.” Durham, 795 F.3d at 1331. If none of the preceding situa- tions exist, however, the “longstanding case law rule is that an appellant who does not raise an issue in his opening brief may not do so in” a reply or sup- plemental brief. Id. at 1330–31. Here, Collins does not identify any claim he could raise for the first time in a supplemental brief. See Levy, 416 F.3d at 1275–76; Durham, 795 F.3d at 1330–31. Accordingly, we DENY Collins’s motion to file a supplemental brief.