Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Christova Pierre Knowlin, Appellant Appellate Case No. 2025-000314 Appeal From Horry County Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-479 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Deputy Chief Appellate Defender for Capital Appeals David Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Brian Hollis Gibbs, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Conway, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Christova Pierre Knowlin appeals his conviction for domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (DVHAN) and sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to allow him to impeach a key fact witness with her pending drug charge and (2) allowing the State to ask Victim's mother about the impact of the crime on Victim's mother's life and enter into evidence a photograph of Victim prior to her injuries, violating Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. 1. We hold any error in prohibiting Knowlin from cross-examining the key witness on her pending drug charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the limitation on cross-examination did not contribute to the verdict. See State v. Graham, 314 S.C. 383, 386, 444 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1994) ("A violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness is not per se reversible error. This [c]ourt must determine whether the 'error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986))); State v. Collins, 409 S.C. 524, 537, 763 S.E.2d 22, 29 (2014) ("The harmless error rule generally provides that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict obtained."); State v. Salley, 398 S.C. 160, 172, 727 S.E.2d 740, 746 (2012) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular circumstances of the case, and therefore a reviewing court must look to the entire record to determine the effect the error had on the verdict."); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (providing that whether an erroneous limitation on cross-examination is harmless in a particular case depends on the facts of each case as well as a set of non-exhaustive factors including: "the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and of course the overall strength of the prosecution's case"); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 334, 563 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2002) (applying the Van Arsdall factors); State v. Curry, 370 S.C. 674, 682, 636 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding a limitation on cross-examination was harmless where the testimony was cumulative and independent, competent evidence supported the verdict). 2. Initially, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to admit a photograph of Victim prior to her injuries because the photograph was relevant to show whether Victim suffered great bodily harm—an element of the offense, and the probative value of the photograph was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See State v. Williams, 432 S.C. 515, 521, 854 S.E.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 2021) ("In criminal cases, this court only reviews errors of law."); State v. Rosemond, 335 S.C. 593, 596, 518 S.E.2d 588, 589-90 (1999) ("The relevance, materiality[,] and admissibility of photographs are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court and a ruling will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion."); State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429-30, 632 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2006) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."); Rule 401, SCRE (providing that to be relevant, evidence must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); Rule 403, SCRE (providing that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"); State v. Gilchrist, 329 S.C. 621, 630, 496 S.E.2d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case . . . ; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis." (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993))); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-20(A)(1) (Supp. 2025) (providing domestic violence occurs when an individual causes "physical harm or injury to a person's own household member"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-65(A)(1) (Supp. 2025) (providing that a person is guilty of DVHAN when he commits domestic violence "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and great bodily injury to the victim results"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-10(2) (Supp. 2025) (defining "great bodily injury" for purposes of the DVHAN statute as "injury which causes a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ"); State v. Salley, 398 S.C. 160, 170, 727 S.E.2d 740, 745 (2012) (holding a photograph of the victim while alive, which showed she was "healthy and vibrant," was properly admitted to corroborate the pathologist's testimony that her sickle cell trait was not outwardly apparent and to counter "an impression of a sickly and fragile child, which may have affected the establishment of guilt," purposes independent of arousing the jury's sympathy). Further, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to admit Victim's mother's testimony about the effect of Victim's injuries on Victim's mother because the probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Williams, 432 S.C. at 521, 854 S.E.2d at 169 ("In criminal cases, this court only reviews errors of law."); State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 647, 515 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1999) ("A trial [court] is accorded broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of the testimony."); State v. Irick, 344 S.C. 460, 464, 545 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001) ("An abuse of discretion arises from an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support."); Rule 401, SCRE (providing that to be relevant, evidence must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." (emphasis added)); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 326, 577 S.E.2d 460, 468 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting brief testimony that the victim played sports and attended a particular high school when the witness did not elaborate on "the victim's relationship with the family or how he acquired any family nicknames"). AFFIRMED.1 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.