Full Opinion

25-2585-cv Stanley v. Jamison UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ Aaron R. Stanley, Petitioner-Appellant, v. 25-2585 J L Jamison, Warden, Respondent–Appellee, Pliler, W.S. Warden, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT: Aaron R. Stanley, pro se, Otisville, NY FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: Jacob R. Fiddelman (Jerry J. Fang, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Andrew L. Carter, District Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Aaron R. Stanley, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition to vacate his conviction and sentence. In 2005, a court-martial panel found Stanley guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. In 2022, Stanley filed his § 2241 petition and raised two due process claims relating to the appointed mental health expert at his 2005 court- martial. Stanley argued that the mental health expert failed to adequately examine him for post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and was insufficiently independent from the prosecution. Stanley also moved to file an amended petition and for partial summary judgment. The district court construed the motions as replies to the Government’s opposition. The court then denied Stanley’s § 2241 petition, concluding that Stanley had not raised his two due process claims on direct appeal, the claims were therefore 2 procedurally defaulted, and there was not cause to excuse the default of either claim. Stanley v. Jamison, No. 1:22-CV-09769 (ALC), 2025 WL 2773986 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025). 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal. 2 “We review a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to § 2241 de novo and review any factual findings for clear error.” Lugo v. Hudson, 785 F.3d 852, 854 (2d Cir. 2015). As an initial matter, Stanley argues that the district court erred when it construed his motion to file an amended petition and his motion for partial summary judgment as replies. We disagree. Even assuming that Stanley had the right to reply, the district court offered him ample opportunity to reply. Indeed, the district court considered both his amended petition and his motion for partial summary judgment as replies. And on appeal, Stanley does not identify any meritorious argument that he would have raised if given further leave to reply. Turning to Stanley’s § 2241 claims, we agree that relief was not warranted. Because Stanley did not raise his due process claims on appeal, the district court 1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. 2 Stanley argues that the district court erred by denying a certificate of appealability. Because both parties agree that a certificate of appealability is not needed in this case, we decline to address the issue. 3 concluded that the claims were procedurally defaulted. The district court further concluded that Stanley did not show cause for the default. However, we need not address the applicability of the procedural default rules in this case. Stanley’s due process claims lacked merit. Stanley’s argument that he received an inadequate mental health examination primarily rested on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 19. In Ake, the Supreme Court concluded that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” 470 U.S. at 83; see also McWilliams v. Dunn, 582 U.S. 183, 187–88 (2017) (“Unless a defendant is assured the assistance of someone who can effectively perform these functions, he has not received the minimum to which Ake entitles him.”). Military courts have applied Ake’s right to a competent expert to court- martial proceedings. United States v. Kelly, 39 M.J. 235, 237 (C.A.A.F. 1994). However, Ake is inapposite here. In this case, trial counsel requested a PTSD expert specifically to assess Stanley’s mental state at the time of his offense, the military judge appointed Dr. DeGregorio for this purpose, and after an examination, Dr. DeGregorio concluded that Stanley did not 4 suffer from PTSD. Stanley’s argument that Dr. DeGregorio’s examination itself was deficient is not sufficiently supported on appeal. While Dr. DeGregorio did not have formal training in PTSD, he did have experience diagnosing and treating combat-specific PTSD. Further, Stanley’s 2021 diagnosis of PTSD does not necessarily show that Dr. DeGregorio’s examination in 2005 was insufficient. And although Stanley did not receive the expert of his choice, Ake clarifies that its reasoning “is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.” 470 U.S. at 83. Stanley’s additional claim that Dr. DeGregorio lacked independence, which Stanley does not argue on appeal, also lacks merit. The mere fact that Dr. DeGregorio was a member of the U.S. Army did not suggest a violation of the right to due process. In the context of a military tribunal, Stanley himself, his defense team, and even members of the jury were also members of the U.S. Army. * * * We have considered all of Stanley’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 5