State v. Brayboy
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-147
JudgeJudge Jefferson Griffin
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA26-147
Filed 18 November 2026
Scotland County, Nos. 20CR052133-820, 22CR000095-820
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
JONATHAN PONCE BRAYBOY, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 23 February 2024 by Judge
Patrick Thomas Nadolski in Scotland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 14 October 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Hunter E. Fritz,
for the State.
Mary McCullers Reece for Defendant-Appellant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant Jonathan Ponce Brayboy appeals from a judgment entered after a
jury found him guilty of discharging a weapon into an occupied moving vehicle and
two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant argues the trial court plainly
and prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the defense of automatism.
STATE V. BRAYBOY
Opinion of the Court
We disagree with Defendant and hold the trial court did not err.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Damian Ransom and Taylor Strickland were previously in a relationship and
had two sons together. However, by October 2020, the couple was no longer together.
On 28 October 2020, Ransom had his older son for visitation and had planned
to keep him for the night. Nevertheless, Ransom changed his plans and decided to
take his older son back to Strickland’s residence that evening, despite Strickland’s
request that Ransom keep their older son because she was spending the evening with
Defendant. Upon his arrival at Strickland’s apartment, Ransom knocked on the door
but, after no one answered, he opened the door and saw Strickland “on top of
[Defendant]” while Defendant was naked. Ransom “lost it” and began beating
Defendant.
After the confrontation, Ransom left the apartment and returned to his vehicle,
where his son was still strapped in his seat. Ransom told Strickland to meet him in
half an hour to get their older son. While Strickland was getting ready to leave to go
get her son, Defendant left the apartment and said he was going to kill Ransom. As
Ransom was driving away, he heard gunshots hitting his truck. Ransom saw
someone, who was later determined to be Defendant, hanging out of a car window
behind him. Ransom called both 9-1-1 and Strickland to report that Defendant was
shooting at him. Afterward, Ransom’s vehicle had multiple bullet holes in various
areas of the truck, and his back glass was shot out.
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Opinion of the Court
After the shooting, Ransom claims he received a Facebook Messenger message
from Defendant stating, “WYA,” which Ransom understood to mean “where you at.”
The message was later purportedly “unsent.”
Defendant testified he remembered being hit repeatedly and hearing ringing
in his ears. Defendant stated he did not remember how the assault ended or what he
did afterward. He further testified the next thing he did remember was being on the
road in his car and trying to figure out where he was and where his phone and wallet
were. Defendant also detailed that he remembered holding his gun but did not
remember shooting. Defendant claimed he was in “disbelief,” shock, and not thinking
clearly.
Defendant introduced medical records showing diagnosis of closed head injury
with concussion sans loss of consciousness, contusion of the face and periorbital
region, neck strain, and assault. Further, Dr. Amy James, expert in forensic
psychology, testified Defendant reported he had experienced a concussion and
emotional distress as well as ringing in his ears, tunnel vision, and inability to see.
Dr. James also noted Defendant reported feeling “like someone else was acting in his
place.” She also stated Defendant’s symptoms were consistent with emotional
distress and concussion, but that concussions “rarely cause a loss of consciousness.”
Dr. James acknowledged concussions can cause “confusion, ringing in the ears,
impulsivity, personality changes, irritability, blurred vision,” and concentration of
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STATE V. BRAYBOY
Opinion of the Court
memory problems. Dr. James testified she did not opine Defendant was “experiencing
automation.”
Defendant did not request an instruction on automatism or unconsciousness
at the charge conference. The trial court instructed the jury on lack of mental
capacity as it related to specific-intent offenses such as attempted first-degree murder
or assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. The jury found Defendant guilty
of discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle and two counts of assault with a
deadly weapon but did not find Defendant guilty of the specific-intent charges.
II. Analysis
Defendant claims the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the
defense of automatism.
Generally, “to preserve an issue for appellate review, a litigant must raise the
issue and secure a ruling from the trial court.” State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 157, 900
S.E.2d 781, 785 (2024) (citation omitted). An issue not preserved by an objection at
trial and not deemed preserved by another rule or law may still be the basis of an
issue on appeal when the action questioned allegedly amounts to plain error. N.C. R.
App. P. 10(a)(4).
The plain error rule must be “applied cautiously and only in the exceptional
case.” State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (citation
modified). Typically, for an instructional error to constitute plain error, a defendant
must show (1) a fundamental error occurred at trial, (2) the fundamental error had a
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Opinion of the Court
probable impact on the trial’s outcome, and (3) the error critically “affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Reber, 386 N.C. at
158, 900 S.E.2d at 786 (citation modified). A fundamental error may be an error “so
basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done.”
Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378 (citation modified).
Here, Defendant did not raise his instructional error on
automatism/unconsciousness at trial and there are no other rules preserving this
argument. Therefore, Defendant’s issue is unpreserved, and we review it for plain
error.
The complete defense of automatism, or unconsciousness, applies when a
person, “though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing.” State v. Fields,
324 N.C. 204, 208, 376 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1989) (citation modified); State v. Caddell,
287 N.C. 266, 290, 215 S.E.2d 348, 363 (1975). Automatism is equated with
involuntary action and implies the existence of “some attendant disturbance of
conscious awareness.” Fields, 324 N.C. at 208, 376 S.E.2d at 742 (citation modified).
Our Supreme Court held that the defendant in Fields was entitled to an
automatism instruction where he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, was
prone to experiencing “disassociative” states, was found by a psychologist to be in a
“disassociative” state when the defendant shot the victim, and had a history of being
“in his own world” since he was a child. Id., at 208–10, 376 S.E.2d at 742–43.
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Opinion of the Court
On the other hand, the defendant in State v. King was not entitled to an
automatism instruction where the evidence consisted of his self-serving statements
such as he “blacked out” while other evidence showed he could describe and knew
what happened. 281 N.C. App. 587, 595–98, 868 S.E.2d 913, 919–21 (2022).
In another example in State v. Andrews, while evidence may have supported
an inference that a defendant’s medication impaired his ability to premediate and
deliberate, it did not support an automatism instruction; the doctor in Andrews never
testified that the defendant was actually unconscious or incapable of controlling his
actions at the time of the relevant events. 154 N.C. App. 553, 557–58, 572 S.E.2d
798, 801–02 (2002).
Generally, the burden of persuasion is on the defendant to prove the existence
of automatism to the jury. State v. Rogers, 219 N.C. App. 296, 307, 725 S.E.2d 342,
349 (2012) (citation omitted). “When determining whether an instruction of
diminished capacity should be submitted to the jury, the Court must consider
whether there is evidence sufficient to cause a reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror
as to whether defendant had a culpable mental state.” State v. Bush, 164 N.C. App.
254, 265, 595 S.E.2d 715, 722 (2004) (citation omitted). “If there is evidence from
which an inference can be drawn that defendant committed the act without the
criminal intent necessary, then the law with respect to that intent should be
explained and applied to the evidence by the Court.” Id. (citation omitted). “In
determining whether the evidence supports an instruction on any affirmative
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Opinion of the Court
defense, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.”
Id. (citation omitted). However, “evidence which merely shows it possible for the fact
in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture that it was so . . . should
not be left to the jury,” and a trial court should not instruct a jury as to such possibility
or conjecture. State v. Clark, 324 N.C. 146, 162–63, 377 S.E.2d 54, 64 (1989) (citation
modified). A trial court must instruct a “jury on all substantive features of the case,”
including defenses; however, the trial court shall never give instructions that are
unsupported by a reasonable view of the case’s evidence. State v. King, 281 N.C. App.
at 595, 868 S.E.2d at 919 (citations omitted).
“The evidence of the man himself will rarely be sufficient unless it is supported
by medical evidence which points to the cause of the mental incapacity.” State v.
Caddell, 287 N.C. at 288, 215 S.E.2d at 362 (citation modified). “‘It is not sufficient
for a man to say, “I had a black-out:” for “black-out” . . . “is one of the first refuges of
a guilty conscience and a popular excuse.”’” Id. (citation omitted). Generally, a man
will need “some medical or scientific evidence to distinguish the genuine from the
fraudulent.” Id. (citation modified).
Here, it is undisputed that Defendant was injured, distressed, and confused.
Rather, the question is whether Defendant was unconscious such that he was unable
to exercise conscious control over his physical actions when he shot at Ransom’s
truck. Defendant claims Dr. James’s testimony supports his argument that he should
have received an automatism instruction. Defendant contends the failure to instruct
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Opinion of the Court
the jury as to automatism was a fundamental error which would have probably
changed the outcome of the trial. Further, Defendant claims the jury would have
likely “been satisfied that automatism resulting from the attack was a total defense
to the charges.”
We hold the evidence does not show Defendant was unconscious or unable to
exercise conscious control over his physical actions when he fired at Ransom’s truck.
First, Defendant’s medical record showed he had a closed head injury with
concussion, without loss of consciousness. Moreover, Dr. James testified that
concussions “rarely cause a loss of consciousness.” While Dr. James acknowledged
loss of consciousness may occur in the extraordinary instance, she did not testify that
is what occurred with Defendant. See Andrews¸ 154 N.C. App. at 557–58, 572 S.E.2d
at 801–02 (holding the trial court did not err in refusing to give an automatism
instruction because, despite expert witness testimony describing symptoms of a
syndrome and explaining the defendant’s medication could have caused the symptom
of acting unknowingly, the expert did not testify that the defendant actually had the
symptom of acting unknowingly). Instead, Dr. James stated she did not opine
Defendant was “experiencing automation” or was “on autopilot.”
Not only is the pattern of this expert testimony similar to the one in Andrews¸
but also it is distinguishable from Fields: the psychologist’s testimony in Fields
determined that the defendant was in fact “unable to exercise conscious control of his
physical actions” and “acting like an automaton” at the time of the shooting. Fields,
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STATE V. BRAYBOY
Opinion of the Court
324 N.C. at 207, 376 S.E.2d at 742. This contrasts to Dr. James’s testimony simply
describing the possible symptoms of a concussion, and Dr. James never purported
such an opinion that Defendant was not conscious of his actions. We hold the
evidence was not sufficient to cause reasonable doubt in a juror’s mind as to whether
Defendant had a culpable mental state. Therefore, the trial court’s alleged error did
not amount to error, much less plain error.
III. Conclusion
The trial court did not err in instructing the jury.
NO ERROR.
Judges STROUD and FLOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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