Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Fragoso CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) THE PEOPLE, C103257 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24FE000863) v. JOSE ANTONIO FRAGOSO, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Jose Antonio Fragoso drove over a bicyclist, fatally injuring her, and then left the scene of the accident. A jury found him guilty of fleeing the scene and further found the victim particularly vulnerable. Based on the victim’s vulnerability and the number and increasing seriousness of Fragoso’s prior convictions, the trial court sentenced him to the upper term of four years. On appeal, Fragoso argues: (1) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term; and (3) the jury’s vulnerable victim finding was not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree with Fragoso’s first and second contentions. With regard to Fragoso’s third contention, we find that any error due to the jury’s vulnerable victim finding was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm. 1 BACKGROUND I Facts On a clear, dark night in early January 2024, at a dimly lit intersection, Fragoso made a right turn into the rightmost lane of a busy, four-lane street and collided with a woman on a bicycle who had just crossed over from the opposite side. There was a metal scraping sound, and the back wheels of Fragoso’s sport utility vehicle “went over” the woman, Mattie Nicholson. Fragoso’s vehicle had its headlights on and Nicholson’s bicycle had at least one reflector but no lights. Nicholson was in the bike lane, going in the same direction as Fragoso at the time of the collision. Fragoso testified that although he heard the metal noise, felt his “back wheel [go] over something,” felt his car “hesitate[]” and shake for a second, and saw a “little flash of light” in his mirror, he did not realize he had just run over Nicholson and her bicycle. Instead, he thought, “dang, is my wheel coming off or something?” and assumed he drove over clothes. Fragoso’s vehicle had been having mechanical problems and had “hesitated” in a similar fashion after running over clothes on the road at that exact same turn two months prior. And when Fragoso checked his right mirror, he did not see anything behind him to his right. After the collision, Fragoso continued driving forward for a few feet and then pulled over to the side of the road, under a streetlight. He turned off his engine, got out, and took multiple steps toward the rear of his vehicle, in the direction of the scene of the collision. According to a witness in a car stopped with its headlights on behind Nicholson, Fragoso appeared to be looking in Nicholson’s direction. A few other cars had parked and people “were kind of getting out of the cars to see what was going on,” but no one attempted to flag down Fragoso. Fragoso was surprised to see that traffic had stopped but thought maybe someone was crossing the street. Fragoso checked his right rear tire then reentered his vehicle and made a right turn into the nearby parking lot. 2 In the parking lot, Fragoso made another right turn and looped back toward the scene of the collision, momentarily stopping his vehicle after passing near it. Fragoso got out of his vehicle again and checked both of his rear tires. Neither tire was loose and Fragoso did not see any scrapes or scratches on his vehicle or notice anything out of the ordinary. He then exited the parking lot to drive home. As he was driving away, he looked back and saw “clothes in the middle lane, or wherever it was.” He may have also seen a shopping cart on the ground. An eyewitness who arrived at the scene shortly after the collision testified that they did not see a shopping cart and that Nicholson did not look like only a pile of clothing. Although the witness initially mistook Nicholson for a fender or bumper lying on the road, they quickly realized she was a person and testified there was nothing to indicate that she was just a pile of clothes; “it’s pretty easy to tell when it’s a person.” Two eyewitnesses also testified that everyone who drove by appeared able to avoid hitting Nicholson. Police officers arrived at the scene a few minutes after the collision to find Nicholson lying in the middle of the street, with multiple abrasions and lacerations across her body, fractured ribs, a fractured pelvis and right femur, and torn internal organs, but still breathing. Close to her lay her damaged bicycle, one reflector still attached and two others on the ground, and a license plate. Nicholson succumbed to her injuries half an hour later. A police detective ran the license plate through a records check and discovered that Fragoso was the registered owner of the vehicle associated with the plate. Two days after the collision, Fragoso learned his name was on the news and that he was wanted for questioning in connection with a hit-and-run incident. The next evening, the detective and other officers visited Fragoso at his residence. Fragoso told the detective he had been “in shock” immediately after the turn, “thought maybe I did hit someone,” and “didn’t know where that person came from.” At trial, Fragoso testified he made these statements 3 with information that was on the news and that he was previously unaware he had run over someone. After arresting Fragoso, officers searched his vehicle, which was missing its front license plate. They found damage to the front of the vehicle, fresh scrapes and scratches on its undercarriage and exhaust pipe, and vehicle record data indicating that, 11 ignition cycles prior to data retrieval, the vehicle had accelerated into a 12-mile-per-hour collision with a human body on a bicycle or object of similar weight. II Procedural History The prosecution charged Fragoso with fleeing the scene (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)), 1 vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2)), and driving while his license was suspended or revoked for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). The prosecution also alleged several circumstances in aggravation, including that the victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)) 2 and that Fragoso’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)). To prevent evidence relating to his charge of driving with a suspended or revoked license from being presented at trial, Fragoso pled guilty to that charge. Fragoso also waived a jury trial on aggravating circumstances based on his prior convictions. A jury found Fragoso guilty of fleeing the scene and further found the crime involved a particularly vulnerable victim. The jury acquitted Fragoso of vehicular manslaughter. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code. 2 Further rules references are to the California Rules of Court. 4 Prior to sentencing, the court reviewed a probation report, Fragoso’s statement in mitigation with letters in support, and a certified record of Fragoso’s arrests and prosecutions, and heard victim impact statements from Nicholson’s daughters. The probation report identified four circumstances in aggravation, including that the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) and Fragoso’s prior adult convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), identified no circumstances in mitigation, and recommended that the trial court deny probation and sentence Fragoso to the upper term for fleeing. The prosecution agreed with the probation report’s recommendations. In support of those recommendations, the prosecution pointed out that Fragoso had “numerous prior DUIs,” which both went “to the fact that [he was] known to be a dangerous driver” and rendered it illegal for Fragoso to drive. Fragoso clarified that his driving under the influence convictions were from over 20 years ago and that his lack of a license was due, in part, to his indigency. He asked the trial court to reduce his fleeing-the-scene conviction to a misdemeanor. He argued the jury’s finding that the victim was particularly vulnerable was undercut by Nicholson’s lack of a helmet or lights and the lack of clarity that he had actual knowledge of her injuries. He further argued that his caution while driving (rule 4.423(a)(6)), remorsefulness (rule 4.414(b)(7)), and acquittal of the charge of vehicular manslaughter, among other factors, weighed in favor of probation. The trial court denied Fragoso’s request to reduce his conviction for fleeing the scene to a misdemeanor. It noted the seriousness of the offense, characterizing it as being “at the extreme end of the spectrum because it resulted in [Nicholson’s] death,” and stated that not only did Fragoso take Nicholson’s life, but he “deprived [Nicholson’s family] of the truth of what really happened in the circumstances resulting in her death” by leaving the scene. The trial court disagreed with Fragoso’s argument that it was unclear he lacked actual knowledge, stating that based on the evidence, the court believed 5 Fragoso “saw and [] realized what he had done” and deliberately left to avoid law enforcement. If Fragoso “had stayed and it had been determined that he was under the influence of alcohol,” which was not implausible given his priors, “[h]e would be looking at a murder charge.” The trial court then imposed the upper term of four years for fleeing the scene and imposed and stayed a term of 15 days for driving with a suspended or revoked license. The court explained it selected the upper term based on two aggravating circumstances: (1) the jury’s finding that the victim was particularly vulnerable; and (2) the numerosity and increasing seriousness of Fragoso’s 19 prior convictions. Fragoso did not object. Fragoso timely appealed in February 2025. His opening was filed in May 2026, and this case was fully briefed on August 19, 2026. DISCUSSION On appeal, Fragoso contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports his fleeing-the- scene conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the upper term; and (3) insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that the victim was particularly vulnerable. We disagree with Fragoso’s first two contentions and find any error due to the third harmless. I Fleeing the Scene Fragoso’s first contention challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for fleeing the scene. In considering such a challenge, “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “The standard of appellate review is the same in cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) For a defendant to prevail, “it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis 6 whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury.” (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.) Section 20001 requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the serious injury or death of another person to immediately stop, provide information, and render aid. (§§ 20003, 20004.) A driver who violates this requirement whether having actual or constructive knowledge of the injury or death is guilty of the crime of fleeing the scene. (People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80.) A driver has constructive knowledge of the injury if they “knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.” (Ibid.) Here, Fragoso argues his conviction was not supported by substantial evidence because there was insufficient evidence he had actual or constructive knowledge that the collision injured another person. However, the record contains substantial evidence showing Fragoso had actual knowledge he ran over a person. Fragoso got out of his vehicle a short distance away from the collision and looked directly at Nicholson. Although Fragoso said he thought she was a pile of clothes, another witness said it was “pretty easy” to tell she was a person and that there was nothing indicating that she was just a pile of clothes. While the area was dimly lit, at least one car was stopped behind Nicholson with its headlights on and all of the oncoming traffic saw her well enough to avoid hitting her, so it was far from the “near-total darkness” Fragoso claims in his opening brief. After Fragoso got back into his vehicle, he effectively made a U-turn into the nearby parking lot and drove back in the direction of the scene of the collision, which gave him another opportunity to see Nicholson and her bicycle lying in the middle of the road. And when officers arrested Fragoso at his home, he admitted that he had been “in shock” immediately after the turn, “thought maybe I did hit someone,” and “didn’t know where that person came from.” Although Fragoso claimed he made these incriminating statements with after- acquired information and had not previously realized he collided with a person, the jury 7 was entitled to disregard that testimony. (People v. Harbert (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 42, 53 [a “driver’s simple denial of such knowledge has never been treated as compelling acquittal.… Claimed ignorance of any accident has been repeatedly rejected in the face of countervailing evidence”].) Given all of this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that there was substantial evidence to show that Fragoso had actual knowledge he had injured a person beyond a reasonable doubt. The record also contains substantial evidence showing that even if Fragoso did not have actual knowledge he injured a person, he at least had constructive knowledge of that fact. Given Nicholson’s extensive injuries, the metal scraping sound, and Fragoso’s admission that he felt his “back wheel [go] over something” and his car shake so hard he thought his wheel was coming off, a reasonable jury could have believed Fragoso “knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.” (People v. Holford, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 80.) Even more so after Fragoso noticed the traffic on the busy street had ceased, saw a person-sized pile of clothes in the middle of the street behind him, and confirmed that neither of his wheels were loose before driving away. In sum, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Fragoso had actual or constructive knowledge he was involved in a collision that resulted in the injury of another person. We therefore conclude sufficient evidence supports his conviction for fleeing the scene. 8 II Imposition of the Upper Term Fragoso’s second and third claims effectively contest the trial court’s imposition of the upper term. His second claim alleges the trial court imposed that term based upon improper speculation. And his third claim alleges insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Nicholson was a particularly vulnerable victim, which is one of the aggravating circumstances justifying the imposition of that term. The People disagree with both of Fragoso’s claims and further argue he forfeited his abuse of discretion claim by failing to object below. Fragoso does not contest this argument in his reply brief. We agree with the People regarding Fragoso’s abuse of discretion claim. We also find that any error due to insufficiency in the evidence supporting the jury’s vulnerable victim finding was harmless. In general, “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) Here, the record shows that Fragoso failed to raise any objections at sentencing and therefore forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion on appeal. In any event, the record does not support Fragoso’s characterization of the trial court’s sentencing decisions as being based upon improper speculation. Although the trial court stated its belief that Fragoso deliberately left the scene to avoid the consequences of his actions, that was little more than a reiteration of the general understanding that a driver who flees the scene “more than likely … is seeking to evade civil or criminal prosecution.” (People v. Bautista (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.) And although the trial court noted that Fragoso could have faced a murder charge had he been driving under the influence of alcohol and remained at the scene, it did not base its sentencing decision on this possibility. To the contrary, the trial court expressly stated it selected the upper term based on two aggravating circumstances: (1) the jury’s finding 9 that the victim was particularly vulnerable; and (2) Fragoso’s numerous and increasingly serious prior convictions. Although Fragoso also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting one of those aggravating circumstances, that Nicholson was a particularly vulnerable victim, he does not make any argument that he was prejudiced by this alleged insufficiency. As noted above, the jury’s vulnerable victim finding was not the only aggravating circumstance the trial court based its imposition of the upper term upon; Fragoso’s numerous and increasingly serious prior convictions were, as well. In this regard, “[o]nly a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term.” (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728.) Moreover, the trial court’s comments that Fragoso’s 19 convictions were both numerous and of increasing seriousness, that “the seriousness of this crime, obviously, is at the extreme end of the spectrum because it resulted in [Nicholson’s] death,” and that Fragoso’s flight “deprived [Nicholson’s family] of the truth of what really happened in the circumstances resulting in her death” all suggest the court was not inclined to impose a lower term. Consequently, even if jury’s finding that Nicholson was particularly vulnerable lacked sufficient supporting evidence, any error caused by that lack was harmless. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. /s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J. We concur: /s/ MAURO, Acting P. J. /s/ RENNER, J. 10