Full Opinion

25-1914 United States v. Greatsinger UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. No. 25-1914 WILLIS TAYLOR, AQUARIUS GUMBS, a.k.a. Q, a.k.a. ICE, a.k.a. DIAMOND, SEAN PEPE, GORDON LAURIA, PAUL PAOLELLA, PETER ABLONDI-TAYLOR, MARK APOTRIAS, THOMAS JOSLIN, DAVID KING, CHRISTOPHER CAHILL, MARKOS PAPPAS, a.k.a. SPEEDY, LISA FAUSEL, JULIO ECHEVARRIA, a.k.a. WARRIOR, Defendants, RICHARD GREATSINGER, Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________ For Appellee: KATHERINE E. BOYLES (Conor M. Reardon, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, Connecticut. For Defendant-Appellant JEFFREY C. KESTENBAND, Kestenband Law Richard Greatsinger: Firm LLC, Glastonbury, Connecticut. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Omar A. Williams, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s July 22, 2025 judgment is AFFIRMED. Richard Greatsinger appeals from a judgment of conviction following his conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 2 cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). As permitted by his plea agreement, Greatsinger argues on appeal that the district court should have suppressed evidence of narcotics seized from his vehicle during an extended stop. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues in dispute, to which we only refer as necessary to resolve this appeal. “On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 208 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under clear error review, we will reject a finding of fact only when the record as a whole leaves us with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 222 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Greatsinger argues that the officer who stopped his vehicle and seized narcotics “did not possess information [giving] rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” necessary to justify the stop under the Fourth Amendment; accordingly, the district court should have suppressed the evidence resulting from the stop. Greatsinger Br. at 2. The government counters that under the “collective knowledge doctrine,” the stop was wholly permissible. See Gov’t Br. at 16–17. 3 The collective knowledge doctrine recognizes that a “search is permissible” where the searching officer “lacks the specific information” giving rise to reasonable suspicion, but “other law enforcement officials initiating . . . the investigation” did possess “sufficient information” to justify the search. United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2001). In other words, even if an officer conducting a search or arrest lacks knowledge of facts that support reasonable suspicion, a search or arrest “may nonetheless be permissible if [that] officer acted on the assessment or instructions of other officers who did have such facts.” United States v. Babilonia, 854 F.3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2017). For example, if a police department issues a “wanted flyer” on the basis of reasonable suspicion, an officer from another department who sees the flyer can arrest the “wanted” individual – even if he was not privy to the facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion – so long as the “stop and detention” are “no more intrusive than would have been permitted an experienced officer on an objective reading of the flyer.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 234–35 (1985). Here, we have no doubt that the search of Greatsinger’s vehicle was justified by the collective knowledge doctrine. Though Officer Riehl, who conducted the vehicle stop, may have lacked personal knowledge sufficient to establish 4 reasonable suspicion, the record makes clear that the surveillance team in direct communication with Riehl – and which ultimately requested the stop – did possess such information. As the district court observed, that team established reasonable suspicion on two bases: first, the officers intercepted communications in which Greatsinger was engaged in coded discussions about narcotics, see Gov’t App’x at 29–30 (“[C]onversations between . . . Mr. Greatsinger and . . . Mr. Gumbs . . . involved discussions about chess pieces, which [were] . . . determined to be code for narcotics related conversations.”); and second, they tracked Greatsinger as he arrived at “one of the main locations” identified as a hotspot for drug activity, id. at 82. Because the surveillance team thus possessed a sound basis for believing that Greatsinger was acting unlawfully, it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for Riehl to “rel[y]” on the team’s “instructions” in conducting the stop. Colon, 250 F.3d at 135–36. Greatsinger counters that even if the surveillance team possessed sufficient information to give rise to reasonable suspicion, the team never actually “communicated” that information to the “acting officer.” Greatsinger Br. at 13. In support of that argument, he relies on this Court’s decision in United States v. 5 Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 316 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016). But Hussain is in no way contrary to the Hensley precedent on which we rely. In Hussain, two officers, Daryl Maudsley and William McAloon, stopped the defendant Damian Cunningham’s vehicle for a traffic infraction. See id. at 310. A second individual, Lacey Scott, was in the passenger seat of Cunningham’s car. Officer McAloon approached the driver’s side of the car while Officer Maudsley approached the passenger side. See id. at 311. The two officers formed distinct observations of the occupants’ conduct, which they did not share with one another. See id. Each officer directed the occupant on his respective side of the car to exit the vehicle and stand behind it. When the occupants vacated the car, Officer McAloon searched it and found a loaded gun concealed under the front passenger seat. See id. Cunningham moved unsuccessfully to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search. See id. at 309. This Court reversed. We held that none of the observed conduct was sufficient to support the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop and search the vehicle. See id. at 317. And even if some of the conduct that Office Maudsley observed could give rise to reasonable suspicion – such as Scott’s “unnatural [body] positioning,” id. at 311 – we declined to impute that knowledge to McAloon, the 6 searching officer, because the two officers had not communicated with each other, see id. at 316. In those circumstances, we declined to apply the collective knowledge doctrine. See id. at 316 n.8. Greatsinger contends that Hussain shows the impropriety of attributing the knowledge of the initiating officers to Officer Riehl, who conducted the stop and subsequent search. It does no such thing. Here, unlike in Hussain, the surveillance team initiating the stop did possess information sufficient to justify both the stop and search. Furthermore, when the team directed Officer Riehl to stop, he had already received – via briefings – the key “facts and circumstances” of the narcotics investigation. Gov’t App’x at 41, 59–60. This case thus falls comfortably within the bounds of Hensley, which authorized attribution of knowledge from a requesting officer to one initiating the stop or search. See 469 U.S. at 233. Finally, Greatsinger submits that even if the stop was warranted under the collective knowledge doctrine, his extended detention – and the canine sniff of his car – could not be justified by a mere “traffic violation.” Greatsinger Br. at 4–5. But while it is true that officers may not extend a stop for a traffic violation in order to conduct a canine sniff for narcotics, see Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353–57 (2015), the record is clear that Greatsinger was not stopped for a mere traffic 7 violation. He was stopped because the surveillance team had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was in fact engaged in narcotics trafficking. 1 See Gov’t App’x at 29–30, 82. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the stop was unduly “prolonged” or that the canine sniff was impermissible. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (noting that officer may “prolong[]” a stop so long as he has “reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual”). * * * We have considered Greatsinger’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 1The stop was disguised as one for a traffic violation only so as not to reveal to the occupants that they were under suspicion. See Gov’t App’x at 29–30, 82. 8