White v. United States

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Nos. 21-CF-0310 & 23-CO-0288 LARRY WHITE, JR., APPELLANT, V. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2020-CF2-001903) (Michael K. O’Keefe, Judge) (Rainey R. Brandt, Judge) (Submitted September 20, 2024 Decided September 3, 2026) Tamara Jones for appellant. Ivy Finkenstadt was on the brief for appellant in No. 21-CF-0310 but subsequently withdrew. Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia at the time the briefs were filed, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Elizabeth H. Danello, Colin Cloherty, Lauren Galloway, and Kevin Birney, Assistant United States Attorneys, for appellee. Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant Larry White, Jr. was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license and related firearm offenses after a stipulated trial. Mr. White argues that (1) the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress  2 evidence as the result of an unlawful search, and (2) the trial court erroneously denied without a hearing Mr. White’s D.C. Code § 23-110 motion to vacate his convictions on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of the suppression motion, but we vacate the trial court’s denial of the Section 23-110 motion and remand the case for further proceedings. I. Factual Background The following appears to be undisputed for current purposes. Mr. White was released into the High Intensity Supervision Program (HISP) operated by the Pretrial Services Agency (PSA) under 24-hour home confinement with GPS monitoring on February 10, 2020, after pleading guilty to a firearm offense in another case. Mr. White had not yet been sentenced in the other case. The next morning, February 11, 2020, an on-duty Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer familiar with Mr. White saw Mr. White’s live Instagram feed, which showed Mr. White holding a black handgun. MPD officers on duty at the time were aware of the location of Mr. White’s residence because they had previously executed a search warrant there. The officers also knew that Mr. White had been released under GPS monitoring, so they contacted PSA and asked that PSA confirm Mr. White’s location. PSA confirmed that Mr. White was located at the address that the officers knew to be Mr. White’s residence.  3 The officers went to Mr. White’s residence and conducted surveillance for approximately fifteen to thirty minutes. While the officers were watching, an SUV pulled up to the residence and honked its horn. Mr. White and a woman came out of the residence. Mr. White was holding a bag and walked towards the back of the SUV. Then Mr. White turned around and started walking away from the SUV. The officers approached Mr. White. One of the officers looked underneath the SUV and saw a black firearm lying on the ground that appeared to be consistent with the firearm in the Instagram live feed from earlier that morning. The firearm was dry even though the ground was wet, and only Mr. White was in the vicinity of the SUV before the officers recovered the firearm. The officers placed Mr. White under arrest. Mr. White was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license, committed during release; possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding device; unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm; and unlawful possession of ammunition. II. Motion to Suppress Mr. White argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the physical evidence recovered at the scene of Mr. White’s arrest as the result of an illegal warrantless search of his GPS data by MPD. We disagree and affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.  4 A. Procedural and Factual Background The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. White’s motion to suppress, the evidence at which included the following. Shortly after 8 a.m. on February 11, 2020, an MPD officer viewed Mr. White’s Instagram live feed and saw Mr. White holding a firearm. The officer understood that Instagram live videos are broadcast in real time. The officer contacted PSA shortly thereafter, aware that Mr. White was on high-intensity supervision at the time. GPS information from PSA confirmed that Mr. White was at the address on record for him in MPD’s databases. Officers on duty that morning were familiar with the address. The officer who contacted PSA did not get a search warrant or judicial authorization to gather information from PSA. The information from PSA “reinforced information that [MPD] already had access to,” and the officers would have thought that Mr. White was at his address on record even if they had not consulted with PSA. The officers knew that Mr. White was scheduled to be in court that morning and would be leaving his house shortly, around 9 or 9:30 a.m., so they went to set up surveillance at Mr. White’s address. Shortly thereafter, the officers recovered a firearm and arrested Mr. White. Mr. White testified at the hearing. The day before Mr. White was arrested, the trial court released Mr. White from jail and put him under supervision in a  5 pending case in which he had pleaded guilty to a firearm offense. At the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the earlier case and noted that Mr. White had been on high-intensity supervision in that case between October 2019 and January 29, 2020, at which point he was taken into custody until his guilty plea eleven days later, on February 10, 2020. Mr. White argued at the suppression hearing that MPD needed to get a search warrant to access Mr. White’s location as monitored by PSA. The United States noted that Mr. White had raised the issue of the GPS data for the first time at the hearing and asked to file a supplemental brief on the issue. The trial court granted the request. In its supplemental filing, the United States argued in relevant part that the officers did not violate Mr. White’s Fourth Amendment rights by accessing his GPS data from PSA because Mr. White did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data. The United States argued, relying on the analysis in United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 481-86 (D.C. 2019), that Mr. White’s reasonable expectation of privacy was diminished by his status as a releasee under supervision by PSA and his notice of and agreement to the condition of GPS monitoring. Cf. Jackson, 214 A.3d at 486 (holding that sharing GPS data of probationer with police  6 by Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) did not invade probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy). The United States appended to its memorandum the release order that Mr. White signed on February 10, 2020, which notified Mr. White that he would be “supervised by a type of electronic monitoring device.” The release order stated that Mr. White was to return for HISP orientation the next morning. The United States noted in its memorandum that Mr. White had previously signed two additional HISP release orders in October 2019 that notified him that GPS monitoring was a condition of release under HISP. Further, in October 2019, as part of his HISP orientation at that time, Mr. White signed a GPS monitoring agreement that acknowledged that “PSA can provide [] tracking information to law enforcement for investigative purposes.” Finally, the United States noted that Mr. White asked to be placed on 24-hour home confinement at his plea hearing in the earlier case, knowing from prior experience that home confinement would entail GPS monitoring and information sharing. In his supplemental response, Mr. White argued in relevant part that he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his GPS data monitored by PSA. Mr. White contended that he had not agreed to his GPS data being shared with law enforcement at the time of his arrest because he had not yet attended HISP  7 orientation or signed a HISP contract, and his prior GPS monitoring agreement expired on January 29, 2020, when he was taken into custody. Further, Mr. White argued that Jackson did not apply to his case, because Jackson related to “convicted individuals after being sentenced and on probation or parole,” and Mr. White was on release pending sentencing. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court found, among other things, that (1) the officer who first viewed the Instagram live video knew where Mr. White lived and was aware that Mr. White was on court-ordered high- intensity supervision; (2) that officer contacted PSA to confirm that Mr. White was in fact at home; (3) the day before his arrest in the present case, Mr. White asked to be, and was, released on HISP, which Mr. White was aware included GPS monitoring; (4) Mr. White, in his prior case, had been released on HISP in October 2019; and (5) as part of his participation in HISP in 2019, Mr. White expressly consented to his tracking information being shared with law enforcement for investigative purposes. The trial court concluded that MPD did not violate Mr. White’s constitutional rights in obtaining GPS information from PSA, because Mr. White did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his GPS data. The trial court saw no “grounds to deviate from the reasoning” in Jackson. Mr. White agreed to the collection and  8 possible disclosure of his GPS data by asking to be placed on HISP, and Mr. White knew that his location was being monitored and potentially shared through that program. The trial court opined that the fact that Mr. White was briefly taken off HISP “does not negate his knowledge or consent” regarding the substance of the GPS monitoring agreement he signed in October 2019. Finally, the trial court noted that MPD’s use of the GPS data was “brief, tailored, and designed only to confirm [Mr. White’s] whereabouts.” B. Analysis Mr. White argues that MPD violated his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining GPS data from PSA. We disagree. In an appeal challenging the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous[,] and we review the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to” sustaining the ruling. Hooks v. United States, 208 A.3d 741, 745 (D.C. 2019). “[O]ur review of the trial court’s legal conclusions is de novo.” Id. (citation modified). The Fourth Amendment “protects the right of the people to be secure against searches . . . that are ‘unreasonable.’” Jackson, 214 A.3d at 472 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Whether a search was reasonable, and thus constitutionally permissible,  9 “depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.” Id. (citation modified). “[T]he reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (citation modified). We hold that PSA’s sharing of Mr. White’s GPS data with MPD to confirm Mr. White’s current location was reasonable. To be clear, Mr. White does not challenge PSA’s monitoring of Mr. White through GPS, instead challenging only PSA’s sharing of GPS data with MPD without a warrant. Mr. White did not have “an objectively reasonable expectation” that PSA “would not share his GPS data with the MPD,” Jackson, 214 A.3d at 482, given the totality of the circumstances in this case, which included: (1) Mr. White’s diminished expectation of privacy due to having been adjudicated guilty of a crime and released under high-intensity supervision; (2) Mr. White’s knowledge of the conditions of the HISP program, including that PSA would share information with MPD; (3) the limited nature of MPD’s access to Mr. White’s GPS data; and (4) the usefulness of the GPS data to MPD’s immediate and legitimate law-enforcement purposes.  10 First, Mr. White’s reasonable expectation of privacy was diminished because he had been adjudicated guilty of a crime and was released under high-intensity supervision. Because Mr. White had been adjudicated guilty and was awaiting sentencing, he had only “conditional liberty.” See, e.g., United States v. Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1993) (opining that when person has been adjudicated and is awaiting sentence “there is a heightened need for close supervision of the . . . person’s activities to protect society and the releasee himself, and the releasee is entitled only to a conditional liberty”); Garcia v. Commonwealth, 158 N.E.3d 452, 464 (Mass. 2020) (concluding that individual “released during a stay of sentence” has diminished privacy interests). Specifically, the trial court was statutorily required to detain Mr. White pending sentencing unless Mr. White could show by clear and convincing evidence that he was not a flight risk and was not a danger to any other person or the community. D.C. Code § 23-1325(b). That statutory requirement reflects the reduced liberty interests of defendants who have been adjudicated guilty. Cf., e.g., United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 318 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a jury found Abuhamra guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of multiple felonies, his reasonable expectation of continued freedom from government detention was significantly reduced from that of the average law-abiding citizen, or that of a pre-trial defendant.”). Moreover, when the trial court released Mr. White pending sentencing,  11 the trial court placed Mr. White on GPS monitoring. See D.C Code § 23-1325(b) (if trial court finds that defendant who is awaiting sentencing does not pose risk of flight or dangerousness, trial court shall treat defendant in accordance with D.C. Code § 23-1321); D.C. Code § 23-1321(c)(1)(B) (where appropriate, trial court may order defendant’s release subject to any condition reasonably necessary to assure appearance of person and safety of any other person and community). Mr. White does not challenge the lawfulness of his being placed on GPS monitoring while awaiting sentencing, and being placed on such monitoring clearly reflects a substantially reduced expectation of privacy. We note that a recently enacted statute authorizes MPD to request “location . . . data” from PSA with respect to releasees wearing “detection devices.” D.C. Code § 23-1321(e)(1), (2)(B)(iv). We place no reliance on that provision, however, which neither party cites and which was enacted after the police obtained the location data at issue in this case. Mr. White argues that the fact that he had not yet been sentenced and was still under the supervision of PSA, not CSOSA, meaningfully distinguishes his reasonable privacy expectations from those of the defendant in Jackson, because PSA’s conditions of release were not “on the . . . continuum of state-imposed punishments” and PSA does not serve the same “law enforcement function” as CSOSA. As we have just explained, however, punishment is not the only reason that  12 persons who have been found guilty of an offense have diminished privacy expectations. We need not determine in which contexts and to what extent individuals who have been charged with but not found guilty of a crime are subject to diminished privacy expectations while under the supervision of PSA. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462 (2013) (opining that privacy expectations of individuals “taken into police custody necessarily are of a diminished scope”) (citation modified). This case involves a defendant who had been adjudicated guilty, and PSA was responsible for supervising his compliance with release conditions, which generally include a prohibition against violating the law and in this case included GPS monitoring. See D.C. Code § 23-1321(b), (c) (stating that defendants shall be released only on condition that they “not commit a local, state, or federal crime during the period of release”); id. § 23-1303(h)(5) (providing that PSA will notify court and prosecution of violations of conditions of release); cf. Jackson, 214 A.3d at 482 (describing “routine data sharing arrangements” between CSOSA and MPD as way “to enhance CSOSA’s ability to prevent supervised offenders from engaging in criminal activity”) (citation modified). We also need not determine the precise degree to which Mr. White’s reasonable expectation of privacy was diminished compared to an individual on parole or probation, given additional circumstances  13 present in this case that further demonstrate that the limited information sharing in this case was reasonable. Second, Mr. White’s reasonable expectation of privacy was further diminished because he knew at the time that he asked to be placed back in the HISP program that the program entailed the “collection and possible disclosure” of his GPS data. Mr. White had been on HISP for several months before his arrest in this case and had only been in detention for eleven days before being released back into HISP the night before his arrest. As part of his earlier participation in HISP, he signed a GPS monitoring agreement that informed him that “PSA can provide [] tracking information to law enforcement for investigative purposes.” Mr. White’s awareness of possible disclosure of his GPS data to law enforcement while on HISP “significantly diminished” any reasonable expectation that his GPS data would not be shared with MPD for investigative purposes. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 119-20 (privacy interests diminished by defendant being “unambiguously informed” of search condition in probation order); cf. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (concluding that parolee “did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate” in search by police officer where parolee signed order that made him aware of condition authorizing warrantless search by law enforcement).  14 Mr. White argues that he “had not consented to the collection of his GPS data nor its possible disclosure at the time of his arrest” because he had not yet signed a new HISP contract and GPS monitoring agreement, and his prior contract had ended. Whether or not Mr. White had an active HISP contract at the time of his arrest does not determine whether Mr. White knew, as a matter of fact, that the HISP program entailed GPS monitoring and the possible disclosure of GPS data to law enforcement. The trial court found that Mr. White did have that knowledge and that his brief termination from the HISP program did “not negate his knowledge” of the HISP conditions. We see no clear error in that finding. Cf., e.g., Jabbour v. Bassatne, 673 A.2d 201, 205 (D.C. 1996) (reviewing trial court’s finding as to what party “knew in fact” for clear error). Third, the GPS data shared with MPD was extremely limited. MPD confirmed Mr. White’s location with PSA at a single point in time for a legitimate purpose. MPD’s access to Mr. White’s GPS data was more limited in this case than it was in Jackson, where the police monitored the defendant’s movements through a GPS monitoring device for a short period. Jackson, 214 A.3d at 486. We nevertheless concluded in Jackson that, given the limited nature and investigative purpose of the police’s use of GPS data, “any intrusion by the police on Mr. Jackson’s reasonable expectation of privacy was de minimis.” Id. As in Jackson, MPD’s use of Mr.  15 White’s GPS data in this case did not “pry into his intimate or private affairs or the details of his personal life.” Id. at 485. Fourth, turning to the nature of the government’s interest, MPD had good reason to request the limited GPS data it received regarding Mr. White’s whereabouts because MPD was engaged in a rapidly developing investigation into potential criminal activity by Mr. White. Within an hour after an MPD officer viewed Mr. White’s Instagram, MPD set up surveillance at Mr. White’s residence, knowing that he would shortly leave his residence to attend court. Even though MPD had other information about Mr. White’s address, confirming Mr. White’s location with PSA was an effective and efficient way to further MPD’s investigation and increase the likelihood of recovering physical evidence to corroborate the Instagram live video. Although the GPS data may not have been necessary to MPD’s investigation, we weigh the usefulness of the data to MPD against Mr. White’s significantly diminished privacy interests and the very limited nature of access to the GPS data. Knights, 534 U.S. 118-19. In that context, we conclude that MPD’s need for the GPS data was a salient factor in favor of the reasonableness of MPD’s conduct. (We note, in connection with the nature of the government’s interest, that Mr. White has not raised any Second Amendment concerns about the police’s conduct in this case.)  16 In sum, Mr. White’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because PSA’s limited sharing of Mr. White’s GPS data with MPD to further MPD’s immediate law-enforcement purposes did not intrude on Mr. White’s reasonable expectation of privacy, which was significantly diminished by his having been adjudicated guilty of a crime and released under supervision with knowledge of the conditions of GPS monitoring. This conclusion is consistent with our decision in Jackson and with the decisions of other courts in comparable circumstances. Jackson, 214 A.3d at 488; cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Govan, 259 N.E.3d 370, 386-87 (Mass. 2025) (concluding that sharing limited-in-time location data about pretrial releasee with police in furtherance of ongoing criminal investigation did not intrude on reasonable expectation of privacy of releasee, who was aware of GPS monitoring and that pretrial release could be revoked for engaging in criminal activity); Hawkins v. State, 735 S.W.3d 898, 906-07 (Tex. App. 2026) (same). We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Mr. White argues that the trial court erred by denying without a hearing his motion pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree.  17 A. Procedural and Factual Background Mr. White filed a motion to vacate his convictions on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the motion, Mr. White argued that his trial counsel had rendered deficient performance because trial counsel did not inform him of a plea offer, and that failure prejudiced Mr. White because he would have accepted the plea offer, which would have put him in a better position than he was in after the stipulated trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires defendant to show both that counsel was “deficient,” in that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and that defendant was prejudiced as a result) (citation modified). Mr. White requested a hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See D.C. Code § 23-110(c) (“Unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon . . . .”). The March 2020 plea offer appended to Mr. White’s Section 23-110 motion stated that the United States would “[d]ismiss the greater and remaining charges” if Mr. White pleaded guilty to carrying a pistol without a license. Mr. White submitted a declaration with his motion stating that he was not advised of the plea offer by his  18 trial counsel and “[h]ad [he] known there was a plea offer [he] would have most likely taken the plea.” The United States opposed Mr. White’s Section 23-110 motion. The United States argued that the motion should be denied without a hearing, because (1) Mr. White’s trial attorneys did convey the plea offer to Mr. White, but Mr. White was not interested, and (2) Mr. White could not establish prejudice because he “fail[ed] to establish that he would have accepted the terms of the plea offer.” The United States submitted declarations from both of Mr. White’s trial attorneys. One of the trial attorneys stated that he conveyed the March 2020 plea offer to Mr. White, but Mr. White “was not interested in entering into a plea agreement at the time” and was focused on the motion to suppress. The declarations stated that the United States revoked the March 2020 plea offer in June 2020 but then reextended the same plea offer in August 2020. Trial counsel negotiated with the United States over email regarding the plea offer, but the United States did not modify the terms of the offer. The United States notified trial counsel in mid-October 2020 that the reextended plea offer would expire on October 29, 2020. Trial counsel subsequently had a telephone call with Mr. White, who was at that time incarcerated, during which trial counsel “personally conveyed the March [2020] plea offer to [Mr.] White.” According to trial counsel, during that meeting Mr. White did not  19 express “any desire to accept the . . . plea offer.” Trial counsel stated that they had advised Mr. White that if he pleaded guilty, then “he would not be able to pursue his motion to suppress or appeal the denial [of] that motion,” and Mr. White wanted to pursue the motion to suppress. The United States acknowledged that trial counsel’s declarations contradicted Mr. White’s declaration as to whether Mr. White was given the plea offer, which could create a dispute of fact requiring a hearing to resolve. The United States contended, however, that the motion failed regardless because Mr. White could not show prejudice. Specifically, the United States argued that because Mr. White’s declaration stated not that he would have taken the plea but only that he “would have most likely taken the plea,” Mr. White “fail[ed] to establish a required prong of Strickland prejudice” in the context of counsel’s failure to convey a plea offer. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (explaining that defendants must show “a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel,” among other things, to establish prejudice from failure to convey plea offer). Further, the United States argued that the record in the case showed that Mr. White wished to litigate the motion to suppress, which he would have had to forgo had he taken the plea offer. Finally, the United States argued that Mr. White did not establish that the United States would not have withdrawn the plea offer before it was accepted or that the court would  20 have accepted the plea offer, although the United States did not contest that taking the plea offer would have resulted in Mr. White being convicted of fewer charges. See id. (to establish prejudice from failure to convey plea offer, defendants must also show reasonable probability that plea would have been entered and that end result of taking plea would have been “more favorable” by way of lesser charge or lighter sentence). The trial court denied Mr. White’s Section 23-110 motion. The trial court found that “there [was] ample evidence that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.” The trial court noted in particular the statements in trial counsel’s affidavits asserting conveyance of the plea offer and Mr. White’s failure to state he was unaware of a plea offer during the stipulated trial despite acknowledging the difference between a stipulated trial and a plea offer. The trial court concluded that Mr. White failed to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel was deficient. To the contrary, there is strong evidence that Mr. White merely prioritized his right to appeal over accepting a plea offer.” The trial court stated that a hearing was not necessary because “Mr. White’s claims are vague and conclusory, and there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts of the claim.” The trial court further concluded that Mr. White had not shown prejudice. The trial court concluded that Mr. White did not show a reasonable probability that he  21 would have accepted the plea offer because his declaration “seem[ed] to imply that he was grappling [with] whether he should take the plea.” Further, the trial court stated that the record was “replete” with evidence that Mr. White decided to proceed with a stipulated trial to preserve his appeal rights. Although the trial court opined that the evidence was more favorable to Mr. White on the other aspects of the prejudice showing required by Frye, Mr. White failed to meet the first component of the Frye test and therefore could not show prejudice. B. Analysis Mr. White argues that the trial court (1) erred by concluding that Mr. White failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer; (2) erred by concluding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient on the record before it; and (3) abused its discretion by denying the motion without holding a hearing. The United States argues that the trial court correctly found that Mr. White did not show prejudice and therefore correctly denied the motion. The United States concedes, however, that if “this case turn[s] on deficiency,” “a hearing would be necessary to resolve the factual dispute over whether [Mr.] White’s attorneys told him about the plea offer.” We agree with Mr. White that the trial court’s prejudice analysis was erroneous. We further agree that the trial court erred in deciding Mr. White’s claim of deficient performance without holding a hearing.  22 We hold that the trial court erred by concluding that Mr. White did not show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer. We review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusion as to whether the defendant demonstrated sufficient prejudice to make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C. 2007) (en banc). Strickland prejudice requires the defendant to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. When the alleged deficiency in trial counsel’s performance is the “fail[ure] to inform [the] client of a plea offer,” the defendant must show (1) “a reasonable probability [the defendant] would have accepted the plea offer,” (2) “a reasonable probability the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it,” (3) a reasonable probability that the trial court would not have “refus[ed] to accept [the plea offer],” and (4) “a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.” Benitez v. United States, 60 A.3d 1230, 1236-37 (D.C. 2013) (citation modified; quoting Frye, 566 U.S. at 147). The trial court did not correctly apply the reasonable-probability standard to the first component of the Frye test. The trial court concluded that Mr. White’s  23 prejudice claim failed because Mr. White’s statement in his declaration “seem[ed] to imply that he was grappling [with] whether he should take the plea.” Mr. White was not required to demonstrate, however, that he would have taken the plea offer. Rather, Mr. White was required to show only that there was a reasonable probability he would have taken the plea offer. Benitez, 60 A.3d at 1236. Mr. White’s declaration states that he “would have most likely taken the plea.” “Most likely” evinces a greater degree of likelihood than is required to meet the reasonable-probability standard. See, e.g., Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1132 (“The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different.”) (citation modified). The trial court suggested but did not conclude that Mr. White established prejudice on the remaining components of the Frye test. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in its analysis on the first Frye component, we remand for reconsideration of Mr. White’s claim of prejudice so that the trial court may hold a hearing if necessary and make the findings required to determine whether Mr. White has met the reasonable-probability standard under Frye. Because we cannot affirm the trial court’s denial of Mr. White’s Section 23-110 motion based on lack of prejudice, we address Mr. White’s challenge to the  24 trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel did not render deficient performance. We agree with both parties that the trial court should have held a hearing to adjudicate factual disputes before deciding Mr. White’s claim of deficient performance. The decision whether to hold a hearing on a Section 23-110 motion “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,” but “there is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing.” Hardy v. United States, 988 A.2d 950, 961 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified). The trial court must hold a hearing “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” D.C. Code § 23-110(c). See, e.g., Shepherd v. United States, 296 A.3d 389, 392 (D.C. 2023) (explaining that Section 23-110 creates default rule that hearing is required unless motion raises procedurally defaulted claims or rests on “(1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, [or] (3) assertions that would not merit relief even if true”) (citation modified). The trial court acted outside of its discretion by concluding that a hearing was not required on the ground that “there [was] no genuine dispute as to the material facts.” As the United States acknowledges, there is a factual dispute, demonstrated by the parties’ conflicting declarations, as to whether trial counsel informed Mr. White of the plea offer in a timely manner. See, e.g., Benitez, 60 A.3d at 1236 (“If defense counsel allows the [plea] offer to expire without advising the defendant or  25 allowing him to consider it, defense counsel does not render the effective assistance the Constitution requires.”) (citation modified). The United States’ evidence on this crucial point does not “conclusively show,” in light of Mr. White’s declaration, that Mr. White was properly advised of the plea offer, and therefore it was error for the trial court to deny Mr. White a hearing on his deficiency claim. D.C. Code § 23-110(c); cf., e.g., Jones v. United States, 918 A.2d 389, 408 (D.C. 2007) (holding defendant was entitled to hearing where Section 23-110 motion and supporting evidence alleged facts which, “if demonstrated, would establish ineffective assistance of counsel”; contradictions in affidavits and trial record casting doubt on credibility of supporting evidence did not “conclusively establish[]” defendant was not entitled to relief). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. White’s convictions in the direct appeal, vacate the trial court’s denial of Mr. White’s Section 23-110 motion, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. So ordered.