Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0453n.06 No. 26-5164 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nov 13, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY JERRY W. DUNN, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) ) Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant Jerry Dunn of five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 720 months. Dunn challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. I. During a three-month stretch in fall 2022, 56-year-old Dunn had an intimate relationship with MV, a 14-year-old girl. According to MV, Dunn sexually assaulted her, took pictures of her while he performed sexual acts, and repeatedly asked her to send sexually explicit pictures and videos of herself. No. 26-5164, United States v. Dunn Officers began an investigation of Dunn and executed a search warrant at his house. They seized various items, including a cell phone. The phone contained images and videos of MV naked, of MV and Dunn kissing, and of Dunn performing oral and digital sex on her. A grand jury indicted Dunn with five counts of employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to produce sexually explicit visual depictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and one count of knowingly possessing material containing a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Dunn went to trial. The jury heard testimony from Detective Jacob Wilson (the officer who seized Dunn’s phone), Amanda Moses (the forensic examiner assigned to the case), MV, and Dunn. Wilson testified about the background of the investigation. Moses testified about the process of extracting the images and videos from the phone. She also dated them. MV testified about how Dunn exploited her for the images and videos and threatened her family if she told anyone. She additionally identified herself and Dunn’s hand or his car in each photograph, explaining that Dunn either took the photographs or directed her to take them and send them to him. And Dunn testified that MV’s allegations were untrue. Dunn moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case and renewed that motion after trial. The district court denied the motions, and the jury found Dunn guilty of all charges. At sentencing, the district court calculated the Guidelines range, which carried a maximum of 1,920 months’ imprisonment. It then discussed the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Dunn to 720 months’ imprisonment. Dunn timely appealed. -2- No. 26-5164, United States v. Dunn II. Dunn argues that (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction and, thus, the district court erroneously denied his motions for judgment of acquittal; and (2) his 720-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. A. Rule 29 requires a court to “enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Evidence is insufficient only if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016)). Dunn first argues that MV’s testimony materially changed over the course of the investigation and trial, which precludes any rational juror from accepting her account. But an argument against a witness’s inconsistent testimony is “merely a challenge to [her] credibility.” United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999). And “challenges to the credibility of a witness” are challenges to the “quality of the government’s evidence,” not “the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Baskerville, 164 F.4th 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). In short, Dunn fails to raise a proper sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on this ground. Next, Dunn argues that, because the forensic examiner testified at trial that she did not remember who transported the phone from the evidence locker to her, the jury lacked any basis to attribute the child pornography to Dunn. This argument fails for the same reason: “[C]hain of custody issues are jury questions,” not questions about the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2010); Talley, 164 F.3d at 996. -3- No. 26-5164, United States v. Dunn In sum, both of Dunn’s purported sufficiency challenges are improvidently raised under Rule 29. We therefore reject them. B. Dunn also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. A sentence is substantively unreasonable when it is “too long” because “the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). We review for an abuse of discretion. Id. Because Dunn’s sentence is below the Guidelines range, we presume that it is reasonable. United States v. Sierra-Villegas, 774 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 2014). Dunn presses two arguments. First, Dunn asserts that his sentence creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity because data from the Judicial Sentencing Information Network (JSIN) shows shorter sentences for similarly situated offenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Second, Dunn insists the district court should have placed less weight on general deterrence and varied downward even further given his age, health risks, and lack of criminal history. Dunn fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. The district court considered the JSIN data when evaluating “the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007). But the district court acted well within its discretion in finding those broad averages unpersuasive given the facts of this case. The district court described Dunn’s conduct as “apex exploitation of a minor victim” and found numerous aggravating circumstances, including Dunn’s “twisted . . . approach,” “five deplorable acts of production,” “perjury at trial,” and “no acceptance of responsibility, no regret, no apology, no contrition.” In light of these circumstances, the district court sensed a strong need to deter others and protect both society and the victim from further conduct. This was not an abuse of discretion. And Dunn has not identified any other “basis -4- No. 26-5164, United States v. Dunn so compelling as to necessitate a shorter sentence.” United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 835 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Thus, Dunn’s below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. III. We affirm. -5-