Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 1 of 13 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14539 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JANTZEN CARTER, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cr-00017-CDL-CHW-1 ____________________ Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jantzen Carter appeals his conviction and 120-month imprisonment sentence for possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. After careful review, we conclude USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 2 of 13 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10502 that (1) Carter waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress by entering an unconditional guilty plea, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the statutory mandatary minimum sentence. We affirm Carter’s conviction and sentence. However, we remand for the limited purpose of correcting the written judgment, which conflicted with the oral pronouncement as to Carter’s term of supervised release. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In 2024, a task force in the Muscogee County, Georgia Sheriff’s Office was investigating Carter for suspected drug dealing. The task force obtained a warrant to track Carter’s cell phone. On May 16, 2024, an investigator with the task force was following Carter, using the cell phone tracking to determine his location. At one point during the surveillance, the investigator observed a truck and a car with identical license tags. Both tags came from a dealer in Alabama that was under investigation for trading in stolen vehicles. At some point, an officer observed the truck, which Carter was driving, fail to maintain its lane and initiated a traffic stop on the truck. During the stop, Carter was initially cooperative. The truck’s vehicle identification number (“VIN”) did not match any records in the law enforcement database, further suggesting that USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 3 of 13 25-10502 Opinion of the Court 3 the truck was stolen. Officers told Carter that the truck would be towed, and an inventory search ensued. Carter asked to retrieve his belongings. When investigators retrieved a duffle bag from the truck, Carter began acting nervous. An officer opened the bag and saw multiple shrink-wrapped packages that appeared to be drugs. Carter was arrested. As part of the inventory search, officers found more suspected narcotics in a box on the back seat of the truck. Field testing of the suspected narcotics indicated they contained fentanyl and cocaine. Lab testing confirmed only cocaine, totaling 14.82 kilograms. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Indictment A grand jury indicted Carter on one count, possession with the intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii). B. Motion to Suppress Carter moved to suppress the drugs that the officers found in the truck. Carer’s motion argued that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop and did not have probable cause to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle. The government responded that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck because of its dealer license tag and that dealership being under investigation for trading stolen vehicles. USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 4 of 13 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10502 The government also argued, among other things, that the search of the truck was a lawful inventory search. At an August 5, 2025 hearing, the district court denied Carter’s motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had probable cause to believe the truck was stolen before they searched it based on (1) the truck baring the same license tag as another car, (2) the tags coming from a dealership believed to be dealing in stolen vehicles, and (3) the fraudulent VIN. The court further determined that, once officers had probable cause to believe the truck was stolen, they had justification to impound it and carried out a lawful inventory search. The court did not specifically address whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck. C. Plea Hearing On September 16, 2025, Carter pled guilty without a written plea agreement. At the outset of the hearing, Carter was sworn in and answered the court’s questions as follows. He was 40 years old, a high school graduate, and he could read and write. He had not been treated for any mental illness or addiction within the last five years and had a clear mind. Carter listened to the government read (1) the charge against him, (2) the elements of the charged offense, and (3) the statutory sentencing range for the offense. Carter told the court that he understood everything. The court further explained to Carter that pleading guilty would subject him to a ten-year mandatory minimum prison sentence. The court explained the USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 5 of 13 25-10502 Opinion of the Court 5 Sentencing Guidelines, but clarified that, regardless of the advisory guidelines range, the minimum sentence the court could impose was ten years. Carter confirmed that he understood. Carter agreed that he discussed the charges with his counsel and was completely satisfied with his counsel’s advice and representation. Carter also confirmed that he had not reached a plea agreement with the government and that the government did not make any promise in connection with his decision to plead guilty. Carter understood that his guilty plea meant that there would be no trial, and further that he was giving up certain trial-related rights. Carter pled guilty to the one-count indictment and stated he was doing so freely and voluntarily without the benefit of any promises and because he was in fact guilty. The government stated the essential facts upon which the plea was based, and Carter agreed that those facts were true. Thereafter, the court found that Carter was competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that the plea was knowing and voluntary, and supported by an independent basis in fact. The court then adjudicated Carter guilty. At no point during the plea hearing did the parties discuss preserving issues for appeal or any conditions on Carter’s guilty plea. D. Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) The PSI assigned Carter a total offense level of 25, consisting of (1) a base offense level of 30 because the offense involved at least 5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine, under USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 6 of 13 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10502 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(5); (2) a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); (3) a one-level decrease for timely notifying the government of his intention to plead guilty, under § 3E1.1(b); and (4) a two-level decrease because Carter was a “Zero-Point Offender,” under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) and (b). Carter had zero criminal history points and a criminal history score of I. Based on a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history score of I, the advisory guidelines imprisonment range was 57 to 71 months. Carter’s conviction, however, carried a ten-year statutory minimum, so the guidelines term of imprisonment became 120 months. E. Objection and Response Carter raised one objection to the PSI, arguing that he qualified for safety-valve relief under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and thus should not be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. Known as the “safety valve” provision, § 3553(f) allows a sentencing court to sentence a defendant convicted of certain drug offenses below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant meets certain requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 128 (2024). As relevant here, the defendant must provide the government with all information he knows regarding related criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). In response, the government argued that Carter was not eligible for safety-valve relief because Carter never proffered any USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 7 of 13 25-10502 Opinion of the Court 7 information about the drugs and told the government that he would not proffer. F. Sentencing Hearing At Carter’s sentencing hearing on December 16, 2025, the government described how it offered Carter multiple opportunities to proffer information and how Carter had declined due to safety fears. Defense counsel conceded that Carter had not proffered. The district court overruled Carter’s objection to the PSI because he was ineligible for safety-valve relief. Carter made no further objections. In requesting a sentence, counsel stated, “I think unfortunately with the safety valve not being in play, we’re kind of stuck with the mandatory minimum on this case.” The district court asked Carter whether he wished to say anything before the court announced his sentence, and Carter stated, “I just want to have my right to appeal.” When the court asked him what he wanted to appeal, counsel clarified that Carter was speaking about the motion to suppress. The district court replied, “[o]kay, he has not waived his right to appeal in this case.” And counsel said, “[t]hat’s correct. So that’s what he’s speaking of, your Honor.” The court imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. After the court imposed Carter’s sentence, it notified him that he had the right to appeal his sentence. The court asked the parties whether there were any objections to the sentence or the manner in which it was imposed, and neither party objected. USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 8 of 13 8 Opinion of the Court 25-10502 The written judgment states that Carter was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. III. DISCUSSION A. Waived Challenge to Motion to Suppress Carter’s first argument is that the district erred in denying his motion to suppress. The government responds that Carter waived his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress because he validly entered an unconditional guilty plea. In his initial appellant’s brief, Carter did not make any arguments about the validity of his guilty plea, and he did not file a reply brief to the government’s waiver argument. So we start with the premise that Carter’s unconditional guilty plea was valid. Whether a defendant waives his right to appeal an adverse ruling by entering a valid, unconditional guilty plea is a question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). “A defendant’s unconditional plea of guilty, made knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit of competent counsel, waives all non-jurisdictional defects in that defendant’s court proceedings.” United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation modified); see also United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.4 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is non-jurisdictional and waived by a guilty plea). USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 9 of 13 25-10502 Opinion of the Court 9 “A defendant who wishes to preserve appellate review of a non-jurisdictional defect while at the same time pleading guilty can do so only by entering a ‘conditional plea’ in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).” Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155. 1 A conditional plea “must be in writing and must be consented to by the court and by the government.” Id. Here, again, Carter has not made any argument that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. And there was no conditional plea in writing and consented to by the court and the government. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155. Thus, Carter waived any error in the denial of his motion to suppress. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155; Charles, 757 F.3d at 1227 n.4. Carter entered his guilty plea on September 16, 2025. The exchange at the later sentencing on December 16, 2025—in which Carter suggested he wanted to appeal the suppression issue, and the district court said he had not waived that right—does not help Carter because it was “both too little and too late.” United States v. 1 Rule 11(a)(2) makes plain that to enter a conditional plea a defendant must obtain the consent of the court and government in writing and reserve the right to appeal an adverse determination: With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 10 of 13 10 Opinion of the Court 25-10502 Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270, 1278 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 903 (2025). In Edwards, as here, the defendant entered a guilty plea with no suggestion that he wanted to preserve any issue for appellate review. Id. at 1277-78. Later at sentencing, the defendant stated that he wanted to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and the district court stated, “you do have the right, if you want, to take an appeal of that.” Id. at 1278. On appeal, Edwards argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand that pleading guilty waived the right to appeal the suppression issue. Id. at 1277. This Court held that the guilty plea was voluntary, the suppression issue was waived, and the statements at sentencing did not change that waiver. Id. at 1278; c.f. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155-57 (holding that the defendant’s plea was not knowing and voluntary because the defendant reasonably but mistakenly believed he had preserved an issue for appeal based on statements made by defense counsel and the district court at the plea colloquy). Carter’s case is indistinguishable from Edwards in this regard. By entering an unconditional guilty plea, Carter waived any challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court’s comments at sentencing do not change that waiver. USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 11 of 13 25-10502 Opinion of the Court 11 B. Reasonableness of Sentence Carter also argues that his 120-month sentence was “greater than necessary” in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.2 He does not say anything about the statutory mandatory minimum penalty. He also does not argue there was any procedural error in his sentencing. When properly preserved, we review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023). Errors in sentencing not brought to the district court’s attention are reviewed for plain error. 3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 172 (2020). 2 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed education, vocational training, or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the sentencing guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 3 The plain-error standard requires the defendant to show: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). If the defendant shows this, we have discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 12 of 13 12 Opinion of the Court 25-10502 Carter did not preserve a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence because he did not (1) ask for a lower sentence nor (2) object to the sentence imposed in the district court. See Holguin-Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 174-75 (holding that a defendant preserves a claim that his sentence was unreasonably long by advocating for a shorter sentence). Even if this challenge were preserved, however, we easily reject Carter’s argument because a district court has no discretion to go below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum.”). There are certain limited exceptions to this, such as the safety-valve provision, but Carter does not argue that any exception applies to him. Carter received the shortest imprisonment sentence he could have received. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (mandating a 10-year minimum sentence for a person who possesses with intent to distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine). Accordingly, we hold that his 120-month sentence was not unreasonably long. C. Limited Remand to Correct Written Judgment “When the oral pronouncement of a sentence varies from the written judgment, the oral pronouncement governs.” United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). If the oral and written conditions of supervised release “unambiguously conflict[],” this Court will remand to the district court “with USCA11 Case: 25-14539 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 13 of 13 25-10502 Opinion of the Court 13 instructions to correct the written judgment to accord with the oral pronouncement of sentence.” United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000). At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a supervised release term of five years, the statutory mandatory minimum term. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). The written judgment incorrectly stated that Carter’s term of supervised release was three years. To fix this discrepancy, we must remand. See Bates, 213 F.3d at 1340. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we affirm Carter’s conviction and 120-month imprisonment sentence. We remand to the district court for it to correct the written judgment to accord with the oral pronouncement of the terms of supervised release. AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.