United States v. Jantzen Carter
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-14539
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-14539
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JANTZEN CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cr-00017-CDL-CHW-1
____________________
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jantzen Carter appeals his conviction and 120-month
imprisonment sentence for possessing five or more kilograms of
cocaine with intent to distribute. After careful review, we conclude
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that (1) Carter waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress by entering an unconditional guilty plea, and (2) the
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the statutory
mandatary minimum sentence.
We affirm Carter’s conviction and sentence. However, we
remand for the limited purpose of correcting the written judgment,
which conflicted with the oral pronouncement as to Carter’s term
of supervised release.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2024, a task force in the Muscogee County, Georgia
Sheriff’s Office was investigating Carter for suspected drug dealing.
The task force obtained a warrant to track Carter’s cell phone.
On May 16, 2024, an investigator with the task force was
following Carter, using the cell phone tracking to determine his
location. At one point during the surveillance, the investigator
observed a truck and a car with identical license tags. Both tags
came from a dealer in Alabama that was under investigation for
trading in stolen vehicles.
At some point, an officer observed the truck, which Carter
was driving, fail to maintain its lane and initiated a traffic stop on
the truck.
During the stop, Carter was initially cooperative. The
truck’s vehicle identification number (“VIN”) did not match any
records in the law enforcement database, further suggesting that
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25-10502 Opinion of the Court 3
the truck was stolen. Officers told Carter that the truck would be
towed, and an inventory search ensued.
Carter asked to retrieve his belongings. When investigators
retrieved a duffle bag from the truck, Carter began acting nervous.
An officer opened the bag and saw multiple shrink-wrapped
packages that appeared to be drugs. Carter was arrested.
As part of the inventory search, officers found more
suspected narcotics in a box on the back seat of the truck. Field
testing of the suspected narcotics indicated they contained fentanyl
and cocaine. Lab testing confirmed only cocaine, totaling 14.82
kilograms.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Indictment
A grand jury indicted Carter on one count, possession with
the intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii).
B. Motion to Suppress
Carter moved to suppress the drugs that the officers found
in the truck. Carer’s motion argued that the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop and did not have
probable cause to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle.
The government responded that officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop the truck because of its dealer license tag and that
dealership being under investigation for trading stolen vehicles.
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The government also argued, among other things, that the search
of the truck was a lawful inventory search.
At an August 5, 2025 hearing, the district court denied
Carter’s motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had
probable cause to believe the truck was stolen before they searched
it based on (1) the truck baring the same license tag as another car,
(2) the tags coming from a dealership believed to be dealing in
stolen vehicles, and (3) the fraudulent VIN.
The court further determined that, once officers had
probable cause to believe the truck was stolen, they had
justification to impound it and carried out a lawful inventory
search. The court did not specifically address whether the officers
had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck.
C. Plea Hearing
On September 16, 2025, Carter pled guilty without a written
plea agreement. At the outset of the hearing, Carter was sworn in
and answered the court’s questions as follows. He was 40 years old,
a high school graduate, and he could read and write. He had not
been treated for any mental illness or addiction within the last five
years and had a clear mind.
Carter listened to the government read (1) the charge
against him, (2) the elements of the charged offense, and (3) the
statutory sentencing range for the offense. Carter told the court
that he understood everything. The court further explained to
Carter that pleading guilty would subject him to a ten-year
mandatory minimum prison sentence. The court explained the
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Sentencing Guidelines, but clarified that, regardless of the advisory
guidelines range, the minimum sentence the court could impose
was ten years. Carter confirmed that he understood.
Carter agreed that he discussed the charges with his counsel
and was completely satisfied with his counsel’s advice and
representation. Carter also confirmed that he had not reached a
plea agreement with the government and that the government did
not make any promise in connection with his decision to plead
guilty. Carter understood that his guilty plea meant that there
would be no trial, and further that he was giving up certain
trial-related rights.
Carter pled guilty to the one-count indictment and stated he
was doing so freely and voluntarily without the benefit of any
promises and because he was in fact guilty. The government stated
the essential facts upon which the plea was based, and Carter
agreed that those facts were true. Thereafter, the court found that
Carter was competent and capable of entering an informed plea,
that the plea was knowing and voluntary, and supported by an
independent basis in fact. The court then adjudicated Carter guilty.
At no point during the plea hearing did the parties discuss
preserving issues for appeal or any conditions on Carter’s
guilty plea.
D. Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”)
The PSI assigned Carter a total offense level of 25, consisting
of (1) a base offense level of 30 because the offense involved at least
5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine, under
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U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(5); (2) a two-level decrease for
acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); (3) a
one-level decrease for timely notifying the government of his
intention to plead guilty, under § 3E1.1(b); and (4) a two-level
decrease because Carter was a “Zero-Point Offender,” under
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) and (b).
Carter had zero criminal history points and a criminal
history score of I. Based on a total offense level of 25 and a criminal
history score of I, the advisory guidelines imprisonment range was
57 to 71 months. Carter’s conviction, however, carried a ten-year
statutory minimum, so the guidelines term of imprisonment
became 120 months.
E. Objection and Response
Carter raised one objection to the PSI, arguing that he
qualified for safety-valve relief under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and thus should not be subject to the mandatory
minimum sentence. Known as the “safety valve” provision,
§ 3553(f) allows a sentencing court to sentence a defendant
convicted of certain drug offenses below the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence if the defendant meets certain requirements.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 128
(2024). As relevant here, the defendant must provide the
government with all information he knows regarding related
criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).
In response, the government argued that Carter was not
eligible for safety-valve relief because Carter never proffered any
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information about the drugs and told the government that he
would not proffer.
F. Sentencing Hearing
At Carter’s sentencing hearing on December 16, 2025, the
government described how it offered Carter multiple
opportunities to proffer information and how Carter had declined
due to safety fears. Defense counsel conceded that Carter had not
proffered. The district court overruled Carter’s objection to the PSI
because he was ineligible for safety-valve relief. Carter made no
further objections. In requesting a sentence, counsel stated, “I think
unfortunately with the safety valve not being in play, we’re kind of
stuck with the mandatory minimum on this case.”
The district court asked Carter whether he wished to say
anything before the court announced his sentence, and Carter
stated, “I just want to have my right to appeal.” When the court
asked him what he wanted to appeal, counsel clarified that Carter
was speaking about the motion to suppress. The district court
replied, “[o]kay, he has not waived his right to appeal in this case.”
And counsel said, “[t]hat’s correct. So that’s what he’s speaking of,
your Honor.”
The court imposed a sentence of 120 months of
imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. After
the court imposed Carter’s sentence, it notified him that he had the
right to appeal his sentence. The court asked the parties whether
there were any objections to the sentence or the manner in which
it was imposed, and neither party objected.
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The written judgment states that Carter was sentenced to
120 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised
release.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Waived Challenge to Motion to Suppress
Carter’s first argument is that the district erred in denying
his motion to suppress. The government responds that Carter
waived his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress because he validly entered an unconditional guilty plea.
In his initial appellant’s brief, Carter did not make any arguments
about the validity of his guilty plea, and he did not file a reply brief
to the government’s waiver argument.
So we start with the premise that Carter’s unconditional
guilty plea was valid. Whether a defendant waives his right to
appeal an adverse ruling by entering a valid, unconditional guilty
plea is a question of law we review de novo. See United States v.
Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2003).
“A defendant’s unconditional plea of guilty, made
knowingly, voluntarily, and with the benefit of competent counsel,
waives all non-jurisdictional defects in that defendant’s court
proceedings.” United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir.
1997) (citation modified); see also United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d
1222, 1227 n.4 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a district court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress is non-jurisdictional and waived by a
guilty plea).
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“A defendant who wishes to preserve appellate review of a
non-jurisdictional defect while at the same time pleading guilty can
do so only by entering a ‘conditional plea’ in accordance with Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).” Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155. 1 A conditional plea
“must be in writing and must be consented to by the court and by
the government.” Id.
Here, again, Carter has not made any argument that his
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. And there was no
conditional plea in writing and consented to by the court and the
government. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155.
Thus, Carter waived any error in the denial of his motion to
suppress. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155; Charles, 757 F.3d at 1227 n.4.
Carter entered his guilty plea on September 16, 2025. The
exchange at the later sentencing on December 16, 2025—in which
Carter suggested he wanted to appeal the suppression issue, and
the district court said he had not waived that right—does not help
Carter because it was “both too little and too late.” United States v.
1 Rule 11(a)(2) makes plain that to enter a conditional plea a defendant must
obtain the consent of the court and government in writing and reserve the
right to appeal an adverse determination:
With the consent of the court and the government, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate
court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal may then
withdraw the plea.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
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Edwards, 142 F.4th 1270, 1278 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 903
(2025).
In Edwards, as here, the defendant entered a guilty plea with
no suggestion that he wanted to preserve any issue for appellate
review. Id. at 1277-78. Later at sentencing, the defendant stated that
he wanted to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and the
district court stated, “you do have the right, if you want, to take an
appeal of that.” Id. at 1278. On appeal, Edwards argued that his
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not
understand that pleading guilty waived the right to appeal the
suppression issue. Id. at 1277. This Court held that the guilty plea
was voluntary, the suppression issue was waived, and the
statements at sentencing did not change that waiver. Id. at 1278;
c.f. Pierre, 120 F.3d at 1155-57 (holding that the defendant’s plea was
not knowing and voluntary because the defendant reasonably but
mistakenly believed he had preserved an issue for appeal based on
statements made by defense counsel and the district court at the
plea colloquy).
Carter’s case is indistinguishable from Edwards in this regard.
By entering an unconditional guilty plea, Carter waived any
challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress. The district
court’s comments at sentencing do not change that waiver.
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B. Reasonableness of Sentence
Carter also argues that his 120-month sentence was “greater
than necessary” in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.2 He does
not say anything about the statutory mandatory minimum penalty.
He also does not argue there was any procedural error in his
sentencing.
When properly preserved, we review the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023). Errors in
sentencing not brought to the district court’s attention are
reviewed for plain error. 3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Holguin-Hernandez
v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 172 (2020).
2 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the
sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
and provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4)
the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with
needed education, vocational training, or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the sentencing guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
3 The plain-error standard requires the defendant to show: (1) an error
occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights. See United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
If the defendant shows this, we have discretion to correct the error if it
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. See id.
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Carter did not preserve a challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence because he did not (1) ask for a
lower sentence nor (2) object to the sentence imposed in the district
court. See Holguin-Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 174-75 (holding that a
defendant preserves a claim that his sentence was unreasonably
long by advocating for a shorter sentence).
Even if this challenge were preserved, however, we easily
reject Carter’s argument because a district court has no discretion
to go below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. United
States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (“It is
well-settled that a district court is not authorized to sentence a
defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum.”). There are
certain limited exceptions to this, such as the safety-valve
provision, but Carter does not argue that any exception applies
to him.
Carter received the shortest imprisonment sentence he
could have received. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (mandating a
10-year minimum sentence for a person who possesses with intent
to distribute 5 or more kilograms of cocaine). Accordingly, we hold
that his 120-month sentence was not unreasonably long.
C. Limited Remand to Correct Written Judgment
“When the oral pronouncement of a sentence varies from
the written judgment, the oral pronouncement governs.” United
States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). If the oral and
written conditions of supervised release “unambiguously
conflict[],” this Court will remand to the district court “with
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instructions to correct the written judgment to accord with the oral
pronouncement of sentence.” United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336,
1340 (11th Cir. 2000).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a
supervised release term of five years, the statutory mandatory
minimum term. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). The written judgment
incorrectly stated that Carter’s term of supervised release was three
years. To fix this discrepancy, we must remand. See Bates, 213 F.3d
at 1340.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm Carter’s conviction and
120-month imprisonment sentence. We remand to the district
court for it to correct the written judgment to accord with the oral
pronouncement of the terms of supervised release.
AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.