Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two November 3, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 61232-1-II Respondent, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION KEITH ZAKEEM REEVES, Appellant. VELJACIC, C.J. — Keith Reeves was convicted of assault in the third degree, malicious mischief in the third degree, and malicious mischief in the third degree—domestic violence. Reeves argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing interest on the restitution ordered. On reply, Reeves argues that the trial court made conflicting orders when it found Reeves indigent while also ordering Reeves to pay restitution. Lastly, Reeves argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court made a clerical error in requiring Reeves to report to the court clerk’s office as it relates to the restitution ordered. We remand for the specific purpose of correcting the clerical error. We otherwise affirm. 61232-1-II FACTS I. THE INCIDENT Reeves was arrested following a domestic violence dispute with his ex-girlfriend. While on route to Pierce County Jail, Reeves headbutted and kicked the central divider of the patrol car. These actions resulted in laceration to Reeves’s forehead, which bled profusely and covered the back of the patrol car with blood. The blood covering the back of the patrol car required the police to hire a biohazard cleaning company. It took the cleaning company several hours to clean the car. The total cost to clean the patrol car was $446.96. II. GUILTY PLEA In a negotiated resolution, Reeves pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree, malicious mischief in the third degree, and malicious mischief in the third degree—domestic violence. III. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE At sentencing, the trial court found Reeves indigent. Reeves and his counsel signed the restitution order: THE COURT: I’m going ask you again, [defense counsel], the question. On this here order setting restitution, (unintelligible) your client (unintelligible) straight line. Is that your client’s signature on that line right there? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Reeves made that mark in my presence. [REEVES]: I did. I did. 2 61232-1-II 2 Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 38. No other conversations were had regarding restitution nor did any party discuss or raise the imposition of interest on the restitution amount. Following the sentencing hearing, the judgment and sentence was ordered and signed. Restitution was set at $446.96 to be paid to the City of Tacoma. Restitution was set to be paid to the court clerk: All payments shall be made in accordance with the policies of the clerk, commencing immediately, unless the court specifically sets forth the rate herein: Not less than $Per Clerk per month commencing Per Clerk. RCW 9.94.760. If the court does not set the rate herein, the defendant shall report to the clerk’s office within 24 hours of the entry of the judgment and sentence to set up a payment plan. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 78. Additionally, the judgment and sentence read: INTEREST The restitution obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments. No interest shall accrue on non-restitution obligations imposed in this judgment. RCW 10.82.090. CP at 78. The prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the trial court signed the judgment and sentence order. Reeves declined to sign. As evident above, both attorneys, the trial court, and Reeves signed the restitution. ANALYSIS I. IMPOSITION OF INTEREST ON RESTITUTION ORDERED For the first time on appeal, Reeves argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing interest on the restitution ordered. Additionally, Reeves argues that the trial court failed to complete the statutory inquiry under RCW 10.82.090(2), which calls on the trial court to inquire about the defendant’s indigency, financial circumstances, mental health, and homelessness when 3 61232-1-II electing to not impose interest.1 The State argues that Reeves failed to raise the issue at the trial court level and therefore failed to preserve the issue on appeal pursuant to RAP 2.5. 2 We agree with the State and decline to review the issue. A. Legal Principles Courts do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 332-33, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). The appellate court retains discretion to decline to review any claim of error not raised at the trial court. RAP 2.5(a). This court has previously held that the specific issue of restitution interest needs to be raised at the trial court level. [T]he legislature’s unique wording in RCW 10.82.090(2) suggests that a request for relief in this subsection must be raised in the trial court. The factual analysis that must be performed by the trial court, particularly the requirement that the victim be given an opportunity to address the court and the requirement that the trial court take that input, if any, into account, cannot be performed by the appellate court for the first time on appeal. 1 RCW 10.82.090(2) reads: (2) The court may elect not to impose interest on any restitution the court orders. Before determining not to impose interest on restitution, the court shall inquire into and consider the following factors: (a) Whether the offender is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3) or general rule 34; (b) the offender’s available funds, as defined in RCW 10.101.010(2), and other liabilities including child support and other legal financial obligations; (c) whether the offender is homeless; and (d) whether the offender is mentally ill, as defined in RCW 71.24.025. The court shall also consider the victim’s input, if any, as it relates to any financial hardship caused to the victim if interest is not imposed. The court may also consider any other information that the court believes, in the interest of justice, relates to not imposing interest on restitution. After consideration of these factors, the court may waive the imposition of restitution interest. 2 The State additionally suggests alternative forms of relief for Reeves related to the restitution order and interest imposed pursuant to RCW 10.82.090(3). We need not address this argument as we do not review the issue of restitution and interest pursuant to RAP 2.5. 4 61232-1-II State v. Ingalsbe, No. 59514-1-II, slip op. at 5 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2059514-1-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. Because Reeves did not raise the issue at the trial court level, we are not required to address it. RAP 2.5(a) grants discretion to review claimed errors not appealed as a matter of right. State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 834-35, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). But Reeves failed to discuss or even mention RAP 2.5 in his opening brief. State v. Frieday, 33 Wn. App. 2d 719, 743, 565 P.3d 139, review denied, 5 Wn.3d 1006 (2025). Accordingly, we decline to consider the imposition of restitution interest. II. CONFLICTING ORDERS Additionally, for the first time in his reply brief, Reeves seeks remand to amend what he contends are conflicting orders: the finding of indigency and the order providing for interest on restitution. But “an issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.” Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); RAP 10.3(c). We therefore do not reach this issue raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief. III. CLERICAL ERROR Lastly, Reeves asserts that the trial court made a clerical error by ordering him to report to the court clerk’s office for restitution matters while he was incarcerated. The State concedes this issue. We agree with Reeves and accept the State’s concession. We remand to correct the clerical error in the judgment and sentence so that Reeves is directed to report to the Department of Corrections regarding his restitution payments pursuant to RCW 9.94A.760(1) and (5)(a). 5 61232-1-II CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s decision to order interest on the restitution. We remand for the specific purpose of correcting the clerical error. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Veljacic, C.J. We concur: Cruser, J. Price, J. 6