Full Opinion

Before HARRELL, DAVIS, and STAMPFLI Appellate Military Judges _________________________ UNITED STATES Appellee v. Jonathan M. HUFFMAN Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant No. 202500400 _________________________ Decided: 16 November 2026 Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary. Military Judge: Michael F. Whitican Sentence adjudged 14 August 2025, by a general court-martial tried at Naval Station Everett, Washington, consisting of a military judge alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1; confine- ment for 119 days; and a bad-conduct discharge. For Appellant: Captain Katherine E. Malcolm, USMC For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander Gregory A. Rustico, JAGC, USN Lieutenant Commander Philip J. Corrigan, JAGC, USN United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court Judge STAMPFLI delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior Judge HARRELL and Judge DAVIS joined. _________________________ This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2. _________________________ STAMPFLI, Judge: In accordance with his pleas of guilty and pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant was convicted by a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone of one specification of assault upon a person engaged in law en- forcement duties in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).1 We have jurisdiction to review this case under Article 66(b)(3), UCMJ.2 Appellant makes a single assignment of error: that the portion of his sen- tence encompassing a bad-conduct discharge was plainly unreasonable. We find no prejudicial error and affirm the findings and sentence. I. BACKGROUND Appellant was in his first enlistment and assigned to Marine Corps Secu- rity Force Battalion at Naval Base Kitsap in Bangor, Washington. Early in the morning of New Year’s Day 2025, Appellant, heavily intoxicated, got into an argument with his wife at their on-base house. Appellant had spent much of the night ringing in the new year by drinking alcohol and playing video games. Appellant testified that he drank approximately two “handles,” or large bottles, of a premixed tequila cocktail.3 During the spousal argument and while he was intoxicated, Appellant retrieved his pistol from a keypad-locked safe, pointed it at his head, and threatened to kill himself. In response, his wife called 911 and left the house with their infant son and pet dog. 1 10 U.S.C. § 928. 2 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(3). 3 R. at 37, 44. A handle is a colloquial term generally referring to a 1.75-liter bottle of alcohol. Appellant uses the term “handle,” but then clarified during the providence inquiry that he drank “two large bottles.” Id. 2 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court Multiple agencies responded to the 911 call, including base police, the Na- val Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the Kitsap County Sheriff’s Of- fice Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team. Master-at-Arms4 Second Class (MA2) C.L. was among the responders, and he took up position behind Appellant’s garage.5 Upon peering around the garage, MA2 C.L. observed Ap- pellant standing at the second story window of the house, pointing a pistol di- rectly at him. MA2 C.L. heard the pistol fire and glass breaking, leading him to immediately dive for cover behind a brick wall. A base police officer heard the bullet whistle between the garage and entryway to the house.6 At some point following the shooting, Appellant announced through the window to MA2 C.L., “Hey man, I’m sorry I shot at you with this,” while hold- ing the pistol in his right hand and a spent casing in his left hand.7 Appellant’s house was a townhouse sharing a wall with another townhouse in a military housing neighborhood at the end of a cul-de-sac. Most of the re- sponders arrived in the morning on New Year’s Day, with some arriving as late as noon. One responder testified that the house was near a playground. Other homes housing military families, many of whom were home for the New Year’s Day holiday, were also in close proximity.8 During the presentencing phase of his court-martial, Appellant presented a robust case, calling two character witnesses, providing an affidavit from his doctor about Appellant’s major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, and entering 12 letters of support. Appellant also made an unsworn statement. The plea agreement between Appellant and the convening authority re- quired a sentence of reduction to E-1, confinement between 1 and 13 months, and allowed for the imposition of a bad-conduct discharge. However, the plea 4 Masters-at-Arms conduct law enforcement operations in support of base com- manders and NCIS. Dep’t of the Navy, Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Per- sonnel Classifications and Occupational Standards (NAVPERS 18068F), Vol. I, Part B, Ch. 49 at MA-4 (July 2026) (NEOCS Manual). 5 During the providence inquiry, Appellant acknowledged MA2 C.L. was engaged in law enforcement duties at the time of the incident. R. at 60; Stip. of Fact, Pros. Ex. 1 at Para. 3.a.(2). 6 Pros. Ex. 3 at 1. 7 Pros. Ex. 2 at 2. 8 R. at 109. 3 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court agreement provided protection from a dishonorable discharge as well as ad- judged fines and forfeitures.9 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a re- duction to E-1, confinement for 119 days, and a bad-conduct discharge. II. DISCUSSION Appellant asks us to hold the portion of his sentence extending to a punitive discharge as “plainly unreasonable” and to set aside the same. A. Standard of review In accordance with Article 66(e)(1)(D), UCMJ, we are empowered to review sentences for offenses occurring after 27 December 2023 for whether they are “plainly unreasonable.”10 The term “plainly unreasonable” is not defined by the statute or within the Manual for Courts-Martial, and we interpret the phrase according to its plain meaning.11 Although neither Congress nor our superior court has provided further guidance on the plainly unreasonable standard for sentence review, as we enunciated in United States v. Brockenborough12 and have subsequently ap- plied in successive cases,13 “unreasonable” is defined as “Not reflecting good judgment; irrational or capricious” and as “Not within sensible or rational lim- its; excessive,”14 and “plain” means “clear or obvious.”15 Like federal civilian courts, courts-martial consider multiple factors in de- termining a sentence. These include rehabilitative factors, such as the ac- cused’s capacity for self-improvement or potential for future service (if appro- priate). However, there are also deterrent factors, for example, discouraging 9 App. Ex. X at 7-8. 10 10 U.S.C. § 866. 11 United States v. Brockenborough, No. 202400476, 2026 CCA LEXIS 21 at *7 (N- M. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2026) (unpublished), rev. denied, __ M.J. __, No. 26- 0157/MC, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 404 (C.A.A.F. May 4, 2026); see also United States v. Sanchez, No. 202500114, 2026 CCA LEXIS 249 at *7 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 28, 2026) (unpublished), rev. denied, __ M.J. __, No. 26-0248/MC, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 786 (C.A.A.F. Sep. 14, 2026). 12 Brockenborough, 2026 CCA LEXIS 21. 13 United States v. Zbranek, No. 202500202, 2026 CCA LEXIS 427 at *7-8 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Sep. 25, 2026) (unpublished); Sanchez, 2026 CCA LEXIS 249 at *7. 14 Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 15 United States v. Cole, 84 M.J. 398, 404 (C.A.A.F. 2024); see also United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1283 (2007). 4 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court others to commit the same offense, and retributive factors, such as “providing just punishment for the offense.”16 As part of military sentencing reform, Congress enacted a system of sen- tencing parameters that better reflected federal civilian criminal practice.17 The sentencing factor language in Article 56, UCMJ,18 the statute that estab- lishes court-martial sentencing, has similarity to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the federal criminal code for imposition of a sentence in a federal criminal trial. Likewise, in reviewing the sentence, Congress intended us to take an approach like that in federal criminal appeals: the “plainly unreasonable” language in Article 66(e), UCMJ,19 mirrors its federal analogue, 18 U.S.C. § 3742.20 16 Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 1002(c). 17 Office of the General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Report of the Military Justice Review Group Part I: UCMJ Recommendations, at 619 (Dec. 22, 2015). 18 10 U.S.C. § 856. 19 10 U.S.C. § 866. See Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §539E, 135 Stat. 1541, 1700-06 (2021), enacting changes to Article 66, UCMJ, that came into effect on 27 December 2023. 20 R.C.M. 1117 previously provided a definition for “plainly unreasonable” in the context of a Government appeal of a sentence, but the rule was amended in 2023 to remove this definition, “thereby enabling the application of those words according to their plain language as provided in Article 66(e).” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.) [MCM], app. 15, Analysis of the Composition of the Manual, the Pre- amble, and the Rules for Courts-Marial, at A15-29. See also Sanchez, 2026 CCA LEXIS 249 at *7; and Office of the General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Report of the Military Justice Review Group Part I: UCMJ Recommendations, at 619 (Dec. 22, 2015). In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 244-45, 260 (2005), separate majorities of the Supreme Court invalidated the mandatory nature of the federal sentencing guide- lines contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and held that the scheme violated the Sixth Amend- ment right to a jury trial. The Court further excised a portion of 10 U.S.C. § 3742 that dealt with the phrase “plainly unreasonable” as a remedy for the Sixth Amendment concerns, but a majority held excision of that portion of the statute does not “pose a critical problem for the handling of appeals” because “a statute that does not explicitly set forth a standard of review may nonetheless do so implicitly.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 260. Thus, the Booker Court excised the provision of the statute providing for de novo review of departures from the sentencing guidelines and upheld a “reasonableness” standard of review. In subsequent sentencing cases, the Court “made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate re- view of sentencing decisions.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 5 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court In performing our review of the reasonableness of the sentence, we afford substantial deference to the military judge and review for an abuse of discre- tion.21 “An abuse of discretion does not mean that this Court merely would reach a different conclusion but rather that the military judge’s ruling was ar- bitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable[,] or clearly erroneous.”22 If, pursuant to that deferential standard of review, we determine that the sentence is not un- reasonable, that concludes our inquiry.23 But if we determine the sentence to be unreasonable, additional analysis is required since there is no basis to con- clude that the word “plainly” is surplusage.24 While in a practical sense, the difference between the “unreasonable” and “plainly unreasonable” may be “slight, perhaps even nil”25 we nevertheless proceed to determine whether an unreasonable sentence is plainly, that is, clearly or obviously, so. B. Appellant’s bad-conduct discharge was not plainly unreasonable Appellant argues that his sentence of a bad-conduct discharge was plainly unreasonable because he presented evidence of both good military character and rehabilitative potential during his presentencing case. There are only two punitive discharges available for sentencing at a general court-martial. A bad- conduct discharge “is less severe than a dishonorable discharge and is designed 21 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 202500018, 2026 CCA LEXIS 327 at *5-6 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. Jul. 13, 2026) (unpublished); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. 22 United States v. Tapp, 85 M.J. 19, 24 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (describing the meaning of the abuse of discretion standard) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 23 “It would seem incongruous that a defendant limited to asserting that his . . . sentence is ‘plainly unreasonable,’ would be allowed to argue that his sentence should be reversed because it is ‘unreasonable,’” and that “it necessarily follows that a sen- tence that is not unreasonable is also not plainly unreasonable,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437, 439. 24 Brockenborough, 2026 CCA LEXIS 21 at *7 (citing Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). Verba cum effectu sunt accipienda (words are to be taken as having an effect). See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 364 F.3d 556, 559 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). 25 United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A]s a practical matter it is hard to conceive of what the difference might be, let alone how to articulate such a difference in a meaningful way . . . between the . . . ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard of review . . . and our post-Booker review of sentences for ‘unreasonableness’”). 6 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court as punishment for bad-conduct rather than as a punishment for serious of- fenses of either a civilian or military nature.”26 While the sentencing parame- ters only concern confinement ranges and there are no sentencing parameters established for other lawful punishments, such as a punitive discharge,27 the maximum punishments in the Manual for Courts-Martial establish that some offenses merit either a bad-conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge, some only a bad-conduct discharge, and some offenses do not rate a punitive dis- charge.28 For violating Article 128, UCMJ, assault upon a person performing law en- forcement duties, the authorized punitive discharges at a general court-mar- tial include either a bad-conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge.29 The plea agreement that Appellant negotiated limited his exposure to only a bad- conduct discharge. “An accused’s own sentence proposal” and “the sentence agreed to by Appellant in the plea agreement [are] a reasonable—but not dis- positive—indication of the sentence’s fairness to Appellant.”30 We have said previously that “[a]lthough not dispositive, where an accused, represented by competent counsel, bargains for a specific range of punitive exposure, and the resulting sentence falls within the negotiated range, that sentence carries strong indicia of being reasonable.”31 Appellant’s punishment is squarely within both the range of authorized punishment, as well as the range that he negotiated with the convening authority. The military judge did not abuse his discretion by imposing a sentence within the negotiated-for range of punish- ment.32 26 R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(C). 27 MCM, app. 12B, Sentencing Parameter Table at A12B-1; and MCM, app. 12D, List of Sentencing Criteria Offenses, at A12D-1. 28 MCM, pt. IV, Punitive Articles; see also, e.g., MCM, app. 12, Maximum Punish- ment Chart, at A12-1. 29 MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.d.(3)(d) at IV-124. 30 United States v. Arroyo, 86 M.J. 89, 90, 93 (C.A.A.F. 2025). 31 Jones, 2026 CCA LEXIS 327 at *6-7 (internal citations omitted). 32 The sentence was also reasonable because the confinement term was within the sentencing parameters established for the offense. In cases where a military judge im- poses a sentence that is within the sentencing parameters for that offense, we may apply a presumption of reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 347). See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range”) (internal 7 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court Appellant argues that we should heavily weigh his rehabilitative potential as a sentencing principle in analyzing the reasonableness of the punitive dis- charge, however, that was not the only sentencing principle that applied under R.C.M. 1002(c). The military judge did not abuse his discretion imposing a sen- tence that carries a retributive and deterrent effect. While this Court takes seriously issues of suicide, mental health crises, and Appellant’s commenda- tory ability to reform and recover from an incident of great personal distress, a bad-conduct discharge also punished Appellant for shooting at law enforce- ment personnel in a family housing area and deters others from doing so in the future. The sentence the court-martial adjudged after hearing all of the sentencing evidence was reduction to E-1, a bad-conduct discharge, and 119 days of con- finement. This sentence was wholly within the sentencing parameters and plea agreement and was on the low end of both, and we find that it was both rea- sonable and within the military judge’s discretion. Thus, Appellant’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.33 citations omitted). The maximum punishment for the offense is a dishonorable dis- charge, three years confinement, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted paygrade. MCM, pt. IV, para. 77.d.(3)(d) at IV-124. Article 56, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2), lists Appellant’s offense as a Category 2 offense which establishes a sentenc- ing parameter of one to 36 months of confinement. MCM, app. 12C, Offense Category Chart, at A12C-6 and MCM, app. 12B, Sentencing Parameter Table, at A12B-1. 33 Appellant urges us to adopt a standard encouraging military judges to put their reasoning on the record or make findings regarding the sentencing factors so we can better assess abuse of discretion. However, we decline to do so because there is ample evidence contained within the record to evaluate the reasonableness of Appellant’s sentence. We are not a legislative body. In cases where a military judge imposes a sentence outside the sentencing parameter, Article 56, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1002 al- ready require the military judge to “include in the record a written statement of the factual basis for the sentence.” 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(2)(B); R.C.M. 1002(a)(2)(B). 8 United States v. Huffman, NMCCA No. 202500400 Opinion of the Court III. CONCLUSION After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: MARK K. JAMISON Clerk of Court 9