United States v. Lucy Carrillo Gonzalez
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-11365
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11365
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LUCY CARRILLO GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00022-KKM-TGW-4
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lucy Carrillo Gonzalez appeals her 48-month sentence for
her role in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. She argues that her
sentence should be vacated because the district court clearly erred
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-11365
when it (1) calculated how much cocaine she was responsible for
distributing, (2) found that she maintained a premises for drug
distribution, which warranted a sentence enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), and (3) found that she played more than a
“minimal role” in the conspiracy, which led it to deny a sentence
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a). She also argues that the
district court abused its discretion by selecting a 48-month
sentence—which, she contends, was a substantively unreasonable
choice. Because the record supports each of the district court’s
decisions, we reject each of Carrillo Gonzalez’s arguments, and we
affirm her sentence.
I.
Carrillo Gonzalez, a sixty-one-year-old woman residing in
Florida, was arrested for serving as a cocaine broker in a drug
trafficking ring.1 Her coconspirators included her adult son, his
girlfriend, and at least ten others. From October 2022 to
January 2024, the group trafficked cocaine from Puerto Rico into
Florida, where Carrillo Gonzalez and her coconspirators would
then sell the narcotics for profit.
Carrillo Gonzalez’s role in the conspiracy involved “taking
orders for cocaine,” “discussing cocaine prices and purchases with
her coconspirators,” and hosting the coconspirators at her
residence “to finalize cocaine transactions.” For example, on
1 Carrillo Gonzalez admitted the following facts in her Presentence
Investigation Report.
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October 24, 2023, Carrillo Gonzalez took an order for about 56.6
grams of cocaine—at least some of which was kept at her residence
before the sale’s closing. On December 1, 2023, several of Carrillo
Gonzalez’s coconspirators met at her residence to distribute the
proceeds from a recent 111.8-gram cocaine sale. And on
December 11, 2023, Carrillo Gonzalez helped her son negotiate a
sale by doing several tasks: she coordinated with their supplier to
arrange for the cocaine’s delivery, she instructed her son what price
to charge “for whole kilograms of cocaine,” and she hosted
everyone at her residence to exchange the drugs and close the deal.
In January of 2024, a grand jury charged members of the
conspiracy on thirteen counts. Carrillo Gonzalez was named in
two of those counts: first, for conspiring to distribute cocaine or
possess cocaine with an intent distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(C); and second, for
possessing cocaine with an intent to distribute, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carrillo
Gonzalez pleaded guilty on both counts.
In determining Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence, her
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) proposed two findings
relevant to this appeal. First, when calculating Carrillo Gonzalez’s
base sentence, the PSR included two sales of cocaine on
November 2, 2023, and November 12, 2023, as part of her “relevant
conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. And second, the PSR applied a
sentence enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) because it found that
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Carrillo Gonzalez “maintained a premises for the purpose of
manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” 2
Carrillo Gonzalez raised several objections to the PSR. First,
she argued that the November sales should not have been included
in her “relevant conduct” because “she was not involved in those
transactions.” Second, she objected to the § 2D1.1(b)(12) sentence
enhancement, arguing that her residence was not maintained for
the purpose of distributing cocaine. And third, Carrillo Gonzalez
claimed that she was entitled to a sentence reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) because she was only a “minimal participant”
in the drug-trafficking ring “when compared to other co-
conspirators.”
At sentencing, the district court addressed Carrillo
Gonzalez’s objections by taking testimony from FBI Special Agent
Melissa Montoya. Montoya testified that Carrillo Gonzalez’s
residence had been wiretapped from October 2023 through
December 2023. And according to Montoya, the FBI captured
“numerous conversations,” which showed that Carrillo Gonzalez
“was involved” in the conspiracy “for pretty much the duration of
the wire.” These included conversations about “the procurement
of narcotics,” coconspirators “leaving drugs at the house,” and “the
pricing of a kilogram of cocaine.” Montoya also testified that
similar text conversations were captured on WhatsApp, which
2 The 2026 Guidelines Manual relocated this enhancement to § 2D1.1(b)(11).
This opinion uses the § 2D1.1(b)(12) citation, which was still in effect at the
time of sentencing.
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showed Carrillo Gonzalez arranging cocaine sales with her
coconspirators.
Based on Montoya’s testimony and the undisputed facts in
the PSR, the district court rejected each of Carrillo Gonzalez’s
objections. The court summarized its interpretation of the
evidence as follows: “I don’t think it’s fair to say that she was being
taken advantage of by other people. I think she knew exactly what
she was doing.” On the court’s read, the evidence showed that
Carrillo Gonzalez “was more of an active participant” in the
conspiracy who was “talking about [the] pricing of drugs” and
oftentimes was “the one making a phone call” to arrange a sale.
The court also found that she “was doing this out of her own home,
which is disturbing.”
After overruling the objections, the district court considered
the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors to
determine Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence. To argue for a sentence
on the lower end of the guideline range, Carrillo Gonzalez’s
attorney offered evidence demonstrating her “mental health issues
and her physical ailments.” This included a letter from her
psychiatrist, which showed that Carrillo Gonzalez had been
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia,
and that she had been prescribed medication for these conditions.
The district court noted that it was “important to take into account
her personal situation” and recognized that she “does have various
health challenges.” But the court ultimately concluded that
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Carrillo Gonzalez “does need to go to prison” for her conduct, and
it settled on a 48-month sentence.
Carrillo Gonzalez now appeals, restating the three
objections to the PSR that she raised at sentencing. She also argues
that her 48-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.
II.
We review each of the district court’s factual findings
relevant to this appeal for clear error—namely, the quantity of
drugs attributable to Carrillo Gonzalez, whether Carrillo Gonzalez
maintained a drug-distribution premises under § 2D1.1(b)(12), and
whether Carrillo Gonzalez was only a “minimal participant” in the
conspiracy under § 3B1.2(a). United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 1225,
1237 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1205
(11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192
(11th Cir. 2016). And we review the substantive reasonableness of
Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
III.
To begin, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court
clearly erred by including the two November cocaine sales in her
“relevant conduct.” Under § 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines,
“relevant conduct” is typically limited to the defendant’s own acts
or omissions, or any acts that the defendant aided or abetted.
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). But, in the case of a criminal
conspiracy, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) also sweeps in acts by coconspirators
that are (i) within the scope of the conspiracy, (ii) in furtherance of
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the conspiracy, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with
the conspiracy’s underlying criminal activity. See id.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th
Cir. 1993). The government carried the burden of establishing that
the November sales were “relevant conduct” on either of these
bases by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v.
Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 1992).
To her credit, Carrillo Gonzalez correctly points out that the
district court did not specify whether it included the November
sales as direct conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or coconspirator
conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Nor did the district court make any
specific findings about Carrillo Gonzalez’s role in the conspiracy,
which is a prerequisite for determining what “drug quantities” are
“reasonably foreseeable” under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Ismond, 993 F.2d
at 1499.
Despite these omissions, we affirm the district court’s
inclusion of the November sales as “relevant conduct.” That is
because, even if a district court “does not make individualized
findings,” a sentence may still be upheld “if the record supports the
amount of drugs attributed to [the] defendant.” Id. And here, the
record supports including the November sales under either
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
First, it would not have been clear error for the district court
to find that Carrillo Gonzalez was directly involved with the
November sales under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Carrillo Gonzalez
admitted that she participated in a continuous conspiracy to
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distribute cocaine. She admitted to brokering cocaine sales on
October 24, December 1, and December 11. And, according to
Special Agent Montoya’s testimony, “numerous conversations”
captured on a wiretap indicated that Carrillo Gonzalez “was
involved for pretty much the duration of the wire” from
October 2023 through December 2023. This uncontroverted
evidence suggests that Carrillo Gonzalez was involved in
transactions immediately before and after the November sales, and
that her role in the conspiracy was a continuous one spanning at
least through October, November, and December. Based on this
record, we cannot say that the district court would have clearly
erred if it had concluded that, by a preponderance of the evidence,
Carrillo Gonzalez also had some direct involvement in the
November sales under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
Second, it would not have been clear error for the district
court to find that the November sales—even if only carried out by
her coconspirators—were reasonably foreseeable to Carrillo
Gonzalez under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Carrillo Gonzalez readily admits
that she agreed to serve as “a broker” in the cocaine ring, which
involved taking orders for cocaine, discussing prices, and
exchanging cocaine at her residence. It should go without saying
that, by agreeing to broker cocaine sales, Carrillo Gonzalez should
have reasonably foreseen that her coconspirators might sell
cocaine. We cannot conclude that the district court would have
clearly erred if it had found that the November sales were relevant
conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
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Carrillo Gonzalez objects by directing us to
United States v. Bush, 28 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1994). According to
Carrillo Gonzalez, Bush requires us to reverse the district court for
failing to specify her role in the conspiracy because, before
determining “the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant,” a
district court “must first make individualized findings concerning
the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the defendant.” Id. at
1087. But Bush demands no such thing—in the paragraph
immediately following the passage that Carrillo Gonzalez quotes,
Bush suggests that an omission of individualized findings does not
warrant reversal so long as “the record supports the district court’s
finding.” Id. For the reasons we’ve already discussed, the record
would have supported the district court’s inclusion of the
November sales under either § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
We therefore affirm.
IV.
Second, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court
clearly erred by finding that she maintained her residence for
cocaine distribution. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a
sentence enhancement if the defendant “maintained a premises for
the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled
substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Drug distribution only needs
to be one of the “primary or principal uses for the premises” for
this enhancement to apply—it “need not be the ‘sole purpose’ of
the premises.” George, 872 F.3d at 1205 (quotation omitted).
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Here, several pieces of evidence support the district court’s
conclusion that drug distribution was at least a “primary” use of
Carrillo Gonzalez’s residence. Carrillo Gonzalez admitted that her
coconspirators had met at the residence on several occasions—
whether to “finalize cocaine transactions” or to distribute the
proceeds among themselves after a sale. She also admitted that, on
at least one occasion, a coconspirator stored cocaine at the
premises before a sale’s closing. And—based on “numerous
conversations” caught on the wiretap—Agent Montoya testified
that coconspirators would “oftentimes go back to [the] residence”
to distribute proceeds after a sale or would leave “drugs at the
house” for other coconspirators to pick up.
Carrillo Gonzalez’s only argument against the district
court’s finding is that these drug-related activities were “vastly
outweighed by her legitimate uses of the home.” But because we
review this finding for clear error, we can only reverse when, based
on “the entire evidence,” we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation
omitted). And we have previously upheld applications of
§ 2D1.1(b)(12) in far more tame cases than this one: In George, for
instance, we found no clear error in applying § 2D1.1(b)(12) when
the record contained only a single witness who—on only one
occasion—observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in the
defendant’s residence. See George, 872 F.3d at 1206. Because the
uncontroverted evidence here shows repeated instances of drug-
related activity at Carrillo Gonzalez’s residence, we cannot
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conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that drug
distribution was one of the residence’s primary purposes. 3
V.
Third, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court clearly
erred by finding that she played more than a “minimal role” in the
conspiracy. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentence
reduction if the defendant was only a “minimal participant” in a
criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a).
“Two principles” inform whether a defendant was only a
minimal participant. United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340,
1343 (11th Cir. 2006). First, “the court must compare the
defendant’s role in the offense with the relevant conduct attributed
to [her] in calculating [her] base offense level.” Id. And second,
“the court may compare the defendant’s conduct to that of other
participants involved in the offense.” Id. Carrillo Gonzalez bore
the burden of establishing that she was entitled to the sentence
3 Carrillo Gonzalez also argues in her reply brief that the district court should
be reversed because it failed to make specific factual findings about her
residence before applying the § 2D.1.1(b)(12) enhancement. But Carrillo
Gonzalez did not raise this argument in her opening brief, so she has forfeited
it. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). And
even if we were to consider it, we would reject it. For the reasons already
stated, the record allows for meaningful appellate review, and it provides a
“sufficient evidentiary basis” for concluding that drug distribution was a
primary purpose of the residence. Cf. United States v. Wise, 881 F.2d 970, 973
(11th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court’s determinations of “relevant
conduct” even when it failed to make explicit findings of fact).
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reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Rogriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 939 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Here, there is enough evidence to reject Carrillo Gonzalez’s
claim to being a minimal participant. As to the first principle, it
would not have been clear error to conclude that Carrillo
Gonzalez’s “actual and relevant conduct were the same.” Alvarez-
Coria, 447 F.3d at 1343. That is because Carrillo Gonzalez admitted
to direct involvement in three of the five drug transactions used to
calculate her base sentence—and Special Agent Montoya’s
testimony suggested that she may have also been involved in the
remaining two November transactions. In other words, this is not
a case where a defendant is mostly being held liable for the acts of
her coconspirators, rather than her own. As to the second
principle, it would not have been clear error to conclude that
Carrillo Gonzalez’s role as a “broker” was comparable to that of
her coconspirators. The evidence showed her recommending
cocaine prices, brokering deals, and arranging for the transport of
narcotics—all of which suggested to the district court that Carrillo
Gonzalez “knew exactly what she was doing” and was not “being
taken advantage of by other people.”
In response, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that her role as a
“broker” meant that she had limited responsibility, had limited
control, and “was not knowledgeable of the entirety of the
conspiracy.” But we have already held that, when a defendant’s
“relevant conduct” is “identical to [her] actual conduct,” the
defendant cannot claim entitlement to a minimal-role reduction
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“simply by pointing to some broader scheme for which [she] was
not held accountable.” Id. And even if Carrillo Gonzalez had less
responsibility or control than other members of the conspiracy, this
is not dispositive, because “it is possible that none [of the
conspirators] are minor or minimal participants.” Rodriguez De
Varon, 175 F.3d at 944. In light of the evidence before the district
court, we cannot say that it clearly erred by finding that Carrillo
Gonzalez played more than a minimal role in the conspiracy.
VI.
Finally, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court
abused its discretion by choosing a 48-month sentence. In
particular, she contends that the sentence is “substantively
unreasonable” because the district court “failed to pay due
consideration” to her “physical and mental condition.”
We disagree. It is “only the rare sentence” that we will deem
“substantively unreasonable” on appeal—and this is not one of
them. United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.
2013). The district court explicitly recognized that Carrillo
Gonzalez “does have various health challenges” and that it was
“important to take into account her personal situation.” It then
weighed this consideration against Carrillo Gonzalez’s drug-
trafficking activity, and it settled on the 48-month sentence—a
choice well within the lower end of the applicable guideline range
of 46 to 57 months. We cannot conclude that this decision was so
unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discretion.
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* * *
We AFFIRM Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence.