Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 1 of 14 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11365 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LUCY CARRILLO GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00022-KKM-TGW-4 ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Lucy Carrillo Gonzalez appeals her 48-month sentence for her role in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. She argues that her sentence should be vacated because the district court clearly erred USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 2 of 14 2 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 when it (1) calculated how much cocaine she was responsible for distributing, (2) found that she maintained a premises for drug distribution, which warranted a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), and (3) found that she played more than a “minimal role” in the conspiracy, which led it to deny a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a). She also argues that the district court abused its discretion by selecting a 48-month sentence—which, she contends, was a substantively unreasonable choice. Because the record supports each of the district court’s decisions, we reject each of Carrillo Gonzalez’s arguments, and we affirm her sentence. I. Carrillo Gonzalez, a sixty-one-year-old woman residing in Florida, was arrested for serving as a cocaine broker in a drug trafficking ring.1 Her coconspirators included her adult son, his girlfriend, and at least ten others. From October 2022 to January 2024, the group trafficked cocaine from Puerto Rico into Florida, where Carrillo Gonzalez and her coconspirators would then sell the narcotics for profit. Carrillo Gonzalez’s role in the conspiracy involved “taking orders for cocaine,” “discussing cocaine prices and purchases with her coconspirators,” and hosting the coconspirators at her residence “to finalize cocaine transactions.” For example, on 1 Carrillo Gonzalez admitted the following facts in her Presentence Investigation Report. USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 3 of 14 25-11365 Opinion of the Court 3 October 24, 2023, Carrillo Gonzalez took an order for about 56.6 grams of cocaine—at least some of which was kept at her residence before the sale’s closing. On December 1, 2023, several of Carrillo Gonzalez’s coconspirators met at her residence to distribute the proceeds from a recent 111.8-gram cocaine sale. And on December 11, 2023, Carrillo Gonzalez helped her son negotiate a sale by doing several tasks: she coordinated with their supplier to arrange for the cocaine’s delivery, she instructed her son what price to charge “for whole kilograms of cocaine,” and she hosted everyone at her residence to exchange the drugs and close the deal. In January of 2024, a grand jury charged members of the conspiracy on thirteen counts. Carrillo Gonzalez was named in two of those counts: first, for conspiring to distribute cocaine or possess cocaine with an intent distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(C); and second, for possessing cocaine with an intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carrillo Gonzalez pleaded guilty on both counts. In determining Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence, her Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) proposed two findings relevant to this appeal. First, when calculating Carrillo Gonzalez’s base sentence, the PSR included two sales of cocaine on November 2, 2023, and November 12, 2023, as part of her “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. And second, the PSR applied a sentence enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) because it found that USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 4 of 14 4 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 Carrillo Gonzalez “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” 2 Carrillo Gonzalez raised several objections to the PSR. First, she argued that the November sales should not have been included in her “relevant conduct” because “she was not involved in those transactions.” Second, she objected to the § 2D1.1(b)(12) sentence enhancement, arguing that her residence was not maintained for the purpose of distributing cocaine. And third, Carrillo Gonzalez claimed that she was entitled to a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) because she was only a “minimal participant” in the drug-trafficking ring “when compared to other co- conspirators.” At sentencing, the district court addressed Carrillo Gonzalez’s objections by taking testimony from FBI Special Agent Melissa Montoya. Montoya testified that Carrillo Gonzalez’s residence had been wiretapped from October 2023 through December 2023. And according to Montoya, the FBI captured “numerous conversations,” which showed that Carrillo Gonzalez “was involved” in the conspiracy “for pretty much the duration of the wire.” These included conversations about “the procurement of narcotics,” coconspirators “leaving drugs at the house,” and “the pricing of a kilogram of cocaine.” Montoya also testified that similar text conversations were captured on WhatsApp, which 2 The 2026 Guidelines Manual relocated this enhancement to § 2D1.1(b)(11). This opinion uses the § 2D1.1(b)(12) citation, which was still in effect at the time of sentencing. USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 5 of 14 25-11365 Opinion of the Court 5 showed Carrillo Gonzalez arranging cocaine sales with her coconspirators. Based on Montoya’s testimony and the undisputed facts in the PSR, the district court rejected each of Carrillo Gonzalez’s objections. The court summarized its interpretation of the evidence as follows: “I don’t think it’s fair to say that she was being taken advantage of by other people. I think she knew exactly what she was doing.” On the court’s read, the evidence showed that Carrillo Gonzalez “was more of an active participant” in the conspiracy who was “talking about [the] pricing of drugs” and oftentimes was “the one making a phone call” to arrange a sale. The court also found that she “was doing this out of her own home, which is disturbing.” After overruling the objections, the district court considered the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors to determine Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence. To argue for a sentence on the lower end of the guideline range, Carrillo Gonzalez’s attorney offered evidence demonstrating her “mental health issues and her physical ailments.” This included a letter from her psychiatrist, which showed that Carrillo Gonzalez had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia, and that she had been prescribed medication for these conditions. The district court noted that it was “important to take into account her personal situation” and recognized that she “does have various health challenges.” But the court ultimately concluded that USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 6 of 14 6 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 Carrillo Gonzalez “does need to go to prison” for her conduct, and it settled on a 48-month sentence. Carrillo Gonzalez now appeals, restating the three objections to the PSR that she raised at sentencing. She also argues that her 48-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. II. We review each of the district court’s factual findings relevant to this appeal for clear error—namely, the quantity of drugs attributable to Carrillo Gonzalez, whether Carrillo Gonzalez maintained a drug-distribution premises under § 2D1.1(b)(12), and whether Carrillo Gonzalez was only a “minimal participant” in the conspiracy under § 3B1.2(a). United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 1225, 1237 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016). And we review the substantive reasonableness of Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). III. To begin, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court clearly erred by including the two November cocaine sales in her “relevant conduct.” Under § 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, “relevant conduct” is typically limited to the defendant’s own acts or omissions, or any acts that the defendant aided or abetted. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). But, in the case of a criminal conspiracy, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) also sweeps in acts by coconspirators that are (i) within the scope of the conspiracy, (ii) in furtherance of USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 7 of 14 25-11365 Opinion of the Court 7 the conspiracy, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with the conspiracy’s underlying criminal activity. See id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993). The government carried the burden of establishing that the November sales were “relevant conduct” on either of these bases by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 1992). To her credit, Carrillo Gonzalez correctly points out that the district court did not specify whether it included the November sales as direct conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or coconspirator conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Nor did the district court make any specific findings about Carrillo Gonzalez’s role in the conspiracy, which is a prerequisite for determining what “drug quantities” are “reasonably foreseeable” under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. Despite these omissions, we affirm the district court’s inclusion of the November sales as “relevant conduct.” That is because, even if a district court “does not make individualized findings,” a sentence may still be upheld “if the record supports the amount of drugs attributed to [the] defendant.” Id. And here, the record supports including the November sales under either § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). First, it would not have been clear error for the district court to find that Carrillo Gonzalez was directly involved with the November sales under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Carrillo Gonzalez admitted that she participated in a continuous conspiracy to USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 8 of 14 8 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 distribute cocaine. She admitted to brokering cocaine sales on October 24, December 1, and December 11. And, according to Special Agent Montoya’s testimony, “numerous conversations” captured on a wiretap indicated that Carrillo Gonzalez “was involved for pretty much the duration of the wire” from October 2023 through December 2023. This uncontroverted evidence suggests that Carrillo Gonzalez was involved in transactions immediately before and after the November sales, and that her role in the conspiracy was a continuous one spanning at least through October, November, and December. Based on this record, we cannot say that the district court would have clearly erred if it had concluded that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Carrillo Gonzalez also had some direct involvement in the November sales under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Second, it would not have been clear error for the district court to find that the November sales—even if only carried out by her coconspirators—were reasonably foreseeable to Carrillo Gonzalez under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Carrillo Gonzalez readily admits that she agreed to serve as “a broker” in the cocaine ring, which involved taking orders for cocaine, discussing prices, and exchanging cocaine at her residence. It should go without saying that, by agreeing to broker cocaine sales, Carrillo Gonzalez should have reasonably foreseen that her coconspirators might sell cocaine. We cannot conclude that the district court would have clearly erred if it had found that the November sales were relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 9 of 14 25-11365 Opinion of the Court 9 Carrillo Gonzalez objects by directing us to United States v. Bush, 28 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1994). According to Carrillo Gonzalez, Bush requires us to reverse the district court for failing to specify her role in the conspiracy because, before determining “the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant,” a district court “must first make individualized findings concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the defendant.” Id. at 1087. But Bush demands no such thing—in the paragraph immediately following the passage that Carrillo Gonzalez quotes, Bush suggests that an omission of individualized findings does not warrant reversal so long as “the record supports the district court’s finding.” Id. For the reasons we’ve already discussed, the record would have supported the district court’s inclusion of the November sales under either § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) or § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We therefore affirm. IV. Second, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that she maintained her residence for cocaine distribution. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentence enhancement if the defendant “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Drug distribution only needs to be one of the “primary or principal uses for the premises” for this enhancement to apply—it “need not be the ‘sole purpose’ of the premises.” George, 872 F.3d at 1205 (quotation omitted). USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 10 of 14 10 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 Here, several pieces of evidence support the district court’s conclusion that drug distribution was at least a “primary” use of Carrillo Gonzalez’s residence. Carrillo Gonzalez admitted that her coconspirators had met at the residence on several occasions— whether to “finalize cocaine transactions” or to distribute the proceeds among themselves after a sale. She also admitted that, on at least one occasion, a coconspirator stored cocaine at the premises before a sale’s closing. And—based on “numerous conversations” caught on the wiretap—Agent Montoya testified that coconspirators would “oftentimes go back to [the] residence” to distribute proceeds after a sale or would leave “drugs at the house” for other coconspirators to pick up. Carrillo Gonzalez’s only argument against the district court’s finding is that these drug-related activities were “vastly outweighed by her legitimate uses of the home.” But because we review this finding for clear error, we can only reverse when, based on “the entire evidence,” we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). And we have previously upheld applications of § 2D1.1(b)(12) in far more tame cases than this one: In George, for instance, we found no clear error in applying § 2D1.1(b)(12) when the record contained only a single witness who—on only one occasion—observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in the defendant’s residence. See George, 872 F.3d at 1206. Because the uncontroverted evidence here shows repeated instances of drug- related activity at Carrillo Gonzalez’s residence, we cannot USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 11 of 14 25-11365 Opinion of the Court 11 conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that drug distribution was one of the residence’s primary purposes. 3 V. Third, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that she played more than a “minimal role” in the conspiracy. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentence reduction if the defendant was only a “minimal participant” in a criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a). “Two principles” inform whether a defendant was only a minimal participant. United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006). First, “the court must compare the defendant’s role in the offense with the relevant conduct attributed to [her] in calculating [her] base offense level.” Id. And second, “the court may compare the defendant’s conduct to that of other participants involved in the offense.” Id. Carrillo Gonzalez bore the burden of establishing that she was entitled to the sentence 3 Carrillo Gonzalez also argues in her reply brief that the district court should be reversed because it failed to make specific factual findings about her residence before applying the § 2D.1.1(b)(12) enhancement. But Carrillo Gonzalez did not raise this argument in her opening brief, so she has forfeited it. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). And even if we were to consider it, we would reject it. For the reasons already stated, the record allows for meaningful appellate review, and it provides a “sufficient evidentiary basis” for concluding that drug distribution was a primary purpose of the residence. Cf. United States v. Wise, 881 F.2d 970, 973 (11th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court’s determinations of “relevant conduct” even when it failed to make explicit findings of fact). USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 12 of 14 12 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Rogriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 939 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Here, there is enough evidence to reject Carrillo Gonzalez’s claim to being a minimal participant. As to the first principle, it would not have been clear error to conclude that Carrillo Gonzalez’s “actual and relevant conduct were the same.” Alvarez- Coria, 447 F.3d at 1343. That is because Carrillo Gonzalez admitted to direct involvement in three of the five drug transactions used to calculate her base sentence—and Special Agent Montoya’s testimony suggested that she may have also been involved in the remaining two November transactions. In other words, this is not a case where a defendant is mostly being held liable for the acts of her coconspirators, rather than her own. As to the second principle, it would not have been clear error to conclude that Carrillo Gonzalez’s role as a “broker” was comparable to that of her coconspirators. The evidence showed her recommending cocaine prices, brokering deals, and arranging for the transport of narcotics—all of which suggested to the district court that Carrillo Gonzalez “knew exactly what she was doing” and was not “being taken advantage of by other people.” In response, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that her role as a “broker” meant that she had limited responsibility, had limited control, and “was not knowledgeable of the entirety of the conspiracy.” But we have already held that, when a defendant’s “relevant conduct” is “identical to [her] actual conduct,” the defendant cannot claim entitlement to a minimal-role reduction USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 13 of 14 25-11365 Opinion of the Court 13 “simply by pointing to some broader scheme for which [she] was not held accountable.” Id. And even if Carrillo Gonzalez had less responsibility or control than other members of the conspiracy, this is not dispositive, because “it is possible that none [of the conspirators] are minor or minimal participants.” Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944. In light of the evidence before the district court, we cannot say that it clearly erred by finding that Carrillo Gonzalez played more than a minimal role in the conspiracy. VI. Finally, Carrillo Gonzalez argues that the district court abused its discretion by choosing a 48-month sentence. In particular, she contends that the sentence is “substantively unreasonable” because the district court “failed to pay due consideration” to her “physical and mental condition.” We disagree. It is “only the rare sentence” that we will deem “substantively unreasonable” on appeal—and this is not one of them. United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court explicitly recognized that Carrillo Gonzalez “does have various health challenges” and that it was “important to take into account her personal situation.” It then weighed this consideration against Carrillo Gonzalez’s drug- trafficking activity, and it settled on the 48-month sentence—a choice well within the lower end of the applicable guideline range of 46 to 57 months. We cannot conclude that this decision was so unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discretion. USCA11 Case: 25-11365 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 14 of 14 14 Opinion of the Court 25-11365 * * * We AFFIRM Carrillo Gonzalez’s sentence.