Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-10100 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 Page: 1 of 5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-10100 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus NELSON ANGEL BELLON, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cr-20100-DPG-1 ____________________ Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Nelson Bellon appeals his 114-month imprisonment sen- tence for carjacking, which was within the guideline range of 100- USCA11 Case: 26-10100 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 Page: 2 of 5 2 Opinion of the Court 26-10100 125 months. Bellon argues that his sentence was substantively un- reasonable because the district court unjustifiably emphasized his prior unsuccessful probation sentences and gave insufficient weight to his mitigating factors, such as his mental health issues, substance dependence, and acceptance of responsibility. We review the substantive reasonableness of a district court’s sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016). “The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable.” Id. at 936. A sentence must be reasonable “in light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. A district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signifi- cant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)) (altera- tion in original). When weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the district court need not explicitly state or discuss each factor; it is sufficient for the court to acknowledge that it considered the factors and the defendant’s arguments. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). We will not find a sentence substantively unreasonable un- less “we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the dis- trict court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § USCA11 Case: 26-10100 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 Page: 3 of 5 26-10100 Opinion of the Court 3 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 611 (11th Cir. 2020) (quot- ing Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190). “A district court’s unjustified reliance on a single § 3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). However, the district court has the “sound discre- tion” to determine the weight that is given to each sentencing fac- tor, and “we will not substitute our judgment in weighing the rel- evant factors.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 663 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011)). This discretion includes “broad leeway” to determine how to weigh a defendant’s criminal history in sentenc- ing. Id. at 1355-56 (quoting United States v. Rosales Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2015)). While we do not strictly presume that a sentence within the guideline range is substantively reasonable, “we ordinarily will ex- pect the sentence to be a reasonable one.” Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 611. “[W]hen sentencing within the advisory Guidelines range, the district court is not required to give a lengthy explana- tion for its sentence.” United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1244 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008)). Furthermore, when a sentence is imposed well below the statutory maximum, this indicates reasonableness. Id. USCA11 Case: 26-10100 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 Page: 4 of 5 4 Opinion of the Court 26-10100 Here, the district court did not impose a substantively un- reasonable sentence because Bellon’s 114-month sentence was within the range of reasonable sentences when balancing the § 3553(a) factors in his case. See Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 611. The district court was justified in placing emphasis on Bellon’s criminal history, including his multiple unsuccessful probation sen- tences, as well as the violent nature of the offense. The weight given to the § 3553(a) factors, many of which relate directly or in- directly to criminal history, was within the sound discretion of the district court. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355-56; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)- (4), (6). Contrary to Bellon’s argument, the district court ade- quately balanced his criminal history factor against his mitigating factors. At sentencing, the court con-firmed that it “considered everything,” which included not only the parties’ arguments, the PSI, the guidelines, Bellon’s criminal history, and the factors set forth in § 3553(a), but also the mitigating factors of Bellon’s preex- isting mental health issues, benzodiazepine addiction and other substance abuse issues, character letters, neuropsychological eval- uation, and that he took responsibility. The district court was not required to explicitly list each § 3553(a) factor in weighing them— though it did list several—or provide a lengthy discussion of the reasoning be-hind its sentence. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324; Ro- driguez, 75 F.4th at 1244. The fact that Bellon’s sentence was within the guideline range of 100 to 125 months and well below the maxi- mum statutory sentence of 25 years indicates that it was reasonable and did not exceed what was necessary for deterrence, reducing USCA11 Case: 26-10100 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 10/22/2026 Page: 5 of 5 26-10100 Opinion of the Court 5 recidivism, or protecting the public from harm. See Cabezas-Mon- tano, 949 F.3d at 611; Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1244. Moreover, as the government notes, although the district court expressed concern with the violent nature of the offense, the impact it had on the victim, and Bellon’s repeated past supervision violations, the court still imposed a sentence in the middle of the guideline range—against its inclination towards the higher end— to account for Bellon’s time served in state custody. The record does not indicate that the district court abused its discretion by im- properly weighing the § 3553(a) factors, committing a clear error of judgment, or imposing a sentence beyond what was reasonable for Bellon’s case. See King, 57 F.4th at 1338; Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 611. Rather, the record indicates that the district court bal- anced the mitigating factors in Bellon’s favor and did not merely punish him based on his criminal history. Cf. Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322. This Court defers to the district court’s exercise of its discre- tion in weighing the relevant factors and will not substitute its own judgment for that of the district court when the sentence was rea- sonable given the facts of the case. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356. As such, Bellon has not sustained his burden of showing that his sen- tence was substantively unreasonable. See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. AFFIRMED.