Full Opinion

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ 936 ORDERS 355 Conn. STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DEVONI MILLER (SC 21286) The state’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal, filed June 29, 2026, having been presented to the court, it is hereby ordered that the motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed. October 29, 2026 PER CURIAM. The defendant, Devoni Miller, has been charged by the state with various offenses, includ- ing murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, arising from events that occurred in Cromwell on or about September 11, 2023. Article first, § 8, of the Con- necticut constitution, as amended by article seventeen of the amendments, and General Statutes § 54-46a pro- vide that no person may be required to stand trial for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment unless a probable cause hearing is held and a court determines that probable cause exists to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged. In accordance with these provisions, the trial court conducted a probable cause hearing over four separate days between November 10, 2025, and March 2, 2026. On May 29, 2026, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision, finding prob- able cause to believe that the defendant had committed the charged murder. The defendant appeals from that determination.1 It is well established that the absence of a final judg- ment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court to hear an appeal. See, e.g., State v. Bemer, 339 Conn. 528, 537, 262 A.3d 1 (2021); Wolfork v. Yale Medi- cal Group, 335 Conn. 448, 459, 239 A.3d 272 (2020); see also General Statutes §§ 51-197a and 52-263. Accord- ingly, a threshold requirement for consideration of the merits of any appeal is a determination that the appeal 1 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. 355 Conn. ORDERS 937 has been taken from a final judgment. E.g., Halladay v. Commissioner of Correction, 340 Conn. 52, 57, 262 A.3d 823 (2021). If this court determines that an appeal has not been taken from a final judgment, it has a duty to dismiss the appeal. E.g., Solomon v. Keiser, 212 Conn. 741, 746, 562 A.2d 524 (1989). The state has moved to dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court’s probable cause determination is not a final judgment subject to immediate appellate review. In support of its motion, the state relies primarily on this court’s decision in State v. Atkins, 203 Conn. 33, 522 A.2d 1234 (1987), which held that a trial court’s finding of probable cause is not a final judgment. See id., 33–34. The defendant opposes the motion, maintaining that the trial court’s probable cause determination is immediately appealable and that Atkins does not resolve the appealability issues presented by the state’s motion. We agree with the state. In State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 512 A.2d 140 (1986), this court held that a defendant may obtain appel- late review, following conviction and sentencing, of a trial court’s finding of probable cause made at a preliminary hearing required by article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended. See id., 333–34. The court in Mitchell, however, expressly left open the question of whether a trial court’s probable cause determination made at or following such a hearing was immediately appealable. Id., 335 n.13 (“Although the defendant raised at oral argument the question of interlocutory review of the determination of probable cause, this issue was not raised either before the trial court or in the defendant’s brief. Therefore, we decline to consider it here.”). In Atkins, this court resolved the question left open in Mitchell, holding that a trial court’s probable cause deter- mination “was not a final judgment” subject to immediate appellate review. State v. Atkins, supra, 203 Conn. 33. In reaching that conclusion, the court examined whether the trial court’s probable cause determination fit within 938 ORDERS 355 Conn. either of the two prongs of the test established in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983), for determining whether an interlocutory order or decision is a final judgment for purposes of appeal and concluded that the probable cause determination satisfied neither prong. State v. Atkins, supra, 33–34. The second prong of the Curcio test asks whether “the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further pro- ceedings cannot affect them.” State v. Curcio, supra, 31. As a part of that inquiry, we look to see whether the defendant has asserted a cognizable legal right that “would be lost if appellate review were delayed.” Id., 34. By concluding that the probable cause determination satisfied neither prong, this court in Atkins necessarily determined that postponing appellate review would not result in the loss of a cognizable legal right. See State v. Atkins, supra, 33–34. The court underscored that con- clusion by expressly emphasizing that “the merits of a finding of probable cause are reviewable after conviction and sentencing . . . .” Id., 34. The defendant nevertheless contends that Atkins is not controlling because it is a “three paragraph per curiam decision,” apparently suggesting that its brevity dimin- ishes its precedential force. She further attempts to undermine Atkins by arguing that the court in Atkins did not have the opportunity to “grapple” with this court’s subsequent decision in State v. McPhail, 213 Conn. 161, 170, 567 A.2d 812 (1989), which, according to the defendant, confirmed that evidentiary insufficiency at a probable cause hearing “will deprive the trial court of jurisdiction . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Last, she maintains that a challenge to a trial court’s probable cause determination satisfies the second prong of Curcio because article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, guarantees a right not to be forced to stand trial without a valid probable cause deter- mination and postconviction review cannot adequately vindicate that right. We are not persuaded by the defen- dant’s arguments. 355 Conn. ORDERS 939 First, the precedential value of this court’s decisions does not depend on their length. Instead, we review the substance of our prior holdings and generally apply that precedent to subsequent cases involving similar facts and legal issues. See, e.g., Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 658, 680 A.2d 242 (1996) (explaining significance of stare decisis in our system of jurisprudence). Second, although the defendant attempts to diminish Atkins by arguing that this court, in deciding that case, “did not have occasion to grapple with McPhail’s sub- sequent confirmation that evidentiary insufficiency at a probable cause hearing ‘will deprive the trial court of jurisdiction,’ ” her argument overlooks the fact that we had already articulated that very principle in Mitchell on which Atkins relies.2 See State v. Atkins, supra, 203 Conn. 33–34; State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 331– 32. Moreover, in State v. Boyd, 214 Conn. 132, 570 A.2d 1125 (1990), this court reversed a defendant’s murder conviction because the admissible evidence presented at the probable cause hearing was insufficient to establish probable cause; id., 141–42; expressly considering both Mitchell and McPhail in doing so. Id., 135–36, 141. Thus, the defendant’s attempt to diminish the prec- edential force of Atkins and its progeny is unavailing. Finally, the defendant maintains that a challenge to a trial court’s probable cause determination satisfies the second prong of Curcio because postconviction review of that determination cannot adequately vindicate her rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut con- stitution, as amended. As we have explained, however, Atkins rejected that conclusion. See State v. Atkins, 2 After Mitchell, but before McPhail was decided, this court clarified that Mitchell’s reference to a probable cause determination as “a prerequisite to subsequent jurisdiction to hear the trial” concerned not subject matter jurisdiction, but only jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 665 n.8, 557 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S. Ct. 84, 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989), and cert. denied sub nom. Seebeck v. Connecticut, 493 U.S. 824, 110 S. Ct. 84, 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989). 940 ORDERS 355 Conn. supra, 203 Conn. 33–34; see also State v. Fielding, 296 Conn. 26, 36, 994 A.2d 96 (2010) (noting that finding of probable cause is not final judgment); State v. Ayala, 222 Conn. 331, 339, 610 A.2d 1162 (1992) (same). And an examination of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, does not compel anything different. The pertinent provision provides: “No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, except in the armed forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger.” Conn. Const., amend. XVII. Although this provision confers a right not to be tried for a qualifying crime in the absence of a probable cause hearing and determination, it does not follow that a defective probable cause hearing gives rise to a right not to stand trial. See State v. Boyd, 221 Conn. 685, 697, 607 A.2d 376 (remedy for defective probable cause hearing based on insufficiency of evidence is not acquittal but new probable cause hearing and new trial), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 923, 113 S. Ct. 344, 121 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1992); cf. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 801, 109 S. Ct. 1494, 103 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1989) (explaining that there is crucial distinction between right not to be tried and right whose remedy requires dismissal of charge). In sum, a trial court’s probable cause determination is not a final judgment subject to immediate appeal but may be challenged on appeal following a defendant’s conviction and sentencing. Because the defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s probable cause deter- mination is premature, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it.