State v. Alcenat

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Alcenat STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES ALCENAT (AC 47150) Moll, Westbrook and Wilson, Js. Syllabus Convicted, after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and drugs, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convic- tion. Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, as the jury reasonably could have determined that the cumulative force of the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influ- ence of intoxicating liquor and drugs while operating his motor vehicle in that he had been driving erratically, had failed to properly perform certain sobriety tests and had refused to submit to a breath or urine test while in police custody, which permitted the jury to infer that he was intoxicated pursuant to statute (§ 14-227a (a) (1)). The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and testimony pertaining to his behavior in erratically driving his vehicle out of a parking lot and onto a street where he was arrested, as the court’s finding that the defendant had not been seized in the parking lot was not clearly erroneous, the court correctly determined that the police seizure of the defendant on the street was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, and the record was inadequate to review the defendant’s unpre- served claim that the police lacked a reasonable basis to conduct a patdown search of his person. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the police officer who initially interacted with the defendant to testify as an expert witness on horizontal gaze nystagmus testing, as that claim was inadequately briefed. The trial court did not violate the defendant’s right to due process and jury unanimity by declining to instruct the jury that it was required to agree specifically as to whether it was intoxicating liquor, any drug or both that caused the defendant’s intoxication, as each method constituted an alternative means of intoxication under § 14-227a (a) (1), and the jury was not required to be unanimous as to the exact method of intoxication. The record was inadequate to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to freedom of speech by requiring him to attend and pay for a victim impact panel as a special condition of his probation, as the defendant made no evidentiary presentation relating to his claim. Argued October 15, 2025—officially released July 14, 2026  State v. Alcenat Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and drugs, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number twelve, and transferred to geographical area number fourteen, where the case was tried to the jury before K. Doyle, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evi- dence; verdict of guilty; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellant (defendant). Nicholas L. Scarlett, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Casey Flynn Bennett, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion MOLL, J. The defendant, Charles Alcenat, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered against him following a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drug (OUI) in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 1 General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both . . . .” Since the events underlying this appeal, the legislature has amended § 14-227a in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the present case. See Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June 2021, No. 21-1, §§ 116 and 117; Public Acts 2025, No. 25-110, § 49; Public Acts 2025, No. 25-159, § 13. In the interest of simplicity, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of the statute.  State v. Alcenat his OUI conviction under § 14-227a (a) (1), (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence stemming from the alleged unlawful search and seizure that preceded his arrest, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing one of the arresting police offi- cers to testify as an expert witness regarding horizontal gaze nystagmus testing,2 (4) the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial by not issuing a specific unanimity instruction to the jury regarding an essential element of the charge of OUI, and (5) the trial court erred by requiring him to attend and pay for a victim impact panel conducted by Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) as a special condition of his probation. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the defendant’s claims. On November 5, 2020, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Shannon Murphy of the Manchester Police Department saw a lone vehicle in the parking lot of Dollar General, a retail store, in Manchester while patrolling the area in her police cruiser. The vehicle’s engine was running and the vehicle was stopped, but was not in park, when Offi- cer Murphy initially saw it. Officer Murphy proceeded to pull up behind the vehicle to read its license plate for investigation because she “wanted to make sure it wasn’t a stolen vehicle that someone had maybe parked there and walked away. [She] wanted to make sure the occupants of the vehicle were okay. [She] just wanted to see what was going on more.” She was unable to see into the vehicle when she approached it in her cruiser, as it 2 “The horizontal gaze nystagmus test measures the extent to which a person’s eyes jerk as they follow an object moving from one side of the person’s field of vision to the other. The test is premised on the understanding that, whereas everyone’s eyes exhibit some jerking while turning to the side, when the subject is intoxicated the onset of the jerking occurs after fewer degrees of turning, and the jerking at more extreme angles becomes more distinct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.4, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 901, 341 A.3d 959 (2025).  State v. Alcenat was nighttime and the car had tinted windows. Officer Murphy believed that the window tints exceeded the legal limit because she could not see into the vehicle what- soever. Upon her approach behind the vehicle, Officer Murphy called through her police radio to report that she had encountered a suspicious vehicle. Once Officer Murphy had pulled behind the vehicle, it slowly moved away to the exit of the parking lot. Despite there being a “no left turns” sign displayed at the parking lot exit and a white “right turn only” arrow painted on the ground in the exit lane, the vehicle’s left turn signal was activated, and the vehicle turned left out of the parking lot onto Center Street during which its rear driver’s side tire went over the mounted curb in the middle of the exit and entranceway to Center Street. Officer Murphy had turned on her cruiser’s emergency lights by the time the vehicle had approached the exit lane in an attempt to pull the vehicle over for the window tint violation and for rolling through a stop sign at the parking lot exit, as well as to check on the vehicle’s occupants. When the vehicle turned left out of the parking lot onto Center Street, Officer Murphy turned off her vehicle’s emergency lights per police policy so as not to engage in a pursuit. Once on Center Street, the defendant’s vehicle went into a left turn only lane as it approached the intersection of Center Street and Broad Street before cutting over to the adjacent center lane and continuing straight on Center Street through the intersection. Officer Murphy exited the parking lot and followed the vehicle, where- upon she observed it proceeding down Center Street until it pulled over onto the sidewalk, mounting its passenger side tires onto the sidewalk, despite there being room for street parking on either side of the road. Upon pulling up behind the stopped vehicle, Officer Murphy turned on her cruiser’s emergency lights and initiated a motor vehicle stop as a result of the vehicle’s suspicious course of action. The vehicle continued moving forward until Officer Murphy approached its passenger side door on foot. The vehicle’s passenger side window was rolled down by the time Officer Murphy approached the vehicle,  State v. Alcenat and she noticed the defendant in the driver’s seat and a female in the front passenger seat. Officer Murphy asked the defendant to put the vehicle in park. The defendant initially was “kind of confused about what was going on and why [Officer Murphy] was talking to them.” Officer Murphy asked the vehicle’s occupants why they had parked in the Dollar General parking lot and were now on the sidewalk, to which they answered that they had been trying to determine whether one of the vehicle’s doors was open. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Daniel Pilz and Offi- cer John Loud of the Manchester Police Department arrived. Sergeant Pilz parked his cruiser in front of the defendant’s vehicle to prevent it from leaving because “the reason [he] was responding [was] that [he] heard that the car had taken off on one of the officers.” Once he approached the driver’s side door of the defendant’s vehicle, Sergeant Pilz asked the defendant to turn off the vehicle’s engine and step out of the vehicle because he “felt like [they] were dealing with someone who had not been cooperative to this point [and he] wanted to control the scene and make sure it was safe.” Despite Officer Murphy’s having previously instructed the defendant to put the car in park and the defendant saying that he had done so, the car jerked backward when the defendant attempted to exit the vehicle. Officer Loud and Sergeant Pilz performed a patdown search of the defendant next to his driver’s side door after he had exited the vehicle because Sergeant Pilz “deemed him as being a potential threat” in light of Sergeant Pilz’ understanding that he “had already taken off on an officer.” During the patdown search, Sergeant Pilz removed, with the defendant’s consent, keys located in his pocket, as well as other items not relevant to this appeal. After the patdown search, Sergeant Pilz, Officer Loud, and Officer Murphy spoke to the defendant behind his vehicle. At that point, the defendant “was kind of just rambling. He was talking about . . . what he did for work. How he was a project manager and hired Manchester  State v. Alcenat police officers. He said that at first he didn’t see [Officer Murphy’s emergency] lights [when she had activated them in the Dollar General parking lot], and then he said that he saw [Officer Murphy’s emergency] lights [the second] time because [she] was in a straight line. [He was saying] [j]ust a lot of . . . random things. Like random facts.” The defendant informed the officers that he and his passenger were at a hookah bar down the street prior to being parked in the Dollar General park- ing lot. Notwithstanding that Officer Murphy had not activated her emergency lights for the second time until she had pulled behind the defendant’s vehicle while it was parked on the sidewalk, the defendant claimed that he stopped when he saw Officer Murphy’s emergency lights activated the second time. Thereafter, Sergeant Pilz and Officer Loud walked the defendant over to the front of Officer Murphy’s cruiser to speak to him, while Officer Murphy went back to speak to the female passen- ger, who remained in the defendant’s vehicle. At that point, Sergeant Pilz looked into the defendant’s eyes while shining a flashlight in them, and he observed that the defendant’s pupils “appeared pinpoint . . . .” Addi- tionally, at some point while at the scene, Officer Loud detected the smell of alcohol coming from the defendant, who was wearing a mask.3 Officer Murphy formed the belief that the defendant may have been under the influence of an intoxicating substance on the basis of his driving patterns, his speech when she was talking to him, and his droopy eyes. When questioned by Officer Murphy, the defendant denied drinking any alcohol but stated that he had smoked hoo- kah. Officer Murphy proceeded to conduct field sobri- ety tests on the defendant, starting with a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. For this test, she instructed the defendant to “keep [his] head perfectly still and to fol- low [her] finger in front of [his] face” and to “touch the tip of [her] finger” to ensure that he could properly see it. Prior to initiating the horizontal gaze nystagmus 3 The parties stipulated to the jury “that November of 2020 was one of the high points of the COVID-19 pandemic.”  State v. Alcenat test, Officer Murphy requested that Officer Loud turn off her takedown lights, which he did.4 Officer Murphy observed “[d]istinct and sustained nystagmus” in each of the defendant’s eyes and saw six out of six “clues,” meaning that the defendant did not perform the test to standard. Officer Murphy next had the defendant conduct the “walk and turn” test. Despite Officer Murphy’s having demonstrated the test in part for the defendant and providing him with instructions, the defendant did not perform the test to standard, as he took fourteen more steps than instructed, stepped offline, and used his arms for balance. The third and final field sobriety test that the defendant conducted was the “one-legged stand” test, whereby he was required to hold his foot in the air for roughly thirty seconds. The defendant performed this test to standard. On the basis of the defendant’s overall performance of the field sobriety tests, Officer Murphy determined that “he was impaired and could not safely operate a motor vehicle.” At that point, Officer Murphy placed the defendant under arrest. Once at the police station, Officer Murphy offered the defendant the opportunity to take a urine or breath test, which the defendant refused by his conduct. The defendant subsequently was charged with OUI in violation of § 14-227a, failure to obey an officer’s signal in violation of General Statutes § 14-223 (a), and failure to drive on the right side of the road in violation of General Statutes § 14-230 (a).5 By way of an amended information dated August 24, 2023, the defendant was charged with a single count of OUI in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). A jury trial took place on August 29, 30 and 31, and Sep- tember 1, 2023. On September 1, 2023, the jury found 4 On cross-examination by defense counsel, Officer Murphy testified that “[t]akedown lights are just kind of big extra spotlights on the top of our lightbar” on the roof of a police vehicle. 5 Since the events underlying this appeal, the legislature has amended § 14-230 (a) in ways that have no bearing on the merits of the present case. See Public Acts 2025, No. 25-159, § 44. In the interest of sim- plicity, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of the statute.  State v. Alcenat the defendant guilty of OUI. On November 20, 2023, the trial court, K. Doyle, J., sentenced the defendant to six months of incarceration, execution fully suspended, with eighteen months of probation and a $500 fine plus costs. As part of his probation, the court ordered the defendant to participate in a victim impact panel con- ducted by MADD. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant first claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his OUI conviction under § 14-227a (a) (1) and that the trial court erred in denying his three motions for a judgment of acquit- tal on that basis.6 For the reasons that follow, we are unpersuaded. Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim, we set forth the following relevant legal principles and standard of review. “In reviewing a sufficiency of the evi- dence claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. . . . “While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven 6 The defendant filed two written motions, one at the close of evidence and another following the guilty verdict, and he made an oral motion after the state had rested its case-in-chief.  State v. Alcenat facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the ele- ments of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Capasso, 203 Conn. App. 333, 338–39, 248 A.3d 58, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 939, 249 A.3d 352 (2021). “[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nichols, 226 Conn. App. 359, 374–75, 317 A.3d 861 (2024). “[T]he jury is the arbiter of credibility. . . . With respect to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that [i]n considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own obser- vations and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the facts in hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roth, 104 Conn. App. 248, 256, 932 A.2d 1071 (2007). “[E]stablished case law commands us to review claims of evidentiary insufficiency in light of all of the evi- dence [adduced at trial]. . . . Moreover, even improperly admitted evidence may be considered . . . since [c]laims of evidentiary insufficiency in criminal cases are always addressed independently of claims of evidentiary error.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Alcenat State v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 302, 280 A.3d 601, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022). The defendant argues that there was no evidence that he consumed any intoxicating substance prior to oper- ating his motor vehicle. He further argues that, con- trary to testimony in the record, he was not slurring his speech, and his performance on the field sobriety tests and his alleged traffic law violations did not support the conclusion that he was intoxicated. The state argues in response that the evidence in the record concerning the defendant’s “erratic operation of his motor vehicle,” performance on the field sobriety tests, slurred speech, the smell of alcohol emanating from his breath, and his refusal to perform an alcohol chemical test constituted sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We agree with the state. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury reason- ably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drug while operating his motor vehicle. Although the defendant argues that his alleged “slurred speech” was in fact due to speaking while wearing a surgical mask and his “strong Haitian French-Caribbean accent,” the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that the jury reasonably could have drawn, which was that the defendant was intoxicated. In particular, (1) Sergeant Pilz testified that, upon shining a flashlight into the defendant’s eyes, the defendant’s pupils “appeared pinpoint,” which the use of narcotics could cause, (2) Officer Murphy testified that (a) she observed “[d]istinct and sustained nystagmus” in the defendant’s eyes during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and (b) the defendant did not perform to standard on the “walk and turn” test, (3) Officer Loud testified that he could smell alcohol on the defendant’s breath, and (4) there was evidence that the defendant had refused to submit to a breath or urine test while in custody.7 7 See General Statutes § 14-227a (e) (1) (“In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of this section, evidence that the defendant  State v. Alcenat With regard to the defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath or urine test, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “Evidence has been offered that the defen- dant refused to submit to a breath or urine test. There has also been evidence offered that the defendant did not, in fact, refuse to take a chemical test. Whether, in fact, the defendant refused to take a chemical test is a question of fact for you to decide. If you find that the defendant did refuse to submit to such a test, you may make any reasonable inference that follows from that fact. You should understand that evidence of a refusal to take a test by itself is not sufficient to find the defendant guilty of the charged crime. Any reasonable inference that you draw from this evidence must be in accord with my earlier instructions on inferences . . . .” Thus, it was permissible for the jury to infer from the defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath or urine test, if so found, that he was intoxicated. See General Statutes § 14-227a (e) (1); see also, e.g., State v. Frazier, 181 Conn. App. 1, 14, 185 A.3d 621 (“[I]t [is] permissible for the jury to infer from the defendant’s refusal to submit to a Breathalyzer test that he had consumed alcohol. . . . It is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 938, 184 A.3d 268 (2018). Additionally, the defendant’s foregoing conduct occurred against the backdrop of evidence of his erratic driving, namely, that he had (1) failed to stop at a stop sign at the exit of the Dollar General parking lot, (2) took a left turn out of the parking lot despite there being a “no left turns” sign clearly posted and a white “right turn only” arrow painted on the ground in the exit lane, (3) refused to submit to a blood, breath or urine test or the nontestimonial portion of a drug influence evaluation requested in accordance with sec- tion 14-227b shall be admissible provided the requirements of subsection (b) of said section have been satisfied. If a case involving a violation of subsection (a) of this section is tried to a jury, the court shall instruct the jury as to any inference that may or may not be drawn from the defendant’s refusal to submit to such a test or evaluation.”).  State v. Alcenat struck the curb upon taking the left turn, (4) made an abrupt lane shift prior to driving through the intersec- tion of Broad Street and Center Street, (5) parked his car partially on the sidewalk on Center Street, and (6) had difficulty putting his car in park while it was on the sidewalk on Center Street. In sum, upon the evidence construed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have determined that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reason- able doubt. Thus, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of OUI in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). II The defendant next claims that the trial court improp- erly denied his motion to suppress the “evidence and testimony pertaining to the defendant’s behavior.” For the reasons that follow, we disagree. The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. On March 18, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the motor vehicle stop, search, and seizure that resulted in his arrest for OUI under § 14-227a (a) (1). The defendant asserted that “[t]he initial seizure . . . was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity or motor vehicle violations,” and “[t]he stop, seizure and arrest . . . were not supported by probable cause.” The court did not conduct a separate evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress; rather, by agreement of the parties, the evidence produced during the state’s case-in-chief comprised the evidentiary record for the motion.8 On August 31, 2023, after the state had rested its case-in-chief, the court heard argument on the motion to suppress. Following argument, the court 8 After the state had rested its case-in-chief, upon inquiry from the court, defense counsel represented that the defendant was not seeking to offer any additional evidence in support of the motion to suppress.  State v. Alcenat orally denied the motion to suppress and stated that it would issue a written opinion at a later date. On November 9, 2023, the court issued its memoran- dum of decision denying the motion to suppress. The court made factual findings derived from, inter alia, the testimony of Officer Murphy, Sergeant Pilz, and Officer Loud, as well as the officers’ respective bodycam footage and Officer Murphy’s cruiser dashcam footage, which were admitted into evidence. The court found credible all three officers’ testimony regarding their interactions with the defendant, and it further found that Officer Murphy’s testimony was corroborated by the bodycam and dashcam footage. The court made the following relevant factual find- ings. Upon seeing the defendant’s vehicle in the Dollar General parking lot, “Officer Murphy decided to approach the [vehicle] because she wanted to see why the car was in the lot at that time of the morning. Officer Murphy knew that there had been reports of people breaking into cars and of stolen cars in this area. She also wanted to see if there were any occupants in the [vehicle] that might need assistance.” Officer Murphy “clearly had the right to investigate this situation” based on these facts. Officer Murphy believed that the defendant’s window tints constituted a motor vehicle violation, as she was unable to see into the back of the vehicle as a result of the tints. Officer Murphy then witnessed the car pull toward the stop sign at the exit of the parking lot where the “exit is marked as a right turn only based on both a sign in the lot and the white arrow indicating right turn only painted on the parking lot exit onto Center Street.” After turning on her vehicle’s emergency lights, Officer Murphy witnessed the defendant’s vehicle turn left out of the parking lot during which its rear driver’s side tire went over the mounted curb in the middle of the exit and entranceway to Center Street. “At that point, Officer Murphy had observed several motor vehicle violations: (1) the improperly tinted rear  State v. Alcenat windows, (2) the failure to fully stop at the stop sign, and (3) the defendant’s failure to obey her signal.” After watching the defendant’s vehicle exit the Dollar General parking lot, Officer Murphy watched it enter a left turn only lane at the Broad and Center Street inter- section; the defendant’s vehicle, however, proceeded to “swerve at the last instant to the center lane and con- tinue eastbound on Center Street past the Broad Street intersection.” The defendant then drove farther down Center Street, and “[t]he evidence conclusively showed that the defendant stopped on his own volition, because Officer Murphy had neither caught up to him nor acti- vated her overhead lights.” Further, although there was a breakdown area large enough to park a car, the defen- dant pulled his vehicle up onto the sidewalk with only one front tire and one rear tire in the roadway. By then, “Officer Murphy had not only observed the motor vehicle violations listed above, but she also saw the defendant (1) drive over the mounted curb divider when turning onto Center Street, (2) suddenly move from the left turn only to the center lane on Center Street, and (3) park partially on the sidewalk instead of in the breakdown lane on Cen- ter Street.” She pulled up behind the vehicle, turned her vehicle’s emergency lights on, informed the police dis- patcher of her location, and approached the defendant’s vehicle from its passenger side. Officer Murphy noticed upon approach that the gas cap was open and the vehicle was not yet in park. When questioned by Officer Murphy regarding why he did not stop when she turned on her vehicle’s emergency lights in the Dollar General park- ing lot, “[t]he defendant responded that he did not see her lights when he left the lot. The defendant appeared confused by Officer Murphy’s questioning and about why she stopped him.” Although she observed the belt to the defendant’s pants unbuckled, she did not observe any drugs or alcohol in the vehicle, nor did she smell alcohol on his breath during their interactions. Upon the arrival of Sergeant Pilz and Officer Loud, Sergeant Pilz requested that the defendant turn off his  State v. Alcenat vehicle’s engine and step out of the vehicle; however, “the defendant had difficulty turning his car off.” The defendant’s car then lurched forward, causing Officer Loud and Sergeant Pilz to step back and prompting Offi- cer Murphy to remind the defendant that he previously had informed her that he had placed the car in park. The defendant finally put the car in park and turned its engine off. Once he exited the vehicle, Sergeant Pilz asked the defendant whether he had any weapons on his person. In response, the defendant did not answer the question directly; rather, he stated that he hired Manchester police officers for jobs routinely in his role as a project manager. The officers proceeded to pat down the defen- dant for weapons while he was restrained but did not find contraband or weapons in his possession. The court noted that “[t]he defendant [made] no claim concerning the validity of this patdown search because nothing of evidentiary value had been located during the patdown.” Although Sergeant Pilz did not smell alcohol on the defendant’s breath during their interactions, he claimed that the defendant “appeared confused” and repeatedly talked about his job as a project manager, about which he was never asked. Sergeant Pilz also found it strange that the defendant did not realize that his belt was unbuckled and his fly was unzipped until the officers informed him so. After observing the defendant’s eyes while shining a flashlight into them, Sergeant Pilz described his pupils as “pinpoint,” a potential indicator of the use of an ille- gal substance. Sergeant Pilz did not find any evidence of contraband or drugs after retracing the path that the defendant previously had driven. Officer Loud previ- ously observed that the defendant had difficulty exiting his vehicle and that his belt buckle was undone. Officer Loud stated that, although the defendant wore a surgical mask during their interactions and spoke with an accent, the defendant was stumbling over his words and slur- ring his speech. Of the three officers, Officer Loud was the only one to smell alcohol on the defendant’s breath,  State v. Alcenat but he could not remember at which point during their interactions that he made that observation. On the basis of its factual findings, the court deter- mined that (1) the defendant was not seized in the Dollar General parking lot, (2) the defendant was seized after he had parked his car partially on the sidewalk on Center Street, (3) Officer Murphy had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant on Center Street on the basis of the multiple traffic violations that she had observed him commit, and (4) the interactions with the officers during the detention justified expanding the detention to perform the field sobriety tests. The defendant maintains that, in denying his motion to suppress, the court improperly determined that (1) he was not seized in the Dollar General parking lot, (2) his seizure on Center Street was lawful, and (3) the officers were justified in removing him from his car and subject- ing him to an invasive search of his clothing. We consider these contentions in turn. Before addressing the defendant’s particular asser- tions, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “Our standard of review of a trial court’s findings and con- clusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 331 Conn. 239, 246, 203 A.3d 1233 (2019). A The defendant first asserts that the court improperly found that he had not been seized in the Dollar General parking lot pursuant to the Connecticut constitution.9 We disagree. 9 The court determined that the defendant had not been seized in the Dollar General parking lot under either the federal or state constitution.  State v. Alcenat “[I]n determining the threshold question of whether there has been a seizure, we examine the effect of the police conduct at the time of the alleged seizure, applying an objective standard.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Lewis, 333 Conn. 543, 560, 217 A.3d 576 (2019). “[A] person [is defined] as seized under our state constitution when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. . . . In determining whether a seizure has occurred, so as to invoke the protections of our state constitution, we have stated that a court is to consider whether in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. . . . Whether there has been such a seizure in an individual case is a question of fact.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 647, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992). “The relevant inquiry . . . focuses on the degree of author- ity exhibited by the police officer during his interaction with an individual. Courts have identified several factors to consider in this regard. For example, a police officer may exhibit authority by restricting a defendant’s free- dom of movement or by isolating him in some manner. See State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62, 71–72, 634 A.2d 879 (1993). A police officer may also exhibit authority by use of his marked police cruiser, parking his cruiser in close proximity to a defendant’s vehicle, displaying weapons and approaching a defendant at a late hour in an isolated location area.” State v. Kimble, 106 Conn. App. 572, 589, 942 A.2d 527, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 912, 950 A.2d 1289 (2008). The defendant does not contest the court’s analysis of this issue under the federal constitution but, rather, limits his claim to the court’s analysis under our state constitution. Further, we note that, in defining “seizure,” our state constitution provides broader protection than does the federal constitution. See State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 652, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (declining “to adopt the restricted definition of a seizure employed by the United States Supreme Court in [California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)] and adher[ing] to our precedents in determining what constitutes a seizure under the state constitution”).  State v. Alcenat In determining that the defendant had not been seized in th