State v. Brozynski

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Brozynski STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EDWARD BROZYNSKI (AC 47201) Alvord, Moll and Keller, Js. Syllabus Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree, assault in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle, assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the defendant appealed. He claimed that his right to a fair trial was denied due to prosecutorial impropriety and that a new trial was therefore required. Held: The defendant’s claim that the prosecutor acted improperly by failing to adhere to the trial court’s instructions and continuing to make improper comments on multiple occasions was unavailing, as the court’s ruling on defense counsel’s objection to the first identified statement was ambiguous, there was no specificity as to what portion of the prosecutor’s second comment was ruled outside the scope of evidence, and, in both cases, the prosecutor rephrased his question or statement in response to the court’s rulings. The defendant’s claim that the prosecutor acted improperly by denigrating defense counsel on two occasions was unavailing, as, to the extent the defen- dant argued that the prosecutor’s language implied that defense counsel intended to mislead the jury, he failed to demonstrate how the language amounted to such an implication, and the prosecutor’s commentary was connected to the testimonial evidence offered by the defendant. The defendant’s claim that certain comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument were highly prejudicial in appealing to the jurors’ emotions was unavailing, as the comments drew on the facts in evidence or the jury’s common knowledge, were not unduly provocative, did not distract the jury from its appraisal of the facts, and/or were in response to the defendant’s theory of defense. The defendant’s claim that the prosecutor made several comments during cross-examination of the defendant that were improper because they referred to facts not in evidence was, with one exception, unavailing, as the comments sought to impeach the defendant’s testimony, were supported by evidence presented at trial, or sought to clarify the defendant’s testimony. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s pretrial custody and supervision, as well as the potential penalties and consequences he would face if convicted, as it was inadequately briefed. Although one of the prosecutor’s comments to the defendant during cross- examination, specifically, his comment that the defendant “should feel terrible for [the motor vehicle collision], you killed two people,” was improper, this  State v. Brozynski court concluded, pursuant to the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), that the impropriety did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Argued March 24—officially released July 28, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts each of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree, assault in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle, assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the case was tried to the jury before Gustafson, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Abigail H. Mason, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Lena A. Arnold, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, John F. Fahey, state’s attorney, and Samantha Magnani, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion ALVORD, J. The defendant, Edward Brozynski, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3), two counts of man- slaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56b (a), two counts of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60d (a), one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General Stat- utes § 14-227a (a) (2), and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor  State v. Brozynski or drugs in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). The defendant claims on appeal that his right to a fair trial was denied due to prosecutorial impropriety and, thus, a new trial is required. We affirm the judgment of conviction. The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On the evening of September 14, 2017, at approximately 11:45 p.m., the defendant, while driving his 2010 Honda Accord (Honda) west on Inter- state 84, departed the highway via exit 38 westbound, hit the exit sign, and then drove west on Colt Highway. After traveling on Colt Highway for approximately one to two miles, the defendant switched from the right lane to the left lane at a high rate of speed. The defendant had difficulty operating the Honda within the lines of the left lane and the Honda crossed the center line into the single lane eastbound side, where he proceeded to drive the wrong way and along the guardrail. Around that same time, Angelique Michaud was driv- ing eastward in her 2015 Mazda 3 (Mazda) on the east- bound side of Colt Highway with three passengers: her husband, Benoit Boislard; her husband’s cousin, Rejean St. Pierre (St. Pierre); and St. Pierre’s wife, Lisette Prince St. Pierre (Prince St. Pierre). The four had been travelling from Quebec, Canada, to Farmington, Con- necticut, to attend the funeral of a relative the next day. As Michaud was looking for their hotel, she saw the defendant’s Honda heading directly toward them driving westward on the eastbound side of the highway. Realizing that she could not cross into the westbound side because there were two cars there and that she could not move to the other side of her lane due to the guardrail, she pressed the brake and, shortly thereafter, the Honda collided with her Mazda. Law enforcement and public safety personnel respond- ing to the scene of the collision found the defendant alone, seated in the driver’s seat of the Honda with the top half of his body lying across the passenger seat. There was an odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant and the  State v. Brozynski Honda, and the defendant displayed characteristics con- sistent with being intoxicated, including red and glossy eyes, slurred speech, and the inability to focus on simple questions from first responders about his condition. The defendant was clothed and had his wallet with him. An eyewitness and first responders rendered aid to the occupants of both vehicles until all occupants were transported to area hospitals. Although they tried to revive St. Pierre at the scene, he died due to the blunt trauma he sustained to his head, neck, and torso. Bois- lard died the next morning due to blunt injuries to his trunk and extremities. Prince St. Pierre was transported to the intensive care unit at Hartford Hospital, where she remained for three weeks until being transferred by medical flight to a hospital in Canada, where she was a patient for one and one-half months. She was then placed in rehabilitation, where she had to learn how to speak and to eat, and, although her daily functioning had improved since the accident, as of the trial, she still required assis- tance with most activities. Michaud sustained a broken right elbow and left wrist, which caused permanent nerve damage in two fingers and limited motion in her elbow. She also suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the collision. The defendant was transported to St. Francis Hospital, where his blood was drawn at 12:50 a.m. and then again at 4:55 a.m. The defendant’s blood samples then were tested and stored by Collaborative Laboratory Services at St. Francis Hospital. Pursuant to a search warrant, Farm- ington police seized the defendant’s blood samples from Collaborative Laboratory Services and had those samples tested by the Connecticut Forensic Science Laboratory (state lab) for the presence of drugs and alcohol. The test results from the state lab showed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.18 for the 12:50 a.m. blood draw and 0.08 for the 4:55 a.m. blood draw. The samples also revealed the presence of zolpidem (also known as Ambien), oxycodone, and meprobamate, all of which were within the normal  State v. Brozynski therapeutic range, or what a physician typically would prescribe. The defendant was arrested and charged in a substitute long form information with two counts of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (3), two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a- 59 (a) (3), two counts of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of § 53a-56b (a), two counts of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of § 53a-60d (a), one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug in violation of § 14-227a (a) (2) and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1). A jury trial was held over the course of seven days in June 2023. The state presented testimony from several witnesses, including eyewitnesses to the accident and the events leading up to it, law enforcement and public safety personnel, medical and laboratory staff from St. Francis Hospital, forensic examiners from the state lab, an expert witness in forensic toxicology, Robert H. Pow- ers, two medical examiners from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, and the defendant’s girlfriend. The defendant also testified. In describing the night of the accident, the defendant testified that, some time prior to the accident, he consumed two Bloody Mary drinks, took his prescription Ambien, and fell asleep. He testified that he did not intend to drive, had no recollection of driving, and never had experienced an episode of so-called “sleep driving” prior to the accident. During closing argument, defense counsel emphasized this theory of defense that Ambien caused the defendant to sleep drive and that sleep driving caused the accident. The jury returned a verdict on June 22, finding the defendant guilty on all counts. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after sev- enteen years, and three years of probation. This appeal,  State v. Brozynski challenging the conviction on the basis that the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial impropriety, followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the defendant claims that, on more than twenty occasions during the prosecutor’s cross-exami- nation of the defendant, closing argument, and closing rebuttal argument, his “right to a fair trial was violated by prosecutorial impropriety.” He contends that “[e]ach of these instances of impropriety are significant and impacted [his] right to a fair trial; however, cumula- tively, they are even more harmful [as] all the improper questions and comments occurred on the final day of the trial.” In response, the state argues that, “[w]ith the exception of a single gratuitous remark, which the state acknowledges that this court may find improper, the defendant’s claims fail because none of the other instances the defendant cites to amount to prosecuto- rial impropriety.” The state further asserts that, “even if this court finds that any impropriety occurred, it did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.” We agree with the state. We begin by setting forth the legal principles that guide our review of this claim. “In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage in a two step analytical process. . . . The two steps are separate and distinct. . . . We first examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Second, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether it deprived the defen- dant of his due process right to a fair trial. . . . In other words, an impropriety is an impropriety, regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial. Whether that impropriety was harmful and thus caused or con- tributed to a due process violation involves a separate and distinct inquiry. . . . “[O]ur determination of whether any improper conduct by the [prosecutor] violated the defendant’s fair trial rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State v. Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)],  State v. Brozynski with due consideration of whether that [impropriety] was objected to at trial. . . . These factors include: [1] the extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by defense conduct or argument . . . [2] the severity of the [impropriety] . . . [3] the frequency of the [impropriety] . . . [4] the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case . . . [5] the strength of the curative measures adopted . . . and [6] the strength of the state’s case. . . . The question of whether the defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the sum total of the improprieties. . . . Under the Williams general due process standard, the defendant has the burden to show both that the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and that it caused prejudice to his defense. . . . The two steps of [our] analysis are separate and distinct, and we may reject the claim if we conclude [that] the defendant has failed to establish either prong. . . . “Because [some of] the claimed prosecutorial impropri- eties occurred during [both closing and] rebuttal closing argument, we also set forth the following legal principles. It is well established that prosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of clos- ing arguments. . . . When making closing arguments to the jury, [however, counsel] must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argu- ment and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . . Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based [on] the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. . . . “Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury’s attention from the facts of the case. [The prosecutor] is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing  State v. Brozynski the people of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent. . . . By reason of his office, he usually exercises great influence [on] jurors. . . . While the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters [that] the jury ha[s] no right to consider. . . . “Lastly, we note that defense counsel did not object to [many] of the [alleged improprieties at trial]. [O]ur Supreme Court has explained that a defendant’s failure to object at trial to each of the occurrences that he now raises as instances of prosecutorial impropriety, though relevant to our inquiry, is not fatal to review of his claims. . . . This does not mean, however, that the absence of an objection at trial does not play a significant role in the determination of whether the challenged statements were, in fact, improper. . . . To the contrary, we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to object to the [alleged improprieties at the time they occurred] suggests that defense counsel did not believe that [they were] [improper] in light of the record of the case at the time.1” (Footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Antwon B., 236 Conn. App. 428, 455–57, 348 A.3d 814 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 910, 349 A.3d 1094 (2026). I A Failure to Adhere to Court Rulings The defendant first claims that the prosecutor acted improperly by ignoring the court’s instructions and 1 “[U]nder settled law, a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] need not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the four-pronged Golding test.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Antwon B., 236 Conn. App. 428, 457 n.18, 348 A.3d 814 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 910, 349 A.3d 1094 (2026).  State v. Brozynski continuing to make improper comments on multiple occasions. “It is well settled that a prosecutor’s failure to obey a trial court order concerning the admissibility of evidence, either while examining a witness or during argument, constitutes improper conduct. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 704, 911 A.2d 1055 (2006); see also State v. Reynolds, 118 Conn. App. 278, 292, 983 A.2d 874 (2009) (purposeful attempt by prosecutor to include inadmissible evidence ‘may entitle the defendant to a new trial’ . . . ), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 933, 987 A.2d 1029 (2010); State v. Williams, 102 Conn. App. 168, 176, 926 A.2d 7 (‘evidentiary violations of a court order should be reviewed as prosecutorial [impropriety], not eviden- tiary errors’), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 906, 931 A.2d 267 (2007). Whether a prosecutor’s improper comment or question has affected a defendant’s due process rights is case specific and ‘turns on the degree to which the breach undermines a trial court’s ruling that protects the integ- rity of the fact-finding process by restricting the admis- sion of unreliable or unduly prejudicial evidence.’ . . . For a breach to constitute prosecutorial impropriety, the trial court’s ruling must be unambiguous; an initially ambiguous order may be rendered ‘unambiguous follow- ing [an] extended colloquy with counsel . . . .’ ” (Citation omitted.) State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 438, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025). The defendant first claims that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask on cross-examination, “[D]o you think the fact that you drank alcohol and don’t remem- ber what happen[ed] that night excuses your behavior?” He asserts that this question was improper because the court had just sustained defense counsel’s objection to the question: “[D]o you think because you drank alcohol and took an Ambien that that excuses your behavior?”  State v. Brozynski The colloquy occurred as follows: “[The Prosecutor]: [D]o you think because you drank alcohol and took an Ambien that that excuses your behav- ior? “[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object. “The Defendant: I had no intentions of going on and doing this, my intentions were to go to sleep. “The Court: Sir, one second, sir. We have to question and answer; [Defense Counsel], did you have an objection? “[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. I just thought it was an improper question. He’s already answered it though, so. “The Court: I’m going to sustain the objection. You can move on with the next question, please. “[The Prosecutor]: Sir, do you think the fact that you drank alcohol and don’t remember what happen[ed] that night excuses your behavior? “[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. That’s not a proper question. “The Court: I’ll sustain the objection.” The defendant contends that the court’s order was clear and the question was improper. We are not persuaded. We do not find that the court’s ruling on the first objection was unambiguous. Without any specificity, the stated basis for the initial objection was simply that defense counsel “just thought it was an improper ques- tion.” Although the court sustained the objection, it did not specify the ground on which it determined that the question was improper.The first question was not so obviously improper or inflammatory such that the prosecutor could not have any doubt as to the offend- ing portion. Cf. State v. Dabate, supra, 351 Conn. 442 (finding state’s argument that prosecutor could not have known which word trial court deemed objection- able strained credulity, as “[t]here can be no legitimate  State v. Brozynski doubt that the word ‘Cheshire’ was the offending word in the trial court’s ruling, given the singular meaning of that term in the parlance of Connecticut’s criminal justice system”). After the objection was sustained, the prosecutor rephrased the question so that it did not ask the defendant to reflect on his culpability as it relates to his theory of defense that the accident was caused by the alleged side effects of the Ambien medication. Accord- ingly, the question was not improper. The defendant also claims that it was improper for the prosecutor to comment during the state’s closing rebut- tal argument: “Again, you didn’t check your common sense at the door. Everybody knows not to mix alcohol with drugs.” The context underlying this comment was as follows: “[The Prosecutor]: [Defense counsel] also mentioned to you that there was no warning on the Ambien. Every single person, all of us, again, everybody has common sense here, you get a prescription, it comes with a long list of drug interactions, things you should and shouldn’t do. Almost every single drug that you pick up at the drug store now comes with warnings about [how] you shouldn’t mix it with alcohol. “[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. That’s really outside the evidence. “The Court: Yeah. I’ll sustain the objection. “[The Prosecutor]: Again, you didn’t check your com- mon sense at the door. Everybody knows not to mix alcohol with drugs.” The defendant posits that “[t]he prosecutor commented on the defense’s theory by arguing that the defendant should have known not to mix Ambien with alcohol. The court ruled in the defendant’s favor that the assumption should not be made . . . .” We cannot identify, nor does the defendant point to, any portion of the record in which the court stated that it sustained the objection on the grounds that the question improperly assumed that the  State v. Brozynski defendant should have known not to mix Ambien with alcohol. Defense counsel objected to the first comment on the basis that it was outside of the evidence and the court sustained the objection; however, there was no specific- ity as to what portion of the prosecutor’s comment was ruled outside the scope of evidence. The prosecutor ref- erenced generally the warnings written on prescription drug bottles—information that had not been introduced into evidence. After the court sustained the objection, the prosecutor omitted a significant portion of the state- ment and simply asked the jurors to use their common sense that everyone knows not to mix prescription drugs with alcohol. The prosecutor’s appeal to the jurors, urg- ing them to use common knowledge in deciding a fact, is not improper. See State v. Devito, 159 Conn. App. 560, 581, 124 A.3d 14 (“[r]emarks that are nothing more than a permissible appeal to the jurors’ common sense do not constitute prosecutorial [impropriety]” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 947, 125 A.3d 1012 (2015). B Denigration of Defense Counsel The defendant next claims that the prosecutor acted improperly by denigrating defense counsel2 on two occa- sions. In the first instance, the defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the defendant on cross-examination, “[W]here [did] you first hear that term sleep driving? From one of your attorneys?” The following context is relevant to our review of this claim. On direct examination, the defendant testified 2 To the extent that the defendant claims the prosecutor inappropriately commented on the defendant’s right to counsel, the issue is inadequately briefed for failing to offer substantive analysis in support of his claim and, thus, we decline to review it. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James R., 138 Conn. App. 181, 186, 50 A.3d 936, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 940, 56 A.3d 949 (2012).  State v. Brozynski that, on the night of the accident, he consumed two Bloody Mary drinks, “took the Ambien sleeping pill [and] . . . went to sleep.” He described: “I went to sleep, when I woke up, I was in the hospital . . . . And the doctor was talking to me saying, do you know you were in a car accident; do you know you were in Farmington? And I told the doctor, no. I don’t know I was in a car accident. I don’t know I was in Farmington. He asked me where you were, I said I was home sleeping, that’s the last thing I remember, I don’t have no recollection of driving the car.” When asked if he “ever had side effects like sleep driving before,” the defendant responded, “No. No.” In response to defense counsel’s question asking if he still takes the prescriptions he had taken on the night of the accident, he stated: “I do not take any medication now because I’m terrified of the side effect of what happened to me with Ambien, so I don’t take nothing.” On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the defendant on his experience with sleep driving, asking: “[S]o, it just happened to be the night that you killed two people that you first had an episode of sleep driving, is that correct, sir?” The defendant replied, “That’s 100 percent correct.” The prosecutor also questioned the defendant on the general topic already discussed and about his communication with the prosecutor previously assigned to the case, prompting the following colloquy: “[The Prosecutor]: And, in the letter from 2022,3 you put in there that there may have been somebody else who walked away from the driver’s side door of the car, correct? “[The Defendant]: That’s what the other attorney that was representing me told me. “[The Prosecutor]: Well, sir, in 2022, that was last year, you were represented by [defense counsel], correct? 3 The letter was introduced for identification purposes only and was not admitted into evidence.  State v. Brozynski “[The Defendant]: Yeah. But before him I had a differ- ent attorney and that attorney told me that. “[The Prosecutor]: I understand that, but you wrote that letter because you wanted to put that forth as a defense that somebody else was driving, not you, is that correct, sir? “[The Defendant]: No. That’s no[t] correct. “[The Prosecutor]: That’s not correct, you just wrote that in the letter? “[The Defendant]: I wrote that because the attorney I had before [defense counsel] told me that, which I didn’t know. “[The Prosecutor]: Well, sir, in fact it says in that letter please prosecutor, can you look into this, are you sure I was driving. Do you recall writing that, sir? “[The Defendant]: Yeah, because the other attorney told me that.” (Footnote added.) Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor engaged the defen- dant in the following line of inquiry in which the alleged improper question was posed: “[The Prosecutor]: You acknowledge drinking alcohol, correct? “[The Defendant]: Yes. I had alcohol at home with no intentions of going out. My intentions were to go to sleep. “[The Prosecutor]: Sir, I heard your intentions, okay. I understand— “[The Defendant]: I didn’t know side effects of Ambien would make me sleep drive and sleepwalk. There was no warnings on the prescription then. I did not know this. “[The Prosecutor]: Before, sir, where did you first hear—  State v. Brozynski “[The Defendant]: I don’t even take anything no more because I’m so devast[at]ed about pills now. I’m petrified about pills. “[The Prosecutor]: That’s a good thing, sir. That’s a good thing. Sir, where [did] you first hear that term sleep driving? From one of your attorneys? “[Defense Counsel]: That’s not a proper question, Your Honor. “The Defendant: Almost everybody— “[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Hold on. “The Court: I’ll sustain the objection as to the form of the question with the last part.” We begin by setting forth the applicable legal principles that guide our review of the claim that the prosecutor’s question denigrated defense counsel. “It has been held improper for the prosecutor to impugn the role of defense counsel. . . . In particular, [i]t is improper for a prosecu- tor to tell a jury, explicitly or implicitly, that defense counsel is employing standard tactics used in all trials, because such an argument relies on facts not in evidence and has no bearing on the issue before the jury, namely, the guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . . There is a distinction [however] between argument that disparages the integrity or role of defense counsel and argument that disparages a theory of defense.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fasanelli, 163 Conn. App. 170, 180, 133 A.3d 921 (2016). We next consider the prosecutor’s question in the context in which it occurred. The defendant testified that he went to sleep the night of the accident and that the Ambien caused him to sleep drive. The prosecutor challenged this theory of defense in several respects, including by asking the defendant if he previously had maintained a different theory of defense. In doing so, the prosecutor elicited testimony in which the defendant recalled asking the former prosecutor assigned to the case to look into whether someone else exited the driver’s side  State v. Brozynski of his car after the accident “because [another] attorney told [him] that.” Shortly thereafter, the defendant stated twice that he communicated that possibility because his attorney had told him about it. In this context, we conclude that the prosecutor’s question, asking the defendant if he first heard of sleep driving from one of his attorneys, was part of a broader line of inquiry intended to rebut the theory of defense posed on direct examination. Moreover, a factual predicate for the ques- tion existed in that it referenced the defendant’s prior testimony that he communicated certain information to the former prosecutor based on what a prior defense attorney told him. See State v. Diaz, 348 Conn. 750, 775–76, 311 A.3d 714 (2024) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate to ask properly phrased questions on cross-examination that relate to the credibility of a criminal defendant’s direct testimony, even if those questions exceed the scope of the questioning on direct examination and refer to facts not in evidence. . . . A cross-examiner may ask questions that are ‘designed to rebut, impeach, modify, or explain any of the defendant’s direct testimony . . . if he or she has a good faith belief that a factual predicate for the question exists.’ ” (Citations omitted.)). To the extent the defendant argues that the prosecu- tor’s question implied that defense counsel intended to mislead the jury, he fails to demonstrate how the inquiry amounted to such an implication. Although generally applied to claims of impropriety committed during clos- ing argument, and not cross-examination, we find it instructive that “[o]ur Supreme Court has repeatedly frowned upon a prosecutor’s use of terms and phrases that imply that defense counsel ‘had not based his argu- ment on fact or reason, but had intended to mislead the jury by means of an artfully deceptive argument.’ . . . [See] State v. Albino, 312 Conn. 763, 776–77, 97 A.3d 478 (2014) (holding improper prosecutor’s comparison of defense counsel’s tactics to octopus’ defense mechanism of releasing ink to hide and deceive); State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535, 557, 78 A.3d 828 (2013) (‘smoke and mirrors’ was improper because it implied deception);  State v. Brozynski but see State v. Fauci, [282 Conn. 23, 39–40, 917 A.2d 978 (2007)] (holding ‘red herring’ to be proper because it was in response to defense counsel’s theory of defense); State v. Nixon, [91 Conn. App. 333, 338, 880 A.2d 199] (‘defendant will most likely try to distract you from the big picture’ not improper . . . ) [cert. denied, 276 Conn. 911, 886 A.2d 426 (2005)]; State v. Young, 76 Conn. App. 392, 405, 819 A.2d 884 (prosecutor’s comment that jury should not . . . be ‘ “fooled” ’ or distracted by defense counsel’s argument was proper), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 912, 826 A.2d 1157 (2003); State v. Jenkins, 70 Conn. App. 515, 536–38, 800 A.2d 1200 (‘ “diverting you from the facts”  ’ not improper), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 927, 806 A.2d 1062 (2002).” (Citation omitted.) State v. Fasanelli, supra, 163 Conn. App. 181. Accord- ingly, we conclude that the question was not improper. The defendant next claims that “the prosecutor con- tinued to denigrate defense counsel and comment on the defendant’s right to counsel during her rebuttal closing argument” with the remark: “I submit to you the defen- dant probably never heard about [sleep driving] until an attorney put that idea in his head.” We are not persuaded. The following colloquy is relevant to our review of this argument: “[The Prosecutor]: Ladies and gentlemen, the only evidence of the sleep driving, which I submit to you the defendant probably never heard about until an attorney put that idea in his head. “[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. “The Court: It’s closing argument. “[Defense Counsel]: There’s no evidence of anything like that. “The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, arguments of coun- sel are just that, they’re arguments to help you assist  State v. Brozynski with the evaluation of the case. I’ll allow the comment. Go ahead.”4 Like the prior instance, we find the comment to be part of a larger argument rebutting the defendant’s theory of defense and that the defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor’s comment amounted to the implication that defense counsel sought to mislead the jury. In addition, we note that prosecutors are afforded generous latitude in arguing their cases forcefully during closing argument provided that the argument is “fair and based [on] the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Antwon B., supra, 236 Conn. App. 456. As already noted, the prosecutor’s commentary on this point was connected to the testimonial evidence offered by the defendant. Therefore, the comment was not improper. C Appeals to the Emotions of the Jurors The defendant identifies nine comments that the prose- cutor made during closing argument that he claims “were highly prejudicial” in appealing to the jurors’ emotions. He argues that “[t]here are no reasonable explanations for these statements other than to inflame the passion of the jur[ors] . . . .” We disagree. “[I]t is well established that, [a] prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jurors. . . . [S]uch appeals should be avoided because they have the effect of diverting the jury’s attention from [its] duty to decide the case on the evidence. . . . When 4 The defendant also asserts that the prosecutor’s comment was improper on the basis that it did not adhere to the court’s prior ruling in which it sustained defense counsel’s objection to the question asking the defendant if he first heard of sleep driving from one of his attorneys. The defendant, however, fails to recognize the fact that the court allowed the comment when defense counsel objected. Because it explicitly was allowed by the court, we are not convinced that this comment did not adhere to the court’s prior ruling. Accordingly, we conclude that the comment was not improper on this basis, either.  State v. Brozynski the prosecutor appeals to emotions, he invites the jury to decide the case, not according to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful and irrel- evant factors which are likely to skew that appraisal. . . . It must be acknowledged that the line between com- ments that risk invoking the passions and prejudices of the jurors and those that are permissible rhetorical flourishes is not always easy to draw. The more closely the comments are connected to relevant facts disclosed by the evidence, however, the more likely they will be deemed permissible. . . . A prosecutor is permitted to use vivid language to describe the nature and enormity of the crime when supported by the evidence, and to the extent that such language appeals to the emotions of the jurors, it is because of the nature of the crime and not because of the terminology the prosecutor used to get his [or her] point across. . . . Thus, comments that are factu- ally based on the evidence and not unduly provocative constitute permissible argument