State v. Acevedo

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Acevedo STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PEDRO ACEVEDO (AC 48259) Alvord, Moll and Palmer, Js. Syllabus Convicted, on pleas of guilty, of the crimes of assault in the first degree, assault of a peace officer, and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault in the first degree. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault in the first degree, as the record indicated that, contrary to the defendant’s claim, the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the sentence that would be imposed under the plea agreement, and, although the defendant claimed that his plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel, during the court’s thorough plea canvass, he expressly confirmed that he was satisfied with the advice that he had received from defense counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance, as the record supported the court’s determination that no substantial reason or exceptional circumstances existed to justify defense counsel’s withdrawal from the case and the appointment of new counsel. Argued April 14—officially released August 25, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, assault of a peace officer, evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, larceny in the second degree and larceny in the fourth degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the defendant was presented to the court, Gold, J., on pleas of guilty to assault in the first degree, assault of a peace officer and evasion of respon- sibility in the operation of a motor vehicle; judgment of guilty in accordance with the pleas; thereafter, the court denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to  State v. Acevedo assault in the first degree, and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Nicole S. Shepter, for the appellant (defendant). Lauren R. Williams, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion PER CURIAM. The defendant, Pedro Acevedo, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered in accordance with a plea agreement, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1), and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied (1) his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault in the first degree, and (2) defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as set forth by the prosecutor as the factual basis underlying the defendant’s guilty plea, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On September 20, 2021, the police responded to a report that an individual was stealing items from a car in a parking lot on Talcott Forest Road in Farming- ton. Officer James O’Donnell of the Farmington Police Department, who was the first officer to arrive at the scene, observed the defendant getting into a vehicle. With his police cruiser’s lights and sirens activated, O’Donnell drove his cruiser closer to the defendant. As he did so, the defendant put his vehicle in reverse, driv- ing backward several feet and up onto a curb. O’Donnell positioned his cruiser to block the defen- dant’s vehicle from fleeing. As O’Donnell opened his door and began to exit the cruiser, the defendant drove between the driver’s side of the cruiser and other cars parked in the parking lot. The defendant struck  State v. Acevedo O’Donnell, pinning him against the cruiser, and then fled the scene. O’Donnell was seriously injured and spent more than one month in a hospital recovering from his injuries. He also spent several months in rehabilitation learning to walk again. The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1), assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1), assault of a peace officer in vio- lation of § 53a-167c (a) (1), evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of § 14-224 (b) (1), larceny in the second degree in violation of Gen- eral Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (1), and larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125 (a). On June 27, 2024, the state and the defendant reached a plea agreement with respect to all the charges. Pursuant to that agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine1 to the charge of assault in the first degree and entered straight guilty pleas to the charges of assault of a peace officer and evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle. In exchange, the state agreed to a sentence recommendation of fifteen years of incarceration. The trial court, Gold, J., accepted the pleas following a thorough canvass, during which the defendant affirmed that he understood the terms of the agreement, including the nature of the charges and the sentence to which he was exposed. He further stated, inter alia, that he was satisfied with his counsel’s advice. The defendant’s sentencing was scheduled for Sep- tember 24, 2024. When the hearing began on that date, however, the defendant indicated that he was not pre- pared to go forward with sentencing because he had not understood the terms of the plea agreement. Specifi- cally, he stated that he believed he was pleading guilty to assault in the second degree, instead of assault in the first degree, and that he would receive a maximum sentence 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).  State v. Acevedo of ten years of incarceration.2 The court interpreted the defendant’s statements as a request to withdraw his guilty plea to assault in the first degree.3 The court continued the matter to October 31, 2024, to consider the defendant’s request and to review the transcript from the plea hearing. On October 28, 2024, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw his appearance as the defendant’s counsel on the ground that a conflict had arisen between him and the defendant during a phone conversation that day. Defense counsel explained that the defendant was “likely to assert that [defense] counsel was ineffective in the representation of him during the plea negotiations and misadvised him on the law,” and, further, that counsel had concerns he could not explain fully due to reasons of client confidentiality but which implicated professional ethical issues for counsel.4 Although defense counsel “[fundamentally] disagree[d]” with the defendant’s alle- gations, counsel believed that his “continued representa- tion [of the defendant] is not appropriate.” At the hearing on October 31, 2024, the court first addressed defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance. After hearing from defense counsel and the defendant, who explained that he was concerned with defense counsel’s competence relating to counsel’s failure to obtain certain body camera footage from the state,5 the court denied counsel’s motion. The court 2 The defendant also stated that he was “under extreme emotional distress” at the time of the plea hearing and that he was not listening during the trial court’s canvass. The court found that these assertions were without merit, and, on appeal, the defendant acknowledges that the record does not support them. 3 The court recognized that the defendant did not raise any claims with respect to his guilty pleas to the other charges. On appeal, the defendant makes clear that his claims relate only to his guilty plea to assault in the first degree. 4 In particular, defense counsel represented that the defendant “appear[ed] likely to persist in a course of conduct [that] counsel . . . believes is fraudulent.” 5 Although the state had produced body camera footage for the defen- dant, he had raised his concerns regarding additional body camera  State v. Acevedo explained that it was apparent that the defendant merely was attempting to delay the resolution of his case and that no substantial reason or exceptional circumstances existed to justify the appointment of new counsel. The court determined that any breakdown in communica- tion between defense counsel and the defendant was “solely and fully [the defendant’s] responsibility” and that defense counsel “has continued to express to this court and demonstrated by his actions his willingness to represent [the defendant] fully and competently as required by law.” With respect to the defendant’s claim about the body camera footage, the court stated: “It is my understanding, based on communications that I’ve had with [the prosecutor] and [defense counsel], that there is no body camera footage. It never existed in the first place.” Finally, the court noted that the defendant had not raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the September 24, 2024 hearing when the court asked him to identify all the grounds that he wished to advance in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court then denied the defendant’s oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court, citing numer- ous portions of the plea canvass that specifically ref- erenced the charge of assault in the first degree, found the defendant’s purported understanding that he was pleading guilty to assault in the second degree “to be wholly and entirely without merit.” Similarly, regarding the defendant’s claim that he believed he would receive a sentence of a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years, the court noted that the transcript of the plea canvass was “replete with references . . . that the agreed upon sentence . . . would involve fifteen years’ incarcera- tion.” Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no basis for allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. After denying the defendant’s motion, the court proceeded to sentence the defendant to a total effective footage at several prior proceedings, including when he was represented by different counsel. It bears noting that, as the court recognized, sev- eral other attorneys previously had entered appearances on behalf of the defendant during the course of his case and then subsequently withdrew.  State v. Acevedo term of fifteen years of incarceration in accordance with the plea agreement. This appeal followed. I The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to assault in the first degree. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion because he demonstrated that (1) he did not understand the nature of the charges or the sentence that would be imposed as a result of the plea, and (2) the plea resulted from the denial of the effective assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded. We begin by setting forth the standard of review and relevant legal principles. Practice Book § 39-26 provides in relevant part: “A defendant may withdraw his or her plea of guilty . . . as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted. After acceptance, the judicial authority shall allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book §] 39-27. A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed.” “[O]ur standard of review is abuse of discretion for decisions on motions to withdraw guilty pleas brought under Practice Book § 39-27. . . . [Section 39-27] specifies circumstances under which a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after it has been entered.6 [O]nce entered, a guilty plea cannot be withdrawn except by leave of the court, within its sound discretion, and a denial thereof is reversible only if it appears that there has been an abuse 6 Practice Book § 39-27 provides: “The grounds for allowing the defen- dant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty after acceptance are as follows: “(1) The plea was accepted without substantial compliance with Sec- tion 39-19; “(2) The plea was involuntary, or it was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or without knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; “(3) The sentence exceeds that specified in a plea agreement which had been previously accepted, or in a plea agreement on which the judicial  State v. Acevedo of discretion. . . . The burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for withdrawal of a plea of guilty. . . . “In determining whether the trial court [has] abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action. . . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discre- tion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lynch, 193 Conn. App. 637, 657–58, 220 A.3d 163 (2019), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 914, 229 A.3d 729 (2020). The defendant first contends that he did not under- stand the nature of the charges or the sentence that would be imposed because of an exchange between the court and the parties at the start of the June 27, 2024 hearing, prior to the plea canvass. During that exchange, the court had inquired whether the defendant was subject to a five year mandatory minimum sentence as a result of a sentence enhancement on the charge of assault in the first degree. Despite some brief initial confusion about the issue, the prosecutor clarified that the defendant was not subject to a five year mandatory minimum or a sentence enhance- ment because that enhancement was associated with the charge of assault in the second degree and did not apply to the charge to which the defendant was entering his Alford plea. Moreover, that brief exchange was immedi- ately followed by the court’s thorough canvass and col- loquy, during which the court repeatedly made clear that the terms of the plea agreement included the charge of assault in the first degree and a sentence of fifteen years authority had deferred its decision to accept or reject the agreement at the time the plea of guilty was entered; “(4) The plea resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel; “(5) There was no factual basis for the plea; or “(6) The plea either was not entered by a person authorized to act for a corporate defendant or was not subsequently ratified by a corporate defendant.”  State v. Acevedo of incarceration, and the defendant repeatedly indicated that he understood the court’s explanation of the plea agreement. See, e.g., State v. Anthony D., 320 Conn. 842, 858–59, 134 A.3d 219 (2016) (considering trial court’s thorough plea canvass in rejecting defendant’s claim that court improperly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea). The defendant also contends that his plea resulted from the denial of the effective assistance of counsel. In sup- port of this contention, the defendant argues that he was unable to make a fully informed decision to plead guilty due to defense counsel’s failure to obtain and review body camera footage. The court, however, expressly found that such body camera footage did not exist. Moreover, the transcript of the plea canvass reveals that, if the defendant were dissatisfied with his representation by defense counsel, he had ample opportunity to explain to the court that he was not being adequately represented. See id., 859–60. The defendant instead expressly con- firmed that he was satisfied with the advice that he had received from defense counsel. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its broad discretion in deny- ing the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to assault in the first degree. II The defendant also claims that the court improperly denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appear- ance. We are not persuaded. The following legal principles pertain to our resolu- tion of the defendant’s claim. “A motion to withdraw appearance is governed by Practice Book § 3-10 which provides in subsection (a) that [n]o motion for with- drawal of appearance shall be granted unless good cause is shown and until the judicial authority is satisfied that reasonable notice has been given to other attorneys of record and that the party represented by the attorney was served with the motion and the notice required by this section . . . . The standard of review regarding a  State v. Acevedo motion to withdraw as counsel is abuse of discretion. The standard of reviewing both a motion by a defendant to discharge counsel and a motion by counsel to withdraw is the same. . . . It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a factual basis exists for appointing new counsel and, absent a factual record revealing an abuse of that discretion, the court’s refusal to appoint new counsel is not improper. . . . Such a request must be supported by a substantial reason and, [i]n order to work a delay by a last minute discharge of counsel there must exist exceptional circumstances. . . . “In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discre- tion . . . [an appellate court] should consider the follow- ing factors: [t]he timeliness of the motion; adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. . . . Discretion means a legal discre- tion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . . It goes with- out saying that the term abuse of discretion . . . means that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds. . . . In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Randolph, 227 Conn. App. 732, 741–42, 322 A.3d 1080, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 920, 325 A.3d 218 (2024). Our review of the record supports the court’s deter- mination that no substantial reason or exceptional cir- cumstances existed to justify the appointment of new counsel following the defendant’s guilty plea and prior to sentencing. The court observed, inter alia, that the defendant was adequately represented by defense coun- sel at the time he entered his guilty plea and defense counsel was prepared to continue to represent him at sentencing. See State v. Marrero-Alejandro, 159 Conn.  State v. Acevedo App. 376, 405, 122 A.3d 273 (2015) (observing that “no substantial reason existed to justify the appointment of new counsel during jury selection, much less ‘excep- tional circumstances,’ ” because “trial counsel appeared to communicate effectively [with the defendant] during jury selection” and counsel “was willing and prepared to represent the defendant at trial”), appeal dismissed, 324 Conn. 780, 154 A.3d 1005 (2017). In sum, under the circumstances presented, neither defense counsel nor the defendant expressed sufficient reason necessitat- ing counsel’s withdrawal from the case. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s denial of defense counsel’s motion to withdraw his appearance was not an abuse of its discretion. The judgment is affirmed.