State v. Samuel F.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Samuel F. STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SAMUEL F.* (AC 48131) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Moll, Js.** Syllabus Convicted, following a jury trial, of multiple counts of harassment in the second degree, threatening in the first degree and threatening in the second degree after the trial court granted the state’s motion to join for trial eight informations that had been filed against him, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that certain counts of the state’s amended, operative information were barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations (§ 54-193) because they significantly extended the dates of the conduct with which he was accused and thereby deprived him of notice of the offenses with which he was charged. Held: The defendant failed to prove that the challenged counts of the state’s amended, operative information violated § 54-193 or that the trial court committed plain error in allowing the state to proceed on those charges, as none of the dates of the alleged conduct in the amended, operative informa- tion was expanded beyond more than a few months as compared with the dates in the eight original informations, the factual allegations underlying the amended charges were the same as or substantially similar to the factual allegations underlying the original charges, which provided the defendant with notice of the facts he would have to defend against at trial, the charges set forth in the original and operative informations broadly addressed his continuous course of conduct in harassing and threatening the victims, and his briefs were devoid of discussion as to how the court’s alleged error resulted in manifest injustice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the state’s motion to join for trial the original eight informations the state filed, as the evidence in those cases was cross admissible, the incidents at issue were relevant to each other to prove identity, motive and common plan or scheme, as set forth in the applicable rule of evidence (§ 4-5 (c)), the evidence corroborated each victim’s identification of the defendant as the individual who was sending them text messages and phoning them, and, despite the defendant’s assertion * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that per- son’s identity may be ascertained. ** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  State v. Samuel F. that joinder of the informations prejudiced him because the evidence was unduly cumulative and some of his text messages to certain victims contained threats that his text messages to other victims did not, this court was not convinced that the mere inclusion of additional types of threats in certain text messages rendered them more prejudicial than probative, as the trial court mitigated any prejudice when it advised the jury on how to keep the evidence separate and instructed that the evidence for each charge must be considered separately. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to present in its rebuttal case evidence from a police report concerning the contents of the defendant’s cell phone and did not improperly decline to provide the jury with a limiting instruction regarding that evidence, as the defendant “opened the door” to its admission when he attempted to show at trial that the police had conducted an inadequate investigation, and, even if this court were to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting that evidence, the defendant failed to show that he was harmed, as the admitted portions of the report were either proportionally related to the state’s rebut- tal of the inadequate police investigation defense or cumulative of evidence already properly presented to the jury. Argued June 1—officially released November 3, 2026 Procedural History Eight informations charging the defendant with sixty- two counts of the crime of harassment in the second degree, forty-six counts of the crime of threatening in the second degree, five counts of the crime of threaten- ing in the first degree, four counts each of the crimes of breach of the peace in the second degree and intimida- tion based on bigotry or bias in the second degree, and one count of the crime of criminal attempt to commit an act of terrorism, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, where the court, P. Brown, J., granted the state’s motion for joinder; thereafter, the state filed a substitute information in the eight cases charging the defendant with thirteen counts of harass- ment in the second degree, eight counts of threatening in the first degree and five counts of threatening in the second degree; subsequently, the cases were tried to the jury before P. Brown, J.; thereafter, the court granted the defendant’s motion to preclude certain evidence and denied the state’s motion to preclude certain evidence;  State v. Samuel F. verdicts and judgments of guilty of thirteen counts of harassment in the second degree, eight counts of threat- ening in the first degree and five counts of threatening in the second degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Laila M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joshua Maddox, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant). Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Kathleen E. Morgan, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion CRADLE, C. J. The defendant, Samuel F., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of eight counts of threatening in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61aa, five counts of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62, and thirteen counts of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) certain counts of the state’s May 7, 2024 amended long form information (operative information) were time barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations in General Statutes § 54-193; (2) the trial court improperly joined eight cases against him for trial, or, alternatively, that the court committed plain error by failing to provide, sua sponte, a limiting instruction to the jury regarding that joinder; and (3) the court abused its discretion by allowing the state to present certain rebuttal evidence, or, alternatively, improperly declined to provide the jury with a limiting instruction regarding that rebuttal evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. By way of background, the defendant has four half-siblings with whom he shares  State v. Samuel F. the same father, namely, two half sisters, R and K, and two half brothers, J and B. The victims in the present case are J, R, and B’s partner, M.1 K was diagnosed with a brain tumor in May 2021 and died on April 19, 2022. From May 2021 through May 2022, J and M received “[h]undreds or thousands” of text messages and “[h]undreds” of phone calls from the defendant. Many of those text messages were sent in a group chat in which J, M and B were included. In May 2022, R also received hundreds of text messages and phone calls from the defendant. In the text messages, the defendant repeat- edly stated, inter alia, that he or someone else would harm or kill the victims and their families. He indicated in those text messages that his anger stemmed initially from his belief that the victims had caused K’s brain tumor and death, and, later, that he was angry that the victims had contacted the police to report his threats. In addition, in text messages sent to J and M, the defendant expressed, in graphic detail, that he or someone else would violently sexually assault them. The defendant also indicated to both J and R that he intended “to go on a shooting spree” at J’s and M’s houses “Sandy Hook style,” and sent them video footage taken by the perpe- trator of a mass shooting that occurred in Buffalo, New York. The defendant further indicated that he intended to shoot up the schools attended by the victims’ children and as well as K’s funeral. The defendant sent the victims images of, inter alia, weapons, horse genitalia, nude people, pornography, and a decapitated woman. In connection with the allegations involving the three separate victims, the defendant was charged, in eight separate informations, for conduct alleged to have occurred between May 3, 2021, and May 26, 2022, with 1 M and B have four minor children together. J and his wife, A, also have four minor children together. Neither those children nor B were complainants in the present case. At the defendant’s sentencing, how- ever, the trial court issued several standing criminal protective orders prohibiting the defendant from, inter alia, stalking, contacting, or coming within 100 yards of them, and ordering the defendant to sur- render all firearms and ammunition, for a period of forty-five years.  State v. Samuel F. five counts of threatening in the first degree, forty-six counts of threatening in the second degree, sixty-two counts of harassment in the second degree, four counts of breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181, four counts of intimi- dation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181k (a) (1) and (3), and one count of criminal attempt to commit an act of terrorism in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-300. The defendant was subsequently arrested on August 12, 2022. On April 8, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars in each case pending against him. On April 10, 2024, the state filed a motion for joinder pursuant to Practice Book § 41-192 in which it requested that all eight of the cases against the defendant be joined for a single trial, which the trial court, P. Brown, J., granted on April 12, 2024.3 On April 22, 2024, the state filed a long form information, which it amended on April 23, 2024, and again with the filing of the operative long form information on May 7, 2024. The operative information comprised the allegations as to all three victims and contained twenty-six counts, spe- cifically, eight counts of threatening in the first degree in violation of § 53a-61aa, five counts of threatening in the second degree in violation of § 53a-62, and thirteen counts of harassment in the second degree in violation of § 53a-183 for conduct that was alleged to have occurred in the towns of Branford, Madison, and Chester. In the operative information, the state charged the defendant with respect to his conduct toward J in Branford as follows: In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, the state charged the defendant with one count of harassment in 2 Practice Book § 41-19 provides: “The judicial authority may, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, order that two or more infor- mations, whether against the same defendant or different defendants, be tried together.” 3 The defendant did not file written objections to the state’s motion for joinder but, as we will discuss, objected at the hearing on the state’s motion.  State v. Samuel F. the second degree by telephone in violation of § 53a-183 (a) (3). Count one of the operative information charged that, “on divers dates between May 2, 2021, and Sep- tember 30, 2021,” the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm,” “made a telephone call [to J] in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, the state charged the defendant with one count of harassment in the second degree by text message in violation of § 53a-183 (a) (1), one count of threatening in the second degree, and one count of harassment in the second degree by telephone call. Count two of the operative information charged that, on “divers dates between October 1, 2021, and October 31, 2021,” the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm [him] . . . communicated with [J] by text message in a manner likely to cause ter- ror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” Count three charged that, “on or about October 31, 2021,” the defendant “threatened to commit any crime of violence” when he sent a certain sequence of text messages to J.4 Count five charged that, “on divers dates between October 1, 2021, and December 13, 2021,” the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm,” made a telephone call to J “in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, the state charged the defendant with three counts of harassment in the second degree by telephone and one count of threat- ening in the first degree. Counts nine, fourteen, and twenty-two of the operative information charged that the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm,” made a telephone call to J “in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm,” “on divers dates between January 21, 2022, and February 27, 2022,” “on divers dates between March 4, 2022, and April 6, 2022,” 4 Specifically, count three of the operative information charged the defendant with sending the following sequence of text messages: “You’re going to get your dick chopped off [J]”; “And you’re going to get hung from a tree”; and, “With a garbage bag over your head.”  State v. Samuel F. and “on divers dates between May 4, 2022, and May 23, 2022,” respectively. Count twenty-five charged that the defendant, “on or about May 23, 2022,” “threatened to commit any crime of violence and, in the commission of such offense, represented by his words that he pos- sessed a firearm” by sending a certain sequence of text messages to J.5 In the operative information, the state charged the defendant with respect to his conduct toward M in Madi- son as follows: In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, the state charged the defendant with one count of harass- ment in the second degree by text message and one count of threatening in the first degree. Count four charged that, “on divers dates between November 24, 2021, and December 23, 2021,” the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm [her] . . . communicated with [M] by text message in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Count six charged that, “on or about November 24, 2021,” the defendant “threatened to commit any crime of violence and, in the commission of such offense, represented by his words that he possessed a firearm” when he sent a certain sequence of text messages to M.6 5 Specifically, count twenty-five of the operative information identi- fied the following sequence of text messages: “the voices tell me to kill your family [J] . . . kill kill kill / And this isn’t over, I’m going to poison your kids / Slip rat poison in your kids food / Just wait until you see the rage and hatred I unleash on your family / I’m going to shoot up your fucking house Sandy Hook style and kill all of your kids with an AR-15 / 7 dead at least after I go on this shooting rampage / Get ready faggot . . . I’m going to shoot [J] in the head, shoot [B] in the head, shoot all their kids in the fucking face / shoot [A] with an [AR-15] / shoot [M] 20 times / I’m going to fire 300 rounds inside both their houses and kill everyone / I’m going to massacre everyone kill everything inside [J’s home address] and [M’s home address] / can you send me some naked photographs of [A]? / I want to use them as targets with an AR-15.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant also sent what the state described in count twenty-five as a “video from [an] active shooter incident in Buffalo, NY,” and a “photo labeled Mass Shooters 2019 depicting . . . photos of the mass shooters from that year . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 6 Specifically, count six of the operative information identified the following text message: “I’ll blow your fucking head in half cunt stay  State v. Samuel F. In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, the state charged the defendant with one count of threatening in the first degree. Count seven of the operative information charged that, “on or about December 14, 2021,” the defendant “threatened to commit any crime of violence and, in the commission of such offense, represented by his words that he possessed a firearm” when he sent a certain sequence of text messages to M.7 In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, the state charged the defendant with one count of harassment in the second degree by text message. Count eight of the operative information charged that, “on divers dates between January 2, 2022, and February 27, 2022,” the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm [her] . . . communicated with [M] by text message in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” Finally, in docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T, the state charged the defendant with three counts of harassment in the second degree by telephone call, four counts of threat- ening in the first degree, four counts of threatening in the second degree, and one count of harassment in the second degree by text message. Counts ten, fifteen, and twenty-three of the operative information charged that the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and away from [K] don’t ever go near her again don’t ever even think about her again or I’ll rearrange your face with a shotgun in front of your kids just like when you assaulted me in front of them at the loft for no reason now go hang out with your fucking . . . nigger family before I break your jaw and stuff your head into a garbage bag you rotten fucking loser alcoholic your kids are a cancer . . . .” We note that this sequence of text messages was sent in a group chat in which the defendant, M, J and B were included. 7 Specifically, count seven of the operative information identified the following sequence of text messages: “Me and [J] are going to rape you [M]”; “I’m going to stick a gun in your asshole bitch [M] you filthy nigger whore I’ll rape you in the shower”; “[J] says he wants to watch [J’s going to stick a wrench inside your vagina”; “[m]e and [B] are going to huff paint thinner and then double penetrate you and use you I’m going to cum on your face”; and, “I’ve been following you at the grocery store [M] with a gun I’ve been watching you shower.” We note that this sequence of text messages was sent in a group chat in which the defendant, M, J and B were included.  State v. Samuel F. alarm,” made a telephone call to M “in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm,” “on divers dates between January 30, 2022, and February 27, 2022,” “on divers dates between March 4, 2022, and April 18, 2022,” and “on divers dates between May 11, 2022, and May 25, 2022,” respectively. Counts eleven, eighteen, twenty, and twenty-six charged that the defendant, “with the intent to terrorize another person . . . threatened to commit any crime of violence and, in the commission of such offense, represented by his words that he possessed a firearm” when he sent a certain sequence of text mes- sages “on or about” January 25, March 25, April 20 and May 26, 2022, respectively.8 Counts twelve, sixteen, sev- enteen, and nineteen charged that the defendant, “with 8 Specifically, count eleven of the operative information identified the following text message: “ILL SHOOT YOU IN YOUR FUCKING FACE NIGGER!!!! STOP. KILLING. [K] YOU’RE GOING TO GET YOUR FUCKING FACE BLOWN OFF WITH A SAWN OFF SHOTGUN YOU BITCH ASS COWARD.” Count eighteen identified the following sequence of text messages: “[M] kill yourself”; “[M] I AM GOING TO FUCKING STAB YOU”; “I’ll put my dick in your asshole [M]”; “[y]ou like cock, whore?”; “[s]how us your cunt you stupid bitch”; “I’m going to point a pistol in your face and make you strip naked you filthy slut”; “[y]ou wanna suck my cock?”; “[f]ucking whore I’ll beat you to death with a gun”; “[n]igger bitch slut”; “[k]ill yourself [M]”; “[y]ou want to suck my dick bitch”; “I’m going to slit your throat [M]”; “I’LL PUT A FUCKING KNIFE TO YOUR NECK”; “FUCKING WHORE.” Count twenty identified the following sequence of text messages: “Hey [M] you stupid fucking whore I’m going to rape you and burn you alive with gasoline”; “[y]ou understand bitch? I’m going to drag you into the woods and rape you”; “I’LL SHOOT YOU IN THE FUCKING HEAD BITCH”; “I’m going to wear a clown mask and rape you and then I’ll end your life forever [M].” The defendant also sent what the state described as an “image of [a] firearm and clown mask.” Count twenty-six identified the following sequence of text messages: “I’m going to shoot up [M and B’s child’s] school by the way I have body armor and an [AR-15] then I’m going to shoot up [J’s home address] and [M’s home address] and shoot up [M’s children’s] school I’m going to kill everyone go on a mass shooting spree,” and, “Friday is the day.” We note that the text messages identified in counts eleven, eighteen, and twenty were sent in a group chat in which the defendant, M, J and B were included. We further note that the text messages identified in count twenty-six were sent to R, who then sent M a screenshot of those messages.  State v. Samuel F. the intent to terrorize another person . . . threatened to commit any crime of violence” by sending a certain sequence of text messages to M “on or about” February 23, March 6, March 23 and April 14, 2022, respectively.9 Count thirteen charged that, “on divers dates between March 6, 2022, and April 26, 2022,” the defendant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm [her] . . . communicated with [M] by text message in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” 9 Specifically, count twelve of the operative information identified the following sequence of text messages: “You fucking fat whore I’ll slap you in the face and drag you by your hair into the bathroom bitch”; “[y]ou’ll take a shit in your hand [M] and then eat it, you disgusting shit mouth pigcunt whore”; “[y]our vagina is pig fat [M] I’ll cut it off with a pair of scissors and eat it I’ll eat your period blood you fat pig”; “[s]how us your pigcunt [M]”; “[e]veryone wants to see your fat stinky monkey lips.” Count sixteen identified the following sequence of text messages: “You dumb slut [M] I’m going to break your face smash your nose break your jaw and sodomize your vagina with a metal wrench I know how to rape you,” and, “[y]ou fucking fat pig whore you titty cow I’ll milk your udders chicken niggerfucker whore you fucking pig slut I’ll fuck your face stick my cock up your nose and rip your asshole and with this metal wrench I’m sticking it so far up your ass I’ll rape you I’ll fuck your ass with pliers while your ass bleeds and you squeal like the fat overweight pig whore that you are, you are nothing but a Rape Pig [M] you need cocks.” The defendant also sent an image of a wrench. Count seventeen identified the following sequence of text messages: “[M] are you actually such a stupid whore”; “[M] are you such a stupid whore that you actually think I’m not going to rape and kill you”; “[d]o you really think I’m done sexually assaulting you”; “[d]o you actually think blocking me is going to keep you safe from your stalker? You stupid nigger monkey hoe you dumb chicken slut”; “I’m going to fucking rape you and sever your head with a chainsaw”; “[r]ip your spine out with a chainsaw and then rape your bloody corpse”; and “[d]o you really think I’m done sexually assaulting you [M].” The defendant also sent what the state described as an “image of [a] woman with decapitated head . . . .” Finally, count nineteen identified the following sequence of text messages: “[J’s] going to rape you [M]”; “[J’s] going to rape you with a knife”; “[t]ake your fucking clothes off whore”; “SPREAD YOUR FUCKING LEGS”; “YOU HEAR ME BITCH? ILL FUCKING KILL YOU ILL RAPE YOUR FUCKING ASS”; “ILL RAPE YOU AND IMPREG- NATE YOU [M]”; “YOU WANT TO HAVE RAPE TRIPLETS? SHOW US YOUR FUCKING CUNT [M]”; “LET ME SUCK YOUR TITS”; and “SHOW YOUR FUCKING CUNT NOW SKANK.” We note that these text messages were sent in a group chat in which the defendant, M, J and B were included.  State v. Samuel F. Regarding the defendant’s conduct with respect to R in Chester, the state charged the defendant as fol- lows: In docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-1, the state charged the defendant with one count of harassment in the second degree by text message and one count of threatening in the first degree. Count twenty-one of the operative information charged that, “on divers dates between May 3, 2022, and May 27, 2022,” the defen- dant, “with the intent to harass, terrorize, and alarm [her] . . . communicated with [R] by text message in a manner likely to cause terror, intimidation, and alarm . . . .” Count twenty-four charged that, “on or about May 23, 2022,” the defendant, “with the intent to ter- rorize another person . . . threatened to commit any crime of violence and, in the commission of such offense, represented by his words that he possessed a firearm” when he sent a certain sequence of text messages to R.10 Following a jury trial held on several days in April and May 2024, the defendant was found guilty on all twenty- six counts. On August 5, 2024, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven years, and five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The defendant first claims that certain counts of the state’s operative information were barred by the 10 Specifically, count twenty-four of the operative information identi- fied the following sequence of text messages: “Fuck you bitch”; “I can do whatever I want nigger”; “[i]t’s a free country, unless your brother is beating you to death”; “I’m going to go on a shooting spree at [J’s home address] and [M’s home address]”; “[w]ith an [AR-15] [S]andy [H]ook style”; “I’m going to massacre everyone kill everything inside [J’s home address] and [M’s home address]”; “I’m going to shoot [J] in the head, shoot [B] in the head, shoot all their kids in the fucking face”; “[s]hoot [A] with an [AR-15]”; “[s]hoot [M] 20 times”; “I’m going to fire 300 rounds inside both their houses and kill everyone”; “I’m going to massacre everyone inside [J’s home address] and [M’s home address]”; and “[k]ill kill kill kill.” The defendant also sent what the state described  State v. Samuel F. applicable one year statute of limitations.11 Specifically, the defendant claims that counts one, two, three, five, eight, nine, ten, fourteen, fifteen, twenty-one, twenty- two and twenty-three violated the statute of limitations in that “[t]hey substantially broadened and amended the charges from the original warrant[s] by significantly extending the dates of the course of conduct . . . .” The defendant contends that the substantial broadening of the charges against him deprived him of notice of the offenses with which he was charged. We disagree. “The general rule is that the prosecution has broad authority to file an amended or substitute information prior to trial within the limitation period. . . . If the state files a substitute information after the limitation period has passed, the statute of limitations will remain satisfied with respect to substitute charges only if the substitute charges do not substantially broaden or amend the timely charges that initially satisfied the statute of limitations. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] adopted the federal rela- tion back approach, which requires a court to compare the timely charges that initially satisfied the statute of limitations to the substitute charges filed after the limi- tation period passed. . . . This approach . . . asks whether the substitute charges substantially broaden or amend the timely charges. . . . If the court determines that the substitute charges do not substantially broaden or amend the timely charges, the substitute charges relate back and inherit the timeliness of the original charges, meaning that the statute of limitations is satisfied with respect to the substitute charges as well. . . . as an “image of a video titled ‘Full video of Buffalo NY mass shooting’ ” and an “image of a rifle.” 11 All of the counts at issue charge the defendant with threatening in the second degree in violation of § 53a-62 or harassment in the second degree in violation of § 53a-183. Pursuant to § 54-193 (c), the charged violations of §§ 53a-62 and 53a-183 were subject to a one year statute of limitations because they were not punishable by a term of imprison- ment of more than one year. See General Statutes § 54-193 (c) and (d). The state does not dispute that the statute of limitations had expired with respect to these counts when it first filed an amended information on April 22, 2024.  State v. Samuel F. “Recognizing . . . that the principal purpose of the stat- ute of limitations is to ensure that a defendant receives notice, within a prescribed time, of the acts with which he is charged, so that he and his lawyers can assemble the relevant evidence [to prepare a defense] before documents are lost [and] memor[ies] fade, [our Supreme Court has] explained that substitute charges will relate back to the timely charges only if the facts underlying [the charges in the substitute information] . . . are substantially similar to the facts underlying [the charges in the] timely filed information . . . . [I]f the facts underlying the substi- tute charges are the same, or substantially similar, to the timely filed charges, the timely charges would have notified the defendant of the factual allegations against which he [would] be required to defend. . . . Consequently, there would be no broadening of the charges because the defendant would not be required to address any factual allegations beyond those alleged within the limitation period.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orane C., 350 Conn. 815, 822–24, 326 A.3d 545 (2024). The defendant concedes that he did not raise this claim at trial and seeks reversal pursuant to the plain error doctrine.12 See Practice Book § 60-5. “Although, ideally, the statute of limitations defense should be raised at trial, unless there is evidence that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived it, the failure to raise it at trial does not preclude an appellate court from considering whether reversal under the plain error doctrine is neces- sary.” State v. Daren Y., 350 Conn. 393, 412, 324 A.3d 734 (2024). “The plain error doctrine . . . is an extraordinary rem- edy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved, are of such monu- mental proportion that they threaten to erode our system 12 The state does not contend that the defendant knowingly and vol- untarily waived the statute of limitations. We do not presume that a defendant has waived a statute of limitations in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Daren Y., 350 Conn. 393, 412, 324 A.3d 734 (2024).  State v. Samuel F. of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party. [T]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. . . . This doctrine requires that we first consider whether the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . Second, we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust.” (Citations omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Id., 405–406. “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving both that it was an obvious error for the trial court to allow the state to proceed on the charges and that the error resulted in manifest injustice.” Id., 413. In order “[t]o show manifest injustice, the defendant must demonstrate that the error was of such monumen- tal proportion that it threatened to erode our system of justice . . . or that it resulted in harm so grievous that fundamental fairness requires a new trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Juan V., 191 Conn. App. 553, 574, 215 A.3d 1232 (2019). The defendant claims that counts one, two, three, five, eight, nine, ten, fourteen, fifteen, twenty-one, twenty- two, and twenty-three of the operative information vio- lated the statute of limitations because they substantially broadened the charges against him by “significantly extending the dates of the course of conduct . . . .”13 13 Specifically, the original information for docket number CR-22- 0242800-T charged the defendant with conduct occurring “[o]n or about” May 3, 2021, but count one of the operative information charged him with conduct occurring “on divers dates between May 2, 2021, and Sep- tember 30, 2021 . . . .” With respect to counts two, three, and five, the original information for docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T charged the defendant with conduct occurring “[o]n or about” December 14, 2021, but the operative information charged him with conduct occurring “on divers dates between October 1, 2021, and October 31, 2021,” “on or about October 31, 2021,” and “on divers dates between October 1, 2021, and December 13, 2021,” respectively. With respect to count eight, the original information for docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T charged the defendant with conduct occurring “on or about” January 2, 9 and 13, 2022, whereas the operative information charged him with conduct  State v. Samuel F. According to the defendant, he could not have received notice of these charges.14 In response, the state contends that “the information did not substantially broaden the charges because the defendant received notice that he would be responsible for defending against his con- duct toward the victims occurring between May 2021 occurring “on divers dates between January 2, 2022, and February 27, 2022 . . . .” With respect to counts nine, fourteen, and twenty-two, the original information for docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T charged the defendant with conduct occurring “[o]n or about” May 25, 2022, whereas the operative information charged him with conduct occurring “on divers dates between January 21, 2022, and February 27, 2022,” “on divers dates between March 4, 2022, and April 6, 2022,” and “on divers dates between May 4, 2022, and May 23, 2022,” respectively. With respect to count twenty-one, the original information for docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-1 charged the defendant with conduct occur- ring “[o]n or about” January 2022 to the “[p]resent day,” whereas the operative information charged him with conduct occurring “on divers dates between May 3, 2022, and May 27, 2022 . . . .” The police officer who signed the arrest warrant affidavit did so on May 25, 2022, which, according to the defendant, means that the “[p]resent day” designation indicates May 25, 2022. Finally, with respect to count twenty-three, the original information for docket number CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S charged the defendant with conduct on various dates between January 15 and May 27, 2022, whereas the operative information charged him with conduct “on divers dates between May 11, 2022, and May 25, 2022 . . . .” 14 The defendant also claims that counts five, nine, ten, fourteen, fif- teen, twenty-two, and twenty-three, which charged him with harassment in the second degree by telephone call, violate the statute of limitations because, “[e]ven though no subsection [of § 53a-183] is specified in the original information, the police did not describe any phone calls [in the arrest warrant affidavit] . . . showing that the [original] charges were for [§] 53a-183 (a) (1) (by text).” In so arguing, the defendant ignores the well settled principle that, “[i]n Connecticut, it is sufficient for the state to set out in the information the statutory name of the crime with which the defendant is charged, leaving to the defendant the burden of requesting a bill of particulars more precisely defining the manner in which the defendant committed the offense. . . . Stated differently, the defendant had to be prepared to defend against either or both subdivisions [of the statute at issue] until further clarification was obtained.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mosback, 159 Conn. App. 137, 156–57, 121 A.3d 759 (2015); see id., 157 (concluding that, where state did not specify subdivision of General Statutes § 14-227a (a) under which state would proceed with prosecution, defendant “was on notice that he was being charged with both statutory alternative theories available under that subsection”).  State v. Samuel F. [through] May 2022.” The state further argues that “the dates of conduct charged were not substantially broad- ened because the dates in the inform