State v. Hernandez Herrera

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Hernandez Herrera STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAYCOL F. HERNANDEZ HERRERA (AC 47891) Cradle, C. J., and Westbrook and Wilson, Js. Syllabus Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the second degree, and failure to appear in the first degree, the petitioner appealed to this court. During the trial, although a video recording and tran- script of the victim’s statement to the police were marked for identification only, they were included among the exhibits that were brought to the jury room prior to the jury beginning its deliberations. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements that he made to the police following his arrest because the detective who interrogated him repeatedly made misrepresenta- tions of fact that rendered his statements involuntary. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the defendant’s right to due process by denying his motion to suppress certain statements he made to the police, as this court, having reviewed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation, concluded that the factual mis- representations and other deceptive tactics used by one of the police officers during the defendant’s interview did not render his statements to the police involuntary and, thus, inadmissible as a matter of due process. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the two exhibits marked for identification only that were inadvertently submitted to the jury during its deliberations, as the court properly exer- cised its discretion in conducting an inquiry into the potential issue of juror misconduct pursuant to State v. Brown (235 Conn. 502), and the defendant failed to demonstrate that his right to an impartial jury was violated. Argued December 15, 2025—officially released June 16, 2026 Procedural History Amended information charging the defendant with the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the second degree, and failure to appear in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Richards, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Rich- ards, J.; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court, Richards, J., denied the defendant’s motions for  State v. Hernandez Herrera a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Nicholas Lee Scarlett, deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Corrandino, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Maycol F. Hernan- dez Herrera, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1) and unlawful restraint in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-96 (a).1 The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress statements that he made to the police following his arrest because the detective who interrogated him repeatedly made misrepresentations of fact that rendered his statements involuntary, and (2) denied his motion for a mistrial in which he argued that certain exhibits marked for identification only were inadvertently submitted to the jury during deliberations. We reject the defendant’s claims and affirm the judgment of the court. The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our review of the defendant’s claims. In 2019, when the assault at issue occurred, the defendant was twenty- two years old and lived and worked in Pennsylvania. Two weekends per month, he travelled to Connecticut to visit his two sons, who lived with their mother. When he visited, he stayed at his mother’s home in Bridgeport. His sister, M,2 also resided at the Bridgeport home. On 1 The defendant also was convicted of failure to appear in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172 (a) (1). The defendant does not contest this conviction on appeal. 2 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others  State v. Hernandez Herrera July 6, 2019, during one of the defendant’s visits, M asked the defendant to drive her to and from a friend’s fifteenth birthday party. The victim, K, who was a friend of M from high school, also attended the party. When the defendant went to the party to pick up M, he went inside, where he met K. The defendant asked K for her phone number, which she declined to give him, although M later gave K’s phone number to the defendant. The defendant gave M, K, and two others a ride home from the party. Over the next few days, the defendant sent text messages to K in which he asked her how old she was, called her beautiful, and told her, “I like you a lot [baby].” On July 13, 2019, M invited K to come over to her house. When K arrived at M’s house around 2 p.m., she and M first socialized in the living room. M later went to her bedroom and subsequently invited K to join her. When K entered the bedroom, she saw the defendant lying on the bed with M sitting next to him. After a few minutes, M asked K to sit on the bed between her and the defendant. Once K sat down on the bed, the defendant told M to leave. When M asked the defendant why, he told her to “get out.” M left the room and closed the bedroom door. Once M was gone, the defendant got on top of K. K attempted to get up but was unable to do so because the defendant was on top of her. The defendant also placed a hand over K’s mouth. The defendant moved K’s clothing aside and pulled his pants down. K told the defendant to stop, and he responded that “he was [going to] be the first and the last.” The defendant then put his penis inside K’s vagina. After the defendant got off K, she exited the bedroom and asked M to use the bathroom. In the bathroom, K observed that she was bleeding from her vagina and that there was blood on her underwear. After K exited the bathroom, M told her that she should leave the house because M’s mother would be home soon through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.  State v. Hernandez Herrera and “she would think ill of [K].” K left the house and called a taxi to drive her home. At home, K changed her clothes and put her under- wear in a bag to prevent her mother from finding the bloodstained underwear. A few hours later, K went to a pharmacy and purchased an emergency contraceptive to prevent any possibility of pregnancy. Sometime later, K washed the underwear she was wearing at the time of the assault. Because K was concerned about her family’s immigra- tion status and possible police involvement, she did not immediately disclose the assault to her family. The fol- lowing day, however, K told friends in Guatemala about the assault. In December 2019, during a meeting with a paralegal at an immigration law firm, K disclosed the assault and told the paralegal that the assailant was her friend’s brother. In January 2020, K also disclosed the assault to her high school therapist. The therapist called the police and K’s mother. Two police officers came to the school to speak with K and, thereafter, initiated a criminal investigation. In addition to providing the police with a formal statement, K brought the underwear that she had been wearing at the time of the assault to the police. The police took photographs but did not have the underwear forensically tested. In January 2021, the Bridgeport police arrested and charged the defendant with unlawfully restraining and sexually assaulting K and transported him to the Bridge- port police station. At the police station, the defendant read and signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights.3 Detective Walberto Cotto, Jr., then conducted a video recorded interview of the defendant. Although the defendant primarily spoke Spanish, Cotto questioned the defendant in English with another officer, Sergeant Gil Valentin, present during the interview to translate into Spanish any questions that the defendant did not understand. Initially, the defendant denied knowing 3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  State v. Hernandez Herrera K and indicated that he had seen her only briefly at his mother’s house on one occasion. Cotto showed the defen- dant a photo of the underwear K had been wearing on the day of the assault and indicated that the police would be able to determine from the underwear whether she had sexual intercourse. In fact, the police already had decided not to test the underwear because K had washed it. The defendant then admitted that he had been in M’s bedroom with M when she had called K to join them, but he claimed that he immediately left the bedroom when K entered. Cotto responded by falsely claiming that M had told the police that the defendant and K had been alone in the bedroom. The defendant then claimed that, when M left him and K alone in the bedroom, K had pushed him onto the bed and kissed him but “[n]othing happened.” After Cotto, again, falsely suggested that K’s underwear was being tested, the defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with K and having put his hand on her face. The defendant’s interview lasted for approximately fifty minutes. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel further argued that the defendant’s waiver and subsequent statements were the result of the coercive environment, which included Cotto and Valentin’s close proximity to him during his interview and the confusing nature of Cotto’s ques- tioning him in English. In a ruling from the bench, the trial court, Richards, J., denied the motion to suppress, finding that the state had met its burden of proving that the defendant had validly waived his Miranda rights. The court also rejected the defendant’s contention that he had been confused during the interrogation, finding that “[t]his confusion . . . is not reflected in the video.” In particular, the court found that Valentin had assisted Cotto during the interview “to avoid any misunderstand- ing on the part of [the defendant] regarding the waiver of his constitutional rights.” The video recording of the  State v. Hernandez Herrera defendant’s interview and an English transcription of the recording were later admitted as full exhibits at trial. K was called by the state to testify at trial. K’s prior consistent video recorded statement to the police and a transcript of that interview were premarked as exhibits 4A and 4B for identification purposes only. Although the video recording and transcript of K’s statement to the police were never admitted into evidence as full exhibits, they were included among the exhibits that were brought to the jury room prior to the jury beginning its deliberations at approximately 2 p.m. on December 14, 2023. The jury stopped deliberating for the day about 5 p.m. The jury resumed deliberations the following day at approximately 10 a.m. At 10:47 a.m., the jury sent a note to the court that asked whether it was “supposed to have [K’s] statement on 10/14/2020 (exhibit 4A) since [it] didn’t see this previously.” The court recalled the jury to the courtroom and instructed the jury that it should not have been provided with those exhibits and should not consider them in any way. After issuing its instruction, the court returned the jury to its delibera- tions. The court asked counsel if there was “[a]nything else” and whether there were “[a]ny exceptions.” Defense counsel responded “[n]o” to both questions. Following a recess, the court again recalled the jury to instruct it to send out a note answering the follow- ing questions: “Did you in any way consider or examine the contents of the aforementioned exhibits? If you did not, please note that in the note, sign it, and date it. If you did, please remember my instruction. And, I might have . . . some other questions for you if you did. But let’s see if you examined it. And I’d like to have that as a note so we can make it part of [the] court record.” The jury responded by note that “[w]e did not review either 4A or 4B—we were uncertain if we should have it from the get-go.” The court indicated on the record to counsel outside the presence of the jury that it was going to consider its inquiry and the jury’s response sufficient to comport with  State v. Hernandez Herrera any obligation the court had under State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995), to conduct an inquiry into potential juror misconduct. The court inquired of counsel: “Is there any issue regarding any other question- ing that either party wishes to ask of the jury. We can bring them out and you can do that.” Defense counsel responded: “No, Your Honor. I think the analysis that we’ve undergone is sufficient.” The state agreed, and the court called the jury into the courtroom to inform the jurors that they had answered the court’s question and could continue with their deliberations. After the jury exited, the court asked counsel if there was “[a]nything else,” to which defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” The court took a recess. Following the recess, however, defense counsel made an oral motion for a mistrial, arguing that the jurors must have looked at the exhibits in question because they were able to identify them as having been improperly presented to them. Counsel argued that, notwithstand- ing the jury’s response to the court’s questions, “the concern is . . . that it corrupted the jury and could affect the defendant’s ability to have a fair and impartial ver- dict in this case.” The state objected to the motion for mistrial. The court denied the motion in an oral ruling from the bench, concluding that a plain reading of the jury’s written response to the court’s inquiry indicated that it had not examined or considered exhibits 4A and 4B and that, therefore, its impartiality could not possibly have been affected.4 The next day, the court indicated that it wanted “to take the extra step of further questioning the jury 4 The court’s decision in full was as follows: “It’s axiomatic that juror misconduct, and that’s what we’re allegedly talking about here, occurs whenever, amongst other criteria, essential criteria, which is before us today, is that juror misconduct occurred because the jury may have been exposed to inadmissible evidence in the jury room by error. And I looked at State v. Johnson [288 Conn. 236, 951 A.2d 1257 (2008)] in this regard . . . . It’s axiomatic that the court must conduct an inquiry whenever it is presented with a misconduct allegation. Again, the court looked at State v. Brown, [supra, 235 Conn. 502]. Here, the court con- ducted an inquiry by calling the panel out, asking the jury foreperson  State v. Hernandez Herrera . . . whether anything regarding [exhibits 4A and 4B] or the process would affect their ability to be fair and impartial.” The court asked the jury to respond in a note to the court. The jury subsequently confirmed by a written note that the incident with the exhibits “did not create any biases on the jury.” Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty on all charges. The court accepted the verdict and later sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after fourteen years, followed by ten years of probation. This appeal followed. I The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process by deny- ing his motion to suppress his statements to the police because the police officers who conducted his interview lied to him with respect to statements purportedly made by M and about potentially incriminating evidence obtained from K’s underwear. The state responds that the defendant’s claim is unpreserved because he never raised these arguments in his motion to suppress, which was limited to whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The state argues that the to answer the question of the court by way of a note . . . whether they had in any way examined the contents of those exhibits. . . . The court recessed for a length of time. The jury knocked on the door, indicated that they had a note. The note, which was signed and dated . . . at 11:1[8] a.m. indicated we did not review either 4A or 4B, we were uncertain if we should have it from the get-go. So, it is obvious—I don’t know whether it’s obvious, but from, I think, a plain reading of the note is they didn’t review it. So, the next question of the court is that would it have affected your ability to be fair and impartial is somewhat moot because they didn’t review the information that the court would have to inquire about. So, in light of those factors, I don’t feel that there was grounds sufficient to grant the mistrial. I feel that the court conducted the inquir[y] under Brown and Johnson as required under Connecticut case law. The jury was questioned, I think, in a manner that it answered the court’s question in a concise manner. They had not examined any of the documents. They were bringing them to the court’s attention simply by noting that they did not know whether they had to have them or not. In light of those factors, your motion for mistrial is denied.”  State v. Hernandez Herrera trial court never made any factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the voluntariness of his state- ments to the police, and, therefore, we should decline to review his unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), because the record is inadequate for review. The state further argues that, even if the record is adequate for review, the defendant has not established a violation of his constitutional rights. Although we conclude that the record is adequate to review the defendant’s unpre- served claim and his claim is of constitutional magnitude, we agree with the state that, on the basis of that record, the defendant has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights with respect to the voluntariness of his statements to the police. We accordingly reject the defendant’s claim to the contrary. We begin with our standard of review and governing legal principles. “[T]he use of an involuntary confession in a criminal trial is a violation of due process. . . . [T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforce- ment officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self- determined . . . . The ultimate test remains . . . [i]s the confession the product of an essentially free and uncon- strained choice by its maker? If it is . . . it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. . . . The determination, by the trial court, whether a confession is voluntary must be grounded [in] a consideration of the circumstances surrounding it. . . . “Factors that may be taken into account, upon a proper factual showing, include: the youth of the accused; his lack of education; his intelligence; the lack of any advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation  State v. Hernandez Herrera of food and sleep. . . . Under the federal constitution, however, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary . . . . “It is well settled that [t]he state bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . [As for the scope of our review] we note the established rule that [t]he trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s interrogation and confession are findings of fact . . . which will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . “[A]lthough we give deference to the trial court con- cerning these subsidiary factual determinations, such deference is not proper concerning the ultimate legal determination of voluntariness. . . . Consistent with the well established approach taken by the United States Supreme Court, we review the voluntariness of a confes- sion independently, based on our own scrupulous exami- nation of the record. . . . [A]pplying the proper scope of review to the ultimate issue of voluntariness requires us . . . to conduct a plenary review of the record in order to make an independent determination of voluntariness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631, 667–69, 262 A.3d 44 (2021), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 873, 211 L. Ed. 2d 575 (2022).5 On several occasions, our Supreme Court has addressed how the use of so-called “false evidence ploys,” in which interrogators reference evidence that they do not have “to give the impression that their case against the defen- dant [is] stronger than it actually [is],” could impact the voluntariness of a confession. Id., 673–74. For example, in State v. Lapointe, 237 Conn. 694, 678 A.2d 942, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994, 117 S. Ct. 484, 136 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1996), our Supreme Court rejected a claim that a 5 As the defendant recognizes in his appellate brief, our Supreme Court in Griffin declined to set a higher standard under the Connecti- cut constitution regarding review of the voluntariness of a confession or incriminating statement to law enforcement. See State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 691.  State v. Hernandez Herrera defendant’s incriminating statement was rendered invol- untary because the police falsely represented to him that it found his fingerprints on the handle of the knife used to murder the victim. Id., 731–32. The court in Lapointe reasoned that “[s]uch statements by the police designed to lead a suspect to believe that the case against him is strong are common investigative techniques and would rarely, if ever, be sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will and to bring about a confession to a serious crime that is not freely self-determined . . . .” Id., 732. Our Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit this language from LaPointe in State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 631, explaining as follows: “Although we do not interpret Lapointe as suggesting that false evidence claims can never contribute to the involuntariness of a confession, we take this opportunity to emphasize that misrepresentations by interrogating officers about the strength of their case against a defendant can, under certain circumstances, add to the coercive nature of an interrogation. We decline at this time, however, to categorically condemn the use of such tactics or to adopt any bright-line rules as to their likely impact on the vol- untariness of a confession.” Id., 674. The court in Griffin indicated that “[t]he impact of false evidence ploys, if any, must . . . be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the presence or absence of other coercive circumstances and the personal characteristics of the defendant.”6 Id., 675. Turning to the defendant’s claim, we first address the issue of preservation raised by the state. It is axiomatic 6 Although not directly applicable to the defendant’s 2021 interroga- tion, we note that the legislature passed legislation, effective October 1, 2023, concerning law enforcement’s use of deception or coercive inter- rogation tactics. See Public Acts 2023, No. 23-27, § 1; see also General Statutes § 54-86q. Subsection (a) of § 54-86q defines what constitutes “ ‘deception or coercive tactics,’ ” and the statute imposes a rebuttable presumption that “any admission, confession or statement, whether written or oral, made by any person during a custodial interrogation by a law enforcement agency official or such official’s agent” is invol- untary and inadmissible in any proceeding if “deception or coercive tactics” were used during the interrogation. General Statutes § 54-86q  State v. Hernandez Herrera that an appellate court “shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised” before the trial court. Practice Book § 60-5; see also State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 443, 988 A.2d 167 (2009) (concluding that claim on appeal regarding motion to suppress was not preserved because claim was not distinctly raised in motion to suppress or during suppression hearing). “The requirement that the claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter, 198 Conn. 386, 396, 503 A.2d 576 (1986). In other words, it must “alert the trial court to the specific deficiency now claimed on appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Id. “Requiring a party to distinctly raise a claim of error before the trial court is no mere formality; rather, it ensures that the trial court is spe- cifically apprised of the alleged error and, thus, has an opportunity to respond accordingly.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Danielle P., 238 Conn. App. 73, 93–94, 335 A.3d 69 (2026). On the basis of our review of the motion to suppress and the arguments made to the court during the hear- ing on that motion, we agree with the state that the defendant failed to preserve his claim that Cotto’s use of false evidence ploys during his interrogation of the defendant was so egregious that, under the totality (c). Significantly, and consistent with Griffin, the use of false evidence ploys is not among the tactics deemed to be presumptively deceptive or coercive provided that the person subject to interrogation is, like the defendant in the present case, over the age of eighteen at the time of the interrogation. Subsection (b) of § 54-86q expands what constitutes “ ‘deception or coercive tactics’ ” if the person being interrogated is under eighteen years of age to include any tactic that “(1) Communicates false facts about evidence that were known to the law enforcement agency official or their agent or should have been known to the law enforcement agency official or their agent to be false; (2) Communicates false statements or misrepresentations of the law that were known or should have been known to be false statements or misrepresentations; or (3) Communicates false or misleading promises of leniency or some other benefit or reward that were known or should have been known to be false or misleading.”  State v. Hernandez Herrera of the circumstances, they contributed to an unfairly coercive interrogation that rendered the defendant’s inculpatory statements to the police involuntary. The written motion to suppress claimed that his statements to the police were “the fruits of an unlawful, warrantless search and/or seizure of the defendant’s person and/or effects”; “obtained . . . without knowing and intelli- gent waiver of [his Miranda] right[s]”; or “obtained through violation of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel . . . .” The written motion did not challenge the voluntariness of the defendant’s statements on the ground that they were the result of coercive or deceptive interrogation tactics. The court indicated in its decision on the motion to suppress that it understood the sole issue before it to be “whether the defendant waived his Miranda rights regarding his statement.” Defense counsel did ask questions during the suppression hearing relative to the atmosphere of the interrogation, including whether the close proxim- ity of the detectives to the defendant may have been intimidating, or whether language barriers may have resulted in confusion. Although defense counsel asked Cotto if it was a generally accepted police practice to give individuals subject to interrogation false information, counsel never established whether the defendant was provided with false information or argued that Cotto’s use of false information was a factor to be considered in evaluating the voluntariness of the defendant’s state- ments. In short, the defendant failed to preserve the precise, specific claim he now raises on appeal. To the extent that his claim is unpreserved, the defen- dant nevertheless seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. “Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following condi- tions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if  State v. Hernandez Herrera subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate [the] harmlessness of the alleged constitu- tional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two prongs govern whether we may review the claim, [whereas] the second two control whether the defendant may prevail on his claim because there was constitutional error that requires a new trial. . . . In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condi- tion is most relevant in the particular circumstances.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 354 Conn. 96, 104–105, 349 A.3d 260 (2026). We conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that Cotto’s use of deceptive tactics during the defendant’s interrogation, including misrepresenting certain facts, rendered his statements involuntary. Accordingly, his claim fails under the third prong of Golding.7 We conclude, consistent with the analysis set forth by the state in its appellate brief, that, in light of the 7 The state argues that the record is inadequate for review and that we should conclude that the defendant’s claim fails under the first prong of Golding. We agree with the state that the defendant’s failure to raise the precise arguments that he now raises on appeal necessarily affects the quality of the record available for review. For example, the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court “did not address whether the detectives’ lies affected the voluntariness of the confession,” did not acknowledge our Supreme Court’s discussion in Griffin regarding deceptive interrogation tactics, and did not evaluate several factors that our courts previously have deemed relevant to an inquiry about the voluntariness of a confession. Such lapses, however, are directly attributable to the fact that the arguments the defendant now raises on appeal were not made to the trial court. At trial, however, it was established that Cotto misrepresented certain facts to the defendant during the interrogation. See State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 742, 578 A.2d 1031 (1990) (in conducting review of decision on motion to suppress, appellate courts are not limited to evidence presented to trial court at suppression hearing). Moreover, the defendant’s interview was video recorded and transcribed, and both are part of the record on appeal. “The defendant bears the responsibility for providing a record that is adequate for review of his claim of constitutional error. If the facts revealed by the record are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to  State v. Hernandez Herrera totality of the circumstances, Cotto’s two factual mis- representations during the defendant’s interview with the police did not render his incriminating statements involuntary and, thus, inadmissible as a matter of due process. As previously stated, in considering whether a statement has been given voluntarily, it is appropriate to consider the totality of the circumstances involved including “the youth of the accused; his lack of education; his intelligence; the lack of any advice as to his consti- tutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food and sleep.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 668. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court expressly found that the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights consistent with Miranda and made a valid waiver of those rights prior to his questioning by the police. The defendant does not challenge those findings on appeal. “The provision of adequate Miranda warnings is significant in our analysis because it has a bearing on both sides of the voluntariness calculus: It bears on the coerciveness of the circumstances, for it reveals that the police were aware of the suspect’s rights and presumably prepared to honor them. And . . . it bears [on] the defendant’s susceptibility, for it shows that the defendant was aware he had a right not to talk to the police.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 671–72. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: “We do not suggest that compliance with Miranda con- clusively establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent whether a constitutional violation has occurred, we will not attempt to supplement or reconstruct the record, or to make factual determinations, in order to decide the defendant’s claim.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 240. Although it would have been less bur- densome for this court if the trial court had made relevant findings with respect to the precise issue before us, we nonetheless conclude that it is possible to evaluate on the existing record as a whole what potential effect, if any, Cotto’s misrepresentations and other tactics had on the defendant and whether those tactics reasonably could have overborn the defendant’s will.  State v. Hernandez Herrera confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984). Prior to his interview, the defendant in the present case was provided with a Miranda waiver form, he read his rights out loud, and he indicated that he understood those rights by writing his initial after each of his rights and signing the waiver forms. Next, the state argues that “the circumstances sur- rounding the police interview, including the length of the interview, the defendant’s demeanor during his interview, and the lucidity of his statements to the police further support that the defendant’s confession was vol- untary.” First, the interrogation lasted approximately fifty minutes, which is far shorter in length than inter- rogations that our Supreme Court previously has deter- mined were not inherently coercive in length. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 682 (collecting cases and holding that three hour interrogation at issue was “far shorter than other interrogations held not to have been inherently coercive”). Second, the trial court found, on the basis of its review of the video recorded interview, that “the defendant shows that he is lucid and not under the influence of any intoxicating substances when he asked [Cotto] at the end of the interview . . . the date of the interview and, after [Cotto] responds, the defendant writes down the correct date and time.”8 As our Supreme Court in Griffin reinforced, “[i]t is undisputed . . . that [a] defendant’s calm demeanor and the lucidity of his statements weigh in favor of finding his confession vol- untary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. 8 In its decision, the court expressly found that Cotto’s testimony at the suppression hearing was credible and supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court credited Cotto’s assessment that, at the time of the interview, the defendant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, his speech was clear and lucid, and his answers were related to Cotto’s questions.  State v. Hernandez Herrera Griffin, supra, 683. Our review of the video recording confirms that the defendant appeared lucid and main- tained a calm demeanor during his interview, and his answers related to the detective’s questions. Third, as the defendant concedes, no evidence was presented that the police subjected him to any physical punishment either before or during the interview. The only allegedly coercive behavior that the defendant articulated before the trial court was that Cotto and Valentin sometimes would invade his personal space by moving closer to him when he denied their allegations. On appeal, he argues that this close proximity made him “afraid that he might be beaten if he didn’t falsely admit guilt.” On the basis of its review of the video recording of the interrogation, however, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the detectives’ proxim- ity to hi