State v. Hernaiz

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Hernaiz STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ESTEBAN Q. HERNAIZ (AC 47830) Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js. Syllabus Convicted, after a jury trial, of unlawful restraint in the first degree and breach of the peace in the second degree as a result of his abuse and confine- ment of the victim in the car they occupied, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convic- tion of unlawful restraint because the victim was able to freely exit the car during the incident. Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, as the jury reasonably could have found that, following an argument, during which the defendant punched the victim, she crawled from the car’s front seat into the backseat against her will, where she was unable to leave because the child locks were engaged and the automatic windows could not be opened, and she feared being subjected to physical violence if she attempted to return to the front seat. This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that the defendant hit the victim with a baseball bat two months after the incident for which he was on trial, as the defendant abandoned his claim by failing to address whether the purported error was harmful, and his assertion that his briefing of the prejudicial effect of the uncharged misconduct evidence encompassed the issue of harm was unavailing, as the issues of harm and prejudice were distinct concepts that must be briefed separately, and the state’s briefing of the issue of harmfulness did not override the defendant’s abandonment of his claim. Argued May 26—officially released September 8, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of breach of the peace in the second degree and with one count each of the crimes of unlawful restraint in the first degree and assault in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, geographical area number nine, where the court, Leaming, J., granted in part the state’s motion to admit certain evidence; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Leaming, J.; verdict of guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree and  State v. Hernaiz one count of breach of the peace in the second degree; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Nicole P. Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Joy M. Drisdelle, special deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state’s attorney, and Jason Germain, supervisory assis- tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion MOLL, J. The defendant, Esteban Q. Hernaiz, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a) and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting uncharged mis- conduct evidence during trial.1 We affirm the judgment of conviction. The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In June 2021, the defendant and the victim2 entered into a romantic relationship, 1 We address the defendant’s claims in a different order than they are presented in his principal appellate brief. 2 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024), we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that per- son’s identity may be ascertained.  State v. Hernaiz during which they lived together in the defendant’s car, a Hyundai Sonata. The defendant physically abused the victim during the relationship, hitting her if she looked at other men or wore certain clothes. Additionally, the defendant constantly would keep the victim in his car, refuse to permit her to leave, and threaten to kill her while making her sit in the backseat with the child locks engaged and the automatic windows closed. In addi- tion, while the defendant and the victim were together around the time of September 22, 2021, the defendant threatened to shoot the victim, although she never saw him with a gun. In 2021, the victim had a history of drug use and was addicted to heroin, which the defendant would purchase and hold for her. When the victim experienced with- drawal symptoms, the defendant would give her heroin on some occasions and withhold it from her on other occasions. In addition, the victim was taking methadone to treat her heroin addiction; however, the defendant did not want the victim to use methadone and, in the days leading up to September 22, 2021, prevented her from accessing it. On September 22, 2021, the defendant drove the vic- tim, who was seated in the front passenger seat of the car, to a shopping plaza in Cromwell (plaza). During the drive, an argument arose that resulted in the defendant yelling at the victim and punching her in the head. When they arrived at the plaza, the victim crawled into the backseat, although she did not want to sit there. At that time, the child locks in the backseat were engaged and the windows, which the victim could not open, were closed, such that she could not exit the car directly from the backseat. While in the backseat, the victim requested that the defendant give her a cigarette and roll down her window to blow the cigarette smoke out of the car. The defendant acquiesced, giving the victim a cigarette and slightly roll- ing down her window. The victim then reached her arm out through the window opening, opened the door from  State v. Hernaiz the outside, exited the car, ran into a grocery store located in the plaza while screaming for help, and hid under a cash register. The defendant exited the car and chased after the victim; however, after the victim had entered the grocery store, the defendant ran back to the car and drove away at a high speed. Two bystanders witnessed the chase, one of whom called 911. Thereafter, police officers and medi- cal responders arrived at the scene, and the victim later was transported by ambulance to a hospital. While in the hospital, the victim missed the defendant and called him every day. With the victim’s consent, the defendant picked her up from the hospital at the end of her stay. The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged by way of a substitute long form information filed on July 25, 2023, with unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a), assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1), breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1), and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (2). The case was tried to a jury on August 7, 9 and 10, 2023. The state called several witnesses, including the victim; the trial court, Leam- ing, J., admitted multiple exhibits into evidence during the state’s case-in-chief. After the state had rested its case-in-chief, the defendant rested without putting on any evidence. On August 10, 2023, the jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1) but not guilty of assault in the third degree and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (2). On May 29, 2024, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of five years of incarceration, execution suspended after three years, fol- lowed by five years of probation with special conditions. This appeal followed. Additional procedural history will be set forth as necessary.  State v. Hernaiz I We first address the defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of unlaw- ful restraint in the first degree. This claim fails. We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles and standard of review. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether [on] the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reason- able doubt. . . . “We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumu- lative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . “Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi- tude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [jury] may draw whatever inferences  State v. Hernaiz from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . . “Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all pos- sible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty. . . . As we review the relevant evidence, we are mindful that [t]he jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before it and, in performing its function, the jury brings to bear its common sense and experience of the affairs of life. . . . It is often said that common sense is not left at the courthouse door.” (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Harvey, 239 Conn. App. 257, 274–75,___A.3d __ (2026), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 22, 2026) (No. 250479). Section 53a-95 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.” For purposes of § 53a-95, the term “[r]estrain” is defined by statute as follows: “ ‘Restrain’ means to restrict a per- son’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without con- sent. As used herein ‘without consent’ means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in  State v. Hernaiz the movement or confinement.” General Statutes § 53a- 91 (1). The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. On August 9, 2023, after the state had rested its case-in-chief, the defendant orally moved for a judgment of acquittal. With respect to the unlawful restraint in the first degree charge, the defendant argued that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had restrained the victim on September 22, 2021. Following argument, the court orally denied the motion, determining in rel- evant part that the victim’s testimony sufficiently estab- lished that the defendant had restrained her. On August 14, 2023, the defendant filed a postverdict motion for a judgment of acquittal. On May 29, 2024, before sentencing the defendant, the court heard argu- ment on the motion. The defendant argued in relevant part that the victim’s testimony did not establish that he had restrained her on September 22, 2021. Following argument, the court orally denied the motion, determin- ing in relevant part that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant had restrained the victim. On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insuf- ficient evidence to support his conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree because the evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had restrained the victim on September 22, 2021. The defendant maintains that the state failed to introduce evidence establishing that, while the victim was in the backseat of the car, he blocked her from accessing the front seat and exiting the car freely. As the defendant summarizes, “[b]ecause [the victim] had reasonable access to the front seat of the car, where there were no child locks, she was not restrained to the backseat of the car.” We do not agree. We pause at this juncture to recite in relevant part the trial court’s instruction to the jury on the charge of  State v. Hernaiz unlawful restraint in the first degree. “The defendant is charged in count one with unlawful restraint in the first degree. This statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows: A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury. For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: “Element one, intent to restrain. The first element is that the defendant specifically intended to restrain the [victim]. A person acts ‘intentionally’ with respect to a result when his conscious objective is to cause such result. . . . “Element two, restrained another person. The second element is that the defendant restrained [the victim] by moving her from one place to another, or by confin- ing her in some place in such a manner as to interfere substantially with her liberty. There is no requirement that the movement be of any specific distance or that the confinement lasts any specific period of time. There need not be any movement at all—the person could be confined by preventing her from leaving a place where she was. “Element three, without consent. The third element is that [the victim] did not consent to the restraint. Con- sent must have been actual and not simply acquiescence brought about by force, fear, shock, or deception. The act must have been voluntary—it must have been truly voluntary. Consent may be expressed, or you may find that it is implied from the circumstances that you find existed. Whether there was consent is a question of fact for you to determine. The defendant has no burden to prove consent. The state must prove the lack of consent. “Element four, risk of injury. The fourth element is that the restraint exposed [the victim] to a substantial risk of physical injury. ‘Physical injury’ is defined as ‘impair- ment of physical condition or pain.’ A ‘substantial’ risk  State v. Hernaiz of physical injury means considerable risk of physical injury. Actual injury need not be proven. “In summary, the state must prove beyond a reason- able doubt that the defendant [1] specifically intended to restrain the [victim], [2] the defendant restrained her by confining her in some place in such a manner as to interfere substantially with her liberty, [3] without her consent, and [4] under circumstances that exposed her to a substantial risk of physical injury. “If you unanimously find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of unlawful restraint in the first degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant not guilty.” (Emphasis added.) As stated previously, the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is limited to the second element, i.e., the restraint element.3 See General Statutes § 53a-95 (a). Thus, returning to the question before us, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had restrained the victim on September 22, 2021. The victim testified that, following an argument during which the defendant yelled at her and punched her in the head,4 3 To the extent the defendant tangentially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the third element (i.e., the “without consent” ele- ment), we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found, consistent with the court’s charge, that the victim did not consent to the restraint. That is, insofar as the defendant argues that, “[c]onsidering that [the victim] crawled into the backseat, she could have crawled back into the front seat where there were no child locks,” we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found that the victim (1) crawled to the backseat as she was conditioned to do when the defendant was angry and would threaten to kill her, and (2) feared additional physical violence if she returned to the front seat. 4 Mindful that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we note that the jury’s verdict finding the defendant not guilty of assault in the third degree and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (2) does not signify  State v. Hernaiz she (1) crawled into the backseat of the defendant’s car on September 22, 2021, although she did not want to be seated there,5 (2) could not exit the car directly from the backseat because the child locks were engaged and the automatic windows, which she could not open, were closed, (3) exited the car only after the defendant had rolled down her window slightly while she was smoking a cigarette, which enabled her to reach her arm out through the window opening and open the door from the outside, and (4) ran into a grocery store while calling for help, with the defendant chasing her, and hid under a cash that the jury necessarily found that the defendant did not punch the victim during the drive to the plaza. See State v. Higgins, 74 Conn. App. 473, 484, 811 A.2d 765 (jury’s verdict finding defendant not guilty of substantive charges relating to his alleged sexual molestation of victim “[did] not dictate a conclusion that the jury necessarily found that no such conduct occurred, nor [did] it foreclose consideration of it in weighing guilt on [a tampering with a witness] charge”), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 950, 817 A.2d 110 (2003). Section 53a-61 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person . . . .” Section 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creat- ing a risk thereof, such person . . . (2) assaults or strikes another . . . .” In the present case, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant punched the victim but that, nevertheless, the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of assault in the third degree and breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (2). 5 The state elicited the following testimony from the victim during trial: “Q. Now, did you want to be locked up in the backseat— “A. No. “Q. —of that car? “A. No. *** “Q. . . . Now, around—on the night of September 22, 2021, when you were in the backseat, did you want to go into the backseat? “A. No. “Q. Were you able to get out of the backseat before— “A. No. “Q. —[the defendant] lowered the window? “A. No. “Q. Were you able to lower the windows on your own? “A. No.”  State v. Hernaiz register. The state also elicited testimony from Michael DePaolo, a firefighter emergency medical technician, and John Carlson, a police officer, both of whom spoke with the victim following the incident on September 22, 2021. Consistent with the victim’s testimony, DePaolo and Carlson testified that the victim recounted to them that she could not exit the car directly from the back- seat with the child locks engaged but that she managed to open the door by reaching her arm out through the window opening after the defendant6 had rolled it down while she was smoking a cigarette. Also consistent with the victim’s testimony, Carlson testified that the victim told him that the defendant had punched her during the drive to the plaza.7 Additionally, the state offered, and the court admitted, certain medical records of the victim, which included notes detailing the incident on September 22, 2021, as described by the victim. The details of the incident on September 22, 2021, set forth in the medi- cal records were consistent with the victim’s testimony regarding her method of escaping from the car. DePaolo and Carlson further testified as to their obser- vations of the victim’s demeanor following the incident on September 22, 2021. DePaolo testified that the victim appeared withdrawn and frightened, and, while being transported to the hospital, she feared that the defendant was following the ambulance. Carlson testified that, upon encountering her inside the grocery store, the victim was crying, screaming, and making comments that she believed that the defendant was going to kill her. In addition, the state elicited testimony from Olga Fon- seca and Melissa Thomas, two bystanders who witnessed the victim run into the grocery store with the defendant chasing her. Fonseca and Thomas both testified that the 6 Carlson testified that the victim identified the defendant to him, whereas DePaolo testified that the victim referred to her “boyfriend” but never identified him. 7 DePaolo testified, and a Cromwell Fire Department report admitted into evidence reflected, that the victim told DePaolo that the defendant had struck her in the head; however, neither DePaolo’s testimony nor the report specified when that occurred.  State v. Hernaiz victim looked frightened and was calling for help. With respect to the defendant, Fonseca testified that he was chasing the victim as if he “really wanted to get her,” and Thomas testified that he was “running aggressively towards [the victim] to try to bring [her] back to the car.” In addition, Fonseca and Thomas both observed the defendant run back to his car after the victim had entered the grocery store and drive away at a high speed. As to the defendant’s contention that he did not restrain the victim because she had “reasonable access” to the front seat of the car, we are unpersuaded. Initially, we note that, during closing argument, the state posited to the jury that the evidence demonstrated that the defen- dant wanted to exercise, and succeeded in exercising, control over the victim. During trial, the state called as an expert witness Josephine Nol, a consultant to clinical social workers and, formerly, an adjunct professor and a psychotherapist with a Ph.D. in clinical social work and a master’s degree in neuroscience, among other degrees. Nol provided testimony about battered woman syndrome, which includes as a component the abuser exercising control over the battered woman.8 See State 8 Nol testified in relevant part that battered woman syndrome “really refers to the fact that there are situations between what we call intimate partner violence, basically, between often and a man and a woman. . . . And the syndrome involves women being abused in a particular way that is—it’s been observed that there’s a pattern to how it happens and how it unfolds over time, and that women who are caught up in this syn- drome often tend to stay and tend to be abused in gradually increasing more lethal ways over time . . . there’s two conditions, actually. One, is that sometimes the violence happens right away and it’s pretty severe right away, and other times there’s a gradual increasing intensity of violence that can start out pretty innocently at first, or what looks pretty innocent, and the perpetrator or the abuser can, at first, begin to do things to limit the woman’s access to other people. He may try to isolate her from her family, her friends, he may try to humiliate her and [use] verbal abuse to, sort of, chip away at her self-esteem. He may try to control the money in the situation. If she works, he may demand that she come home right after work, that she not have any outside interests. So, it can be really gradual and can look really subtle and, as it proceeds, her self-esteem plummets. She has a harder and harder time advocating for herself and the underlying message from him often is that, somehow, she’s responsible for his unhappiness; that she’s not  State v. Hernaiz v. Yusuf, 70 Conn. App. 594, 613, 800 A.2d 590 (“Our Supreme Court has held that expert testimony concern- ing battered woman syndrome is relevant ‘to describe the behavior patterns typically ascribed to battered [woman] syndrome.’ State v. Borrelli, 227 Conn. 153, 174, 629 doing it right; she’s not being the kind of spouse that he needs. And so, then he may escalate the punishment, if you will, for her not being the way he wants her to be. He becomes possessive; he becomes jealous; he wants to get more—he becomes increasingly controlling. And the whole time that this is happening, she’s feeling responsible. She is buying his story that she’s responsible for his unhappiness. And so, then you get into a really well defined cycle . . . . “[O]nce there is violence in the relationship, once that has begun, then there’s a cycle through which the violence occurs. There’s the first sort of tension building cycle, or part of the cycle, where there isn’t neces- sarily any violence. There is, you know, there may be still the verbal intimidation and the humiliation, but the tension builds. Both partners can feel that this tension is building and then at some point [the abuser’s] frustration bubbles over and he attacks [the battered woman], beats her up, does any number of terrible things to her. And then after that, the violence subsides because his frustration has been vented and he may feel remorse or he may act remorseful and he may apologize to her, he may promise that it’ll never happen again; it’s [called] the honeymoon period. And he may buy her flowers, he [may] promise to do better and, so, then she thinks to herself, well, he really does love me, and she buys his promises for a long time that it’s not going to happen again. And then the tension begins to build again. . . . “[T]he violence tends to escalate because you have to know that it doesn’t solve the problem for [the abuser]. He gets temporary relief through the violence outbursts, but whatever he’s struggling with, it doesn’t fix it. So, it goes again and again and, if [the battered woman] makes any attempt to leave, that only frustrates him more and he gets more angry. . . . “[W]hen [the battered woman is] frightened enough, terrified enough, to leave, the adrenaline is high, the fear is front and center, and she gets out of there, hopefully, she gets out of there. It’s also—she’s at high risk for [the abuser] killing her at that point. That’s one of the times that women are most at risk for being killed, is when they try to escape. And then, once she gets far enough away from the incident and she gets help maybe or she gets offered some safety, the adrenaline slows down and the guilt kicks in, right? And he often will make contact with her. If he’s been arrested or restrained for a while or something, he may eventually make contact with her and then he’ll start in on her to convince her that this is a terrible thing for both of us, you know, look what you’re doing to me, look what you’re going to do to my life, they’re out to get us, and then he kind of makes it into a we-ness, right? Instead of you and me against each other, it’s you and me against those  State v. Hernaiz A.2d 1105 (1993).”), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 921, 806 A.2d 1064 (2002). The state presented Nol with the following hypo- thetical: “You have an individual that’s dating another individual. It starts off as a friendly, kind of neigh- borly relationship, becomes romantic. They start living together; they start living together in a car, and the person that is the abused complainant is addicted to heroin. . . . That relationship escalates, and it becomes romantic, and they start living [in] a car. Assuming further that when they’re living in the car that individual, the abuser, becomes jealous, becomes very controlling, controls the abused person’s ability to get drugs, get their methadone, and, basically, controls that person in the car, and when he gets jealous or he controls that situation, she tries to get out, that individual punches—and it is backed up by medical documentation—that she’s punched in the head, scratches on her chest, bruising on her arms. When she escapes [from] the car runs away and calls 911, she is subsequently treated for those injuries and then, when she’s treated for those injuries, she starts feeling remorse; she blames herself. She goes to the hospital, they treat her, and she starts calling that abus[ive] person. . . . And [she] tries to get back with him. And this is on a number of occasions that this happens, and when she calls that person back, he actually gets back together with her.” When asked whether that hypothetical was “consistent with the battered [woman] syndrome or a battered woman,” Nol responded: “Actually, that fits it to a T.” The victim testified that (1) the defendant purchased and held heroin for her, and, when she experienced with- drawal symptoms, he would provide her with heroin on some occasions and withhold it from her on other occasions, (2) the defendant did not want her taking people and, so, we need to make sure that they don’t break us up. And so, she’s often convinced by that argument and may recant at that point.”  State v. Hernaiz methadone for her heroin addiction, and she was not on methadone on September 22, 2021,9 (3) the defendant did not allow her to use a bathroom on September 22, 2021,10 (4) the defendant was physically violent toward her during their relationship, (5) the defendant threat- ened to kill her while ordering her to sit in the backseat on past occasions, (6) the defendant threatened to shoot her around the time of September 22, 2021, although she never saw him with a gun, (7) the defendant would order her to sit in the backseat when he was angry with her, and (8) she crawled into the backseat on September 22, 2021, following an argument during which the defen- dant yelled at her and punched her, although she did not want to sit there. In light of the foregoing testimony, as contextualized by the expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the victim (1) went into the backseat on September 22, 2021, against her will; see footnote 3 of this opinion; and (2) faced a threat that she would be subjected to physical violence if she attempted to return to the front seat, thereby foreclosing that route as a reasonable means of egress. In sum, construing the evidence in the light most favor- able to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant restrained the victim on September 22, 2021. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim challeng- ing the sufficiency of the evidence vis-à-vis his unlawful restraint in the first degree conviction fails. 9 Carlson testified that the victim told him that the defendant was refusing to allow her to take methadone or to bring her to her methadone appointments. DePaolo testified that the victim told him that, in the days preceding September 22, 2021, the defendant had been withhold- ing Suboxone from her, which DePaolo understood to be another name for methadone. The Cromwell Fire Department report and the victim’s medical records in evidence also set forth statements by the victim indi- cating that the defendant had prevented her from accessing methadone. 10 The state elicited the following testimony from the victim during trial: “Q. Was [the defendant] allowing you to go to the bathroom on [Sep- tember 22, 2021]? “A. No.”  State v. Hernaiz II The defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting uncharged misconduct evi- dence during trial. In addition to addressing the merits of this claim, the state argues that we should decline to review it because the defendant, in his principal appel- late brief, failed to address whether the purported evi- dentiary error was harmful, and, therefore, the claim is inadequately briefed. We conclude that the defendant’s claim is inadequately briefed, and, therefore, we deem it to be abandoned and decline to review it. We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal principles. “Evidence of a defendant’s uncharged miscon- duct is inadmissible to prove that the defendant commit- ted the charged crime or to show the predisposition of the defendant to commit the charged crime. . . . Exceptions to this rule have been recognized, however, to render mis- conduct evidence admissible if, for example, the evidence is offered to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity or the elements of a crime. . . . To determine whether evidence of prior misconduct falls within an exception to the general rule prohibiting its admission, we have adopted a two-pronged analysis. . . . First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. Second, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect of the other crime evidence. . . . “Our Supreme Court has identified four factors rel- evant to determining whether the admission of otherwise probative evidence is unduly prejudicial. These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the [jurors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) where the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the defendant, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to  State v. Hernaiz meet it.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 815–16, 162 A.3d 63, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905, 170 A.3d 2 (2017). The following additional procedural history is relevant to our discussion of the defendant’s claim. On June 23, 2023, the state filed a motion to introduce uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to § 4-5 of the Connecti- cut Code of Evidence.11 The state sought to introduce evidence of an incident that had occurred on November 8, 2021 (November 8, 2021 incident), during which, as the state detailed, (1) the victim ran into a gas station in Meriden and tried to hide behind a counter, and (2) the defendant ran into the gas station after the victim, grabbed her by her hair as he attempted to pull her from behind the counter, and hit her with a baseball bat. On July 17, 2023, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of, inter alia, the November 8, 2021 incident, and on July 19, 2023, he filed an objection to the state’s motion. On July 25, 2023, the court determined that (1) evidence of the November 8, 2021 incident was relevant to prove the defendant’s intent and motive, as well as to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony, and (2) certain video surveillance footage offered by the state that depicted the defendant hitting the victim with the baseball bat was more prejudicial than probative; however, the court ruled that edited footage omitting the defendant’s attack with the baseball bat