State v. Clarke

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Clarke STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VERROL CLARKE (AC 47935) Moll, Suarez and Clark, Js.* Syllabus Convicted of assault in the second degree in violation of statute (§ 53a-60 (a) (1)) after an altercation with the victim in a supermarket’s bottle return room, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Held: The evidence was sufficient to establish, as required for a conviction pur- suant to § 53a-60 (a) (1), that the defendant acted with the specific intent to inflict serious physical injury on the victim and that the victim had sustained a serious physical injury, as the jury reasonably could have relied on the supermarket’s video surveillance footage that showed the defendant punching and kicking the victim in the head, and the victim’s testimony and that of two physicians, M and S, who determined that the victim had lost consciousness during the incident. The prosecutor’s repeated use of the term “assault” during the trial and closing argument to the jury did not improperly deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial, as the defendant never objected to the use of that term, the trial court gave the jury detailed instructions on the elements of the charged crime, and the prosecutor used the term pursuant to its commonly understood meaning when questioning M and S about the victim’s injury, in responding to the defendant’s claimed lack of specific intent to cause the victim’s injury and in inviting the jury to find the defen- dant guilty on the basis of the evidence, and, even it were assumed that the prosecutor’s conduct was improper, many of her remarks were invited by the defense, the defendant did not request curative instructions to the jury, the court twice instructed the jurors that they were the sole judges of the facts, and the state presented overwhelming evidence, including the video surveillance footage, that corroborated the victim’s testimony and that of M and S that he had suffered a loss of consciousness during the encounter. The prosecutor’s argument that the jury should credit M’s testimony about the victim’s injuries as opposed to that of S was grounded in the evidence and did not constitute improper vouching for M’s credibility, as the jury reasonably could have inferred from M’s testimony that, as a neurosurgeon, he had specialized knowledge of the brain, the prosecutor’s remark that S was unable to answer certain questions during the trial was not improper comment on S’s credibility but an invitation to the jury to infer that M was more credible than S, and the prosecutor’s comment, “thank God” for M, was in response to defense counsel’s assertion that M did not treat the victim. Argued February 11—officially released October 27, 2026 * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  State v. Clarke Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of assault in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport and tried to the jury before McShane, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Connor R. Reed, special deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney, and Candace C. Solis, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Verrol Clarke, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a second jury trial,1 of one count of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1).2 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insuffi- cient to convict him of assault in the second degree, and (2) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, which reasonably could have been found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On the morning of Septem- ber 2, 2020, at approximately 9 a.m., the defendant and the victim were at a Stop & Shop supermarket in Bridge- port returning bottles in the supermarket’s bottle room. The victim, who was seventy-four years old at the time of the incident,3 approached the bottle room, dropped two garbage bags outside of the bottle room entrance, 1 The defendant’s first trial resulted in a hung jury, and the trial court declared a mistrial. 2 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person . . . .” 3 As the state noted in its brief to this court, the victim testified that he was seventy-five years old at the time of the incident; however, his  State v. Clarke and walked away. The defendant then entered the bottle room and began to return bottles. Approximately one minute later, the victim entered the bottle room and encountered the defendant. An exchange occurred between the defendant and the victim, during which the defendant gestured for the victim to leave the bottle room and informed the victim that he was required to wear a mask in accordance with the restrictions in place at Stop & Shop at that time due to the COVID-19 pandemic.4 The victim, who is not a native English speaker, left the bottle room, called his daughter, and asked her to bring him a mask. Approximately three minutes later, the victim returned to the bottle room wearing a mask. Another confronta- tion ensued between the defendant and the victim, dur- ing which time the defendant again began to point and gesture for the victim to leave the bottle room. When the victim did not leave the bottle room, the defendant punched the victim in the head while the victim’s head was turned away from him, causing the victim to fall to the ground. The victim rose to his knees but, less than one minute later, the defendant lowered his face mask and then kicked the victim in the head, causing him to fall to the ground again and lose consciousness. The defendant then continued to return bottles while the victim was lying on the ground. At approximately 9:06 a.m., the victim stood up, briefly left the bottle room, then returned to retrieve his glasses, which had fallen off during the incident. The victim could not remember the events that had transpired after he called his daughter to bring him a mask, but he realized that he was injured and could not drive. He then called his daughter again to pick him up from Stop & Shop. The victim’s daughter arrived shortly thereafter medical records from the date of the incident, which were admitted into evidence, indicate that he was seventy-four years old. 4 Stop & Shop posted a sign outside of the bottle room, stating: “ATTENTION CUSTOMERS: 1 PERSON AT A TIME IN THE BOTTLE ROOM. 2 BAGS TOTAL.”  State v. Clarke and found the victim leaning on his car in the parking lot with his hand on his head. She observed a visible bump on the left side of the victim’s forehead and took the victim directly to St. Vincent’s Medical Center in Bridgeport. The police responded to a call concerning the incident and eventually obtained video surveillance footage from Stop & Shop that captured the incident. At the hospital, the victim reported that he had fallen about thirty minutes previously in a supermarket, strik- ing the left side of his head. The victim noted that he did not remember the incident, and a large hematoma was observed on the left side of his forehead. He was hyper- tensive and was noted to have a history of hypertension. A computerized tomography (CT) scan of the victim’s brain revealed swelling around the left frontal region but no acute intracranial abnormalities. The emergency department physician who treated the victim on the date of the incident, William Sacks, diagnosed the victim with syncope,5 and the victim was discharged that same day. After the victim was discharged from the hospital, he slept and later awoke with intense pain in his head. Over the following days, the victim was unusually sleepy and developed a black eye, issues with his balance, and severe headaches.6 As a result, on September 5, 2020, the victim returned to St. Vincent’s Medical Center, where he was admitted until September 8, 2020. The victim reported disorientation and constant headaches, and his medical records from his second hospital stay revealed that he reported a “possible fall [versus] got hit.” The victim also reported symptoms of nausea, dizziness, photophobia, trouble finding words, and confusion. He had another brain CT scan, which showed an acute right occipital hem- orrhage, or brain bleed. The victim was seen by Abraham 5 Abraham Mintz, a neurosurgeon, testified that “[s]yncope basically means passing out, somebody who passes out for no [reason]. Or, I mean, there is always a reason why somebody passes out, but it’s atraumatic. It means that you pass out without trauma to the head.” 6 Photographs of the victim depicting injuries on the left side of his head and eye were admitted into evidence.  State v. Clarke Mintz, a neurosurgeon, who diagnosed the victim with a brain bleed and admitted him to the intensive care unit. After being discharged, the victim, who worked as a house painter, was out of work for nearly four months, and his daughter had to care for him, which she did not do prior to the incident. After he returned to work, the victim could perform only small jobs and could no longer complete painting jobs that required the use of exten- sion ladders because of ongoing dizziness. Prior to the incident, the victim also went for walks and drove, but as of the time of trial, the victim was no longer driving and could walk only short distances. The victim also had problems with his hearing after the incident. The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2).7 As stated previously in this opinion, the defen- dant’s first trial resulted in a hung jury, and the court declared a mistrial. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The state’s attorney’s office elected to prosecute the defen- dant a second time and filed the operative substitute information charging the defendant with assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (1) in April 2024. The defendant elected to be tried by a jury, which heard evidence over four days from April 30 to May 3, 2024. At trial, the state presented testimony from several witnesses, including, inter alia, the victim, the victim’s daughter, employees from Stop & Shop, Mintz, and the investigating police officers. On the first day of trial, Officer Keith Porter of the Bridgeport Police Department testified that he received a call concerning the incident and went to the victim’s residence to investigate. Por- ter did not speak with the victim, but he interviewed members of the victim’s family, who did not know what 7 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when . . . (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm . . . .”  State v. Clarke had occurred because the victim could not remember the incident. Porter was not initially able to obtain video sur- veillance footage from Stop & Shop, but Detective Ken- neth C. McKenna eventually obtained the surveillance footage on September 24, 2020. As noted previously, the surveillance footage was admitted into evidence and depicts the events leading up to, including, and after the incident.8 The next day, the state offered testimony from Marcella Robbins, a cashier at Stop & Shop, who testified that the defendant was a regular customer at the Bridgeport location. During Robbins’ testimony, she was shown portions of the video surveillance footage depicting herself and the defendant, who was standing in a cashier’s line approximately thirty minutes after the incident. Robbins testified that, at that time, COVID-19 masking restrictions were in place, and she confirmed that the defendant’s mask was lowered below his chin in the footage she was shown. See footnote 10 of this opinion. The state also presented testimony from Mintz con- cerning the victim’s injuries. Mintz testified that he participated in the victim’s care as a consultant during his second hospital stay and was asked to give an opinion on his condition. Mintz testified that the victim’s medi- cal records from September 2, 2020, indicated that the victim did not remember the incident. Mintz testified 8 Michael Peslak, an asset protection employee with Stop & Shop, testi- fied that he retrieved the video surveillance footage at the request of the police. Thereafter, Steven Kline, the owner of a digital media forensics company, was hired to analyze and enhance the raw surveillance foot- age. Kline enhanced the video footage by, inter alia, adjusting the low lighting shown in the surveillance footage to allow for more contrast between different objects shown in the video. Kline created a compila- tion video of the enhanced footage, which was admitted into evidence. Kline testified that the raw surveillance footage had a “low frame rate” and, together with the “high velocity” nature of the incident, it was difficult to see the exact moments when the defendant punched and kicked the victim. Kline therefore created a “frame by frame” document containing still frames extracted from the raw surveillance footage to demonstrate the incident to the jury more clearly; this document was also admitted into evidence. The raw video surveillance footage was also admitted into evidence.  State v. Clarke that the victim had lost consciousness and that a loss of consciousness constitutes an impairment of the brain. Mintz also stated that it would not be unusual for a patient sixty-five years or older to have higher blood pressure following an “assaultive type of head injury” because of a stress response. Mintz testified that he could not say whether the brain bleed was causally related to trauma from the alleged assault, but he also could not definitively conclude that it was not related. After the prosecutor rested the state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel made an oral motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. Thereafter, the defense presented testimony from Sacks, who treated the patient on September 2, 2020. Like Mintz, Sacks testified that the victim reported that he had fallen and that the victim did not tell Sacks that he had been assaulted. Sacks testi- fied that the victim’s initial head CT scan showed swelling on the outside of the skull but no internal hemorrhage. Sacks testified that he had diagnosed the victim with syncope; see footnote 5 of this opinion; or atraumatic loss of consciousness, but acknowledged that, at the time he was treating the victim, the cause of the victim’s loss of consciousness was unknown. Sacks further testified concerning the victim’s brain bleed that it is possible to have delayed bleeding that is related to an initial head trauma. He opined, however, that he believed it was more likely that the victim’s brain bleed was caused by hypertension, rather than by trauma. He also testified that he did not believe the victim’s injuries constituted a loss or impairment of a function of a bodily organ. The defendant also testified on his own behalf. He testi- fied that he regularly frequented Stop & Shop to return bottles and cans because he needed money to buy food. He acknowledged that he was depicted in photographs that were extracted from the video surveillance footage and in the footage itself. The defendant stated, however, that he did not intend to hurt anyone. He stated that he believed the victim was “too close” to him, given the COVID-19 restrictions that were in place at that time,  State v. Clarke that the victim had not been wearing a mask, and that only one person at a time was supposed to be in the bottle room. He also testified that his behavior was a “reaction to being violated and put at risk of [COVID-19]” and that the victim’s presence in the room felt threatening to him. Concerning the video surveillance footage, the defen- dant testified that he believed the footage had been tampered with. The defendant acknowledged that the surveillance footage depicted what “kind of looks like a punch. You see, we don’t know exactly. The picture is not clear. The evidence has been tampered with . . . .” He testified that he “pushed [the victim] away. He backed up on the wall, slid down. Real funny guy. Slid down, I stood there like this, and then I gave him a little slap out of the way, a kick like that.” Finally, the defendant testified that “[t]here was nothing stopping [him] from hurting [the victim] if [he] really wanted to. . . . With only me and him in there, if I really wanted to hurt the guy, I could’ve shown what real intent would be. It would have been repeated blows, a more definite trying to hurt the guy. But that’s not what we’re dealing with here.” After the defense rested, defense counsel renewed the defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The jury found the defendant guilty of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (1). On July 9, 2024, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after sixty-four months, followed by five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I We first address the defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault in the second degree.9 Specifically, he argues, inter alia, that 9 We address the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim before we address his prosecutorial impropriety claim because, if he prevails on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction,  State v. Clarke there was insufficient evidence that (1) he intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim and that (2) the victim suffered a serious physical injury, as required for a conviction under § 53a-60 (a) (1). We disagree. We begin our analysis with well settled legal principles governing our review of evidentiary sufficiency claims, including our standard of review. “In reviewing the suf- ficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so con- strued and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . “[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumu- lative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . “[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a rea- sonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, the proper remedy is to reverse the trial court’s judgment and to direct the entry of a judgment of acquittal on remand. See State v. Turner, 181 Conn. App. 535, 544 n.11, 187 A.3d 454 (2018), aff’d, 334 Conn. 660, 224 A.3d 129 (2020).  State v. Clarke whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict of guilty. . . . “Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evi- dence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substan- tial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ragalis, 235 Conn. App. 538, 547–48, 345 A.3d 844, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 934, 347 A.3d 877 (2025). A The defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he acted with the specific intent to inflict serious physical injury on the victim. We are not persuaded. We first set forth the relevant legal principles that guide our resolution of this claim. “To convict the defen- dant of assault in the second degree under § 53a-60 (a) (1), the state was required to prove that (1) the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, and (2) acting with such intent, the defendant caused serious physical injury to that person.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harold B., 241 Conn. App. 666, 675, ___ A.3d ___ (2026); see also General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1). “Assault in the second degree under § 53a-60 (a) (1) is a specific intent, rather than a general intent, crime. . . . Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one. . . . [T]he [jury is] not bound to accept as true the defendant’s claim of lack of intent or his explanation of why he lacked intent. . . . Intent may  State v. Clarke be, and usually is, inferred from the defendant’s verbal or physical conduct. . . . Intent may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. . . . The use of inferences based on circumstantial evidence is necessary because direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind is rarely available. . . . Intent may be gleaned from circumstantial evidence such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading up to and immediately following the incident. . . . Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his voluntary con- duct. . . . “Regarding the intent requirement, an individual acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct . . . when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct . . . . Nonetheless, [t]here is no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence so far as probative force is concerned. . . . Moreover, [i]t is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substan- tial circumstantial evidence. . . . Finally, we underscore that intent [can] be formed instantaneously and [does] not require any specific period of time for thought or premeditation for its formation. . . . “[I]t is the role of the jury to determine whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant . . . intended to . . . cause serious or deadly physical injury to the victim. Our only task on appeal is to determine whether, on the basis of the record before us, the jury reasonably could have found as it did.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 687–89. We conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom; see id., 689; that the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious physical injury when he punched him and kicked him in the head. Notwithstanding his testimony that he did not intend to injure the victim, the defendant acknowledged  State v. Clarke that the video surveillance footage depicts him making physical contact with the victim with his hand and his foot. “[Jurors] may draw from the evidence only such inferences as are reasonable, but they are not required to put aside their common sense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mendez, 154 Conn. App. 271, 279, 105 A.3d 917 (2014). The jury reasonably could have relied on the video surveillance footage, which was admitted into evidence, in finding that the defendant specifically intended to cause the victim serious physical injury. The surveillance footage depicts the defendant confronting the seventy-four year old victim and punching him in the head while the victim’s head was turned away. The footage depicts the victim falling onto the ground as a result, after which time the defendant kicked the victim in the head while he was on his knees. Finally, the foot- age shows the victim lying motionless on the ground for several minutes before he was able to stand up and eventually leave the scene. The evidence further reveals that, after the incident, the defendant did not take any steps to summon medical assistance or aid the victim, but, rather, he continued to redeem bottles and cans in the bottle room while the victim was lying next to him on the ground. See, e.g., State v. Raynor, 175 Conn. App. 409, 439, 167 A.3d 1076 (2017) (noting that jury reasonably could have considered fact that defendant did not summon medical assistance for victim in inferring that defendant intended to cause physical injury to victim), aff’d, 334 Conn. 264, 221 A.3d 401 (2019); State v. Perugini, 153 Conn. App. 773, 782–83, 107 A.3d 435 (2014) (concluding that sufficient evidence of intent to cause serious physical injury existed when, inter alia, defendant did not take any steps to summon medical assistance or aid victim), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 911, 106 A.3d 305 (2015). More- over, although the victim could not recall the incident, he testified that he lost consciousness as a result, had severe pain in the following days, and continued to have  State v. Clarke ongoing issues with dizziness and with his daily activi- ties at the time of trial. From the defendant’s conduct, the jury could have reasonably inferred that he intended to cause the victim serious physical injury. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 342 Conn. 239, 252–53, 269 A.3d 104 (2022) (sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to cause serious physi- cal injuries existed when defendant punched victim and kicked victim while she was knocked down); State v. Pjura, 200 Conn. App. 802, 809–10, 240 A.3d 772 (con- cluding that jury reasonably could have found that act of punching victim directly and with great force in head was strongly corroborative of intention to cause serious physical injury), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 977, 241 A.3d 131 (2020); State v. Mendez, supra, 154 Conn. App. 279 (jury reasonably could have found that defendant had specific intent to cause victim serious physical injury by punching victim in mouth). The defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavail- ing. The defendant relies on his testimony that he did not go to Stop & Shop to hurt anyone and did not have any reason to hurt the victim. He further relies on his counsel’s statement during closing arguments to the jury that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by “fear and paranoia” because the victim was not following the COVID-19 protocols that were in place at Stop & Shop at that time,10 as well as the fact that he needed the money from returning bottles and cans to buy food. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The jury, however, was free to reject this theory and to discredit the defendant’s testimony. See, e.g., State v. Leveille, 232 Conn. App. 687, 694 n.7, 337 A.3d 797 (2025) (“it is well estab- lished that [t]he [jury is] not bound to accept as true the 10 We agree with the state’s assertion in its brief to this court that the jury reasonably could have rejected the defendant’s contention that he was concerned about contracting COVID-19 because the victim was not wearing a mask, as the video surveillance footage depicts the defendant lowering his mask before kicking the victim, and depicts him in the cashier line of the supermarket approximately thirty minutes later with his mask lowered beneath his chin.  State v. Clarke defendant’s claim of lack of intent or his explanation of why he lacked intent” (internal quotation marks omit- ted)); State v. Miller, 229 Conn. App. 435, 443 n.5, 327 A.3d 448 (2024) (“[i]t is axiomatic that this court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, and we decline the defendant’s invitation to do so here” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 909, 330 A.3d 880 (2025). For these reasons, the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient for the jury reasonably to find that he intended to cause the victim serious physi- cal injury fails. B The defendant further claims that the record contains insufficient evidence to prove that the victim sustained a serious physical injury pursuant to § 53a-60 (a) (1). We disagree. “ ‘Serious physical injury’ ” is defined by General Stat- utes § 53a-3 (4) for purposes of § 53a-60 (a) (1) as “physi- cal injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . . .” “Whether an injury constitutes a serious physical injury . . . is a fact intensive inquiry and, therefore, is a question for the jury to determine. . . . [Despite] the difficulty of drawing a precise line as to where physical injury leaves off and serious physical injury begins . . . we remain mindful that [w]e do not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record . . . and that we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sus- taining the verdict.” (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Morlo M., 206 Conn. App. 660, 670, 261 A.3d 68, cert. denied, 339 Conn. 910, 261 A.3d 745 (2021). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence that the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis of the evidence presented regarding his loss of  State v. Clarke consciousness. “This court previously has held that loss of consciousness may constitute a serious loss or impair- ment of the function of a bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical injury. See [id., 673–74] (jury reasonably could find serious physical injury on basis of testimony that vic- tim lost consciousness at some point during defendant’s repeated beating of her) . . . see also State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 488–89, 522 A.2d 249 (1987) (severe facial lacerations and temporary loss of consciousness caused by strangling were serious physical injur[ies] supporting conviction of assault in first degree); State v. Rumore, 28 Conn. App. 402, 413–15, 613 A.2d 1328 (temporary loss of consciousness and laceration requiring surgical stapling satisfied serious physical injury element of assault in first degree of elderly victim), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 906, 615 A.2d 1049 (1992). In Rumore, this court explained that § 53a-3 (4) does not require that the impairment of the organ be permanent. The jury could properly interpret the evidence to prove that the victim’s brain was not functioning at a cognitive level when she was unconscious and thus was impaired. State v. Rumore, supra, 415.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kenneth B., 223 Conn. App. 270, 277–78, 308 A.3d 82, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952, 308 A.3d 1038 (2024). In the present case, ample evidence was presented from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that the victim lost consciousness.11 The victim testi- 11 Because we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that the victim sustained a serious physical injury on the basis of his loss of conscious- ness, we need not address the defendant’s separate claim that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the victim’s intracranial hemor- rhage, or brain bleed, was causally related to the incident. See, e.g., State v. Kenneth B., supra, 223 Conn. App. 277 (declining to address defendant’s remaining arguments concerning victim’s injuries in light of conclusion that there was sufficient evidence that victim suffered serious physical injury on basis of evidence regarding loss of consciousness). We note, however, that, in addition to his loss of consciousness, the victim also presented at the emergency department with a large hematoma on the left side of his forehead. Photographs of this injury, and photographs depicting the victim with a black eye, were admitted into evidence. The victim also testified that he had to miss work for nearly four months because of his injuries, his daughter had to assume  State v. Clarke fied that he “passed out” after the incident. The victim was brought by his daughter to St. Vincent’s Medical Center directly after the incident, and he was diagnosed with syncope, or loss of consciousness. Sacks and Mintz both testified that the victim had sustained a loss of consciousness. Mintz also explained to the jury that loss of consciousness is often accompanied by memory loss concerning the surrounding events, stating: “Usually, they don’t remember a period of time before, even though they may have been perfectly awake . . . . [T]he exact mechanism is not remembered by the person because the brain stops—stops forming memory. . . . So, if the brain is not working, it will not form memory. Thus, you will not remember what happened.” This testimony was consistent with the victim’s lack of memory concerning the assault itself.12 The jury also reasonably could have inferred that the victim lost consciousness based on the video surveillance footage, which depicts him lying motionless on the ground for several minutes after he was punched and kicked by the defendant.13 Although the defendant relies on Sacks’ testimony that the victim’s diagnosis of loss of consciousness did not cre- ate a serious impairment of a function of a bodily organ, he acknowledges that Mintz testified to the contrary. This argument is no more than an attack on the jury’s credibility determinations, which we do not second-guess on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 175 Conn. App. 739, 753, 168 A.3d 605, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 970, 173 a caretaker role for him, and he continued having ongoing symptoms at the time of trial. 12 The victim specifically testified: “I don’t remember everything. I remember that I went to that place. The man said I need to have a mask. I called my daughter to bring me a mask, and then I don’t remember anything more. . . . What I remember was that, after the incident, I found myself in front of my car. I don’t remember much.” 13 We therefore reject the defendant’s contention that there was insufficient evidence that loss of consciousness occurred merely because the victim’s medical records indicated that he was “unsure of loss of consciousness.” In light of Mintz’ testimony that loss of consciousness is often accompanied by memory loss, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the victim’s uncertainty as to whether he lost consciousness could be attributed to memory loss he suffered as a result of the assault.  State v. Clarke A.3d 953 (2017). The defendant also concedes that case law from reviewing courts has established that loss of consciousness can constitute a serious physical injury. “[W]hether [the victim] suffered a serious physical injury was a question of fact for the jury. . . . We decline to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ragalis, supra, 235 Conn. App. 558. On the record before us, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the jury could not reasonably have found that the victim suffered a serious physical injury, given the evidence before it. See, e.g., State v. Leveille, supra, 232 Conn. App. 698 n.10. We therefore reject the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. II The defendant also claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly (1) used the word “assault” and its derivatives and (2) vouched for the credibility of Mintz, one of the state’s witnesses. We disagree. We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. Although the defendant did not object to any of the alleged misconduct challenged on appeal, he maintains that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the alleged misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. “[W]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived the defen- dant of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to s