State v. Evans E.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Evans E. STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EVANS E.* (AC 48504) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Eveleigh, Js.** Syllabus Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the second degree, risk of injury to a child, and sexual assault in the fourth degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the prosecutor violated his constitu- tional right to a fair trial by improperly asking witnesses to comment on the credibility of the complainant, J, and emphasizing that improper testimony during closing arguments. Held: This court concluded that the improprieties committed by the prosecutor deprived the defendant of a fair trial, as, after analyzing the conduct of the prosecutor under the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), this court lacked the requisite fair assurance that the prosector’s improper elicitation of testimony as to J’s credibility and the improper argument emphasizing that testimony did not substantially sway the jury’s verdict. Argued May 21—officially released October 27, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with four counts of the crime of sexual assault in the second degree, seven counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, and one count of the crime of sexual assault in the fourth degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number seven, and tried to the jury before Zagaja, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree, seven counts of risk of injury to a child, and one count of sexual assault in the fourth * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained. ** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  State v. Evans E. degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial. Trent A. LaLima, for the appellant (defendant). Lena A. Arnold, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Nichol Peco, senior assistant state’s attor- ney, for the appellee (state). Opinion CRADLE, C. J. The defendant, Evans E., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), six counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statues § 53-21 (a) (2), one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1), and one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (B). On appeal, the defendant claims that the prosecutor violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by improperly asking witnesses to comment on the credibility of the complainant, J, and emphasizing that improper testimony during her closing arguments. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.1 The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 2013, the defendant began dating Y, J’s mother. 1 The defendant also claims the court improperly allowed the state to introduce evidence relating to his consciousness of guilt and erred in limiting his access to only a redacted version of J’s medical records. Because we reverse the judgment based on the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial impropriety, we need not address these additional claims of error. Insofar as the issue regarding J’s medical records may arise on retrial, we note that the record does not contain a complete unredacted ver- sion of the medical records at issue. The record reflects that on July 11, 2023, the trial court, Chaplin, J., conducted an in camera review of medical records of J. Upon its review, the court marked a “full version” of the medical records as court exhibit 1 and a redacted ver- sion, which it provided to the parties and marked as court exhibit 2. The defendant thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s disclosure of only the redacted records. The court, Zagaja, J.,  State v. Evans E. Shortly thereafter, the defendant moved in with Y, J and J’s younger sister, R. In 2016, the defendant and Y had a son together. In July 2018, the family moved from New York to Meriden. The defendant became a father figure to J and R. Beginning when J was eight or nine years old, when the family still lived in New York, the defendant began to touch and kiss J inappropriately. The defendant referred to the inappropriate incidents as “massages.” This con- duct continued after the family moved to Connecticut in 2018. One such incident2 occurred on a snowy day in 2020 when J was thirteen years old. On that day, J left her wet shoes at the entrance of her home to dry off. The defendant took J’s shoes upstairs to the bedroom that he shared with Y and told J to go get them. When J entered the defendant’s bedroom, he began hugging and kissing her, beginning on her mouth and neck and then her body. The defendant stopped when R walked by the room.3 reviewed the records. The court explained to the parties: “I did review the records. I can indicate that they were in quite orderly condition. There was a full, unredacted, set that was clearly identified. A set of records, clearly identified, that was tendered by the State’s Attorney to Judge Chaplin. There was, then, a separate set, which identified the redacted pages and portions of redactions that were actually prepared, identified. And those were the sets of information that were released to the parties. In reviewing the entirety of the records . . . this court is in agreement with Judge Chaplin’s previous finding, understanding that the entirety of the records are confidential, and the breach of that confidentiality should only be effectuated if any material contains any potentially inconsistent, contradictory, or relevant information to this case at hand, or reflects on the credibility of the witness—the therapy witness. And based on my entire review, again, I am agreeing with Judge Chaplin’s decision. So, those records will remain intact for, potentially, appellate review, in the event there is a conviction. They are in place, and I am indicating that.” Our review of those records reveals that there are several pages missing from the “full, unredacted, set” of medical records that Judge Chaplin had marked as court exhibit 1. Indeed, this is readily apparent by the absence of the very first page of the unredacted set of records. Thus, to the extent either party seeks to rely on these records on retrial, the record should be rectified accordingly. 2 J testified that these incidents occurred approximately two to three times each week for a period of three and one-half to four years. 3 R testified that when she walked by the room, she saw J and the defen- dant hugging. R also testified to two other incidents that “concerned”  State v. Evans E. Another incident occurred in 2020, during which the defendant blindfolded J with a T-shirt. Because the blindfold did not fully cover her eyes, J could see out from underneath it and she saw the defendant’s penis, stomach, and legs throughout the incident. The defen- dant began kissing J and touching her body and chest. He then put J on his bed and continued touching her chest, kissing her “whole body,” and eventually put his mouth “to [her] vagina.” He then put his penis “to [her] vagina” and into her mouth. After the defendant ejaculated in J’s mouth, he sent her to rinse her mouth out. At some point that same year, J told R what the defen- dant was doing to her. At that time, J was too afraid to tell Y. Another incident occurred in March 2021. J was at home doing her homework and got up to get a drink of water in the dining room. When she entered the dining room, the defendant was in the room with the lights off. The defendant took off the white T-shirt that he was wearing and blindfolded J with it. He began kissing her and then took her hand and led her up to the bedroom that he shared with Y. The defendant continued to kiss J, started touching her body and put his mouth on her vagina. The defendant put his penis into the folds of J’s vagina, but did not put it all the way inside. The defen- dant put a pillow on the floor, lowered J to her knees and put his penis into her mouth. After the defendant ejaculated into J’s mouth, he instructed her to go into the bathroom to spit and rinse her mouth out. On March 8, 2021, J disclosed to Y that the defendant had been inappropriately touching her and kissing her for the preceding three to four years since they had been living in New York. Upon learning of this, Y began cry- ing. R came downstairs and, seeing their mother cry- ing, asked J if she had “told [her].” J said yes. Y then her: one when the defendant and J were peeking out from the dining room with the lights out trying to scare her and the other when the defendant was standing behind the closed door to the bedroom that she shared with J and their brother and the light was off and the defendant claimed to be fixing a light that was, to her knowledge, not broken.  State v. Evans E. immediately called the defendant to confront him with these allegations. At first, the defendant stated that he did not know what Y was talking about. J, who was in the room when Y and the defendant were on speaker phone, prompted Y to ask the defendant about the “massages” that he would give to J, which caused the defendant to start crying. Y then told the defendant that she no lon- ger wanted him in her house and told him to come and retrieve his belongings, which the defendant did later that same day. The defendant also returned to Y his house key and cell phone, for which Y had paid. Later that evening, Y and J reported the defendant’s actions to the Meriden Police Department. On March 26, 2021, Priscilla Westberg, a forensic interviewer at the Yale New Haven Hospital Child Abuse Clinic, conducted a forensic interview of J.4 During this interview,5 J told Westberg that the defendant began touching her inappropriately when she was eight or nine years old and living in New York. Westberg and J discussed various times that the defendant had touched J inappropriately. J was offered a medical examination by a nurse practitioner, Beth Moller. J declined because she was on her menstrual cycle. A sexual assault kit was not completed because it had been more than five days since the date of the most recent incident. Detective Kevin Ieraci of the Meriden Police Depart- ment thereafter called the defendant to schedule an inter- view with him. That interview was scheduled for April 21, 2021. The defendant did not attend that appointment. Ieraci attempted to communicate with the defendant, but the defendant did not respond, and Ieraci later learned that the defendant was in the Dominican Republic. On July 28, 2021, the defendant, along with his attorney, met with Ieraci and told Ieraci that he had not attended 4 Westberg explained that “[a] forensic interview is a fact-finding interview done for medical purposes.” 5 The forensic interview was recorded, admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial.  State v. Evans E. his April 21 appointment because he had gone to the Dominican Republic to see his mother who had fallen ill. The defendant thereafter was arrested and charged with four counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1), six counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1), and one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (B). Following a jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of two charges of sexual assault in the second degree and guilty of the remaining charges against him. The court thereafter sentenced him to a total effective sentence of forty years of incarceration, execution suspended after eighteen years, and fifteen years of probation. This appeal followed. The defendant claims that the prosecutor committed multiple improprieties that deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor “improperly elicited opinion evidence on the ultimate issue in the case—the credibility of [J’s] . . . allegations— and improperly bolstered [J’s] credibility with those opin- ions during closing argument.” The defendant argues that, in this case, in which the presentation of evidence was completed in less than two days, the prosecutor improperly asked three of the state’s five witnesses,6 aside from J herself, to opine on J’s credibility. He further asserts that the testimony of those witnesses vouching for the credibility of J was then highlighted to the jury during the state’s closing argument. We agree. We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal principles. “In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impro- priety, we engage in a two step analytical process. . . . The two steps are separate and distinct. . . . We first examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Second, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether it deprived the defendant of his due process 6 At trial, the state presented the testimony of J, Y, R, Ieraci, Moller and Westberg. The prosecutor asked Y, Ieraci and Westberg whether they believed J’s allegations against the defendant.  State v. Evans E. right to a fair trial. . . . In other words, an impropriety is an impropriety, regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial. Whether that impropriety was harmful and thus caused or contributed to a due process violation involves a separate and distinct inquiry.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hinds, 344 Conn. 541, 555–56, 280 A.3d 446 (2022). “It is the defendant’s burden to satisfy both steps.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Parris, 352 Conn. 652, 658, 338 A.3d 1139 (2025). Where alleged improprieties occurred during closing argument, we look to the following legal principles. “It is well established that prosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of clos- ing arguments. . . . When making closing arguments to the jury, [however, counsel] must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argu- ment and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . . Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based [on] the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courtney G., 339 Conn. 328, 341, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021). “[The prosecutor] is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney, but is also a high public officer, represent- ing the people of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent. . . . By reason of [her] office, [she] usually exercises great influence upon jurors. [Her] conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty [is] at stake should be forceful, but fair, because [she] represents the public interest, which demands no victim and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice, or resentment. If the accused [is] guilty, he should [nonetheless] be con- victed only after a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the sound and well-established rules which the laws  State v. Evans E. prescribe. While the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license to state, or to comment upon, or to suggest an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters which the jury ha[s] no right to consider.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martinez, 319 Conn. 712, 727–28, 127 A.3d 164 (2015). With these principles in mind, we address each of the claimed improprieties in turn. As to the defendant’s claims that the prosecutor improperly asked witnesses to comment on J’s cred- ibility, it is well established that a witness may not be asked to comment on the veracity of another witness’ testimony. See State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 706, 793 A.2d 226 (2002). Such questions are prohibited because “[f]irst . . . determinations of credibility are for the jury, and not for witnesses. . . . Consequently, questions that ask a [witness] to comment on another witness’ verac- ity invade the province of the jury. . . . Moreover, [a]s a general rule, [such] questions have no probative value and are improper and argumentative because they do noth- ing to assist the jury in assessing witness credibility in its fact-finding mission and in determining the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. . . . Second, questions of this sort also create the risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the witness has lied. . . . This risk is especially acute when the witness is a government agent in a criminal case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 707–708. Before addressing the specific improprieties identified by the defendant on appeal, we note that defense counsel did not object to either the improper inquiries or the improper argument during trial. “[W]e note that the defendant’s failure to object at trial to each of the occur- rences that he now raises as instances of prosecutorial impropriety, though relevant to our inquiry, is not fatal to review of his claims. . . . This does not mean, however, that the absence of an objection at trial does not play  State v. Evans E. a significant role in the determination of whether the challenged statements were, in fact, improper. . . . To the contrary, we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was [improper] in light of the record of the case at the time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 354 Conn. 615, 634, 355 A.3d 513 (2026). Here, however, as noted previously and discussed subsequently, it is well settled that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness. We therefore conclude that defense counsel’s failure to object to those inqui- ries and the associated arguments by the prosecutor is immaterial to this case. The first instance of alleged impropriety arose during the state’s direct examination of Y when the prosecu- tor inquired whether Y believed J when J told her that the defendant had been sexually assaulting her. After Y testified that she called the police “[b]ecause [J] told [her] what was going on,” the following colloquy ensued: “[The Prosecutor]: And you believed her? “[Y]: Of course. “[The Prosecutor]: And why did you believe her? “[Y]: Because when I called him, and I approached him about it, the first answer he told me was, what are you talking about? When she told me the massage word, and I told him, over the phone, he started crying. So—and then he handed me the keys and the phone, in the entrance when he got home. So, to me, I have to believe my child.” The prosecutor here not only asked Y if she believed J’s allegations against the defendant but also asked why she believed her. The prosecutor’s inquiry was improper.7 The defendant next claims that the prosecutor commit- ted impropriety during redirect examination of Ieraci. 7 The state argues that the prosecutor’s inquiry was not improper because Singh prohibits only questions asking witnesses to comment  State v. Evans E. We note that at the outset of her direct examination of Ieraci, the prosecutor appropriately asked him about his professional qualifications. Ieraci testified that he had been a law enforcement officer for seventeen years and a detective for approximately eight years. During that time, he had investigated more than one hundred sexual assault cases. Ieraci explained that he had “specific train- ing . . . in regards to sexual assault investigations.” The defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly asked Ieraci, on redirect examination, whether he would have “submitted a warrant for the defendant’s arrest if [he] did not believe J.” Ieraci responded that he would not have. At oral argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate counsel conceded that the state’s inquiry was likely aimed at clarifying Ieraci’s testimony, elicited dur- ing defense counsel’s cross-examination of him, concern- ing an alleged fabrication by J and R that was unrelated to the allegations of sexual assault. The defendant never- theless contends that it was improper for the prosecutor to go so far as to ask Ieraci if he believed J. We agree. Although it is understandable that the prosecutor felt compelled to make the distinction between the truthful- ness of J’s allegations against the defendant in this case and her fabrication in a wholly unrelated matter, the proper approach would have been to continue the inquiry without asking Ieraci whether or not he found J credible. The defendant next contends that the prosecutor improperly asked Westberg to offer an opinion as to J’s credibility. The prosecutor began her direct exami- nation of Westberg by asking about her professional qualifications. Westberg testified that she had a bach- elor’s degree and a master’s degree in social work and special training in conducting forensic interviews of children. She further indicated that she had been con- ducting such interviews for five years and had conducted on the credibility of the testimony of another witness. We disagree with this overly narrow reading of Singh, which, as quoted herein, states that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the veracity of another witness, and does not limit the prohibition to the testimony of another witness.  State v. Evans E. more than one thousand forensic interviews. As noted herein, Westberg conducted a forensic interview of J and the recording of that interview was admitted through Westberg and played in its entirety for the jury. Defense counsel thereafter asked Westberg: “Is it fair to say that it’s hard to judge somebody’s credibility based on a one and a half hour meeting?” Westberg responded that it is not. Defense counsel then asked a series of questions about the interview, attempting to highlight various inconsistencies in J’s narrative. The following exchange then occurred during the state’s redirect examination: “[The Prosecutor]: [Defense counsel] asked you if it was hard to judge credibility within a period of an hour. I believe you said no. “[Westberg]: Yes. “[The Prosecutor]: So, did you find her to be credible? “[Westberg]: I did.” The prosecutor also asked Westberg why she found J to be credible. Westberg responded: “The amount of detail that she was able to provide, it’s really hard to embellish. She . . . was consistent throughout her interview. She even challenged me when I got things incorrect, and she corrected me multiple times.” It is well established that “[e]xpert witnesses cannot be permitted to invade the province of the jury by tes- tifying as to the credibility of a particular witness or the truthfulness of a particular witness’ claims. . . . An expert witness ordinarily may not express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, which must be decided by the trier of fact. . . . [A]n ultimate issue [is] one that cannot reasonably be separated from the essence of the matter to be decided [by the trier of fact]. . . . In a sexual assault case wherein the subject of the perpetrator’s identity is not a matter of dispute, and the defense focuses on the credibility of the complainant, the ultimate issue . . . [is] whether the [complainant] had been sexually abused . . . and expert testimony vouching for the complainant’s  State v. Evans E. credibility is not helpful to the jury in deciding [that] precise question . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 786–87, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012).8 In its appellate brief and at oral argument before this court, the state has conceded that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask Westberg to comment on J’s cred- ibility and we agree. Finally, the defendant claims that the prosecutor com- mitted impropriety during her rebuttal closing argu- ment. The defendant claims that, during her rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor improperly argued: “Detective Ieraci told you that he would not have submit- ted a warrant for any charges if he didn’t think [J was] credible. Priscilla Westberg told you that she thought that [J] was credible based on her training and experi- ence. The detective’s training and experience for multiple years, [Westberg’s] training and experience for hundreds of interviews. The state submits to you that [J] was cred- ible about what happened to her and that you should find [the defendant] guilty of all the charges as they were presented.” Because the evidence itself was improper, the prosecutor’s argument emphasizing that evidence also was improper. Moreover, the prosecutor’s reference to the testimony of Ieraci and Westberg, along with a description of their extensive training and experience, added persuasive force to their improper testimony. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. 8 We note that the state did not disclose Westberg as an expert witness and the court did not give the jury an instruction relating to expert witnesses. As noted herein, Westberg did testify, however, that she has specialized training in conducting forensic interviews and has several years of experience conducting forensic interviews, including that she has conducted more than one thousand of them. The state referred to Westberg as an expert witness at oral argument before this court. We therefore apply the foregoing legal principles to her testi- mony. As indicated herein, however, it was improper for the state to ask Westberg to opine on the credibility of J whether she did so as an expert witness or not.  State v. Evans E. Having determined that the prosecutor committed improprieties, “we must examine not only whether any individual impropriety deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial, but also whether the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties . . . deprived [him] of his . . . right to a fair trial. . . . To [do so], we must determine whether the sum total of [the prosecutor’s] improprieties ren- dered the defendant’s [trial] fundamentally unfair . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428, 437, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025). “[T]he defendant must establish that the trial as a whole was fundamentally unfair and that the [impropri- ety] so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. . . . In weighing the significance of an instance of prosecutorial impropriety, a reviewing court must consider the entire context of the trial, and [t]he question of whether the defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different [in the absence of] the sum total of the improprieties.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Parris, supra, 352 Conn. 676. “[O]ur determination of whether any improper conduct by the [prosecutor] violated the defendant’s fair trial rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State v. Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)], with due consideration of whether that [impropriety] was objected to at trial. . . . These factors include: [1] the extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by defense conduct or argument . . . [2] the severity of the [impropriety] . . . [3] the frequency of the [impropriety] . . . [4] the centrality of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case . . . [5] the strength of the curative measures adopted . . . and [6] the strength of the state’s case. . . . The question of whether the defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the sum total  State v. Evans E. of the improprieties. . . . Under the Williams general due process standard, the defendant has the burden to show both that the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and that it caused prejudice to his defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henry B.-A., 234 Conn. App. 197, 206–207, 342 A.3d 1063, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 934, 347 A.3d 876 (2025). We begin with the first Williams factor, whether the improprieties committed by the prosecutor were invited by defense conduct or argument. We first note that, during her direct examination of J, the first witness to testify at the trial, the prosecutor asked J whether she had ever said anything untruthful and what kinds of things she had been untruthful about. J responded that she had been untruthful about “little things” in the past. Because the state’s case rested primarily on J’s credibility, defense counsel, understandably challenged her credibility, beginning with the third question that he asked her on cross-examination. Defense counsel asked J: “Does your mom think you’re a liar?” This immedi- ate attack on J’s credibility set the tone for the entire trial. At every turn and with every witness, defense counsel attempted to impugn J’s credibility, over the state’s objection, and, generally, did not object to the state’s subsequent attempts to bolster or rehabilitate her credibility. Thus, to a certain extent, the prosecutor’s improper inquiries were invited by defense counsel’s challenges to J’s credibility. The fact that the defense theory of the case was that J was lying, however, did not give the prosecutor permission to ignore the well settled prohibition against asking a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness. We next consider the second Williams factor, the severity of the improprieties at issue. “In determining whether prosecutorial impropriety is severe, we con- sider whether defense counsel objected to the improper remarks, requested curative instructions, or moved for a mistrial. . . . We also consider whether the impropri- ety was blatantly egregious or inexcusable.” (Citation  State v. Evans E. omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) State v. Ciullo, 314 Conn. 28, 59, 100 A.3d 779 (2014). Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s improper inqui- ries or argument or request any curative measures. We acknowledge that defense counsel’s failure to do so may indicate “that defense counsel presumably did not think that the comments were so severe as to have a negative effect on the jury.” State v. Patterson, 170 Conn. App. 768, 798, 156 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 910, 158 A.3d 320 (2017). Our Supreme Court, however, has recognized that “defense counsel may elect not to object for tactical reasons, namely, because he or she does not want to draw the jury’s attention to it . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. A. M., 324 Conn. 190, 207, 152 A.3d 49 (2016). Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated that “prosecutorial misconduct can be sufficiently egregious to overcome the suggestion that defense counsel did not think it was unfair at the time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 208. Here, the prosecutor’s improper inquiries and argu- ment were not minor or insignificant. The improprieties were particularly severe in this case because the prosecu- tor violated the well established principle of law that it is improper to ask a witness to testify as to the credibility of another witness and, in so doing, invaded the province of the jury. See State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 706–707. The improper inquiries, which were compounded by the subsequent argument pertaining to J’s credibility, were neither indirect nor subtle. The prosecutor asked Y, Ieraci and Westberg outright whether they believed J’s allegations against the defendant. Although defense counsel’s failure to object at trial is not by itself fatal to a defendant’s claim and may have been borne of tacti- cal reasons, any apparent lack of severity with respect to the impropriety that may be attributed to defense counsel’s failure to object is counterbalanced in part by the frequency of the improprieties, which is the third Williams factor. The record reflects that the impropri- eties were not isolated to one portion of the trial. The presentation of evidence in this case lasted less than  State v. Evans E. two days. The state presented the testimony of J, Y, R, Ieraci, Moller and Westberg. Of the five witnesses other than J, the prosecutor improperly asked three of them to comment on the veracity of J and then bolstered that improper testimony during closing argument.9 Thus, it cannot reasonably be argued that the improprieties at issue were not frequent. The fourth Williams factor is the centrality of the improprieties to the critical issues in the case. As we have concluded herein, the prosecutor improperly asked Y, Ieraci and Westberg whether they believed J’s allega- tions that the defendant had sexually assaulted her and, in so doing, invaded the province of the jury, to which the role of assessing J’s credibility belonged exclusively. Because J’s credibility was the ultimate issue for the jury to determine, the prosecutor’s improper inquiries were central and critical to the case against the defendant. The persuasive force of the testimony of Ieraci, who ulti- mately drafted the arrest warrant for the defendant, and the testimony of Westberg, who conducted the forensic interview of J, and the prosecutor’s emphasis of that tes- timony in her closing argument cannot be overstated. It is particularly troublesome that the prosecutor bolstered that testimony by mentioning the extensive experience of those witnesses. Our Supreme Court has recognized that “improper statements during closing arguments may have a profoundly serious effect because they are [a]mong the final words of persuasion the jury [hears] before deliberation . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 464, 797 A.2d 1088 (2002). As the defendant aptly points out, because that was the last argument heard by the jury, defense 9 In considering the prosecutor’s argument in its entirety, we note that the prosecutor also improperly bolstered Westberg’s improper testimony in her initial closing argument when she argued: “[W]e brought you medical evidence in the form of the forensic interview. Which you are allowed to consider as substantive evidence. Not only that, but the forensic interviewer was allowed to talk about how she has done hundreds of these interviews, and she found [J] to be credible. And why, because she was consistent and because whenever the interviewer made a mistake she corrected her.”  State v. Evans E. counsel had no opportunity to respond and therefore, that argument likely left a lasting impression in the minds of the jurors. We next consider the fifth Williams factor, the strength of the curative measures adopted. No such measures were taken in this case. Although no curative measures were adopted, the absence of such measures is attributable to defense counsel’s failure to object or request any curative instruction from the court. Therefore, defense counsel “bears much of the responsibility for the fact that [the] claimed impropriet[y] went uncured.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 343 Conn. 566, 581, 275 A.3d 578 (2022). Finally, we consider the sixth Williams factor, the strength of the state’s case. This case lacked any phys- ical evidence and therefore depended entirely on J’s credibility. We repeatedly have described such cases as “not automatically . . . weak,” but also “not particularly strong . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Favoccia, supra, 306 Conn. 809. Indeed, J herself testi- fied that she had a history of lying. The state contends, inter alia, that this was not a “one witness case” but, rather, that, “in addition to [J’s] testimony, the state presented the constancy of accusation testimony of [R] and powerful consciousness of guilt evidence.” As to R’s testimony, our Supreme Court has held that constancy of accusation evidence is admissible “only to corroborate the [complainant’s] testimony and not for substantive purposes.”10 State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 304, 677 A.2d 917 (1996).11 As to the purported consciousness of guilt evidence, the court declined to give the jury an 10 See footnote 3 of this opinion. 11 This principle is codified in § 6-11 (c) (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which provides in relevant part that a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the alleged assault “may testify that the allegation was made and when it was made, provided that the complain- ant has testified to the facts of the alleged assault and to the identity of the person or persons to whom the alleged assault was reported. Any testimony by the witnesses abo