State v. Dukes

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Dukes STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MALCOM ELTON DUKES (AC 48115) Alvord, Suarez and Seeley, Js. Syllabus The defendant, who had been on probation as a result of prior criminal con- victions, appealed from the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to eight years of incarceration. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court erroneously found him in violation of his probation when it relied on evidence the police seized during an inventory search of his vehicle and inculpatory statements he made to the police. Held: This court declined to review, pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly relied on the warrantless seizure by the police of his cell phone and ammunition from his vehicle, as the record was inadequate to review that claim, the defendant having failed to raise any fourth amendment claim or request that the court exclude the evidence at the violation of probation hearing, and the court made no findings concerning the validity of the inventory search or whether the police had engaged in misconduct so as to warrant application of the exclusionary rule. The record was inadequate for this court to review, pursuant to Golding, the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the inculpatory statements he made while in police custody should have been excluded at the violation of proba- tion hearing because he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) prior to questioning, as the trial court did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions as to whether the defendant had been in custody or subject to interrogation, the record was unclear as to whether he had been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda and he did not seek to exclude the statements or raise a Miranda claim at the violation of probation hearing. The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find that the defendant violated his probation by engaging the police in a motor vehicle pursuit, evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle and possessing a firearm in the vehicle, as the court’s factual findings underlying those conclusions were not clearly erroneous. The trial court’s finding that the defendant violated his probation by pos- sessing ammunition in his vehicle was clearly erroneous, as the presence of a passenger in the vehicle during the incident at issue meant that the defendant did not have exclusive control over the vehicle’s interior, there was no evidence that he knew of the ammunition’s character or presence in the vehicle, and the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. This court determined that a new sentencing hearing was not required as a result of the trial court’s erroneous finding that the defendant had possessed  State v. Dukes ammunition in his vehicle, as the court made no mention of the ammunition during sentencing but focused instead on the seriousness of the conduct of the defendant, as a convicted felon, in possessing a firearm when he was on probation for the same offense, and the record was devoid of any indication that the sentence imposed may have been impacted by the court’s erroneous finding so as to warrant a new sentencing proceeding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant’s proba- tion and imposing a sentence of incarceration, as the court’s determination that the beneficial purposes of probation were no longer being served was supported by ample evidence from which it reasonably could have determined that the defendant no longer was a good risk for continued probation because his behavior was adverse to his own rehabilitation and to the public’s safety. Argued February 18—officially released June 9, 2026 Procedural History Information charging the defendant with violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport and tried to the court, McShane, J.; judgment revoking probation, from which the defen- dant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Nicole P. Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Alexander A. Kambanis, deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney, and Candace C. Solis, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion SEELEY, J. The defendant, Malcom Elton Dukes, appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding him in violation of, and revoking, his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32.1 On appeal, the defen- 1 General Statutes § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time during the period of probation . . . the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation . . . . *** “(c) Upon notification by the probation officer of the arrest of the defendant or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court  State v. Dukes dant claims that the trial court erred in finding him in violation of his probation because, (1) in making that finding, the court improperly relied on certain evidence that should have been suppressed, namely, (a) evidence recovered from his vehicle following an inventory search of the vehicle conducted by the police, allegedly in viola- tion of his fourth amendment rights, and (b) inculpatory statements he had made to the police, allegedly in vio- lation of his Miranda rights,2 and (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated his probation. The defendant also claims that the court abused its dis- cretion in revoking his probation and sentencing him to eight years of incarceration. We decline to review both aspects of the defendant’s first claim and disagree with his second claim, although we conclude that one of the four grounds on which the court found the defendant in violation of his probation was not supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, because we are confident that the court’s erroneous finding did not impact the sentence imposed, and because we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unneces- sary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant’s probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defen- dant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross- examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant’s own behalf. . . . “(d) If such violation is established . . . the court may . . . (4) revoke the sentence of probation . . . . If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .” 2 Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prior to a custodial interrogation, a criminal suspect must “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”  State v. Dukes and imposing the eight year sentence of incarceration, we affirm the judgment of the court. The following facts, which the court reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The defendant had been con- victed in 2018, on a guilty plea, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of Gen- eral Statutes § 29-35 (a), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217, for which he had been sentenced to a total effective term of fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after seventy-eight months, followed by five years of probation.3 The defendant’s probationary period com- menced on September 29, 2021. On two separate occa- sions—October 4 and November 4, 2021—he met with a probation officer and reviewed and signed the conditions of his probation. Those conditions included, inter alia, the standard condition that he not violate any criminal law of this state or the United States, and court-ordered special conditions that he, inter alia, not possess any weapons, ammunition, narcotics or drugs; pay restitu- tion; submit to random urine tests; and maintain verifi- able employment. On October 10, 2023, the defendant was arrested by the Bridgeport police and charged with, inter alia, criminal possession of a firearm, ammunition or an electronic defense weapon in violation of § 53a-217, carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of § 29-35 (a) (1), illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38, carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53-206, possession of a large capacity magazine in violation of General Statutes § 53-202w (c), violation of the deadly weapon registra- tion requirements under General Statutes § 54-280a, possession of a weapon on school grounds in violation of 3 A certified copy of the defendant’s conviction record and the order of the defendant’s probation were admitted into evidence at the violation of probation hearing.  State v. Dukes General Statutes § 53a-217b, possession of more than the legal limit of cannabis in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279a (d) (1), engaging police in pursuit in violation of General Statutes § 14-223 (b), evasion of responsibil- ity in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) (3), disobeying a signal of an officer in violation of § 14-223 (a), reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, illegal opera- tion of a motor vehicle while his registration or license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (a), operating a motor vehicle without carrying an operator’s license in violation of General Statutes § 14-213, illegal operation of a motor vehicle without minimum insurance in violation of General Statutes § 14-213b, and failure to obey a stop sign in violation of General Statutes § 14-301. As a result of the defendant’s arrest on those charges, he was arrested pursuant to a warrant dated December 1, 2023, and charged with violating his probation. A hear- ing was held before the court, McShane, J., on August 26 and 27, 2024. During the evidentiary phase of the hearing, the state presented the following evidence in support of the violation of probation charge. On the evening of October 8, 2023, Officer Roberto Rivera of the Bridgeport Police Department was working as a patrol officer in a marked patrol car when he observed a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed. The vehicle, an orange Dodge Challenger (Challenger),4 “hit a dip in the road, which caused the front of the vehicle [to] scrape in the front [and then move] in a motion as if it was going to go airborne, all the while accelerating.” While the vehicle was accelerating, the driver of the Challenger failed to come to a complete stop at two intersections, after which Rivera activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and siren and attempted to conduct a motor vehicle stop of the Challenger. The driver of the Challenger, however, accelerated at a high rate of speed and failed to come to a 4 In the transcript of the violation of probation hearing, this vehicle also is referred to as a Dodge Charger, which is inaccurate.  State v. Dukes complete stop at another intersection. Rivera’s pursuit of the Challenger was recorded on a police dashboard camera, which was activated when Rivera engaged his vehicle’s lights and siren. That recording was played during the hearing and admitted into evidence as state’s exhibit five. During his pursuit of the Challenger, Rivera observed the license plate number and ran it through his mobile police computer in his patrol car, which showed that the Challenger was registered to the defendant and that the registration of the vehicle was suspended due to insur- ance compliance issues. Rivera also provided the license plate number to police dispatch, which informed him of the defendant’s address and that the Challenger’s owner had a suspended driver’s license. At that point, the Challenger had failed to come to a complete stop for a third time, and Rivera exercised his discretion to dis- continue his pursuit of the Challenger. Rivera, instead, proceeded to the defendant’s address, where he parked his vehicle and waited to see if the defendant would arrive there. After waiting several minutes, Rivera left and pro- ceeded down Reservoir Avenue in a southerly direction to make his way toward police headquarters. As Rivera approached the intersection of Ortega and Reservoir Avenues, he observed a small crowd in the roadway. To his left, Rivera observed the orange Challenger that he had been pursuing. The Challenger appeared to have been in an accident, as it had gone through a fence and was resting in bushes on residential property. A still image of the accident scene involving the Challenger, taken from Rivera’s body camera, was admitted into evidence as an exhibit. Immediately upon his arrival at that scene, Rivera first made sure that everyone was safe and that no injuries had occurred. He then spoke with several witnesses who provided him with information, which he then relayed to police dispatch and to other officers who were canvassing the area. Thereafter, Rivera called for the fire depart- ment because the Challenger was emitting smoke and  State v. Dukes was locked. There was no one inside the vehicle. After members of the fire department opened the vehicle and made it safe for towing, Rivera conducted an inventory search. During her direct examination of Rivera, the prosecutor asked whether the Bridgeport Police Depart- ment has a policy regarding inventory searches, to which Rivera responded, “[y]es.” He explained that, when, as in this case, there is no driver or occupant present, “the vehicle gets towed,” and “you do an inventory search of the vehicle and make sure there’s no valuables inside of the vehicle” so that, if the owner does retrieve the vehicle, the owner cannot say that valuables were left in it that have disappeared. Rivera testified further that, pursuant to police department policy, he can look inside a vehicle’s closed containers, such as the glove box, trunk and center console.5 During his inventory search of the Challenger, Rivera located a cell phone on the front driver’s side floor, a digital scale in the glove compartment, small sandwich bags on the rear passenger side floor, a black plastic bag with .45 caliber ammunition in it that was in the “[r]ear passenger seat, center console,”6 and a plastic ziplock bag that had a “green-like substance in it.” When 5 During his cross-examination of Rivera, defense counsel briefly questioned him regarding the inventory search. First, counsel elicited testimony that Rivera had searched the Challenger prior to calling for a tow truck, without a warrant, and that his intent in conducting the search was to look for “[a]nything of value.” Defense counsel then asked if it is “Bridgeport police policy to document what might be valuables in a car at the scene of an accident,” to which Rivera responded, “[y]es.” Defense counsel then asked whether “that’s always the case” and whether Rivera ever waits “until the car is towed to a specific area,” and Rivera responded that he could not “speak on other people” or about how things are done by other officers. Defense counsel then stated, “[s]o, your objective in going into the car with your flashlight and looking around is to look for valuables,” and Rivera responded, “[c]orrect.” No further questions were asked regarding the inventory search or any policies of the Bridgeport Police Department regarding such searches. 6 When asked on cross-examination specifically where in the vehicle the ammunition was located, Rivera initially testified that it was “[i]n the rear seat by the center console.” (Emphasis added.) After refresh- ing his recollection by viewing his police report, he clarified that it was found in the “[r]ear passenger seat, center console.” By “center console,” Rivera was referring to a compartment in the backseat of the vehicle.  State v. Dukes Rivera picked up the cell phone, an image appeared on its lock screen wallpaper. A photograph was taken of the cell phone depicting the lock screen wallpaper image on October 9, 2023, and a copy of that image, which was a photograph of the defendant, as well as a photograph of the ammunition, were admitted into evidence without objection.7 In light of Rivera’s discovery of the ammunition in the Challenger and the fact that no driver or other occu- pant of the vehicle was present, Rivera communicated via radio to other officers canvassing the area that the driver, who had fled the scene, might be in possession of a firearm or be attempting to dispose of one. Rivera also was contacted by an officer with a police intelligence gathering unit (intelligence unit) and was provided with information about the possible location of the firearm; as a result, Rivera walked toward the location. After moving a yellow garbage can, Rivera found a firearm between a fence and a pallet near a dumpster located on the prop- erty of an elementary school. Photographs of that area, along with a still photograph from Rivera’s body camera of Rivera retrieving the firearm, were admitted into evidence as exhibits.8 The elementary school has exterior cameras that are monitored by the Bridgeport police. The school is located approximately one block from where the Challenger was found. A photograph depicting an aerial view of where the Challenger was located in relation to the elementary school was admitted into evidence. The police recovered video footage from the elementary school’s cameras and from cameras facing the intersection where the acci- dent involving the Challenger had occurred. A digital 7 Photographs of the defendant that were taken during the booking process on October 8, 2023, also were admitted into evidence. 8 Rivera testified that the firearm had a barrel of less than twelve inches and that it was loaded with thirteen rounds in the magazine. The firearm was put into an evidence bag and transported to police headquarters with the other evidence. The ammunition discovered in the Challenger was the same type of ammunition as the ammunition in the firearm in that both were .45 caliber.  State v. Dukes video disc of that footage collected by the intelligence unit was admitted into evidence without objection and played at the hearing on August 26, 2024. That footage depicts two individuals leaving the scene of the accident and walking toward the elementary school. The surveil- lance footage from the side parking lot of the elementary school shows a male individual approaching a ramp at the elementary school and then running on the ramp with an object in his right hand that appears to be a firearm. In video footage from the exterior main entrance of the elementary school, the male figure can be seen running toward a dumpster at the end of an alleyway, moving a garbage bin that was adjacent to the dumpster and, after a few seconds, moving the garbage bin to its original position and then fleeing the area. Subsequently in the video footage, Rivera can be seen retrieving a firearm from that same area near the dumpster and garbage can at the elementary school and taking photographs of the firearm. Upon discovering the firearm, Rivera made it safe to handle “by taking the magazine out and making sure there [were] no rounds in the chamber.” Rivera testified that the firearm was loaded, as he had found thirteen rounds in the magazine. Still photographs taken from the video footage also were admitted into evidence. Rivera testified as to exhibit twenty-four, which shows the side parking lot of the elementary school, stating that “you could see a male individual on the school ramp holding a[n] object in his right hand.” Rivera testified that exhibit twenty- three is a still photograph of the side parking lot of the elementary school “with the male party by the ramp,” and stating that “what sticks out about this is his jeans have either reflective or white lining going straight down and the color of his [dreadlocks].” With respect to exhibit twenty-two, a still photograph of the same side parking lot of the elementary school, Rivera testified that it “shows the same male individual with what appears to be, in his right hand, a firearm that he is holding by the slide.” Exhibit twenty-seven shows the defendant’s clothing at the time he was apprehended; specifically, he  State v. Dukes was wearing pants with a white stripe running vertically down the legs. Photographs of the defendant at the time of his arrest also were admitted into evidence and show that he has dreadlocks that are red and yellow in color. Michael Bourke, a forensic science examiner with the DNA unit of the state forensics laboratory, testified regarding his testing of DNA swabs of the firearm9 and magazine that had been submitted to the laboratory. The DNA found on the swab of the firearm generated a DNA profile that contained a mixture of DNA from five contributors. Bourke testified that “one of the con- tributors contributed considerably more DNA than the others,” and was considered to be a “major contributor,” and that he was able to develop a specific DNA profile for that contributor.10 He entered that DNA profile into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database,11 which allows for a search against convicted offender samples in the database. A match was generated in the database, indicating that the forensic profile from the sample taken from the firearm “was a match to the offender DNA profile” from a sample submitted into the database that came from the defendant. Officer Christopher Matarazzo of the Bridgeport Police Department testified regarding his assistance appre- hending the defendant during the evening of October 8, 2023. Other officers had advised over the police radio 9 Paul Nikola, a detective with the Major Crimes ID Forensic Unit of the Bridgeport Police Department, testified that he first examined the firearm for latent fingerprints but did not find any that were usable. Thereafter, he took DNA swabs of the firearm that were sent to the state laboratory for testing. He also test-fired the weapon and concluded that it functioned properly. 10 Because there was no major contributor to the DNA sample taken from the magazine, no further testing was done with respect to that sample. 11 “ ‘CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically added to the database. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 128 Conn. App. 846, 852–53 n.3, 19 A.3d 678, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 907, 32 A.3d 961 (2011).’ State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2, 252 A.3d 811 (2020).” Jones v. Commissioner of Correction, 212 Conn. App. 117, 133 n.4, 274 A.3d 237, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 933, 276 A.3d 975 (2022).  State v. Dukes that they had observed a male matching a description that had been provided to them in the area of Funston Avenue and Soundview Avenue. The defendant was found near a house on Funston Avenue at about 11:45 p.m. Video footage from Matarazzo’s body camera was admitted into evidence without objection and played during the hearing.12 In the footage, Matarazzo asked the defendant, who was lying face down on the ground with his hands behind his back, to turn over, at which time the defendant stated, “I don’t have no guns, bro. . . . I never had no guns. I was drinking, and I ran from you.” The defendant also stated that he had “weed” on him that he had thrown away, that he had “crashed” and ran from the “orange car” because he had been drinking and “panicked,” and that he was by himself at the time. At the conclusion of Matarazzo’s testimony, the pros- ecutor rested the evidentiary portion of the state’s case. Thereafter, the court canvassed the defendant concern- ing his right to testify. The next morning, the defendant informed the court that he would not be testifying, and, after the court canvassed him further and questioned his counsel about that decision, the court made a finding that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. Defense counsel did not call any witnesses during the evidentiary phase of the hearing.13 After hearing brief arguments from the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court made the following rel- evant findings. Specifically, the court first noted the five witnesses14 who testified at the hearing and “found all 12 Still photographs taken from the body camera footage also were admitted into evidence. Matarazzo testified that the photographs depicted what he was doing and what he saw when he captured the defendant, as well as the clothing worn by the defendant at the time of his capture, which included pants with a white stripe running vertically down the pant legs. 13 During cross-examination of Bourke, defense counsel offered, and the court admitted, into evidence one exhibit, which consisted of a CODIS profile entry form relating to the swabs of the firearm. 14 Marvin G. Saddler, the defendant’s probation officer, also testified during the evidentiary portion of the hearing regarding the conditions of the defendant’s probation and certain documents from the defendant’s  State v. Dukes the witnesses to be credible.” It also noted the evidence presented by the prosecutor demonstrating that the defendant was on probation, that the defendant’s pro- bationary period began in October 2021, that the viola- tion of probation warrant had been signed on December 5, 2023, and that the defendant had acknowledged and signed the written conditions of his probation. The court found “by a fair preponderance of the evi- dence [that] the state ha[d] proven that the defendant, while on probation at the time, engaged in criminal con- duct, specifically, [he] violate[d] the motor vehicle . . . and criminal laws of this state. The motor vehicle laws include . . . engaging a pursuit and evading responsibil- ity.” The court stated further: “And, there . . . certainly [was] circumstantial evidence that he, in fact, was the individual in that orange [Challenger] on the night of October 8, 2023. Specifically, I point to the following that indicates that he is the one: One, his cell phone was left behind, with [a photograph of him on the lock screen] . . . . [Y]ou look at it and it’s, in fact, him. . . . [H]e admitted that he drove that car and was involved in an accident and left the scene. I will note that I know that counsel may dispute that with regard to a trial, with regard to a motion to suppress, but those were the statements that were made, probably—although there’s no evidence— before any advisement of rights, but certainly they were made by the defendant at the time without being really questioned by the police. So, I find that the statements were voluntary and that the defendant admitted to vio- lating the laws, at least of engaging and evading. . . . “I think [that the] police do have a safety or a need to engage in what we call an inventory search, and that inventory search is to protect them, meaning the police, so someone doesn’t claim, ‘I had five gold bars in there, and now they’re not there.’ It’s . . . to . . . [protect] the police from false claims of any property loss. It also probation file that were admitted into evidence, which showed, inter alia, that the defendant had signed the written conditions of his proba- tion on October 4 and November 4, 2021.  State v. Dukes protects the police from anything that may be in there that’s dangerous while the car is in police custody. So, as part of that search, the police found three bullets. . . . “[W]e learned that, after the accident, two people left the orange Dodge Challenger. They’re followed by city cameras to a school. I will note that the defendant’s appearance in there—they’re not the clearest videos in the world—but the appearance is consistent with the defendant. . . . [O]ne of the things I found perhaps most compelling was, if you look at the video, particularly when they’re at the school on what, counsel, you’ve described as the ramp, the defendant’s indications, his theatrics, so to speak—which I’ve noted in this court- room—throwing his hands around and the manner in which he held himself, his disposition, his demeanor certainly seems like the same person we have here in court. And I’ve seen him in court. I’ve seen him when there’s answers that he doesn’t like, when there’s ques- tions he doesn’t like. His mannerisms, his gestures, are similar to that of what I saw on the video. Now, the police . . . put together [a] video of the individuals leaving the Challenger and going to the area of the school, and in that [area the] police were able to find a gun on the ground. It just so happens [that] the gun has . . . DNA [on it] that is consistent with a previous submission by the defen- dant, probably from this conviction. So, I find that the circumstantial evidence certainly indicates [that] the defendant violated the laws of this state, particularly possession of a weapon . . . to wit, a Glock pistol, [for] which the defendant would be in violation of his proba- tion. I also find that possession of the bullets is also consistent with that. “There was evidence with regard to a green, plant- like material that tested positive—there was no clear evidence whether it tested positive. I will not find that that is a violation of his probation or violation of a law, but I will find that there is substantial other evidence that indicates that the defendant engaged in criminal law violations while on probation.” (Emphasis added.)  State v. Dukes Thereafter, the court heard testimony from Marvin G. Saddler, the defendant’s probation officer, after which the court made a determination that the goals of the defendant’s probation were no longer being served, and it balanced the defendant’s liberty interests against the need to protect the public. A sentencing proceeding was held on September 3, 2024. The court rendered judgment revoking the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to a term of eight years of incarceration.15 This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. We first set forth our standard of review and legal principles governing violation of probation proceedings. A violation of probation hearing “involves two distinct components. Initially, the court conducts an adversarial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defen- dant has indeed violated a condition of probation. . . . The state must establish a violation of probation by a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . That is to say, the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the defendant has violated a condition of his or her probation. . . . This court will not disturb a trial court’s factual determination that a violation has occurred unless that determination is clearly erroneous. . . . “Second, if the evidence supports a violation, the court exercises its discretion and determines whether the beneficial, rehabilitative purposes of probation are still being served or whether the need to protect the public outweighs the probationer’s interest in liberty. . . . Thus, an appellate court will affirm an exercise of discretion reinstating an original sentence or ordering incarcera- tion, absent a manifest abuse of discretion or injustice requiring reversal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dennis, 237 Conn. App. 649, 656–57, 352 A.3d 204, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 932, 354 A.3d 728 (2026). 15 We note that, although the record does not contain a written deci- sion of the trial court, it does include a signed transcript of the court’s oral decision. See Practice Book § 64-1 (a).  State v. Dukes “The law governing the standard of proof for a viola- tion of probation is well settled. . . . [A]ll that is required in a probation violation proceeding is enough to satisfy the court within its sound judicial discretion that the probationer has not met the terms of his probation. . . . [A] trial court may not find a violation of probation unless it finds that the predicate facts underlying the violation have been established by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing—that is, the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the defendant has violated a condition of his or her probation. . . . This court has observed that to support a judgment of revocation of probation, [o]ur law does not require the state to prove that all conditions alleged were violated; it is sufficient to prove that one was violated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Owens, 235 Conn. App. 482, 494–95, 345 A.3d 489 (2025). With these general principles and standards of review in mind, we turn to the defendant’s claims on appeal. I On appeal, the defendant challenges the court’s find- ing that he violated his probation and raises a number of grounds in support of his challenge, which we address in turn. The defendant also asserts that, to the extent that any of his claims are deemed unpreserved, this court should review any unpreserved claims pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). A The defendant claims that the court, in finding that he violated his probation, improperly relied on certain evidence that should have been suppressed. Specifically, he claims that the cell phone and ammunition evidence recovered from the Challenger following Rivera’s inven- tory search of the vehicle was obtained as a result of an illegal warrantless search of the vehicle in violation of his fourth amendment rights and, thus, should have been  State v. Dukes excluded and should not have factored into the court’s violation of probation findings. The state counters in its appellate brief that the defen- dant did not preserve his claim that the ammunition and cell phone evidence recovered from the Challenger should have been excluded. The state further contends that the defendant should be deemed to have waived this claim due to his failure to seek to suppress this evidence at trial; that, even if the claim is not waived, the record is inadequate to review the claim pursuant to Golding; that the claim fails on its merits because there was no “ ‘egregious, shocking or harassing police misconduct’ ”; State v. Maietta, 320 Conn. 678, 686, 134 A.3d 572 (2016); involved in this case; and that any alleged error in the admission of the evidence was harmless, as sufficient other evidence in the record supported the court’s viola- tion of probation findings. We agree with the state that the defendant’s claim is unpreserved, as the defendant did not request that the court exclude that evidence at the violation of probation hearing or raise any fourth amendment claim before the trial court. We also agree that the record is inadequate to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim pursuant to Golding. Therefore, we decline to review this claim. “Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fun- damental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Sidiropoulos, 237 Conn. App. 262, 296, 351 A.3d 871, cert. denied, 354 Conn. 923, 353 A.3d 842 (2026). “[T]he inability to meet any one prong requires a determination that the defendant’s claim must fail. . .  State v. Dukes . The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condi- tion is most relevant in the particular circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nathan S., 236 Conn. App. 759, 812, 350 A.3d 544 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 931, 354 A.3d 728 (2026). “The first Golding requirement is that the record be adequate to review the alleged claim of [constitutional] error . . . . The defendant bears the responsibility for providing a record that is adequate for review of his claim of constitutional error. If the facts revealed by the record are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a constitutional violation ha