State v. Asbel R.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Asbel R. STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ASBEL R.* (AC 49632) Westbrook, Wilson and Bishop, Js. Syllabus Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding its use of medical records that had been admitted into evidence. Held: The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the medical treatment evidence, which was admitted into evidence in full, without limitation, as the court’s instruction to the jury was correct in law, adapted to the issues in the case and sufficient to guide the jury as to its consideration of the medical records. The trial court’s failure to grant the defendant’s request for a specific una- nimity instruction as to the multiple risk of injury counts did not violate his right to jury unanimity, as the court’s instruction sufficiently and accurately stated the law on unanimity as to those counts where each risk of injury charge against the defendant was predicated on a continuing course of conduct. Argued April 13—officially released October 27, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information, in the first case, charging the defendant with the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number thirteen, and substitute infor- mation, in the second case, charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of sexual assault in the first degree, three counts of the crime of sexual assault in the second degree, and with one count of the crime of risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that per- son’s identity may be ascertained.  State v. Asbel R. judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number fourteen, and substitute information, in the third case, charging the defendant with two counts of the crime of sexual assault in the second degree and one count of the crime of risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number twelve; thereafter, the court, Droney, J., granted the state’s motion to consolidate the cases for trial, and the cases were tried to the jury before Droney, J.; verdict of guilty in the first case, and verdict, in the second case, of guilty of one count of sexual assault in the first degree, two counts of sexual assault in the sec- ond degree and one count of risk of injury to a child, and verdict, in the third case, of guilty of one count each of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child; subsequently, the court, Droney, J., rendered judgments in accordance with the verdicts, from which the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court. Affirmed. John Raad, for the appellant (defendant). Liam M. Drobney, certified legal intern, with whom were Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attor- ney, Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Robin Krawczyk, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion BISHOP, J. The defendant, Asbel R., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in viola- tion of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), three counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A), and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly instructed the jury in two ways. First, the defendant  State v. Asbel R. claims that the court improperly instructed the jury regarding its use of medical records that had been admit- ted into evidence. Second, the defendant claims that the court improperly declined to give the jury a specific unanimity instruction as to the risk of injury counts. We affirm the judgments of conviction. The following facts, which reasonably could have been found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to our review of the defendant’s claims on appeal. The female victim, N, was born in 2003. The defendant, who was born in 1975, was the boyfriend of N’s mother and, from the time N was approximately three years old, lived with N and her mother. The defendant is not N’s biological father, nor was he married to N’s mother, but N considered him to be her stepfather and her father. Shortly after the defendant started living with N and her mother, the family moved from East Hartford to East Windsor. While living in East Windsor, N slept in the same bed as her mother and the defendant, often sleeping between them. After N’s brother Y was born,1 the four members of the household all slept together in the same bed. The family lived together in East Wind- sor until N reached the fifth grade and was about nine or ten years old. During the time the family was living in East Wind- sor, the defendant committed incidents of sexual abuse against N. These incidents involved the defendant touch- ing N outside of her clothes in her vaginal area. The first incident happened when N was eight years old. The defendant had asked N’s mother to go to the grocery store and, after she left, the defendant and N were lying in bed, both falling in and out of sleep, when the defendant started to rub his hand on N’s vaginal area. Following this first incident, the defendant engaged in the same type of behavior with N on more than one occasion, at random times, for approximately one or two years. 1 The defendant is Y’s biological father.  State v. Asbel R. At some point while the family was living in East Wind- sor, N told her friend’s mother, L, that the defendant was “touching [her].” L also was a neighbor and a friend of N’s mother. L spoke with N’s mother about the situation, but N’s mother was not supportive. N’s mother did not call the police or make efforts to keep the defendant away from N. Indeed, she did not see to it that the defendant and N no longer slept in the same bed. Instead, N’s mother asked N why she was “telling family business to people and why [N] didn’t come to her.” The defendant did not stop touching N after she reported his behavior to L. The family moved from East Windsor to Windsor Locks before N entered the fifth grade, when she was about nine or ten years old. The family’s sleeping arrangement remained the same after the move and, while living in Windsor Locks, the defendant continued touching N, and N testified at trial that the touching eventually “led to other sexual things . . . .” When N was in the sixth grade, at about the time she was turning eleven years old, the defendant put his penis in her mouth. N testified about one occasion when she was lying on the bed and the defendant “pushed [her] head down to his area.” Once his penis was in N’s mouth, the defendant “did the motion and she just proceeded to.” Although N could not recall if the defendant ejaculated on that occasion, he did ejaculate in her mouth more than once, on other occasions, and she “[s]pit it out.” N also testified about another time when she was taking a shower and the defendant “came in, undressed himself, and also got in the shower and proceeded to shower with [her] and push [her] head down” so that she could perform oral sex on him. There were times, as well, both before and after N was thirteen years old, that the defendant would “go down” and put his tongue in N’s vagina. He also penetrated her body with his finger. When N was in the seventh grade and either eleven or twelve years old, the defendant started having penile  State v. Asbel R. vaginal intercourse with her. The defendant subjected N to acts of penile vaginal penetration2 on more than one occasion, approximately twice a week, until N was in the ninth grade and about fourteen years old. These incidents of penile vaginal penetration always occurred in the bedroom when N’s mother was not at home. If Y was home, the defendant would put him in the shower when the defendant and N were in the bedroom. N testified about one specific incident of penile vagi- nal intercourse in Windsor Locks because it was when she lost her virginity. She was in the seventh grade at the time, so she was either eleven or twelve years old. N was half on and half off the bed, and the defendant was standing. The defendant put a towel underneath N and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He wore a condom on that occasion, but there were other times that he did not and would ejaculate either on a cloth or a towel that was near him.3 N also recalled another incident that occurred when she was in the ninth grade and either thirteen or four- teen years old. On that occasion, the defendant was hav- ing penile vaginal intercourse with N when he tried “push[ing] [his penis] in anally.” See footnote 3 of this opinion. N told the defendant that it “really hurt,” but he did not stop; rather, he told her “he would go easy.” By the time of this occurrence, the defendant’s sexual encounters with N “almost . . . [became] a routine when [they] were alone . . . .” The defendant “would usually take [N] by [the] hand to the . . . bedroom, and [she] would just know.” 2 We note that General Statutes § 53a-65 (2) defines such acts as “sexual intercourse.” 3 The defendant used condoms on other occasions. N testified at trial that there was one instance when N’s mother found a used condom on the dresser in the bedroom of their home in Windsor Locks. The condom was from one of the defendant’s sexual encounters with N, but when N’s mother questioned the defendant about it, he told her “he had jerked off into it.” N’s mother also asked N about the condom, but she did not tell her mother what really happened.  State v. Asbel R. The defendant also would subject N to sexual encoun- ters at his place of business, a body shop located in South Windsor. N sometimes would be at the shop with the defendant, without her mother present, because N would mix paint for the defendant and help him tape cars before painting them. The sexual encounters in the South Windsor body shop happened on more than one occasion, and N described one particular incident that occurred in the “spray booth” where there were no surveillance cameras. On that occa- sion, she and the defendant were working on an SUV that opened in the back. They opened the truck, N laid on her back and the defendant penetrated her vagina with his penis while he was standing. N was either thirteen or fourteen years old at that time. The defendant also had N perform oral sex on him in the spray booth, on more than one occasion. After the defendant had penile vaginal intercourse with N for the first time, in Windsor Locks, the defendant told N not to tell anyone. He told N that he did not want anyone finding out what he did, and he told her that if anyone did find out, he would kill both N and himself. N knew that the defendant had a gun, which he would “always” show her. He carried the gun on himself, in a holster, or kept it on top of the refrigerator in their home. The defendant referred to N as his “wife” and would tell her that he could not wait until she turned eighteen so he could leave N’s mother and Y and “be together” with N. When N was fourteen, she started dating A, a fifteen year old boy who lived in another town. At some point during the course of their five to six month relationship, N disclosed to A that she had been sexually abused by the defendant. A encouraged N “to speak up and say some- thing.” N had become close with A’s mother so N told her about the sexual abuse, and A’s mother offered to help. On June 24, 2018, the day after N’s conversation with A’s mother, A’s parents picked N up from the body shop in South Windsor and brought her to the South Windsor  State v. Asbel R. Police Department where she reported that she had been sexually abused by the defendant. After N reported the sexual abuse to the South Wind- sor Police Department, the East Windsor and Windsor Locks Police Departments also became involved because crimes occurred in those jurisdictions as well. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and subsequently charged, in three separate long form informations, with a total of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2), five counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1), one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2).4 The state filed a motion to consolidate the three cases on grounds that the evidence that would be presented in each case would be cross admissible. The defendant did not object to consoli- dation and, after hearing argument, the court granted the state’s motion.5 The three cases were tried together 4 The long form information in Docket No. HHD-CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T is predicated on crimes that allegedly occurred in East Windsor between November 14, 2011, and August 2013, and it charged the defendant with sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) in count one and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2) in count two. The long form information in Docket No. HHD-CR- XX-XXXXXXX-T is predicated on crimes that allegedly occurred in Wind- sor Locks between August 2013 and November 13, 2016, and between November 14, 2016, and June 25, 2018, and it charged the defendant with sexual assault in the first degree in violation § 53a-70 (a) (2) in counts one and two, sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1) in counts three, four and five, and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2) in count six. The long form information in Docket No. HHD-CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T is predicated on crimes that allegedly occurred in South Windsor between July 1, 2017, and June 25, 2018, and it charged the defendant with sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1) in counts one and two and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2) in count three. 5 During the argument regarding the state’s motion to consolidate, the prosecutor explained that the allegations in each of the three informa- tions were based on complaints by the same victim, N, about actions by the same defendant, that spanned a number of years, and that “the only reason why there are three different files is because . . . the allegations of abuse occurred in three different towns.” She then reiterated that “the state’s claim is that the evidence [in each of the three cases] would  State v. Asbel R. before a jury on September 12, 13, 14 and 15, 2023. N was nineteen years old at the time of trial. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2), three counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (1), one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A), and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2), but not guilty of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of sexual assault in the second degree.6 The court rendered judgments of conviction based on the jury’s verdicts, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. Before we address the defendant’s specific claims of instructional error, we set forth our standard of review and general legal principles that are germane to our analysis. “The principal function of a jury charge is to assist the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which [the jury] might find to be established.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lindsay, 143 Conn. App. 160, 179, 66 A.3d 944, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 910, 76 A.3d 626 (2013). “When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last be cross admissible under State v. DeJesus, [288 Conn. 418, 953 A.2d 45 (2008)], and, therefore, the cases [should] be joined.” In response, defense counsel advised that, after conferring with his client, he “concur[s], and my client concurs with the state in that the allegations, except for the location, are effectively allegations of a continuing course of conduct that allegedly escalated over time. “So, without being redundant, I think it would be very inefficient to require these matters to be tried one after another, and for this reason, Your Honor, we have no objection.” 6 In the three consolidated cases the court imposed a total effective sentence of eighteen years of incarceration, followed by fifteen years of special parole.  State v. Asbel R. resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William G., 232 Conn. App. 317, 338, 335 A.3d 511 (2025). “A request to charge which is relevant to the issues of [a] case and which is an accurate statement of the law must be given. . . . It follows from this principle, however, that a request to charge must be an accurate statement of the law. . . . Indeed, it is axiomatic that a trial court should not instruct the jury in accordance with a request to charge unless the proposed instruction is a correct statement of the governing legal principles.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farmer-Lanctot v. Shand, 184 Conn. App. 249, 256, 194 A.3d 839 (2018). “The trial court must adapt its instructions to the issues raised in order to give the jury reasonable guidance in reaching a verdict and not mislead them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Iazzetta v. Nevas, 105 Conn. App. 591, 593, 939 A.2d 617 (2008). “Whether the evidence presented by a party reasonably supports a particular . . . charge is a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . Similarly, whether there is a legal basis for the requested charge is a question of law also entitled to plenary review.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Cohen, 204 Conn. App. 25, 32, 253 A.3d 46 (2021), appeal dismissed, 344 Conn. 84, 277 A.3d 788 (2022). I The defendant first claims that the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the extent to which it was permitted to use medical records that had been admitted into evidence as full exhibits. Specifically, he argues that the court should not have instructed the jury that its consideration of statements made by N in those medical  State v. Asbel R. records was “not limited to credibility or corrobora- tion like prior inconsistent statements and constancy of accusation” and that such statements could, instead, be “considered for their content.” According to the defen- dant, the court’s instruction misled the jury because it “impermissibly validated [the medical records] beyond the purpose of their admissibility, which was impeach- ment . . . .” The state claims, in response, that the court properly instructed the jury on its use of the medical records. We agree with the state. The following procedural history is relevant to this claim. During his cross-examination of N at trial, defense counsel established that, after she reported the sexual abuse by the defendant to the South Windsor police, N was directed to the Manchester Memorial Hospital emergency department for an evaluation. N testified that she recalled speaking with a number of doctors and nurses at Manchester Memorial Hospital, that she gave them detailed accounts of what had been occurring, and that she had advised them that the last sexual assault had occurred between 3 and 5 p.m. on June 19, 2018, five days prior to her evaluation. Defense counsel then elicited testimony that N had attended the graduation ceremony at her high school, where she sang as a member of the chorus, on June 19, 2018, and that she was there between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. Specifically, N testified, after reviewing a series of text messages that had been extracted from her cell phone, that she and the defendant had picked up one of N’s friends at approximately 1 p.m. so that she and her friend could go to the graduation together, that she and her friend left N’s home for the graduation at around 3:34 p.m., and that N sang at the graduation until 6 p.m. When defense counsel asked N how it was possible, given that timeline, that her last sexual encounter with the defendant occurred on June 19, 2018, between 3 and 5 p.m. as she had reported to “the nurse, the doctors, at the Manchester [Memorial] Hospital,” N stated that she  State v. Asbel R. was “not sure” about the time frame but that she was sure of the date. At that point, defense counsel requested that the “med- ical records from Manchester [Memorial] Hospital . . . be marked for identification” and, after presenting them to N, engaged in the following colloquy with her: “[Defense Counsel]: And do you see how there’s various notes that were made on the twenty fourth of June 2018? “[N]: Correct. “[Defense Counsel]: And that’s when you went to Man- chester [Memorial] Hospital to be evaluated? “[N]: Correct. “[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And to be evaluated related to a complaint that you had been sexually assaulted, correct? “[N]: Correct. “[Defense Counsel]: And . . . is it true that you advised the nurse pursuant to this note that the last time [the defendant] assaulted [you] . . . sexually was Tuesday around 3 to 5 p.m.? “[N]: Correct. “[Defense Counsel]:Okay. All right. And you did that so you could receive proper medical care, right? “[N]: Correct. “[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And you imagined that the doctors relied upon your assertion as to when the sexual assault allegedly occurred, right? “[N]: Correct. “[Defense Counsel]: All right. And do you recall tell- ing [the Department of Children and Families (DCF)] . . . social worker and police officers the same thing? “[N]: Yes.  State v. Asbel R. “[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So, you told all of them that you were sexually assaulted on the nineteenth of June between 3 and 5 in the afternoon, right? “[N]: I do recall. “[Defense Counsel]: All right. You do? Okay. Were you lying? “[N]: I was making a statement of the day and types of trauma throughout the day. I cannot pinpoint every time that I was assaulted and every day and every time throughout the day. . . . It was [a] various amount of times when it comes to the situation. I cannot pinpoint every second of every time. When they asked me a specific time, I ranged the time, but I know the date.” Defense counsel then moved on and addressed other subjects in his questioning of N. Shortly after doing so, the court advised him that the Manchester Memorial Hos- pital medical records were still marked for identification purposes only. Defense counsel then moved to have the Manchester Memorial Hospital medical records admit- ted as a full exhibit, and the state did not object to their admission. At the time of his proffer, defense counsel did not request that the hospital records be admitted for a limited purpose only, and, thus, the court admitted the Manchester Memorial Hospital medical records as a full exhibit with no limitations.7 Thereafter, during the state’s case-in-chief, it pre- sented testimony from Audrey Courtney, an advanced 7 The “History of Present Illness” section of the Manchester Memorial Hospital records states in relevant part that, on June 24, 2018, “14 y/o F, presented to [emergency department] with complaint of sexual assault by [her] stepfather in past 6 years. The sexual intercourse started about 2 years ago, and the last episode was 5 days ago. [Patient] reported anal & vaginal penetration 5 days ago . . . . [Patient] reported to police about sexual assault, and was directed to [emergency department] for further eval[uation]. [Patient] felt depressed” and “denied sexually active except sexual assault events.” The “Disposition” section states in relevant part that “[patient] presented to [emergency department] with multiple sexual assault episodes, and the last was 5 days ago.” The “Nursing Notes” reflect in relevant part “that the abuse [has] been going on for a while and the last time he assaulted her sexually was Tuesday  State v. Asbel R. practice registered nurse from the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect department at Connecticut Children’s Medi- cal Center (CCMC). Courtney examined N on July 26, 2018. During Courtney’s testimony, the prosecutor offered the medical records associated with that exami- nation into evidence as a full exhibit and defense counsel did not object to that proffer. Moreover, defense counsel did not request that the court admit the CCMC records for a limited purpose only, and the court admitted them as a full exhibit, without limitation.8 The record reflects that, after providing counsel with written copies of its initial proposed jury instructions on Thursday, September 14, 2023, the court met in chambers with counsel “to review and highlight the around 3-5 PM, she did not go to school that day. [Patient] reported that he put his penis in her vagina and rectum.” 8 The “History of Current Concern” section of the CCMC records states in relevant part that N had been referred by DCF “for evaluation of concern about sexual abuse by [the defendant] . . . . According to intake note . . . [N] reported penile vaginal and digital vaginal penetration by [the defendant]. . . . DCF said that N is in DCF custody because mother did not believe [N]. . . . “[According to the DCF social worker] [N] was referred to DCF by South Windsor Police. [N] ran away from [the defendant’s] business in South Windsor and her boyfriend’s parents picked her up. They brought her to the police because she said that she was molested by [the defendant] since she was 8 years old. . . . [N] said that [the defendant] . . . put his penis in her mouth, digital vaginal penetration and intercourse. . . . [N] said [to the DCF social worker] that [she] told her mother’s friend about [the defendant] years ago and mother’s friend told mother. Mother said that [N] was lying and told her not to say anything again or she would get in trouble. [The DCF social worker] said that [N] did not want mother to know about the appointment. “In a diagnostic interview . . . N identified [the defendant] and reported sexual abuse including vaginal intercourse with bleeding the first time, anal penetration, he would push her head down to suck [his] penis and he would lick her genitals. She said that the abuse began when she was 8 years old and last occurred 2 weeks prior to the interview.” The “Menstrual History” of the CCMC records states in relevant part that N experienced “[b]leeding from vagina that was not period . . . [t]he second time he did intercourse,” that she knew there was bleeding because the defendant told her and that she was in the seventh grade at the time. In response to “confidential questions” listed in the CCMC records, N reported in relevant part that the defendant “seldom” used condoms. “He would pull out,” instead. He “injected” both orally and anally, however.  State v. Asbel R. areas that we would be hearing argument about” at the on the record charging conference that was scheduled for September 18, 2023. After that in-chambers meeting, the court made revisions to the initial draft and provided counsel with a copy of the revised draft on September 17, 2023. In that revised draft, the court had added an instruction regarding medical treatment evidence that provided: “Statements made by a complainant to a medical professional pursuant to receiving or seeking treatment have been admitted as substantive evidence. This means that your consideration of these statements is not limited to credibility or corroboration like prior inconsistent statements and constancy of accusation. These statements may be considered for their content.” The court inquired of counsel, at the on the record charging conference on September 18, 2023, whether “either side ha[d] an objection to this” added instruction. The prosecutor indicated that she had no objection, and defense counsel stated, “So I paused when I read it last night . . . and I of course understand and appreciate what distinguishes something from coming in in a substantive way or manner, as opposed to for an alternative reason. For example, here as a prior inconsistent statement. . . . “Well, that was what was distinguishing, at least in the instructions. I, at the same time, irrespective of per- haps the law is simply clear on it, but from the defense’s perspective the sole purpose of the document was for impeachment . . . .” Defense counsel then clarified that he had been refer- ring to the Manchester Memorial Hospital records that had been admitted into evidence at his request, and he inquired as to whether the proposed instruction was also intended to pertain to the CCMC records, which had been admitted into evidence at the prosecutor’s request. The court responded that, “[s]ince both are full exhibits, the Manchester Memorial Hospital and the CCMC [records], I had envisioned it encompassing both. But that’s why I wanted to highlight it for both sides, so I can hear what your arguments are.”  State v. Asbel R. The prosecutor argued that the statements in the medi- cal records should be considered for their substance and that the jury should be free to believe the statements if they chose to do so. The court then noted that “the defense objects to the inclusion of the medical treatment evidence, and the state wants it in.” Defense counsel responded that “I don’t know if I object to it being admit- ted. I mean, it’s been admitted as exhibits,” and the court clarified that it meant that the defense “object[s] to the inclusion in this draft of the medical treatment evidence instruction.” Defense counsel then confirmed that the court’s statement was accurate. The court overruled the defendant’s objection and indicated that it was going to “keep the medical treatment evidence instruction in. I am going to add though at the end, where it says: These statements may be considered for their content, if you believe them.” (Emphasis added.) The following day, the court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows: “Medical treatment evidence. Statements made by a complainant to a medical profes- sional pursuant to receiving or seeking treatment have been admitted as substantive evidence. This means that your consideration of these statements is not limited to credibility or corroboration like prior inconsistent state- ments and constancy of accusation. These statements may be considered for their content, if you believe them. “Impeachment: inconsistent statements. Evidence has been presented that the complainant made a state- ment outside of court that is inconsistent with her trial testimony. You should consider this evidence only as it relates to the credibility of the witness’s testimony, not as substantive evidence. In other words, consider such evidence as you would any other evidence of inconsistent conduct in determining the weight to be given to testi- mony of the witness in court. The law treats an omission in a prior statement as an inconsistent statement.” As stated previously in this opinion, the defendant argues that the medical treatment evidence instruction misled the jury because it “impermissibly validated [the  State v. Asbel R. medical records] beyond the purpose of their admissibil- ity, which was impeachment . . . .” At the outset, we note that the medical treatment evidence instruction the court gave to the jury followed, almost verbatim, the medical treatment evidence instruction set forth in the model criminal jury instructions which are published on the Judicial Branch website.9 See Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.6-12, available at https://www.jud. ct.gov/JI/criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited October 14, 2026). The instruction is predicated on the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule set forth in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence,10 which “pro- vides that statements made for the purpose of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment are not precluded from admission by the hearsay rule.” State v. Griswold, 160 Conn. App. 528, 537, 127 A.3d 189, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 907, 128 A.3d 952 (2015). Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel objected to the admission of the medical records from Manchester Memorial Hospital or CCMC for any reason, let alone on the basis of hearsay. Indeed, defense counsel confirmed with N, while cross-examining her with respect to the statement she made to the doctors and nurses at Man- chester Memorial Hospital about the date and time of the last sexual assault, that she “did that so [she] could receive proper medical care” and that she “imagined that the doctors relied upon [her] assertion as to when the sexual assault allegedly occurred . . . .” In other words, defense counsel established, at least with respect to those particular statements, that N made them in furtherance 9 Although the language used in the model jury instructions is not binding on this court, it is nonetheless instructive when considering the adequacy of a jury instruction. See State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826, 853 n.19, 256 A.3d 131 (2021). 10 Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part: “The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness . . . (5) . . . A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.”  State v. Asbel R. of her medical treatment. See, e.g., State v. Juan V., 109 Conn. App. 431, 446–47, 951 A.2d 651 (statements must have been made in furtherance of medical treatment to fall under medical treatment exception to hearsay rule), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 931, 958 A.2d 161 (2008). Thus, the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule was clearly implicated by the evidence in this case. See id. Moreover, although the defendant argues that the purpose for which the records from Manchester Memo- rial Hospital and CCMC were admitted was for impeach- ment only, it is undisputed that no such limitation as to their use was requested when the records were admitted. Thus, the medical records from Manchester Memorial Hospital and CCMC were admitted into evidence in full, without limitation. Nor does it appear, on the basis of our review of the record, that defense counsel ever expressly requested the court to give a limiting instruction with respect to the jury’s use of the medical records. Even during the on-the-record charging conference, after confirming that he had no objection to the admission of the medical records as exhibits but claiming that from the “defense’s perspective” their sole purpose was for impeachment, defense counsel made no such request. See, e.g., State v. Strong, 122 Conn. App. 131, 148, 999 A.2d 765 (“[i]t is well established in Connecticut . . . that the trial court generally is not obligated, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 907, 3 A.3d 73 (2010). “It is well settled that [e]vidence admitted without objection remains evidence in the case subject to any infirmities due to any inherent weaknesses. . . . A fail- ure to make a sufficient objection to evidence which is incompetent waives any ground of complaint as to the admission of the evidence. . . . If the evidence is received without objection, it becomes part of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. H. Pearce Real Estate Co., 232 Conn. App. 82, 88–89, 335 A.3d 81, cert. denied, 352 Conn.  State v. Asbel R. 906, 335 A.3d 847 (2025). “[E]vidence which is offered and admitted for a limited purpose only [however] . . . cannot be used for another and totally different purpose . . . .” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 864, 37 A.3d 700 (2012). Because the records from Manchester