Full Opinion

25CA0817 Peo v Pace 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA0817 City and County of Denver District Court Nos. 02CR185 & 02CR186 Honorable Demetria E. Trujillo, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ned Pace, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division I Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK J. Jones and Sullivan, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Ned Pace, Jr., Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Ned Pace, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying his most recent postconviction motion. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 In 2002, Pace was convicted of two counts each of first degree murder, felony murder, and sexual assault. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. A division of this court affirmed the judgment. People v. Pace, (Colo. App. No. 02CA2379, May 5, 2005) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). ¶3 Between 2008 and 2023, Pace filed three Crim. P. 35(c) motions for postconviction relief, all of which were unsuccessful. See People v. Pace, (Colo. App. No. 10CA0368, Mar. 24, 2011) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Pace, (Colo. App. No. 23CA1724, Dec. 12, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). ¶4 He filed the Crim. P. 35(c) motion at issue in 2025. He alleged, among other things, newly discovered evidence of “a massive fraud” within the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) pertaining to the work of forensic scientist Yvonne “Missy” Woods. See People v. Castorena, 2026 CO 2, ¶¶ 3-4 (discussing the investigation of, and criminal charges filed against, Woods based on anomalies in her work as part of DNA testing in a CBI forensic laboratory). He 1 asserted that the anomalies in Woods’s work “confused and contaminated DNA evidence that was used in [his] trial.” He asked the court to either appoint postconviction counsel and hold an evidentiary hearing or vacate his convictions for “lack of evidence.” ¶5 The district court denied the motion without a hearing. It found that Pace had adequately alleged newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered before trial. But it concluded that the evidence was not material and would not probably produce an acquittal because Woods “had no involvement in Pace’s case and trial.” More specifically, the court explained that the record established that a different CBI analyst, Pamela Schaner, had identified the DNA match and informed a Denver Police Laboratory Technician, Gergory LaBerge. LaBerge then conducted an independent DNA analysis, which was presented at trial. Thus, “CBI’s involvement in no way contributed to Pace’s conviction.” II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶6 A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction based on newly discovered evidence under Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(V) must show that (1) the new evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the defendant and counsel exercised diligence to discover all favorable evidence 2 before and during trial; (3) the newly discovered evidence is material to the issues involved and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) on retrial, the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal. People v. Bonan, 2014 COA 156, ¶ 27. A claim based on newly discovered evidence that has not previously been raised is not barred as successive. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(b). ¶7 A Crim. P. 35(c) motion may be denied without a hearing if (1) the allegations are bare and conclusory; (2) the allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief; or (3) the record directly refutes the defendant’s claims. People v. Lopez, 2025 COA 73, ¶ 8. ¶8 We review de novo the denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14. III. Analysis ¶9 Pace’s claim in his motion was premised on the suggestion that the anomalies in Woods’s work affected the DNA evidence in his case. But, as the district court noted, Woods’s misconduct was not material to his conviction because she was not involved in his case. Rather, the DNA in his case was tested and analyzed first by Schaner and ultimately, and independently, by LaBerge. Thus, the 3 record “directly refutes” Pace’s claim that the anomalies in Woods’s work undermined the DNA evidence in his case. Lopez, ¶ 8. ¶ 10 On appeal, Pace changes course by claiming that Schaner and LaBerge had anomalies in their DNA testing “just like Yvonne ‘Missy’ Woods,” and “[t]hey ha[d] the same results.” He also asserts that Woods’s conduct, and that of another CBI analyst, “reveal fraud at all Colorado DNA laboratories.” This is not the claim that Pace raised in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, and we generally do not address new claims raised for the first time on appeal. See People v. Huggins, 2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 (declining to consider issue not raised or ruled on in postconviction motion); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 251 (Colo. 1996) (rejecting the defendant’s “attempts to use his brief on . . . appeal to fortify a number of issues inadequately raised or supported by his [postconviction] motion”). ¶ 11 But even if we could construe these new allegations as within the scope of Pace’s claim, they are “bare and conclusory in nature, and lack supporting factual allegations.” People v. Melendez, 2024 COA 21M, ¶ 12. Pace has pointed to no evidence — or even allegations of evidence — of misconduct by Schaner and LaBerge. It is bare and conclusory for Pace to claim, without more, that 4 Schaner’s and LaBerge’s DNA testing had anomalies “just like . . . Woods” or that Woods’s and the other analyst’s conduct “reveal[s] fraud at all Colorado DNA laboratories.” There is nothing in the record to indicate that Schaner worked with Woods or the other analyst on this case, or any other. And the record confirms that LaBerge worked in the Denver Police Laboratory, not CBI, making any connection between him and Woods even more speculative. ¶ 12 Indeed, Pace’s attorneys acknowledged in a pretrial motion that “[t]he policy from CBI is that [its DNA database search] is merely an ‘investigatory tool’ for law enforcement personnel and CBI simply forwards that information to the appropriate law enforcement agency who is responsible for conducting their own investigation and testing to confirm the results.” And as the district court explained, the record shows that is what happened in this case. Schaner informed LaBerge of the DNA match, and LaBerge then conducted his own independent DNA testing and analysis. ¶ 13 Thus, Pace did not allege facts sufficient to show that the newly discovered evidence of Woods’s misconduct, or the alleged misconduct of the other CBI analyst, was material in his case or that such evidence would probably produce an acquittal at a retrial. 5 See Bonan, ¶ 27. The district court therefore correctly denied his claim without a hearing. See Lopez, ¶ 8; De Baca v. Dist. Ct., 431 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Colo. 1967) (“[Crim. P. 35(c)] proceedings may not be used as fishing expeditions in the hope that the petitioner may somehow, in the course of an evidentiary hearing, discover some thing which may require the granting of [35(c)] relief.”). ¶ 14 Any other claims that Pace raised in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion at issue that were not based on the newly discovered evidence were barred as successive and have been abandoned on appeal. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII); People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 494-95 (Colo. App. 2010) (affirming denial of Crim. P. 35(c) claim on alternative ground that it was successive); People v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that claims raised in postconviction motion but not reasserted on appeal are abandoned). IV. Disposition ¶ 15 The order is affirmed. JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur. 6