Full Opinion

23CA1676 Peo v Jebe 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 23CA1676 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR6515 Honorable Nikea T. Bland, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Quinn M. Jebe, Defendant-Appellee. ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Tow, C.J., and Schutz, J., concur Prior Opinion Announced December 5, 2024, Reversed in 25SC53 NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 John Walsh, District Attorney, Alison Suthers, Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Adrienne R. Teodorovic, Alternate Defense Counsel, Windsor, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 The prosecution appeals the district court’s dismissal, with prejudice, of all criminal charges against defendant, Quinn M. Jebe. Because the prosecution requested dismissal without prejudice and because the court improperly relied on the speedy trial statute to dismiss with prejudice before the relevant deadline, we reverse and remand for the court to dismiss the charges against Jebe without prejudice. 1. Background ¶2 On November 23, 2022, Jebe was arrested and charged with sexual assault on a child and distribution of a controlled substance to a minor. His arrest followed an investigation conducted between March and August 2021, including a forensic interview with the alleged victim. Jebe pleaded not guilty on February 27, 2023, making his statutory speedy trial deadline August 28; the court set trial for August 1. Jebe was unable to post bond and remained in custody from the date of his arrest. ¶3 At a pretrial readiness conference on July 17, the prosecution announced that it could not call ready for trial because it was unsure whether the alleged victim could testify due to his mental health condition. On July 27, the prosecution moved to dismiss the 1 case without prejudice, asserting that the alleged victim was unavailable to testify. At a hearing the next day, Jebe objected and asked the district court to instead release him from jail and reset trial for the speedy trial deadline. The court expressed concern about dismissing the case without prejudice, given Jebe’s 248-day pretrial incarceration, and asked the prosecution to respond. The prosecution simply repeated its request to dismiss without prejudice and told the court that it would “be in the same position” if trial were reset to August 28. The court then dismissed the case with prejudice. ¶4 The prosecution filed a motion to reconsider, explaining that the alleged victim was being held in the Youthful Offender System; that he was unwilling or unable to discuss the sexual assault allegations; and that, in “multiple meetings, the very mention of [Jebe’s] name caused [him] to ‘shut-down.’” The prosecution acknowledged that it intended to refile charges in the future, when the alleged victim’s mental health stabilized and he was not “housed in a facility where cooperation with law enforcement could endanger him.” Citing People v. Walker, 252 P.3d 551 (Colo. App. 2011), the prosecution argued that Jebe’s statutory speedy trial rights were 2 not yet at issue and that the district court’s dismissal with prejudice was premature. It once again asked the court to dismiss Jebe’s charges without prejudice. ¶5 In response, Jebe alleged that the prosecution had moved to dismiss in bad faith or “to cover up for . . . incompetence and lack of preparation.” Jebe pointed to the prosecution’s failure to provide specific discovery, update witness lists, or make any substantive motions including those pertaining to introducing relevant hearsay. He argued that dismissing without prejudice would infringe on his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The prosecution replied that it had moved forward in good faith, made “good-faith and documented efforts” with the alleged victim, timely alerted the defense to its uncertain ability to proceed to trial, and delayed its motion to dismiss to pursue a plea deal. 3 ¶6 The district court denied the prosecution’s motion to reconsider, and the prosecution appeals.1 2. Discussion ¶7 The prosecution contends that the district court erred by denying its motion to dismiss Jebe’s case without prejudice and instead dismissing with prejudice. We agree. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶8 Because the district court’s ruling is based on Crim. P. 48(b) — a rule “designed to substantially conform to” the speedy trial statute, Carr v. Dist. Ct., 543 P.2d 1253, 1254 (Colo. 1975) — our analysis will focus on the statutory right to a speedy trial and Rule 48. See 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2026 (the speedy trial statute); see also People v. Nelson, 2014 COA 165, ¶ 21 (explaining that, though the speedy trial statute is intended to implement the constitutional 1 We originally dismissed the prosecution’s appeal as untimely filed. People v. Jebe, (Colo. App. No. 23CA1676, Dec. 5, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The Colorado Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari, reversed this division’s decision, and remanded the case to this court for reinstatement of the appeal as timely. People v. Jebe, 2026 CO 48, ¶¶ 1-2, 9, 34. We now consider the merits of the appeal. 4 right to a speedy trial, we use different analyses to determine statutory and constitutional rights violations). ¶9 As relevant here, the speedy trial statute mandates that a defendant must be brought to trial within six months of the date that they pled not guilty. People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 17. The duty to pursue trial within this timeframe lies with the prosecution and the district court. People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO 25, ¶ 11. The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Id.; Taylor, ¶ 18. Rule 48(b)(1) authorizes a district court to dismiss charges on that basis, but the speedy trial statute prohibits the court’s dismissal “based on an anticipated violation.” Walker, 252 P.3d at 552, 555 (emphasis added); see Huang v. Cnty. Ct., 98 P.3d 924, 929 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶ 10 Within the six-month speedy trial period, the prosecution maintains broad discretion to dismiss charges without prejudice, rendering the charges “a nullity.” Huang, 98 P.3d at 928; see People v. Storlie, 2014 CO 47, ¶ 10 (“[T]he discretion to dismiss criminal charges lies with the prosecution, not the court.”); see also Crim. P. 48(a) (setting forth the parameters of a prosecutor’s authority to seek dismissal of a case). In these circumstances, if 5 the prosecution later reindicts the defendant, even on identical charges, the statutory speedy trial period begins anew. Huang, 98 P.3d at 928. ¶ 11 The prosecution’s discretion to dismiss charges, while broad, is not unlimited. Rule 48(a) provides, “No criminal case . . . shall be dismissed . . . unless upon a motion in open court, and with the court’s consent and approval.” The district court may withhold its consent and approval in narrowly defined circumstances, when “the evidence is clear and convincing that the interests of the defendant or the public are jeopardized” by dismissal. People v. Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d 70, 73 (Colo. 1981); accord Storlie, ¶¶ 10, 11. As relevant here, if the court finds that a prosecutor acted in a manner inconsistent with good faith — namely, by attempting to harass the defendant or prejudice his defense — it may deny the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss. See Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d at 73; Storlie, ¶ 14. ¶ 12 We review the denial of a motion to dismiss criminal charges for an abuse of discretion. Storlie, ¶ 10. B. Application ¶ 13 Although the district court found that the prosecution had not adequately explained its reasons for opting to dismiss the case, it 6 did not find that the prosecution had acted in a manner inconsistent with good faith. See Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d at 73; Storlie, ¶¶ 11, 14. Nonetheless, it determined that dismissal with prejudice was the appropriate remedy under Rule 48(b)(1) and was not premature. ¶ 14 True, as Jebe points out, the court found: • The statutory speedy trial deadline was set to expire in just over one month. • Jebe suffered “obvious” prejudice because he had been confined for over eight months. • Jebe objected to the prosecution’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and asked that the case be set for trial. • The prosecution did not move for a continuance. • The prosecution did not show that the alleged victim was truly “unavailable” for trial, as he was in custody, and it did not explain how he could not be equipped to testify. • The prosecution represented that it would not be able to proceed to trial on the speedy trial deadline. ¶ 15 Nevertheless, the court’s decision to deny the prosecution’s motion and instead dismiss the case with prejudice rested heavily 7 on an anticipated violation of the statutory speedy trial deadline — a prohibited basis for its ruling. See Walker, 252 P.3d at 555; Huang, 98 P.3d at 929. Moreover, while the court found that Jebe had been prejudiced by his pretrial incarceration, it did not find that his defense would be prejudiced by granting the prosecution’s motion. See Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d at 73; cf. Nelson, ¶ 36 (“[P]reventing oppressive pretrial incarceration” is one type of prejudice considered in a constitutional speedy trial analysis, but even then, prejudice to the defense is the most serious consideration.). ¶ 16 Because the district court improperly relied on an anticipated speedy trial violation and not on a finding that the prosecution had acted in a manner inconsistent with good faith, we conclude that it misapplied the law — thereby abusing its discretion — in denying the prosecution’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. See People v. West, 2025 CO 61, ¶ 13 (“A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is . . . based on a misapplication of the law.”). Its findings did not satisfy the narrowly defined circumstances permitting it to withhold consent and approval of the prosecution’s motion. See Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d at 73; Storlie, ¶¶ 10-11, 14. 8 Accordingly, we reverse the ruling and remand for dismissal without prejudice. ¶ 17 This opinion does not preclude Jebe from raising future claims that his statutory or constitutional speedy trial rights have been violated in the event the prosecution refiles the charges. The rule that dismissal and reindictment resets the statutory speedy trial clock includes an exception: The prosecution cannot indiscriminately dismiss and refile charges to avoid the mandate of section 18-1-405 and Rule 48(b). Nelson, ¶ 20; Walker, 252 P.3d at 552; Schiffner v. People, 476 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo. 1970). And the circumstances of a trial delay in this case may be relevant to analyzing an alleged constitutional speedy trial right violation. See, e.g., Nelson, ¶¶ 33-36 (discussing an application of the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 3. Disposition ¶ 18 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur. 9