Full Opinion

24CA1510 Peo v Jacobs 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA1510 Yuma County District Court No. 02CR15 Honorable Justin B. Haenlein, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Duwayne Jacobs, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Schock and Sullivan, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, M. Shelby Deeney, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Michael Duwayne Jacobs, appeals the district court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(a) motion. We affirm the district court’s order. I. Background ¶2 Jacobs was convicted of sexual assault on a child, a class 4 felony, based on acts that occurred in April 2002. See § 18-3- 405(1), C.R.S. 2026. Pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (SOLSA), the district court sentenced Jacobs to an indeterminate term of six years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections and “a parole term of 10 years to life.” Jacobs’ conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. ¶3 In 2011, Jacobs filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(a) motion. He argued, among other things, that he was subject to a “discretionary” term of parole pursuant to section 17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S. 2026, which couldn’t exceed the six-year minimum term of his sentence. The district court denied the motion. Jacobs appealed, and a division of this court affirmed. See People v. Jacobs, (Colo. App. No. 12CA0875, Oct. 24, 2013) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); see also People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130, 1135 (Colo. App. 2008) (“A court may take judicial notice of its own records.”). The 1 division concluded that section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) didn’t apply to Jacobs’ parole sentence and, thus, he wasn’t entitled to “discretionary” parole thereunder. See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 5-7. ¶4 Instead, the division concluded, section 17-2-201(5)(a.7) applied because Jacobs was sentenced pursuant to SOLSA for a sex offense committed after November 1, 1998. See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 6-7; § 17-2-201(5)(a.7). And under subsection (5)(a.7), parole must be determined pursuant to SOLSA. See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 7; § 17-2-201(5)(a.7). Accordingly, the division held that Jacobs’ sentence was legal. See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 8. ¶5 In 2024, Jacobs filed a second Rule 35(a) motion, which is the subject of this appeal. In this Rule 35(a) motion, Jacobs again argued that he is entitled to “discretionary” parole pursuant to section 17-2-201(5)(a.5). The district court denied his motion. In so doing, it noted that the argument in this motion was “substantially similar” to the argument in his first Rule 35(a) motion and that “[t]he trial court and Colorado Court of Appeals ha[d] already determined [] that C.R.S. § 17-2-201(5)(a.5) does not apply 2 to [his] conviction [because] C.R.S. § 17-2-201(5)(a.7) creates an exception for any person convicted of a sex offense committed on or after November 1, 1998.” Jacobs appeals the denial of his second Rule 35(a) motion. II. Discussion ¶6 Jacobs contends that he is entitled to “discretionary” parole pursuant to section 17-2-201(5)(a.5), and, therefore, the portion of his sentence imposing a “mandatory indeterminate period of parole” is illegal. We disagree. A. Standard of Review ¶7 We review de novo both the denial of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion and the legality of a sentence. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 23. We likewise review de novo whether a prior court ruling constitutes the law of the case. People v. Medina, 2026 COA 36M, ¶ 14. B. Analysis ¶8 A sentence is illegal if it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme outlined by the legislature. People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. 2005). Under Rule 35(a), a criminal defendant may file a postconviction motion to correct an illegal sentence “at any 3 time.” Crim. P. 35(a). The phrase “at any time” doesn’t, however, contemplate relief on a matter that was resolved in a prior proceeding. People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 4 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶9 Indeed, the law of the case doctrine precludes successive Rule 35(a) motions and other attempts to relitigate an appellate court’s holdings. See Medina, ¶ 15. This doctrine rests on the policy that “when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter.” Id. (quoting Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Colo. App. 1982)). ¶ 10 Generally, we apply the law of the case doctrine to refuse to revisit issues resolved by another division in the same case unless the previous decision is no longer sound or applying it would result in manifest injustice. Id. at ¶ 16 (applying the law of the case doctrine to a Rule 35(a) motion that raised substantively the same issue as the defendant’s direct appeal). ¶ 11 In this case, a division of this court previously rejected Jacobs’ argument that he is entitled to “discretionary” parole under section 17-2-201(5)(a.5). See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 5-7. Jacobs doesn’t assert that the previous division’s decision is no longer sound or that applying it would result in manifest injustice. 4 Nor could he plausibly do so. The previous division properly concluded that section 17-2-201(5)(a.7) –– not section 17-2- 201(5)(a.5) –– applies to Jacobs’ sentence because he was sentenced under SOLSA for acts committed after November 1, 1998. See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 5-7; § 17-2-201(5)(a.7) (for sex offenses sentenced under SOLSA and committed on or after November 1, 1998, parole is determined pursuant to SOLSA). Thus, in accordance with subsection (5)(a.7), Jacobs’ parole period was properly determined pursuant to SOLSA. See Jacobs, No. 12CA0875, slip op. at 6; § 17-2-201(5)(a.7); see also § 18-1.3- 1006(1)(b), C.R.S. 2026 (the parole period for a class 4 sex offense shall be an indeterminate term of ten years to life). The previous division’s decision is the law of the case, and we therefore decline to revisit it.1 III. Disposition ¶ 12 We affirm the district court’s denial of Jacobs’ Rule 35(a) motion. 1 Though both parties suggest, as an alternative, that we remand the case to the district court to amend the mittimus, we don’t believe a remand is necessary. 5 JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur. 6