Peo v. LeChiffre

22CA1270 Peo v LeChiffre 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 22CA1270 El Paso County District Court No. 20CR4790 Honorable Chad Miller, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jean-Joseph Danger LeChiffre, Defendant-Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Brown and Moultrie, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katherine Wynn, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee McClintock Criminal Defense, P.C., Theodore P. McClintock, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jean-Joseph Danger LeChiffre, appeals the judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and second degree assault. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 LeChiffre was charged with the above offenses based on evidence that he conspired with his mother, Marcella Sandoval, to murder his father, Gilbert Sandoval. Sandoval1 pled guilty to conspiracy to commit accessory to a crime and received a two-year probationary sentence in exchange for her cooperation with the prosecution. At trial, she testified that she and LeChiffre planned to murder the victim because he had been abusive, was dragging out the divorce process, and had cut LeChiffre out of his will. Sandoval testified that on July 22, 2020, she invited the victim to her house under the guise of reconciliation, ran her hand across the piano keys to notify LeChiffre that she and the victim were coming down to the basement, and then brought the victim to the basement, where LeChiffre was waiting. She testified that LeChiffre hit the 1 We refer to Marcella Sandoval as Sandoval in this opinion, and we refer to Gilbert Sandoval as “the victim.” 1  victim with a baseball bat before cutting Sandoval’s hands to make it appear she had acted in self-defense. ¶3 A family friend, Donald Schlick, also testified. He said that he and LeChiffre had agreed that LeChiffre would come to the house where Schlick was working on July 22. He testified that LeChiffre arrived “fairly agitated and sweating heavily, in the process of changing his shirt to a dry one.” He further testified that LeChiffre asked him to go with him to his mother’s house, because there were problems happening, and that he “drove very fast and erratically” to get there. ¶4 The prosecution also presented testimony from Bradford Eblen, who was in the jail cell next to LeChiffre after he was arrested. Eblen testified that LeChiffre asked him to contact LeChiffre’s ex-wife and children and explain to them that “[LeChiffre’s] not a monster, that he just lost control and he’s not a bad person and that initially he was doing this for them, to take care of them.” He further testified that LeChiffre admitted to killing the victim with a baseball bat, that there was a substantial amount of estate money involved, and that LeChiffre’s mother was going to take the blame but was now telling the truth that LeChiffre did it. 2 ¶5 A blood spatter expert also testified that, based on the pattern of blood drips found on top of spatter stains at the crime scene, the victim bled before Sandoval did. ¶6 LeChiffre testified in his own defense, denying that he killed his father. He also presented his brother as an alternate suspect, but the prosecution established his brother’s alibi. ¶7 The jury found LeChiffre guilty as charged. ¶8 LeChiffre appeals, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court improperly admitted CRE 404(b) evidence and the prosecutor improperly asked several witnesses to opine on the veracity of other witnesses’ testimony. He further asserts that the trial court committed structural error by excluding all persons under the age of eighteen, including his two teenaged children, from the courtroom. We conclude that none of these arguments warrant relief and affirm. II. Public Trial Right ¶9 Because violation of the right to a public trial is structural error, we address this issue first. Doing so, we conclude LeChiffre’s attorney waived his public trial right. 3 ¶ 10 Our supreme court has made clear that the right to challenge a courtroom closure on appeal is limited to “closures that elicited a contemporaneous objection from the defendant.” Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 12. “If a defendant fails to object to a known closure, he waives his right to a public trial and may not challenge the closure on appeal.” People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶ 12. ¶ 11 LeChiffre acknowledges that the original record is devoid of information regarding why his teenage son and daughter were kept from observing his trial. As a result, at LeChiffre’s request, we remanded this case to the trial court to settle the record. LeChiffre argues that the record remains unsettled as to whether his attorney objected to the courtroom closure in this case. He points to his testimony at a hearing to reconstruct the record that he asked defense counsel to object and defense counsel did so. ¶ 12 But in reconstructing the record, after considering LeChiffre’s testimony, the trial court unequivocally found that no objection was raised to the court. It emphasized that it would not have ruled on this issue without consulting authority, “which further supports the fact that whether it was in accordance with Mr. LeChiffre’s wishes 4  or not, [defense counsel] did not object to the children not being in the courtroom.” ¶ 13 Because defense counsel did not object, we conclude this issue is waived. See Stackhouse, ¶ 14 n.5 (counsel’s failure to object is an affirmative waiver, even if there is no other evidence of intentional relinquishment of a known right). That LeChiffre may have wanted defense counsel to object is of no moment. See id. at ¶ 15 (because there are sound strategic reasons to waive the public trial right, defense counsel is the “captain of the ship” (quoting Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo. 2007))). Accordingly, we do not consider LeChiffre’s arguments further. III. CRE 404(b) Evidence ¶ 14 LeChiffre also asserts that the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic character evidence of a fight between him and the victim that should have been excluded under CRE 404(b). We disagree. A. Applicable Law ¶ 15 We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. People v. Wilson, 2025 COA 94, ¶ 27. A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id. 5 ¶ 16 CRE 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct for the purpose of proving that a defendant acted in conformity with a character trait on a particular occasion. It governs admissibility “when the trial court determines that uncharged misconduct evidence supports an improper inference of the defendant’s character.” Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 43. To be admissible, such evidence must be logically relevant to a material fact, the logical relevance must be independent of the prohibited inference of the defendant’s bad character, and the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Id. at ¶ 27 (discussing the framework articulated in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318-19 (Colo. 1990)). B. Additional Facts ¶ 17 At trial, the prosecutor asked a witness who had worked for the victim whether she ever saw “any instances where [LeChiffre and the victim] almost got into a fight.” Over defense counsel’s objection, the witness testified that she had once. She testified that the victim was in a motorized wheelchair, with only the mobility of his hands, and that he and LeChiffre were arguing over the victim’s 6  intent to remove LeChiffre as power of attorney authority. She continued: I really didn’t pay attention to the details of it. It was kind of going on, but you know, [the victim] was, like, “What are you going to do, beat me up? You going to fight me? Look at me. I’m crippled, you know? What kind of man are you to try to fight me. I’m crippled. And not only that, you know, what disrespect. I’m your father. What did I ever do to you?” And [LeChiffre] told him that’s ridiculous, you know? You’re . . . no match for me. Something about, whatever his level of Jiu- Jitsu, that he wasn’t an equal match, and it would be detrimental to him. C. Discussion ¶ 18 At the outset, we are not convinced that this testimony was character evidence or offered to prove that LeChiffre acted in conformity with any particular trait. See Wilson, ¶ 28 (if extrinsic evidence does not suggest bad character, CRE 404(b) does not apply). LeChiffre argues that it shows that he allegedly threatened his father with physical violence while the victim was in a wheelchair. But the witness testified that LeChiffre and the victim argued and that LeChiffre specifically declined to fight his father. Her testimony further suggests that it was the victim who was 7  egging LeChiffre on, and that LeChiffre thought it “ridiculous” to consider engaging further. For these reasons, we question whether CRE 404(b) applies. ¶ 19 Even if the witness’s testimony did implicitly invoke LeChiffre’s character, however, we conclude that it meets Spoto’s requirements.2 The testimony was evidence of LeChiffre’s motive for the murder (LeChiffre’s desire to exercise control over the victim’s estate), and LeChiffre’s motive was certainly a material fact. Its relevance did not require the jury to infer LeChiffre’s motive from his bad character — instead, the jury could simply infer that LeChiffre wanted to control the victim’s estate. The logical relevance was therefore independent of the prohibited character inference. Finally, because LeChiffre refused to fight the victim, the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, particularly in light of the substantial evidence of LeChiffre’s guilt. Accordingly, even if we were to conclude that CRE 404(b) applied, we discern no error. 2 Contrary to LeChiffre’s arguments, we may perform a Spoto analysis for the first time on appeal. See People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 154, 158 (Colo. App. 2001). 8  IV. Questions Relating to Witness Veracity ¶ 20 LeChiffre next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by asking several witnesses to opine on the veracity of other witnesses’ testimony. We see no basis for reversal. A. Applicable Law ¶ 21 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010). We first determine whether the conduct was improper based on the totality of the circumstances, and then we consider whether such actions warrant reversal under the applicable standard. Id. ¶ 22 “[A]sking a witness to opine on the veracity of another witness is prejudicial, argumentative, and ultimately invades the province of the fact-finder.” Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 732 (Colo. 2006). Therefore, “were they lying” type questions are “categorically improper.” Id. at 733; see also People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1081 (Colo. 2009) (under CRE 608(a), witnesses may not give opinion testimony that another witness was telling the truth on a specific occasion). This includes asking a testifying defendant 9  whether another witness was “mistaken” or to explain the testimony of an adverse witness. People v. Koper, 2018 COA 137, ¶ 32. ¶ 23 Because LeChiffre did not object to the questions he challenges on appeal, we will not reverse in the absence of plain error. Plain error is both obvious and substantial. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. Under this standard, we reverse only if the error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the conviction. Id. B. Discussion ¶ 24 LeChiffre challenges multiple questions the prosecutor posed to him and Steve Long, a longtime friend of the Sandoval family. But some of these questions were not improper in the first instance. Specifically, the prosecutor asked Long how his feelings had changed since the investigation began and, when Long suggested that he felt like an idiot, why that was. Long responded that he believed Sandoval “lied to protect herself” and that LeChiffre had been “bullshitting [him] all along.” Even though Long’s testimony pertained to Sandoval and LeChiffre’s veracity, it was not responsive to any improper questioning by the prosecution. See Liggett, 135 10  P.3d at 731 (focusing on the impropriety of the questions themselves). ¶ 25 Similarly, referencing Sandoval’s testimony about the condition of the house where the victim was killed, which was inconsistent with LeChiffre’s testimony on that issue, the prosecutor asked LeChiffre whether his was mistaken. But after the trial court sustained an objection to speculation, the prosecutor rephrased, asking, “Do you know . . . what your mom meant?” It was not misconduct to do so. See id. at 732 (a cross-examiner may ask nonprejudicial questions that highlight discrepancies in the evidence). ¶ 26 To be sure, the prosecutor asked other questions that were obviously improper under Liggett: The prosecutor asked Long whether he believed information LeChiffre had previously given him about the victim and Sandoval’s relationship was true, and he asked LeChiffre whether Sandoval or Schlick was making something up, whether Sandoval was mistaken, and whether Sandoval pled guilty “because she’s up a river.” ¶ 27 Nevertheless, we conclude these errors were not substantial. As discussed, the evidence against LeChiffre was strong. It 11  included Sandoval’s detailed testimony, Schlick’s testimony about LeChiffre’s demeanor right after the murder, expert testimony negating the self-defense theory, and Eblen’s testimony about LeChiffre’s confession (using specific details that would not otherwise have been available to him). ¶ 28 Moreover, the testimony elicited by the prosecution’s improper questions “considerably lessen[ed] their prejudicial impact.” Liggett, 135 P.3d at 733 (while a witness’s “responses do not excuse the impropriety of the questioning,” they may tip the scales against reversal). Long’s testimony that LeChiffre had previously not been telling the truth was cumulative of other properly elicited testimony.3 Similarly, in response to the prosecutor’s improper questions, LeChiffre declined to comment on Sandoval’s testimony, testifying that he did not know what she or anyone else believed. LeChiffre also referenced Long’s unprompted testimony that Sandoval had lied and suggested that her plea deal made her 3 He repeatedly testified, without improper questioning, that LeChiffre had told him certain things initially, but he no longer believed those things to be true. He further testified that LeChiffre “now has a credibility issue” and that “[a] lot of the stuff that [Long] did went through [LeChiffre], and it’s pretty questionable now.” 12  testimony less credible — answering the improper question in a way that bolstered his defense theory and potentially diminished the prosecution’s evidence.4 Similarly, when asked about the veracity of Schlick’s testimony, LeChiffre simply clarified what he had told him. ¶ 29 Viewed in this context, and particularly in light of the strong evidence of LeChiffre’s guilt, we conclude the prosecutor’s improper questions did not rise to the level of plain error. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. V. Disposition ¶ 30 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur. 4 Moreover, it was undisputed that Sandoval had changed her story since the murder. She initially claimed that she acted in self- defense and then she testified against LeChiffre. LeChiffre also directly contradicted her account in his testimony. 13