Peo v. Jackson

25CA1182 Peo v Jackson 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1182 City and County of Denver District Court No. 09CR938 Honorable Andrew J. Luxen, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph H. Jackson, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division A Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Tow, C.J., and Ashby*, J., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Ralph H. Jackson, Pro Se *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 Defendant, Ralph H. Jackson, appeals the district court’s order denying his most recent motion for postconviction relief. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 The district court sentenced Jackson to 120 years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections after a jury found him guilty of nine felonies and the court adjudicated him a habitual criminal. A division of this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and the mandate was issued in March 2013. See People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 11CA0007, Sep. 6, 2012) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). ¶3 Between 2013 and 2021, Jackson filed multiple postconviction motions and appeals. See People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1715, Mar. 19, 2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 16CA1408, July 19, 2018) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 21CA1246, Nov. 3, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). ¶4 In 2024, the United States Supreme Court announced Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). The court held that a 1  criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the defendant’s prior convictions were committed on different occasions for the purposes of a federal habitual criminal statute, the Armed Career Criminal Act. See id. at 835; see also People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, ¶¶ 15-26, 576 P.3d 725, 729-31 (applying Erlinger to the pre-2025 version of Colorado’s habitual criminal statute). Thereafter, the General Assembly amended Colorado’s habitual criminal statute to require a jury, rather than a judge, to determine whether a defendant was previously convicted of the alleged felonies, whether the convictions were separately brought and tried, and whether the convictions arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes. See Ch. 344, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-803(1), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1866. ¶5 In May 2025, Jackson filed the postconviction motion at issue in this appeal. Captioned as a motion under Crim. P. 35(a), Jackson asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional under Erlinger because the habitual criminal finding was made by a judge and not a jury. Jackson requested counsel and an evidentiary hearing. 2 ¶6 The district court declined to appoint counsel and instead ordered that the prosecution submit “ANY RESPONSE” within fourteen days and that “NO REPLY” would be permitted. The prosecution responded by attaching an order from a different case, in which the same district court had denied a similar motion for postconviction relief on the ground that Erlinger did not apply retroactively. The prosecution argued that the court should deny the motion because, like the defendant in the other case, Erlinger did not apply retroactively because Jackson’s conviction and sentence became final in 2013. The court denied Jackson’s motion and request for counsel “for the reasons outlined in the People’s Response.” II. Discussion ¶7 Jackson contends that the district court (1) erred when it denied his motion without appointing him counsel or granting him an evidentiary hearing; (2) violated Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) by failing to provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law and (3) violated Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) when it denied his motion without a hearing after inviting a response from the prosecution but without forwarding it to the public defender. We conclude that Jackson’s 3  challenge to his sentence is untimely and successive, and Erlinger may not be applied retroactively, and accordingly, any error in not complying with Rule 35(c)(3)(IV) or (V) was harmless. A. The Motion is Untimely and Successive ¶8 On appeal Jackson recognizes, and we agree, that while his postconviction motion claimed that his sentence was “illegal,” his claim challenged his habitual criminal adjudication and sentence on constitutional grounds. “[A] claim that [a] sentence is unconstitutional . . . properly falls under Rule 35(c).” Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26, 394 P.3d 1128, 1134 (also stating that the party presentation principle “does not prevent a court from properly characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a party”); People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006) (“The substance of a postconviction motion controls whether it is designated as a Crim. P. 35(a) or 35(c) motion.”). Therefore, the postconviction motion at issue here is properly characterized as a Rule 35(c) motion, not a Rule 35(a) motion. ¶9 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14, 459 4  P.3d 516, 519; see also People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7, 544 P.3d 679, 681 (reviewing de novo whether a case applies retroactively on collateral review). Further, appellate courts may affirm a district court’s ruling on any ground supported by the record. People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 69, 383 P.3d 77, 90. ¶ 10 Rule 35(c) claims are, with certain exceptions, subject to procedural bars. Absent, among other things, justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, postconviction challenges to non-class 1 felonies must be brought within three years of the conviction becoming final. See § 16-5-402(1), (2)(d), C.R.S. 2026. Subject to certain exceptions, the court must deny any claim that is successive — that is, a claim that was raised and resolved, or could have been presented, in a previous appeal or postconviction proceeding. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII). As relevant here, there is an exception to these procedural bars for claims based on a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively. See § 16-5-402(2)(d); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)(b), (VII)(c); People v. Rainer, 2013 COA 51, ¶¶ 24-29, 412 P.3d 520, 525-26, rev’d on other grounds, 2017 CO 50, 394 P.3d 1141. 5 ¶ 11 Because Jackson’s conviction became final in March 2013, more than twelve years before he filed his current motion, his claim is time barred. See § 16-5-402(1). True, Erlinger was not announced until 2024. However, accepting as true (for the sake of argument) Jackson’s assertion that Erlinger simply extended the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), his challenge is successive because he could have raised it in his direct appeal or in his first Rule 35(c) motion. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII). Thus, unless an exception applies, Jackson’s 2025 motion is procedurally barred. See § 16-5-402(2)(d); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII). ¶ 12 Jackson did not specifically allege in his postconviction motion that any such exception applied (instead, he erroneously asserted that he was raising an “illegal sentence” claim under Rule 35(a)). However, Jackson did assert that “based on the Court ruling in Erlinger . . . this motion can be heard on Constitutional Error.” While reading this contention as an assertion of the exception allowing review of new constitutional rules would arguably be inconsistent with his characterization of Erlinger as a mere extension of the Apprendi rule, we will nevertheless liberally 6  construe his pleading, see Cali, ¶ 34, 459 P.3d at 522, and construe Jackson’s assertion as a claim in the alternative that Erlinger announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(c); § 16-5-402(2)(d); see People v. Medina, 2026 COA 36M, ¶¶ 20-21, 592 P.3d 806, 810-11 (reviewing courts have the discretion to address the merits of an untimely or successive claim for postconviction relief if the claim is premised on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable and can be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review). ¶ 13 In Medina, a division of this court recently addressed whether Erlinger established a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable to cases, like this one, on collateral review. Medina, ¶¶ 19-37, 592 P.3d at 810-13. The division concluded that the rule announced in Erlinger does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review because while it is a new rule of constitutional law it is not a substantive rule or a watershed procedural rule. Id. at ¶¶ 30-37, 592 P.3d at 812-13. ¶ 14 People v. Fields, 2025 COA 84, 581 P.3d 789, and Gregg, on which Jackson relies, are inapposite. Unlike the defendants in 7  those cases, Jackson’s conviction was final before Erlinger was announced. And the unpublished opinion he relies on, People v. Barber, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0502, Sep. 19, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)), has no precedential value and should not be cited in an appellate brief in this court. See Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40, 454 P.3d 345, 353. ¶ 15 In sum, whether we agree that Erlinger merely extended the Apprendi rule or we agree with the Medina division’s reasoning and holding, Jackson’s claim must fail. In the first scenario, his claim is successive because he could have raised it on direct appeal but did not; in the second, the decision has no retroactive effect on convictions and sentences that, like Jackson’s, were final long before Erlinger was decided. ¶ 16 Accordingly, the district court properly denied his motion. B. The District Court’s Departure from Rule 35(c)(3)(V) was Harmless ¶ 17 Next, we address Jackson’s assertion that the district court erred when it departed from the procedures outlined in Rule 35(c)(3)(IV) and (V). 8 ¶ 18 We review de novo the interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure. People v. Higgins, 2017 COA 57, ¶ 11, 413 P.3d 298, 300. A district court’s noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 35(c)(3)(IV) and (V) is reviewed for harmless error. Id. at ¶ 16, 413 P.3d at 301; People v. Davis, 2012 COA 14, ¶ 13, 272 P.3d 1167, 1170. “An error is not harmless, as relevant here, if it affected the fairness of the district court proceedings.” Higgins, ¶ 16, 413 P.3d at 301. ¶ 19 When a defendant files a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 35(c), the district court must complete an initial review of the motion and determine if “the motion and the files and the record of the case” show that the defendant is not entitled to relief. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV). ¶ 20 After conducting its initial review, the court may deny a Rule 35(c) motion without a hearing if it determines that the defendant is not entitled to relief. Id.; see also People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70, ¶ 25, 558 P.3d 234, 240. If the court does not deny the motion without a hearing under Rule 35(c)(3)(IV), it is required to serve a copy of the motion on the prosecuting attorney, if not previously served by the defendant or his counsel. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). If the 9  defendant has requested counsel, the court is required to serve a copy of the motion on the public defender. Id.; see also Segura, ¶ 25, 558 P.3d at 240. A court errs when it departs from this procedure. See Higgins, ¶ 13, 413 P.3d at 300 (concluding that the district court erred when it sent a copy of the defendant’s Rule 35(c) motion to the prosecution, but not the public defender’s office, and when it denied the motion after reviewing the prosecution’s response). ¶ 21 Because Jackson requested counsel in his motion, the district court deviated from the mandatory procedure set forth in Rule 35(c)(3)(V) when it solicited a response from the prosecution without sending a copy to the public defender. See Higgins, ¶ 13, 413 P.3d at 300. That error was magnified when the court prohibited Jackson’s reply. Nevertheless, we conclude that these procedural errors were harmless because, as noted, the claim was time barred and successive, and the court was required to deny it on that basis. See Higgins, ¶ 18, 413 P.3d at 301; see also § 16-5-402(1.5) (an appellate court may deny relief on timeliness grounds regardless of whether the issue was addressed in the district court); People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 494 (Colo. App. 2010) (applying Rule 10  35(c)(3)(VII) on appeal to preclude a successive claim even though the district court did not rely on that provision). So, despite the error, the proceeding’s fairness was not affected. Cf. Higgins, ¶ 16, 413 P.3d at 301. ¶ 22 For similar reasons, we conclude that any error in the adequacy of the district court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law was likewise harmless. See People v. Aguilar- Ramos, 224 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2009) (concluding that “any inadequacy in the [district] court’s factual findings and legal conclusions was harmless” because the motion was properly denied as a matter of law). III. Disposition ¶ 23 The order is affirmed. CHIEF JUDGE TOW and JUDGE ASHBY concur. 11