Full Opinion

24CA2098 Peo v Jelosek 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA2098 Larimer County District Court Nos. 17CR1173 & 17CR2289 Honorable Laurie K. Dean, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Eric Jelosek, Defendant-Appellant. ORDERS AFFIRMED Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Kuhn and Meirink, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Daniel Eric Jelosek, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Daniel Eric Jelosek, appeals the postconviction court’s orders denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motions on the ground that they were time barred. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 In 2017, Jelosek pleaded guilty to stalking and second degree criminal trespass in Larimer County District Court case number 17CR1173 (the first case). Pursuant to the parties’ sentencing stipulation, the district court ordered a two-year deferred judgment on the stalking conviction and imposed a concurrent two-year probationary sentence on the trespassing conviction. ¶3 Two months later, Jelosek was again charged with stalking the same victim, as well as two counts of violation of a protection order, in Larimer County District Court case number 17CR2289 (the second case). In the first case, the prosecution filed a complaint to revoke Jelosek’s deferred judgment and probation. ¶4 Soon after, the parties entered into plea agreements resolving both cases. In the first case, Jelosek admitted the revocation complaint and agreed to the revocation of his deferred judgment and probation. In the second case, Jelosek agreed to, and did, plead guilty to stalking. The district court accepted the agreements 1 and sentenced Jelosek on December 7, 2017, to (1) two years in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) with a concurrent six-month jail sentence in the first case and (2) a concurrent two- year DOC sentence in the second case. ¶5 Exactly three years later, on December 7, 2020, Jelosek filed lengthy pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motions in both cases (the 2020 motions). For a reason that isn’t clear in the record, both motions were filed in the second case. On December 9, 2020, the postconviction court issued a single written order summarily denying Jelosek’s request for relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35. Jelosek didn’t appeal that order. ¶6 Nearly four years later, Jelosek filed the two nearly identical pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motions at issue here, one in each case (the 2024 motions). In them, he raised a variety of postconviction claims seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas. He also presented allegations seeking to show that his failure to timely file the motions was the result of circumstances amounting to “justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.” § 16-5-402(2)(d), C.R.S. 2026. ¶7 The postconviction court issued written orders denying the 2024 motions as time barred. 2 II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶8 A court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing if, among other things, the record directly refutes the allegations in the motion. People v. Lopez, 2025 COA 73, ¶ 8. ¶9 We review de novo the summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, including a denial on the ground that the motion was time barred. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14; People v. Chavez-Torres, 2019 CO 59, ¶ 11. III. Analysis A. Time Barred ¶ 10 Unless an exception under section 16-5-402(2) applies, Crim. P. 35(c) claims are subject to the time limitations set forth in section 16-5-402(1). The time limitation to challenge a non-class 1 felony conviction is three years. § 16-5-402(1). ¶ 11 Because Jelosek didn’t pursue a direct appeal, his convictions became final when he was sentenced on December 7, 2017, so he had until December 7, 2020, to file any Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See People v. Hernandez-Escajeda, 2024 COA 111, ¶ 20 (if a defendant doesn’t directly appeal a judgment of conviction, his conviction is final when the judgment entered) (cert. granted July 21, 2025). So 3 unless an exception under section 16-5-402(2) applies, the 2024 motions were time barred. ¶ 12 Jelosek asserted in the 2024 motions that he had justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for the late filing because of the “extreme circumstance” of health issues he had been experiencing since 2014 caused by both toxic blood sugars and seizures leading to head injuries. He asserted that these conditions led to, among other things, having “very limited unclear cognitive associations and understanding of [m]aterial facts and in what’s going on around him,” and being “completely incapable of defending [himself] legally, competently.” He added that “[i]t is only recently, within the year of 2024, that [he] has been able to regain enough cognition on a consistent basis to be able to understand [p]rocedures, [f]acts and [e]vidence, [m]ake logical [a]nalysis, and make [an] attempt as a ‘[r]easonable [i]ndividual’ would at defending himself legally.” ¶ 13 We conclude that the postconviction court didn’t err in summarily denying Jelosek’s motions. As the postconviction court ruled, Jelosek’s allegations regarding the “extreme” cognitive impairments he was experiencing between 2017 and 2023, which allegedly prevented him from filing any Crim. P. 35(c) motion before 4 2024, are refuted by the record in these cases and the record in a more recent criminal case cited by the postconviction court in its order. ¶ 14 In terms of these two cases, Jelosek’s allegation that he didn’t have the mental capacity to file timely Crim. P. 35(c) motions by December 7, 2020, is directly refuted by the record in this case, which shows that he did indeed file timely and lengthy Crim. P. 35(c) motions in both cases on December 7, 2020. We also note that in a letter Jelosek wrote to the court three months before filing his December 2020 Crim. P. 35(c) motions, he wrote that over “the past several months,” he had “learned that [he had] been wrongfully charged [and] convicted three years ago.” Indeed, Jelosek learning that he had allegedly been wrongfully charged and convicted in these cases appears to be precisely what led him to file the timely the 2020 motions. ¶ 15 And in terms of the record in the more recent criminal case cited by the postconviction court, we, like the district court, may “take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding.” Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (quoting People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004)); see also People 5 v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130, 1135-37 (Colo. App. 2008) (it’s appropriate for a court to take judicial notice of the court records in the judicial branch’s case management system). The court records in that case — Larimer County District Court case number 20CR771 — show that Jelosek was charged yet again with stalking and violation of a protection order involving the same victim as these cases, along with habitual criminal counts, showing that it is clearly a “related proceeding.” Harriman, ¶ 64 (quoting Sa’ra, 117 P.3d at 56). That case file also contains an evaluation from the Colorado Department of Human Services, Office of Behavioral Health, determining that Jelosek was sane at the time of the offenses in that case and was competent to proceed in that case. The offenses in that case allegedly occurred in February or March of 2020, before Jelosek’s deadline of December 7, 2020, to file any timely Crim. P. 35(c) motion in these cases. And the evaluation finding Jelosek competent to proceed in that case took place in July 2021, which refutes Jelosek’s contention that he wasn’t competent to file the 2024 motions until 2024. 6 B. Successive ¶ 16 We agree with the People that the 2024 motions are also successive because the claims therein were raised, or could have been raised, in the 2020 motions. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII); see also People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42M, ¶ 29 (An appellate court may affirm “on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground was relied upon or even contemplated by the trial court.” (quoting People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 22 (Colo. 1999))). IV. Disposition ¶ 17 The orders are affirmed. JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur. 7