Peo v. Scott

25CA0843 Peo v Scott 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA0843 Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CR2058 Honorable LaQunya Baker-McKay, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeremy Hasani Scott, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE TOW Bernard* and Ashby*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Radhika M. Kattula, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Antony Noble, Alternate Defense Counsel, Bryan Collins, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 Defendant, Jeremy Hasani Scott, appeals the postconviction court’s order summarily denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 D.T. and J.W. were Scott’s stepdaughters from different marriages. In 2012, D.T. claimed Scott had repeatedly sexually assaulted her since she was in fourth grade. Although law enforcement investigated, charges were not filed and a detective ultimately destroyed recorded interviews with Scott. ¶3 After D.T. made the allegations, Scott separated from D.T.’s mother and remarried J.W.’s mother. In 2019, approximately seven years after D.T.’s initial allegations, J.W. accused Scott of sexually assaulting her multiple times while she was in fifth grade. ¶4 A new investigation ensued, and later that year prosecutors charged Scott with sexually assaulting D.T. and J.W. A jury convicted Scott of five counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. The trial court sentenced Scott to an aggregate term of sixty years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. 1 ¶5 Scott’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See People v. Scott, (Colo. App. No. 20CA1744, Feb. 2, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). ¶6 Scott filed a timely pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which was later supplemented by appointed counsel, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, among other claims. The postconviction court denied the motions without a hearing. II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶7 We review de novo the postconviction court’s denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14. ¶8 A Crim. P. 35(c) motion may be denied without a hearing when “the motion and the files and record of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is not entitled to relief.” Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV). This standard is satisfied if (1) the defendant’s allegations are bare and conclusory; (2) the allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief; or (3) the record directly refutes the defendant’s claims. People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34, ¶ 15. A defendant need not set forth evidentiary support for the allegations in the motion but must assert facts that, if true, would provide a basis for relief. People v. Melnick, 2019 COA 28, ¶ 12. 2 ¶9 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must ultimately satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 (Colo. 2003). Under this test, a defendant must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. Id. To establish deficient performance, a defendant must prove that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Because a defendant must ultimately prove both deficient performance and prejudice, denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing is proper if “the existing record establishes that the defendant’s allegations, even if proven true, would fail to establish [either] prong of the Strickland test.” Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77. ¶ 10 Where the postconviction court denied the Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing, the focus of the inquiry is on the adequacy of the allegations. In other words, we look to whether the 3  defendant alleged sufficient facts that, if proved true, would establish both deficient performance and prejudice. III. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel ¶ 11 Scott contends that he was entitled to a hearing on his claims that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to (1) sufficiently litigate an issue related to the destruction of certain evidence; and (2) investigate, interview, and present appropriate witnesses. We discern no error. A. Destruction of Evidence 1. Additional Background ¶ 12 D.T. initially claimed that Scott sexually assaulted her in 2012. According to the detective’s testimony, charges were not brought at that time because the district attorney’s office thought D.T.’s allegations, which were based solely on her statements, did not provide sufficient evidence for a conviction. Files from this first investigation, including recorded interviews with Scott, were then destroyed because the “case had not been filed.” As noted, charges related to D.T.’s allegations were filed several years later, after J.W. disclosed that Scott sexually assaulted her. 4 ¶ 13 Before the trial, Scott moved to dismiss the counts related to D.T.’s allegations, arguing that the destruction of the files was a due process violation and the delay in charging Scott was outrageous governmental conduct. The trial court denied both motions and, instead, instructed the jurors that they were permitted to draw an adverse inference against the government for having destroyed the files. 2. Discussion ¶ 14 Scott contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to more promptly review discovery, which prevented them from adequately litigating the issue of destroyed evidence because they failed to have the detective who deleted the exculpatory evidence testify at the motions hearing. He contends that had the detective testified, the court would have dismissed the charges. ¶ 15 Scott did not sufficiently allege prejudice in his pro se motion. He merely argued that the detective’s trial testimony showed that the detective’s memory had faded in the years since the initial investigation took place. At trial, the detective testified, I didn’t document this anywhere, but my recollection is that at that time back in 2012, the audio files and the photographs would 5  have been placed in a folder on my computer. We — we have a system now, Digital Acquire, that all of that stuff automatically goes into. But back in 2012, my recollection is that it would have gone into a folder on my computer. And then at some point, as I was going through folders, I most likely deleted them because that case had not been filed. ¶ 16 Even assuming this testimony reflects some lapse in memory, Scott does not assert any factual allegations regarding how the detective’s testimony would have differed had he been called at the motions hearing just one month earlier. In essence, Scott’s prejudice allegation relies on the conclusory assumption that the detective’s testimony at the motions hearing would have led the court to dismiss the charges. Such speculation is insufficient. See People v. Melendez, 2024 COA 21M, ¶ 35 (concluding that the defendant did not allege prejudice because there were no specific factual allegations concerning what the witness’s testimony would have been). ¶ 17 Nor did Scott sufficiently allege prejudice in his supplemental motion. The supplemental motion alleged that the detective would have testified at a motions hearing, rather than at trial, and the Court would have been in a position to judge both bad faith and whether other evidence was comparable. 6  Instead, it was only at trial where the deficiencies were brought to light. Had the Court found a due process violation, the Court would have had the power to dismiss the charges against the Defendant related to DT. Asserting that the court could have found a due process violation and that the court had the power to dismiss the charges is not akin to alleging that there is a reasonable probability that the motion to dismiss would have been successful. Cf. People v. Sharp, 2019 COA 133, ¶ 32 (explaining that the defendant must prove that the motion would have been successful to demonstrate prejudice). Indeed, Scott does not explain why he believes the trial court would have dismissed the case at motions when, upon hearing the testimony at trial, it did not elect to revisit the sanction. Thus, Scott did not sufficiently allege prejudice, and the postconviction court did not err by denying this claim without a hearing. See People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (An appellate court may affirm the postconviction court’s ruling on any ground supported by the record.). B. Failure to Investigate and Call Witnesses ¶ 18 Scott also contends that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to call D.T.’s brothers and J.W.’s case investigator as 7  witnesses at trial. Scott further contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to investigate his alibi. He contends that had this evidence been presented, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different because the jury would have had critical evidence to “negate guilt.” ¶ 19 As to D.T.’s brothers, Scott merely alleges in his motion that “[c]ounsel still failed to interview and call D[.]T[.]’s three other brothers who were all interviewed in 2012 by CPS.” However, Scott does not explain what D.T.’s brothers’ testimony would have been or how it would have affected the outcome of the trial. See Melendez, ¶ 35. ¶ 20 As to J.W.’s case investigator, Scott alleges in his motion that they “investigated the 2019 case [and] found J.W. was lying at school.” Nothing more. He does not identify who the case investigator was, what their testimony would have been, or how their testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial. See id. ¶ 21 Thus, Scott’s allegations were insufficient, and the postconviction court did not err by denying this claim regarding the failure to call witnesses without a hearing. See People v. Osorio, 8  170 P.3d 796, 801 (Colo. App. 2007) (finding the allegations conclusory because they failed to specify what the witnesses would have said or how the defendant was prejudiced). ¶ 22 As to counsels’ investigation of Scott’s alibi, he alleged in his motion that he “had no access to his 2012 alibi because [of] the more than 8[-]year delay in charging [t]he case” and that his “alibi would have been known to counsel [and] thus, to the jury who asked why the charges [were] not filed in 2012.” Liberally construing Scott’s motion, see Cali, ¶ 34, he alleged that he lived in California when most of the sexual assaults of D.T. occurred. But he did not allege who his alibi witnesses would have been, and his allegation of prejudice is conclusory. And, though, on appeal, Scott attempts to expand on this claim in his opening brief by contending that D.T.’s brothers could have been his alibi witnesses, we consider only what was presented to the postconviction court. See People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 251 (Colo. 1996) (rejecting the defendant’s attempt to use his appellate brief to fortify issues inadequately raised or supported in his postconviction motion). Thus, his allegations were not sufficient to warrant a hearing on this claim. 9  IV. Abandoned Claims ¶ 23 Scott has abandoned his claims in his postconviction motions that he did not reassert on appeal. See Osorio, 170 P.3d at 801. V. Disposition ¶ 24 The order is affirmed. JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE ASHBY concur. 10