Full Opinion

21CA1144 Peo v Vega Dominguez 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 21CA1144 El Paso County District Court No. 20CR27 Honorable Jessica Curtis, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javier Vega Dominguez, Defendant-Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE TOW Lipinsky and Grove, JJ., concur Prior Opinion Announced April 4, 2024, Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Vacated in Part in 24SC319 NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Aric Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Javier Vega Dominguez, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of, among other offenses, soliciting for child prostitution and criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child. ¶2 We previously issued an opinion affirming in part and vacating in part. People v. Vega Dominguez, 2024 COA 32 (Dominguez I). We rejected Vega Dominguez’s contention of instructional error related to his conviction for soliciting for child prostitution and affirmed the judgment of conviction related to that charge. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. But we vacated Vega Dominguez’s conviction for criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child after concluding that it violated his right to equal protection. Id. at ¶ 30. Because we concluded that vacatur was required, we did not address two other challenges to that conviction. Id. at ¶ 30 n.5. ¶3 The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed our judgment related to the claimed instructional error but reversed our decision related to the conviction for criminal attempt to commit patronizing a prostituted child. People v. Dominguez, (Colo. No. 24SC319, Dec. 23, 2024) (unpublished order). The court vacated that aspect of our judgment and remanded the case for us 1 to consider the issues we had not reached. People v. Dominguez, 2026 CO 30M (Dominguez II), ¶¶ 4, 48. ¶4 We now consider, and reject, Vega Dominguez’s remaining arguments. Thus, we affirm the judgment of conviction. I. Background ¶5 The facts of the case are set forth in full in our previous decision, Dominguez I, ¶¶ 3-7, and we need not repeat them here. II. Analysis ¶6 Vega Dominguez asserts two constitutional challenges — both of which he concedes were not preserved: (1) that the statute criminalizing patronizing a prostituted child, § 18-7-406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021,1 is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to him; and (2) that the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (SOLSA), §§ 18-1.3-1001 to -1012, C.R.S. 2026, is based on a conclusive presumption that all sex offenders are 1 In 2026, the General Assembly amended the patronizing a prostituted child statute, including renaming the offense to “engaging in commercial sexual activity with a child.” Ch. 335, sec. 9, § 18-7-406, 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws 2034. The revisions do not affect our analysis. 2 dangerous and more likely to reoffend than other criminals, which presumption is unconstitutional as applied to him. ¶7 When, as here, constitutional challenges were not preserved for review, reversal is warranted only upon a showing of plain error. Dominguez II, ¶ 20. Under this standard, we will reverse only if the error was obvious and substantial. Id. An error is obvious if it “contravene[s] a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or Colorado case law,” id., to such an extent that “a trial judge should be able to avoid it without the benefit of an objection,” Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16. ¶8 We need not address the merits of Vega Dominguez’s constitutional challenges because, even if we were to conclude that there was error, he cannot show that any error was plain. ¶9 As to his challenge to the patronizing a prostituted child statute, Vega Dominguez cites no case law holding that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. To the contrary, he acknowledges that another division of this court rejected an identical claim. See People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 23. Nevertheless, he argues that decisions of other divisions are not binding on us. See People v. Thomas, 195 P.3d 1162, 1164 (Colo. App. 2008). This argument 3 fails to recognize, however, that the Houser decision was binding on the trial court. See C.A.R. 35(e). Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court should have been able to recognize the alleged constitutional infirmity without the benefit of an objection when the court had to follow binding case law affirming the statute’s constitutionality. ¶ 10 Similarly, Vega Dominguez explicitly acknowledges in his opening brief that “none of the prior case law upholding [SOLSA is] on point because in those cases, the divisions did not address the legal or factual validity of the conclusive presumption upon which [SOLSA] is premised.” (Emphasis added.) And he acknowledges in his reply brief that “the Colorado Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of this matter.” In other words, Vega Dominguez concedes that no case law has established that SOLSA is based on an improper conclusive presumption about future dangerousness. Thus, contrary to Vega Dominguez’s contention, any error cannot be plain. ¶ 11 Vega Dominguez’s argument that general due process and Eighth Amendment principles are well established also misses the mark. Our obviousness inquiry focuses not on the overarching 4 concepts embodied by those provisions but, rather, whether any existing law says that the specific challenged statutes run afoul of those concepts. See Dominguez II, ¶¶ 24, 38 (noting the “long held” principle that Colorado’s equal protection doctrine prohibits two criminal statutes from proscribing identical conduct while providing for disparately harsh punishment, but concluding that any error was not plain because no previous case had held that the two offenses at issue in the case violated that principle). For the same reasons the supreme court rejected Vega Dominguez’s plain error equal protection challenge, we conclude that any error arising from his other constitutional challenges did not contravene any clear statutory command, well-established legal principle, or Colorado case law. Thus, any error was not plain. III. Disposition ¶ 12 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE GROVE concur. 5