Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THE PEOPLE, B343574 Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. PA049927 ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Vacated. Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorney General, Dana Muhammad Ali and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Antonio Rodriguez is under a judgment of death that is pending on automatic appeal in the California Supreme Court. While that appeal was pending, the superior court entertained his petition under Penal Code section 1172.751 and struck three prior-prison-term enhancements from the noncapital portion of his sentence, leaving the judgment of death intact. The People contend the superior court had no jurisdiction to modify any part of the judgment while the automatic appeal was pending. We agree and thus vacate the order. BACKGROUND I. The Offenses and the 2010 Judgment of Death Rodriguez committed heinous crimes against children. He and his codefendant, the children’s mother, subjected five-year- old Desiree S. and her six-year-old brother, Brian S., to an extended course of physical and sexual abuse. Desiree died from that abuse. A jury convicted Rodriguez of the first degree murder of Desiree and found true two special circumstances, each resting on the murder’s commission while Rodriguez was engaged in the forcible sexual penetration of Desiree. The jury also convicted him of the torture of Desiree, assault on a child causing her death, two counts of forcible sexual penetration of Desiree by a foreign object, and the abuse of both children. It fixed the penalty at death. The trial court entered a judgment of death on the murder count. The determinate portion of the sentence included three one-year prior-prison-term enhancements under former section 667.5, subdivision (b). 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 II. The Pending Automatic Appeal Rodriguez’s automatic appeal from the 2010 judgment of death has been pending in the Supreme Court since 2011, and it remains undecided. (People v. Rodriguez, No. S186360.)2 III. The December 3, 2024 Section 1172.75 Order In 2021 the Legislature declared invalid most prior-prison- term enhancements imposed under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), and created a procedure by which the sentencing court recalls the sentence and resentences the defendant. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(d).) Rodriguez petitioned the superior court for relief under that procedure. On December 3, 2024, on the parties’ stipulation and without taking evidence, the court struck the three prior-prison-term enhancements and left the remainder of the sentence, including the judgment of death, unchanged. Rodriguez was not present, and his counsel waived his presence. The court amended the abstract of judgment to reflect the stricken enhancements. IV. This Appeal Rodriguez appeals from the order granting his section 1172.75 petition. He contends he was entitled to a full resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d), at which he had a right to be present to provide postconviction evidence and urge a lesser sentence, rather than the bare striking of the enhancements the court ordered. The People respond that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to act on the petition at all 2 We take judicial notice on our own motion of the records of the Supreme Court in People v. Rodriguez, No. S186360. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) 3 while the automatic appeal from the judgment of death remained pending in the Supreme Court, and that the order must therefore be vacated. DISCUSSION I. The Superior Court Lacked Jurisdiction During the Automatic Appeal Whether the superior court had jurisdiction to act on Rodriguez’s petition presents a question of law on undisputed facts, which we review independently. (People v. Millsap (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 368, 375 (Millsap); People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 669.) A different panel of this court recently held in Millsap that the California Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over death penalty cases is indivisible and that a superior court has no power to resentence a capital defendant under section 1172.75 while this automatic appeal is pending. (Millsap, at p. 383.) Millsap is dispositive of Rodriguez’s appeal. He asks us to reconsider Millsap, but we find its reasoning sound, adopt it, and reach the same result here. Under Millsap, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Rodriguez’s petition, and its December 3, 2024 order is void. Because the court lacked jurisdiction it follows that it could not hold the hearing where Rodriguez contends he had a right to be present nor consider the postconviction evidence he would have offered. II. We Do Not Reach Section 1172.75’s Capital Scope or the Effect of Section 1509 The Attorney General asserts arguments that were not directly addressed by Millsap. He contends that the plain language of 1172.75 means resentencing is unavailable to anyone 4 sentenced to death, that subdivision (f) is best read to exclude capital defendants, and that section 1509, enacted by Proposition 66, independently forecloses the use of section 1172.75 to disturb a judgment of death. Rodriguez disputes these assertions, contending that section 1172.75 reaches capital defendants. He argues that the statute contains no capital exclusion, that its 2022 renumbering signals the Legislature’s intent to include capital defendants, and that reading the narrow exclusion added by Senate Bill No. 285 in 2024 (§ 1172.75, subd. (f)) to exclude all capital defendants would render that subdivision surplusage, so that other capital defendants must remain within the statute’s reach. We decline to reach these issues because the jurisdictional defect is dispositive. 5 DISPOSITION The December 3, 2024, order striking the three prior- prison-term enhancements is vacated. Our disposition leaves the enhancements in place as part of the judgment under review. Nothing in this opinion forecloses Antonio Rodriguez from obtaining their elimination in his pending automatic appeal, where the retroactive invalidation of former section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancements may be raised and relief afforded. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS TAMZARIAN, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. DAUM, J. 6