People v. Taintergallon CA1/2

Filed 10/26/26 P. v. Taintergallon CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A171516 v. TYLER CHRISTOPHER (San Mateo County TAINTERGALLON, Super. Ct. No. 22NF007305A) Defendant and Appellant. After a check of the license plate on defendant Tyler Taintergallon’s Mercedes indicated that it was registered to a Chevrolet, police officers conducted a traffic stop of his parked vehicle. Taintergallon told the officers that the vehicle was registered in his name, and they ran a second check of the license plate. While those results were pending, Taintergallon gave the officers false identification, a search of his person produced a loaded firearm, and he was placed under arrest. The second check—of the correct license plate—then revealed that the Mercedes was indeed registered to Taintergallon. The trial court denied Taintergallon’s motion to suppress, and later, his application for mental health diversion, following which he pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court imposed a three-year 1 sentence but suspended its execution and placed Taintergallon on two years formal probation. Taintergallon appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the initial stop of his vehicle and subsequent search of his person violated the Fourth Amendment. Despite his failure to seek or obtain a certificate of probable cause, he also argues that the pre-plea denial of his application for mental health diversion was an abuse of discretion. We affirm. BACKGROUND June 4 Arrest and Charges On June 4, 2022, after a records check of the license plate on his Mercedes indicated it was registered to a Chevrolet, Taintergallon was detained by South San Francisco police and provided them with false identification. A subsequent search of Taintergallon’s person produced a loaded firearm and a criminal records check revealed that he was a convicted felon. On June 13, 2022, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed a felony complaint, and on November 1, the operative information, charging Taintergallon with possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction (Pen. Code,1 § 29900, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1), unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), and possession of a forged driver’s license (§ 470b) (count 3). The information further alleged that in August 2015, Taintergallon had been convicted of robbery (§ 211) and three other felonies, and three circumstances in aggravation with respect to count 3. 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2  The Motion to Suppress On March 28, 2023, Taintergallon moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his June 2 detention pursuant to section 1538.5. The prosecution filed opposition, and a hearing on the motion was held on June 5, with two witnesses: South San Francisco Police Sergeant Chris Devan and San Bruno Police Officer Hector Sanchez. Some of their testimony was as follows. On June 4, 2022, at approximately 1:57 a.m., Sergeant Devan responded to East Grand Avenue and Gateway Boulevard in response to reports of a large sideshow2 in the area. Sergeant Devan estimated that the sideshow involved “approximately a hundred vehicles and about 200 pedestrians.” As other officers were clearing out the sideshow, Sergeant Devan parked at the Speedway gas station because he “noticed that a majority of the spectators from the sideshow had their cars parked in that parking lot.” Sergeant Devan’s attention was drawn to Taintergallon because he “noticed the vehicle that he was associated to, a white Mercedes, was backed into a handicapped parking stall.” Sergeant Devan “then . . . noticed that [Taintergallon] and a female subject approached the vehicle; he was about to get into the driver’s seat, and then they looked over at me and abruptly 2 According to Sergeant Devan, a sideshow “is an illegal exhibition of speed . . . that normally happens in city streets or intersections where hundreds of people, both spectators, pedestrians and people in vehicles, spin donuts and do other illegal activities in the intersection.” Sergeant Devan had observed that “[m]any of the people that attend these sideshows are . . . armed,” and he had “seen sideshows where there are like gunshots fired from automatic rifles, handguns; they’ll light off fireworks, throw bottles and other objects at police officers; they’ll also shine lasers in the eyes of the officers when they’re on the scene.” 3 walked away from the vehicle.” Taintergallon and his companion then “walked to the entrance to the gas station convenience store,” and “[i]t looked like they pulled on the door to go inside, but it was locked, and then they walked back to that vehicle.” Taintergallon “walked back to the rear of the vehicle. It appeared that he had some sort of a brief interaction with the female and it appeared that he handed her the keys to the vehicle.” She “approached and got into the driver’s seat,” but Taintergallon “appeared to be lingering outside.” This caused Sergeant Devan to suspect that Taintergallon did “not want to be associated with the vehicle,” so he conducted a records check of its license plate by reading the plate to dispatch using his radio. When the records check showed that the plate number was associated with a Chevrolet, not a Mercedes, Sergeant Devan suspected that the vehicle may have been stolen. Sergeant Devan then “conducted a high-risk traffic stop on the occupants of the vehicle,” and Officer Sanchez placed Taintergallon in handcuffs. After Sergeant Devan gave the reason for the stop, Taintergallon said that the vehicle was registered in his name. Sergeant Devan told Taintergallon, “Oh, okay, it might be my mistake. The Bs look like eights from far, so that might be my bad.” He then asked for a second records check of Taintergallon’s license plate, which later showed that the Mercedes was registered in Taintergallon’s name. Sergeant Devan “assumed that maybe I read the plate incorrectly,” but did not “know if it was in fact incorrect until I could verify that with dispatch.” Meanwhile, the officers asked Taintergallon for identification, and he responded that it was in his wallet in his right pocket. With Taintergallon’s consent, Officer Sanchez retrieved Taintergallon’s identification from the wallet and returned the wallet to Taintergallon’s pocket. Around this time, 4 Sergeant Devan informed Taintergallon that it was illegal to be a spectator at a sideshow and Taintergallon responded that he “did not know it was illegal.” When Sergeant Devan was handed the identification, Taintergallon said something to the effect of, “What does that one say?” Sergeant Devan remarked that he “found it odd, that somebody handing me their driver’s license representing themself would ask what their driver’s license said,” and Taintergallon then admitted his identification was fake. Sergeant Devan asked Taintergallon for his real identification, which Taintergallon said was either in his pocket or his wallet. Officer Sanchez then “proceeded to grab” Taintergallon’s wallet from his pocket. Taintergallon was wearing a “black satchel bag . . . worn going over the chest area,” and it “was resting on his right side . . . covering the pocket,” so Officer Sanchez “used [his] hand to move it out of the way.” As he did so, he noticed the bag “was heavier than usual,” and he “grasped it with [his] hands, and . . . felt a handgun inside.” Officer Sanchez asked what was inside the bag, and Taintergallon responded with “something in the sense of, It’s a gun, Officer, or gun, sir.” Officer Sanchez then searched the bag and found a loaded Glock 9 mm handgun inside. Taintergallon was placed under arrest. The Trial Court’s Ruling After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied the motion, finding that “there was a good faith mistake that was reasonable when looking at the circumstances and the officer’s quickly checking again concerning this license plate,” and that “the officer did have a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant has also committed a misdemeanor by being at the location of the sideshow presumably as . . . someone who was observing . . . .” In doing so, the court noted that Sergeant Devan “said he 5 may have made a mistake, not that he believed he certainly had one way or another, but that he was simply going to be now double-checking and putting the information again into the system he was using to check.” The Application for Mental Health Diversion On December 11, 2023, defense counsel filed an application for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. The motion asserted that “Mr. Adams [sic] has been formally diagnosed with Schizophrenia,” that “Mr. Taintergallon reported that at the time of the arresting incident [he] was not prescribed antipsychotic medication and began to feel triggered,” “[t]he paranoia he suffered from lead him to believe he needed to carry a loaded firearm,” and that he had “a history of engagement and adherence to medication management and treatment which has led to periods of mental health stability and sobriety.” The motion was accompanied by a “Mental Health Suitability Report and Plan,” prepared by Jearenna Franklin, a licensed clinical social worker. Her report was based on a “Personal History Questionnaire attempted in the community in San Francisco,” an interview with Taintergallon for “approximately 2 hours,” both on August 13, 2023; and a “follow-up interview conducted via telephone” on August 15. Its first three pages gave an extensive history of Taintergallon’s “Early Childhood,” adolescence, and young adulthood, and his “Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE).” With respect to “Treatment Evidence and Recommendations,” the report indicated that after a suicide attempt at the age of 19, Taintergallon was “taken to the hospital where he was placed on an involuntary 5150 hold and diagnosed with schizophrenia and prescribed Seroquel.” And that “[a]t the time of the arresting incident, Mr. Taintergallon stated that he felt triggered by his interactions with the police due to being shot by the police a 6 decade ago. He felt that the police were going to shoot him again and this time kill him. He stated that at the time of arrest he felt emotionally unstable and triggered. He was not taking his mental health medications and was not being treated by mental health staff at the time.” The Trial Court’s Ruling On January 29, 2024, after hearing the argument of counsel, the trial court ruled as follows. After expressing “a little bit of concern about the quality” of the diagnosis, the court “accept[ed] that diagnosis of schizophrenia for purposes of this motion and this hearing.” However, the trial court went on to find that there was “clear and convincing evidence that the mental health diagnosis was not a significant or contributing cause or factor in this particular case”: “This is a case where the defendant is calmly contacted by the police while attending a sideshow. He has a gun and forged identification. There is nothing in the facts as outlined in the People’s response of the other information that provides the Court that he was suffering or afflicted with any of the symptoms related to schizophrenia . . . .” The court noted that Franklin’s report described one of the symptoms of schizophrenia as “low impulsivity, which the Court would think would be a lack of impulsive behavior, but then talks about . . . impulsive behavior . . . [that] caused the alleged offense,” noting this was “confusing” and “I don’t find there’s sufficient evidence of that based on the information provided.” With respect to suitability, the court found “no evidence from a qualified mental health professional that the symptoms of the defendant’s illness that are supposedly related to this offense would respond to mental health treatment,” that “defendant has a violent history,” including planning and participating in a robbery, that the treatment plan provided was 7 “extremely general,” “unspecific,” and “insufficient,” and that given the violent history and the “way some of these offenses are so . . . planned out,” Taintergallon posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. The court concluded that Taintergallon was not eligible or suitable for diversion, and denied the application. The Plea and Sentence On June 28, 2024, pursuant to a plea agreement, Taintergallon pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction (count 1) and admitted his prior strike. The trial court dismissed the balance of the information on the prosecutor’s motion. At sentencing on September 24, the trial court dismissed Taintergallon’s prior strike in the interests of justice pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a). The court then imposed an upper term sentence of three years on count 1, but suspended its execution and placed Taintergallon on two years of formal probation. Taintergallon filed a notice of appeal, checking the box to indicate his “appeal is based on the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5.” The request for a certificate of probable cause on the next page was left blank. DISCUSSION The Motion to Suppress Was Properly Denied Applicable Law and the Standard of Review “ ‘In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was 8 reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212 (Macabeo).) “ ‘[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative . . . stop when [the officer] has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” [Citations.] “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” [Citations.] [¶] Because it is a “less demanding” standard, “reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.” [Citation.] The standard “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” [Citation.] Courts “cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty . . . where none exists.” [Citation.] Rather, they must permit officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” ’ ” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 (Flores), quoting Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380–381.) In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1213.) “One such exception is a search incident to lawful arrest. In United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224 (Robinson), the high court noted the exception is well settled and . . . rejected the argument that a search incident to arrest must be justified on a case-by-case basis: ‘ . . . A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that 9 intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.’ (Id. at p. 235.)” (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1213.) Finally, the exclusionary rule is “ ‘a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.’ ” (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1220, quoting Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 231–232.) But its application “is not automatic.” (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1219.) “ ‘The rule . . . operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” ’ (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 (Leon).) [¶] The high court has recognized that the deterrent purpose of the rule is not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith. . . . ‘ “If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” ’ (Leon, at p. 919.)” (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1220.) With these principles in mind, we turn to Taintergallon’s arguments. Taintergallon’s Initial Detention Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment Taintergallon advances three arguments that his initial detention (and its length) violated the Fourth Amendment: (1) there was no reasonable 10 suspicion to justify his initial detention based on his having been a spectator at a sideshow, (2) Sergeant Devan’s misreading of his license plate does not warrant application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and (3) his detention was unreasonably prolonged after Sergeant Devan realized he had run a records check on the wrong plate. We disagree. We need not consider Taintergallon’s first argument, because he was not detained until the officers conducted a traffic stop of his vehicle, at which point Sergeant Devan had already received the result of his initial records check causing him to believe the vehicle was stolen. (See People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975–978 [detention begins when “objectively,‘ “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,” ’ or ‘ “otherwise terminate the encounter” ’ ”]; People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 57.) Taintergallon does not dispute that the results of the first records check—even if based on the wrong license plate—established reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop of his vehicle. (See, e.g., United States v. Dorais (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1124, 1131 [holding a “mistake of fact does not defeat the officers’ reasonable suspicion” supporting traffic stop]; People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 644 [acknowledging “an officer’s mistaken factual belief, held reasonably and in good faith, can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop”].) Nor does he offer any argument that Sergeant Devan’s apparent misreading of his license plate was objectively unreasonable. Instead, Taintergallon points to Sergeant Devan’s statement that “maybe I read an eight for B or vice versa,” and argues that it shows Sergeant Devan was “aware” of both “the propensity for error” and “this likely mistake very early on in the detention,” and that therefore his actions 11 were “at best, negligent and, at worst, an intentional subterfuge to facilitate an illegal detention.” We are not persuaded. Defense counsel pursued much of the same argument while cross- examining Sergeant Devan, repeatedly pressing him to admit that at the time of his remark about mistaking eights and Bs, he not only recognized the possibility that he had made a mistake, but realized that he had actually done so (e.g., “so at that point you looked at the license plate and you realized, I made a mistake, I reversed a B or an eight, right?”). But Sergeant Devan never took the bait. He explained that he had initially “observed the plate [and] read it to dispatch via my radio,” and that he did not “recall what plate [he] gave them.” And he testified at least three times that once Taintergallon told him the vehicle was registered in his name, he “believed [he] may have made a mistake,” but “didn’t know until [he] got the actual return back from dispatch.” Taintergallon’s argument thus failed below, the trial court evidently crediting Sergeant Devan’s testimony and version of events, and expressly finding that he made a “good faith mistake that was reasonable.” And so it must fail here as well, as we defer to the trial court’s implied credibility findings with respect to Sergeant Devan’s testimony. (See People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 166 [on a motion to suppress evidence the trial court “ ‘sits as a finder of fact with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences’ ” and “ ‘[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence’ ”]; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673–674.) 12  Officer Sanchez’s Search of the Satchel Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment Taintergallon next argues that Officer Sanchez’s search of his satchel violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not justified as a pat search under Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 (Terry), that searching the satchel was outside “ ‘a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of [the] person’s clothing’ ” (People v. Collins (1970) 1 Cal.3d 658, 662) permissible under Terry, and that the search violated physical manipulation of his “luggage” violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under Bond v. United States (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 336. The Attorney General does not respond in detail to these arguments, because he contends that Officer Sanchez’s search of Taintergallon’s satchel was a search incident to a lawful arrest. We agree. “When a custodial arrest is made, and that arrest is supported by independent probable cause, a search incident to that custodial arrest may be permitted, even though the formalities of the arrest follow the search.” (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1218; see Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 111 [similar]; see also Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762–763 [“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape”].) As noted, at the time of Officer Sanchez’s search of Taintergallon’s satchel, Taintergallon had already consented to a search of his wallet, provided the officers with false identification, and admitted that it was false. And shortly after the firearm was located, Taintergallon was placed under arrest and transported to the police station. Under these circumstances, the search of the satchel was a lawful search incident to arrest. (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1218.) Nor does Taintergallon contend otherwise, his reply brief entirely 13 failing to mention the Attorney General’s argument on this point. (See Rudick v. State Board of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [appellants made implicit concession by “failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument on th[at] point”]; Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 [court assumed respondent’s claim was correct, “since defendant did not dispute respondent’s claim in his reply”].) Taintergallon’s Challenge to the Denial of His Application for Mental Health Diversion Fails for Lack of a Certificate of Probable Cause Section 1237.5 provides in relevant part: “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . except where both of the following are met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” Taintergallon does not dispute that he neither sought nor obtained such a certificate. “ ‘It has long been established that issues going to the validity of a plea require compliance with section 1237.5.’ ” (People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 781, quoting People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75–76.) Without a certificate of probable cause, we “lack[] authority . . . to consider” such issues and must order dismissal. (People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 797; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099.) However, a certificate of probable cause is not required for an appeal from “[t]he sentence or other matters occurring after the plea or admission that do 14 not affect the validity of the plea or admission.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B); see People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379.) Taintergallon’s application for mental health diversion was denied five months before he entered his plea, and had his application instead been granted, and mental health diversion been successful, the charges against him would have been dismissed. (See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627.) His challenge to that denial is thus plainly not a “matter[] occurring after the plea,” nor one that does “not affect [its] validity.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B.) Furthermore, in People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, our Supreme Court clarified that a defendant is only eligible for pretrial mental health diversion “ ‘until adjudication’ ” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1))—a phrase that “ ‘encompasses both a plea hearing and an adjudication by trial.’ ” (Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 810.) Our colleagues in Division Four have held that a certificate of probable cause is required to appeal from a conviction after a no contest plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request pretrial mental health diversion, reasoning that, “given the rule set forth in Braden, “an attorney’s failure to request pretrial mental health diversion cannot, by definition, be a ‘matter occurring after the plea.’ ” (People v. Robinson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 133, 136.) And in People v. Moore (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 90, 93–95, our colleagues in Division Five reached the same conclusion. We agree with the reasoning in these cases, which compels the conclusion that the denial of an application for mental health diversion likewise “cannot, by definition, be a ‘matter occurring after the plea,’ ” and thus a challenge to that denial requires a certificate of probable cause. (Robinson, p. 136.) 15  Taintergallon does not dispute any of this, his reply brief conceding that “an appeal based on the denial of mental health diversion would require a certificate of probable cause.” Instead, he appears to argue that because his appeal is also based on the denial of his motion to suppress, he is free to raise issues that require a certificate of probable cause, despite his failure to request or obtain one. He is wrong. (See People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 678, fn. 4 [“Even if the appeal goes forward without a certificate of probable cause, based upon claims that do not require one, the defendant may not raise additional claims that do require a certificate”]; Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1100–1102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(3) [“If the defendant does not file the written statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 . . . the appeal will be limited to issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.”].)3 In Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098, our Supreme Court described section 1237.5 as “a mechanism that d[oes] not invite consideration of the peculiar facts of the individual appeal” and a “general 3 Taintergallon’s reliance on People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102 and People v. Guzman (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1060 is unavailing. In Jones, our Supreme Court held that language in former California Rules of Court, rule 31(d), providing that an appeal based solely on noncertificate grounds “ ‘shall not be operative unless the notice of appeal states that it is based upon such grounds’ ” did not prevent a defendant appealing from the denial of a motion to suppress from also raising (noncertificate) claims regarding his probation conditions, notwithstanding that the latter were not listed in his notice of appeal. (Jones, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1106–1107, 1110.) Guzman dismissed the defendant’s appeal and denied his petition for habeas corpus because he had failed to comply with section 1237.5 and “attempt[ed] to bypass statutory procedures and obtain appellate review of the preplea effectiveness of counsel improperly.” (Guzman, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065.) Neither case provides any support for the proposition that Taintergallon may entirely evade the requirements of section 1237.5 with respect to his argument regarding mental health diversion simply because he has also appealed from denial of his motion to suppress. 16 ‘legislative command’ ” to defendants that “lays down a ‘condition precedent’ to the taking of an appeal within its scope,” going on to conclude that it “should be applied in a strict manner.” We will follow this guidance, and accordingly we will not consider Taintergallon’s challenge to the denial of his application for mental health diversion. DISPOSITION The order denying the motion to suppress is affirmed. 17  RICHMAN, ACTING P. J. We concur. DESAUTELS, J. SWEET, J. (A171516N)  Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 18