Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Dodson CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, G065178 v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CF1775) ESHON DWAYNE DODSON, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed. Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Eshon Dwayne Dodson was sentenced to the midterm of three years in prison for committing armed robbery with two other men. On appeal, Dodson contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by imposing the midterm sentence based on aggravating factors that were not submitted to the jury and found true beyond a reasonable doubt. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation or the low term sentence of two years. Finding these contentions unmeritorious, we affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. THE ROBBERY The victim in this case, identified at trial as John Doe, was a Secret Service agent when this case arose on June 15, 2024. That evening, Doe worked an event in Los Angeles until about 8:30, at which time he started driving back to his home in Orange County. Upon arriving there, Doe parked his vehicle in the street and sat inside it for about five minutes while he took off some of his gear. Then he exited his vehicle and began walking toward his house while carrying a bag containing various items, including his phone, radio, holster, and an extra magazine for his gun.1 As Doe was walking, Dodson pulled up on his righthand side in an SUV with its headlights off. Jamonte Johnson exited the front passenger seat, ran around the front of the car, and ran up to Doe while pointing a gun in his face and demanding the bag. Then he forcefully grabbed Doe’s bag and scurried back to the front passenger seat. At that point, Doe saw another 1 Doe’s movements and the robbery itself were captured on home surveillance videos that were shown to the jury at trial. 2 man, Bertran Bell, who had stepped out of the back seat of the SUV and was standing by his open door. Bell reached into his waistline, prompting Doe to pull his gun and start shooting. Doe continued firing as Bell ducked into the back seat and Dodson quickly drove away. After switching cars, Dodson and Johnson dropped Bell off at the hospital, where he was treated for gunshot wounds. Meanwhile, using a tracking device for Doe’s phone, the police located his stolen belongings, which had been dumped off Jamboree Road in Tustin. The police also recovered a gun the robbers had discarded in the street as they were leaving the scene of the robbery. Both Dodson’s and Johnson’s DNA was found on the gun, as well as on the recovered stolen belongings. Based on cell tower data, investigators were able to determine Dodson and his cohorts had followed Doe from Los Angeles before confronting him outside his home. II. THE CHARGES, THE VERDICT, AND THE FATE OF DODSON’S COHORTS Dodson and Johnson were charged in an information with second degree robbery, and Johnson was separately charged with possessing a 2 firearm as a felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 211/212.5, subd. (c), 29800.) The information alleged as enhancements that Johnson personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that Dodson was armed with a firearm within the 3 meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). No aggravating sentencing factors were alleged as to either defendant. 2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 That statute applies when the defendant is personally or vicariously armed during a felony. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) 3 The jury convicted Dodson and Johnson on all charges and found the firearm allegations true. Johnson, a third strike offender, was sentenced to 29 years to life in prison. The judgment against him was affirmed on appeal in People v. Johnson (Mar. 18, 2026, G065100) [nonpub. opn.]). Bell received a six-year sentence as part of a pretrial plea bargain. III. DODSON’S SENTENCING HEARING A. Probation Versus Prison Because the jury found Dodson was armed with a firearm during the robbery, he was presumptively ineligible for probation. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(1).) At defense counsel’s request, however, the trial court stated it would consider granting Dodson probation because he was only 21 years old at the time of the robbery and he had no prior criminal convictions. The court acknowledged that Dodson had pled guilty in Los Angeles to carrying a loaded firearm in public in an unrelated case in 2022. But the court considered that a pending conviction, not a prior conviction, because Dodson 4 had yet to be sentenced in that case. Arguing in favor of probation, defense counsel informed the trial court Dodson was willing to accept responsibility early in the case by pleading guilty to an indicated sentence of three years, but because his case was joined with Johnson’s and Johnson did not want to take a plea, Dodson was unable to do so. Defense counsel also argued Dodson was pressured to participate in the robbery by Johnson, who is 12 years his senior, and Dodson 4 Sentencing in the Los Angeles case was delayed to give Dodson a chance to complete community service as a way to get the conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. The record on appeal does not reflect whether Dodson successfully availed himself of that opportunity. 4 played a relatively passive role in the robbery, compared to Johnson and Bell. In addition, defense counsel told the court Dodson had a good support network in place that could help him succeed if he were granted probation. The trial court agreed Dodson’s youth was a factor favoring probation. As further mitigating circumstances, the court also found it significant Dodson had no prior convictions, he appeared to be remorseful and willing to comply with probation, his family would lose support if he were imprisoned, and a prison term would have adverse collateral consequences on Dodson’s life. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(b).) On the aggravating side of the ledger, however, the trial court found the nature and circumstances of the robbery indicated it was sophisticated, well-planned, and more serious as compared to other robberies. The court also found it concerning that Dodson was vicariously armed during the robbery after having pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm in his Los Angeles case. And although Dodson did not use a gun during the robbery, the court found he played an integral role in the offense as the wheelman, and there was nothing to suggest Dodson participated in the robbery against his will or tried to stop it from occurring. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(a).) Furthermore, although Doe was a Secret Service agent, the trial court found he was a vulnerable victim because he was off duty when Dodson’s group attacked him by surprise outside his home. Based on a statement Doe made before sentencing, the court also found he suffered 5 lasting emotional trauma as a result of the robbery. 5 Doe told the probation officer the robbery shattered his sense of safety and security and has made it harder for him to connect with friends and family. Doe also said the robbery negatively affected his career and 5 All things considered, the trial court determined the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and it denied Dodson’s request for probation. The court then turned to the length of Dodson’s prison term. B. Selecting the Term for Dodson’s Robbery Conviction The sentencing range for second degree robbery is two, three, or five years in prison. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) In deciding which term to select, the trial court recognized that, because Dodson was only 21 years old at the time of the robbery, there was a presumption in favor of the lower term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).) Nonetheless, based on the violent, dangerous, and brazen nature of the robbery and many of the same factors it discussed in connection with the probation issue, the court found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones such that imposition of the low term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (Id., subd. (b)(6).) The court therefore sentenced Dodson to the midterm of three years for the robbery. It then added one year for the firearm enhancement, bringing Dodson’s aggregate sentence to four years in prison. DISCUSSION I. SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIM Dodson argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by imposing the midterm sentence on the robbery count based on factors that were not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. We disagree. “Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi), financial situation because he has had to limit his responsibilities at work and take time off to address his mental health. 6 any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the statutorily authorized penalty for a crime must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 123.) For purposes of Apprendi, the statutorily authorized penalty is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict. (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303–304.) The Apprendi rule is codified in section 1170, subdivision (b), which makes the midterm sentence the presumptive maximum sentence for a determinate term of imprisonment. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1); People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) Pursuant to that section, the trial court may not impose an upper term sentence unless it relies on aggravating factors that (except for prior convictions in a certified record) have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1)–(3).) In addition, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides, “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced . . . childhood trauma . . . . [¶] (B) The person . . . was a youth [defined as a person under the age of 26] at the time of the commission of the offense. [¶] (C) . . . [T]he person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking.” (Ibid.) This provision creates a presumption in favor of the lower term for defendants who, like Dodson, come within its terms. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 426–430.) Dodson argues the statute also makes the lower term the statutory maximum sentence within the meaning of Apprendi, so that any 7 fact used to increase his sentence above the lower term had to be submitted to the jury. As explained in People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189 (Hilburn), however, “the low term becomes presumptive [under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)] only after the sentencing court makes findings in addition to those supporting the jury’s verdict. Under the . . . statute, the low term is presumed only if the sentencing court first finds the defendant falls into one of the three special categories set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) and, second, finds that circumstance was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense. Thus, unlike the middle term, the lower term is presumed only after the court makes additional findings beyond those of the jury. Because those findings occur after the defendant is convicted, and are not necessary for imposition of the presumptive middle term, they do not create a new statutory maximum sentence,” for purposes of Apprendi. (Hilburn, at pp. 204–205; see also People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 928–929 [rejecting the argument that a presumptively low term sentence under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) cannot be elevated based on factors that were not submitted to the jury].) In arguing otherwise, Dodson relies on Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, which held California’s former determinate sentencing law violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the trial court to increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum (from the middle to the upper term) based on facts that were decided by the judge and not the jury. (Cunningham v. California, at p. 290.) But by increasing Dodson’s sentence from the presumptively low term to the middle term, the trial court did not increase his punishment beyond the statutory maximum. Rather, the court simply restored Dodson’s sentence to the maximum term 8 allowed by the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the court’s decision to impose the midterm sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment. II. DENIAL OF PROBATION AND SELECTION OF MIDTERM SENTENCE Dodson claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for probation and by sentencing him to the midterm of three years for the robbery. Again, we disagree. A. Denying Probation Like most sentencing decisions, “‘A denial or a grant of probation generally rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner’” or its decision “‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909–910.) Thus, it is not enough to show that reasonable minds may differ over whether probation was appropriate; “‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance.’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.) Dodson argues the court abused its discretion by relying on the fact he was vicariously armed during the robbery to deny probation because that fact was also used to enhance his sentence by one year under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). In so arguing, Dodson relies on People v. Parrott (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1119, which found error in the trial court’s reliance on the victim’s age to deny probation because that fact was an element of the charged offense. (Id. at pp. 1124–1125.) However, other cases have stated it is 9 permissible for a trial court to use the same fact to both deny probation and enhance punishment. (People v. Bowen (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 102, 106; People v. Haynes (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1138.) We need not decide whether the dual-use prohibition applies here because, even if it does, the bare circumstance of Dodson being vicariously armed during the robbery was not used against him twice. That fact did supply the basis for his one-year firearm enhancement, and the trial court did mention that fact in denying his request for probation. But in assessing Dodson’s suitability for probation, the court was not simply concerned that Dodson was vicariously armed during the robbery. Rather, the court found it significant that Dodson was vicariously armed after he had already pled guilty to a firearm offense in his Los Angeles case. In other words, the court determined Dodson’s repeated criminal activity with firearms made him particularly ill-suited for probation. Because that factor differed from the one used to enhance his sentence, there was no dual use of facts. (See People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1777–1778 [no improper dual use of facts where conduct supporting aggravating factor exceeded that needed to impose sentence enhancement]; cf. People v. Golliver (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1619–1620 [denial of probation justified where the trial court relied on factors that were related to but went beyond the inherent elements of the defendant’s offenses].) Nevertheless, Dodson contends the mitigating factors favoring probation “overwhelmingly outweighed” the aggravating ones such that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his request for probation. But in tendering this argument, Dodson admits Doe suffered significant emotional injury as a result of the robbery. That fact, standing alone was sufficient to justify the trial court’s decision to deny probation. (See 10 People v. Quintanilla (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 406, 413 [the presence of a single aggravating factor is enough to support a trial court’s sentencing choice].) Moreover, although Dodson downplays both his involvement in and the seriousness of the robbery, the record shows he played a key role in the offense by following Doe home from Los Angeles, turning off his headlights, and stealthily maneuvering his vehicle into a position that allowed his gun-wielding cohort Johnson to take Doe by surprise outside his home late at night. Despite the fact Doe was an armed Secret Service agent, he had no chance to defend himself when Johnson stormed out of Dodson’s car and aimed a gun at his head at close range. Based on all the circumstances presented, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Dodson’s request for probation. We cannot say the court’s decision exceeded all bounds of reason. B. Midterm Sentence Even though Dodson’s age at the time of the robbery created a presumption in favor of the low term sentence for that offense, the trial court had discretion to impose the midterm if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); Hillburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 203.) Dodson recognizes this but claims imposition of the midterm constituted an abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented. His claim is based on the same arguments we have already rejected—namely, that the trial court violated the prohibition on the dual use of facts and the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating ones. It is true Dodson was relatively young and criminally inexperienced when this case arose, perhaps making him susceptible to peer 11 pressure from his older partners in crime. To his credit, Dodson was also prepared to admit culpability and plead guilty at an early stage of the proceedings, had Johnson not insisted on going to trial. However, the trial court was rightfully concerned about the timing of the robbery in relation to Dodson’s prior conviction for unlawfully carrying a firearm in public. Considering the robbery came on the heels of the prior conviction, and the robbery also involved firearms, the court could reasonably conclude the low term sentence would not be sufficient to deter Dodson from engaging in future criminal activity with guns and would not be in the interest of justice. Considering as well the harrowing circumstances of the robbery and Dodson’s role in the offense, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to the midterm of three years. Although reasonable minds could differ about whether Dodson deserved a lesser term, the court’s decision did not exceed the bounds of reason. Nor was it arbitrarily or capriciously arrived at. Rather, the record shows the court took a hard look at all relevant factors before making its sentencing decision. Under these circumstances, there is no basis to disturb that decision. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. GOODING, J. WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, P. J. DELANEY, J. 12