People v. Dodson CA4/3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketG065178
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Dodson CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G065178
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24CF1775)
ESHON DWAYNE DODSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed.
Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Defendant Eshon Dwayne Dodson was sentenced to the midterm
of three years in prison for committing armed robbery with two other men.
On appeal, Dodson contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
rights by imposing the midterm sentence based on aggravating factors that
were not submitted to the jury and found true beyond a reasonable doubt. He
also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for
probation or the low term sentence of two years. Finding these contentions
unmeritorious, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE ROBBERY
The victim in this case, identified at trial as John Doe, was a
Secret Service agent when this case arose on June 15, 2024. That evening,
Doe worked an event in Los Angeles until about 8:30, at which time he
started driving back to his home in Orange County. Upon arriving there, Doe
parked his vehicle in the street and sat inside it for about five minutes while
he took off some of his gear. Then he exited his vehicle and began walking
toward his house while carrying a bag containing various items, including his
phone, radio, holster, and an extra magazine for his gun.1
As Doe was walking, Dodson pulled up on his righthand side in
an SUV with its headlights off. Jamonte Johnson exited the front passenger
seat, ran around the front of the car, and ran up to Doe while pointing a gun
in his face and demanding the bag. Then he forcefully grabbed Doe’s bag and
scurried back to the front passenger seat. At that point, Doe saw another
1
Doe’s movements and the robbery itself were captured on home
surveillance videos that were shown to the jury at trial.
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man, Bertran Bell, who had stepped out of the back seat of the SUV and was
standing by his open door. Bell reached into his waistline, prompting Doe to
pull his gun and start shooting. Doe continued firing as Bell ducked into the
back seat and Dodson quickly drove away.
After switching cars, Dodson and Johnson dropped Bell off at the
hospital, where he was treated for gunshot wounds. Meanwhile, using a
tracking device for Doe’s phone, the police located his stolen belongings,
which had been dumped off Jamboree Road in Tustin. The police also
recovered a gun the robbers had discarded in the street as they were leaving
the scene of the robbery. Both Dodson’s and Johnson’s DNA was found on the
gun, as well as on the recovered stolen belongings. Based on cell tower data,
investigators were able to determine Dodson and his cohorts had followed
Doe from Los Angeles before confronting him outside his home.
II.
THE CHARGES, THE VERDICT, AND THE FATE OF
DODSON’S COHORTS
Dodson and Johnson were charged in an information with second
degree robbery, and Johnson was separately charged with possessing a
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firearm as a felon. (Pen. Code, §§ 211/212.5, subd. (c), 29800.) The
information alleged as enhancements that Johnson personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that Dodson was armed with a firearm within the
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meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). No aggravating sentencing
factors were alleged as to either defendant.
2
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
That statute applies when the defendant is personally or
vicariously armed during a felony. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
3
The jury convicted Dodson and Johnson on all charges and found
the firearm allegations true. Johnson, a third strike offender, was sentenced
to 29 years to life in prison. The judgment against him was affirmed on
appeal in People v. Johnson (Mar. 18, 2026, G065100) [nonpub. opn.]). Bell
received a six-year sentence as part of a pretrial plea bargain.
III.
DODSON’S SENTENCING HEARING
A. Probation Versus Prison
Because the jury found Dodson was armed with a firearm during
the robbery, he was presumptively ineligible for probation. (§ 1203, subd.
(e)(1).) At defense counsel’s request, however, the trial court stated it would
consider granting Dodson probation because he was only 21 years old at the
time of the robbery and he had no prior criminal convictions. The court
acknowledged that Dodson had pled guilty in Los Angeles to carrying a
loaded firearm in public in an unrelated case in 2022. But the court
considered that a pending conviction, not a prior conviction, because Dodson
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had yet to be sentenced in that case.
Arguing in favor of probation, defense counsel informed the trial
court Dodson was willing to accept responsibility early in the case by
pleading guilty to an indicated sentence of three years, but because his case
was joined with Johnson’s and Johnson did not want to take a plea, Dodson
was unable to do so. Defense counsel also argued Dodson was pressured to
participate in the robbery by Johnson, who is 12 years his senior, and Dodson
4
Sentencing in the Los Angeles case was delayed to give Dodson
a chance to complete community service as a way to get the conviction
reduced to a misdemeanor. The record on appeal does not reflect whether
Dodson successfully availed himself of that opportunity.
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played a relatively passive role in the robbery, compared to Johnson and Bell.
In addition, defense counsel told the court Dodson had a good support
network in place that could help him succeed if he were granted probation.
The trial court agreed Dodson’s youth was a factor favoring
probation. As further mitigating circumstances, the court also found it
significant Dodson had no prior convictions, he appeared to be remorseful and
willing to comply with probation, his family would lose support if he were
imprisoned, and a prison term would have adverse collateral consequences on
Dodson’s life. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(b).)
On the aggravating side of the ledger, however, the trial court
found the nature and circumstances of the robbery indicated it was
sophisticated, well-planned, and more serious as compared to other robberies.
The court also found it concerning that Dodson was vicariously armed during
the robbery after having pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm in his Los
Angeles case. And although Dodson did not use a gun during the robbery, the
court found he played an integral role in the offense as the wheelman, and
there was nothing to suggest Dodson participated in the robbery against his
will or tried to stop it from occurring. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(a).)
Furthermore, although Doe was a Secret Service agent, the trial
court found he was a vulnerable victim because he was off duty when
Dodson’s group attacked him by surprise outside his home. Based on a
statement Doe made before sentencing, the court also found he suffered
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lasting emotional trauma as a result of the robbery.
5
Doe told the probation officer the robbery shattered his sense of
safety and security and has made it harder for him to connect with friends
and family. Doe also said the robbery negatively affected his career and
5
All things considered, the trial court determined the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and it denied Dodson’s request for
probation. The court then turned to the length of Dodson’s prison term.
B. Selecting the Term for Dodson’s Robbery Conviction
The sentencing range for second degree robbery is two, three, or
five years in prison. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) In deciding which term to select, the
trial court recognized that, because Dodson was only 21 years old at the time
of the robbery, there was a presumption in favor of the lower term. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(B).) Nonetheless, based on the violent, dangerous, and brazen
nature of the robbery and many of the same factors it discussed in connection
with the probation issue, the court found the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating ones such that imposition of the low term would
be contrary to the interests of justice. (Id., subd. (b)(6).) The court therefore
sentenced Dodson to the midterm of three years for the robbery. It then
added one year for the firearm enhancement, bringing Dodson’s aggregate
sentence to four years in prison.
DISCUSSION
I.
SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
Dodson argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
rights by imposing the midterm sentence on the robbery count based on
factors that were not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. We
disagree.
“Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi),
financial situation because he has had to limit his responsibilities at work
and take time off to address his mental health.
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any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the
statutorily authorized penalty for a crime must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 123.) For
purposes of Apprendi, the statutorily authorized penalty is the maximum
sentence that may be imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury’s
verdict. (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303–304.)
The Apprendi rule is codified in section 1170, subdivision (b),
which makes the midterm sentence the presumptive maximum sentence for a
determinate term of imprisonment. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1); People v. Flores
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) Pursuant to that section, the trial court
may not impose an upper term sentence unless it relies on aggravating
factors that (except for prior convictions in a certified record) have been
stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by
the jury. (§ 1170, subds. (b)(1)–(3).)
In addition, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides, “unless the
court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to
the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if
any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced . . . childhood trauma . . . . [¶] (B)
The person . . . was a youth [defined as a person under the age of 26] at the
time of the commission of the offense. [¶] (C) . . . [T]he person is or was a
victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking.” (Ibid.) This
provision creates a presumption in favor of the lower term for defendants
who, like Dodson, come within its terms. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th
416, 426–430.) Dodson argues the statute also makes the lower term the
statutory maximum sentence within the meaning of Apprendi, so that any
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fact used to increase his sentence above the lower term had to be submitted
to the jury.
As explained in People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189
(Hilburn), however, “the low term becomes presumptive [under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)] only after the sentencing court makes findings in addition
to those supporting the jury’s verdict. Under the . . . statute, the low term is
presumed only if the sentencing court first finds the defendant falls into one
of the three special categories set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) and,
second, finds that circumstance was a contributing factor in the commission
of the offense. Thus, unlike the middle term, the lower term is presumed only
after the court makes additional findings beyond those of the jury. Because
those findings occur after the defendant is convicted, and are not necessary
for imposition of the presumptive middle term, they do not create a new
statutory maximum sentence,” for purposes of Apprendi. (Hilburn, at pp.
204–205; see also People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922,
928–929 [rejecting the argument that a presumptively low term sentence
under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) cannot be elevated based on factors
that were not submitted to the jury].)
In arguing otherwise, Dodson relies on Cunningham v. California
(2007) 549 U.S. 270, which held California’s former determinate sentencing
law violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed the trial court to
increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum (from the
middle to the upper term) based on facts that were decided by the judge and
not the jury. (Cunningham v. California, at p. 290.) But by increasing
Dodson’s sentence from the presumptively low term to the middle term, the
trial court did not increase his punishment beyond the statutory maximum.
Rather, the court simply restored Dodson’s sentence to the maximum term
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allowed by the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the court’s decision to impose the
midterm sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment.
II.
DENIAL OF PROBATION AND SELECTION OF MIDTERM SENTENCE
Dodson claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
request for probation and by sentencing him to the midterm of three years for
the robbery. Again, we disagree.
A. Denying Probation
Like most sentencing decisions, “‘A denial or a grant of probation
generally rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner’” or its decision “‘exceeds the
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People v.
Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909–910.) Thus, it is not enough to show
that reasonable minds may differ over whether probation was appropriate;
“‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant
facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled
differently in the first instance.’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
378.)
Dodson argues the court abused its discretion by relying on the
fact he was vicariously armed during the robbery to deny probation because
that fact was also used to enhance his sentence by one year under section
12022, subdivision (a)(1). In so arguing, Dodson relies on People v. Parrott
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1119, which found error in the trial court’s reliance on
the victim’s age to deny probation because that fact was an element of the
charged offense. (Id. at pp. 1124–1125.) However, other cases have stated it is
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permissible for a trial court to use the same fact to both deny probation and
enhance punishment. (People v. Bowen (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 102, 106;
People v. Haynes (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1138.)
We need not decide whether the dual-use prohibition applies here
because, even if it does, the bare circumstance of Dodson being vicariously
armed during the robbery was not used against him twice. That fact did
supply the basis for his one-year firearm enhancement, and the trial court did
mention that fact in denying his request for probation. But in assessing
Dodson’s suitability for probation, the court was not simply concerned that
Dodson was vicariously armed during the robbery. Rather, the court found it
significant that Dodson was vicariously armed after he had already pled
guilty to a firearm offense in his Los Angeles case. In other words, the court
determined Dodson’s repeated criminal activity with firearms made him
particularly ill-suited for probation. Because that factor differed from the one
used to enhance his sentence, there was no dual use of facts. (See People v.
Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1777–1778 [no improper dual use of facts
where conduct supporting aggravating factor exceeded that needed to impose
sentence enhancement]; cf. People v. Golliver (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1612,
1619–1620 [denial of probation justified where the trial court relied on factors
that were related to but went beyond the inherent elements of the
defendant’s offenses].)
Nevertheless, Dodson contends the mitigating factors favoring
probation “overwhelmingly outweighed” the aggravating ones such that it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his request for
probation. But in tendering this argument, Dodson admits Doe suffered
significant emotional injury as a result of the robbery. That fact, standing
alone was sufficient to justify the trial court’s decision to deny probation. (See
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People v. Quintanilla (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 406, 413 [the presence of a
single aggravating factor is enough to support a trial court’s sentencing
choice].)
Moreover, although Dodson downplays both his involvement in
and the seriousness of the robbery, the record shows he played a key role in
the offense by following Doe home from Los Angeles, turning off his
headlights, and stealthily maneuvering his vehicle into a position that
allowed his gun-wielding cohort Johnson to take Doe by surprise outside his
home late at night. Despite the fact Doe was an armed Secret Service agent,
he had no chance to defend himself when Johnson stormed out of Dodson’s
car and aimed a gun at his head at close range. Based on all the
circumstances presented, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision to deny Dodson’s request for probation. We cannot say the court’s
decision exceeded all bounds of reason.
B. Midterm Sentence
Even though Dodson’s age at the time of the robbery created a
presumption in favor of the low term sentence for that offense, the trial court
had discretion to impose the midterm if the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6);
Hillburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 203.) Dodson recognizes this but claims
imposition of the midterm constituted an abuse of discretion under the
circumstances presented. His claim is based on the same arguments we have
already rejected—namely, that the trial court violated the prohibition on the
dual use of facts and the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating ones.
It is true Dodson was relatively young and criminally
inexperienced when this case arose, perhaps making him susceptible to peer
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pressure from his older partners in crime. To his credit, Dodson was also
prepared to admit culpability and plead guilty at an early stage of the
proceedings, had Johnson not insisted on going to trial. However, the trial
court was rightfully concerned about the timing of the robbery in relation to
Dodson’s prior conviction for unlawfully carrying a firearm in public.
Considering the robbery came on the heels of the prior conviction, and the
robbery also involved firearms, the court could reasonably conclude the low
term sentence would not be sufficient to deter Dodson from engaging in
future criminal activity with guns and would not be in the interest of justice.
Considering as well the harrowing circumstances of the robbery
and Dodson’s role in the offense, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing him to the midterm of three years. Although
reasonable minds could differ about whether Dodson deserved a lesser term,
the court’s decision did not exceed the bounds of reason. Nor was it
arbitrarily or capriciously arrived at. Rather, the record shows the court took
a hard look at all relevant factors before making its sentencing decision.
Under these circumstances, there is no basis to disturb that decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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