Full Opinion

Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Russell CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, H053963 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. C2305747, C2403142) v. KEOINJHANIE RUSSELL, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Keoinjhanie Russell was charged with multiple felonies in two different counties. Russell entered a negotiated plea disposition to resolve two separate cases in Santa Clara County. She pleaded no contest to several theft crimes in exchange for an aggregate four-year term in both cases and dismissal of the remaining charges. Russell was subsequently sentenced to four years in prison on a separate case in Marin County. At the Santa Clara County sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the stipulated four- year sentence under the plea agreement without addressing Russell’s Marin County sentence. On appeal, Russell contends that the stipulated four-year sentence is unauthorized because the aggregate term does not account for her Marin County sentence (Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subd (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452).1 We conclude Russell is estopped from challenging the unauthorized sentence on appeal and we will affirm the judgment. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 A. Russell’s Santa Clara County Cases In May 2023, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a complaint in case No. C2305747 (Case A), charging Russell with two counts of grand theft of personal property exceeding $950 (§ 487, subd. (a)). In February 2024, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a separate complaint in case No. C2403142 (Case B), charging Russell with one count of committing organized retail theft (§ 490.4, subd. (a)(3)) and four counts of grand theft of personal property exceeding $950 (§ 487, subd. (a)). Russell was arraigned on the two Santa Clara County complaints in September 2024, and released on her own recognizance with various terms and conditions. B. Russell’s Marin County Case3 The Marin County District Attorney charged Russell in case No. SC221782A, with two counts of grand theft of personal property exceeding $950 (§ 487, subd. (a)), two counts of committing organized retail theft (§ 490.4, subd. (b)(1)), and two counts of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)). Following the September 2024 Santa Clara County arraignment hearing, Russell was transferred to Marin County on an outstanding warrant in Case No. SC221782A. Russell remained incarcerated in Marin County until October 2025, when she was transferred back to Santa Clara County. 2 We omit the underlying facts of the offenses as they are not included in the record on appeal and are not pertinent to the resolution of Russell’s claim. 3 Russell derives the facts pertaining to her Marin County case from the August 2025 probation report and November 2025 supplemental probation report. Since the record on appeal does not include either the complaint or minute order for Russell’s Marin County case, we will do the same. 2 C. Santa Clara County Plea Hearing In January 2025, Russell was released on the Voluntary Home Detention Program (VHDP) with global positioning monitoring under the supervision of Pretrial Services on the two Santa Clara County cases. In May 2025 Russell entered into a negotiated plea to resolve the two Santa Clara County cases. Russell pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft of personal property in Case A, and in Case B, she pleaded no contest to one count of committing organized retail theft and two counts of grand theft of personal property. The parties agreed that Russell would serve a four-year split sentence,4 with one and a half years to be served in county jail and the remaining sentence to be served under mandatory supervision. The trial court accepted Russell’s plea and set the matter for sentencing in August 2025.5 The trial court terminated the detention program and Russell was released on her own recognizance pending sentencing. D. Marin County Sentencing and Section 1381 Demand In July 2025, Russell was incarcerated in Alameda County on a Marin County warrant. Russell was transferred to Marin County to address the outstanding warrant in case SC221782A. In August 2025, the Marin County Superior Court sentenced Russell to 16 months pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h), with eight months to be served in custody and eight months on mandatory supervision in Marin County.6 While serving the custodial portion of her sentence in Marin County, Russell failed to appear at the August 2025 4 “Subdivision (h)(5) of section 1170 created the ‘split sentence’ which allows a defendant to serve a realigned sentence partially in local custody and partially on mandatory supervision by the probation department. [Citation.]” (People v. Borynack (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 958, 963.) 5 Russell was charged with codefendants Diamond Uniqueneshay Cooper and Coreyon Jhaperry Wyatt in Case A, and alongside Cooper in Case B. Neither Cooper nor Wyatt are parties to this appeal. 6 The record does not indicate how the case was resolved or the charges included in Russell’s sentence. 3 sentencing hearing in Santa Clara County. The Santa Clara County Superior Court therefore issued a warrant for Russell’s arrest. Pursuant to section 1381, Russell sent notice to the Santa Clara County District Attorney that she was serving a term of imprisonment in Marin County and asserted her right to be sentenced on the Santa Clara County charges within 90 days. The Santa Clara County Superior Court granted the Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office section 1381 request and sent the Marin County Sheriff a written order to produce Russell in Santa Clara County. Russell was transferred back to Santa Clara County in October 2025. E. Santa Clara County Sentencing Hearing The sentencing hearing in the Santa Clara County cases took place in December 2025. Before the hearing, the Probation Department filed a probation report and supplemental probation report. The supplemental report noted that Russell had been charged and sentenced in Marin County case No. SC221782A. At the Santa Clara County sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that it had read and considered the original probation report. Defense counsel informed the trial court that there was a supplemental probation report, but the record is unclear as to whether the trial court reviewed it. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court sentenced Russell to an aggregate four-year split term. In Case B, the trial court sentenced Russell to a split term of three years four months, consisting of the two-year midterm for organized retail theft, consecutive to two terms of eight months (one-third the middle term) for each grand theft of personal property conviction. The trial court ordered Russell to serve 18 months in jail with the remaining 22-month sentence to be served under mandatory supervision with various terms and conditions (§ 1170, subd. (h)). In Case A, the trial court sentenced Russell to eight months (one-third the middle term of two years) of mandatory supervision for grand theft of personal property conviction, to be served consecutively to Case B. 4 The trial court dismissed the remaining charges and concluded the sentencing hearing without addressing Russell’s 16-month Marin County sentence. Defense counsel did not object. Russell timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION Russell contends that the trial court erroneously imposed the stipulated four-year sentence under the plea agreement because the aggregate term did not account for her sentence in Marin County, in violation of section 1170.1, subdivision (a) and California Rules of Court, rule 4.452. Russell requests that we remand the matter for resentencing. The Attorney General concedes the error, stating that the trial court “apparently acted in excess of its jurisdiction by not pronouncing an aggregate sentence on both the Santa Clara County and Marin County cases.” Nevertheless, the Attorney General asserts that Russell is estopped from challenging the unauthorized sentence on appeal because she agreed to the sentence imposed by the trial court. We agree with the Attorney General. A. Consecutive Sentencing of Multiple Felonies in Several Cases We agree with the parties that the trial court erroneously omitted Russell’s Marin County sentence from the aggregate term of imprisonment. Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) states, in pertinent part: “[W]hen any person is convicted of two or more felonies, whether in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and whether by judgment rendered by the same or by a different court, and a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed[,] . . . the aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for applicable enhancements . . . .” (Italics added.) In other words, “multiple consecutive determinate terms must be combined into a single, ‘aggregate term of imprisonment for all [such] convictions’ [citation] that merges all terms to be served consecutively and complies with the rules for calculating aggregate terms (e.g., one-third the base term for subordinate terms . . . ), 5 whether or not the consecutive terms arose from the same or different proceedings . . . [citations].” (In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 772-773, citing § 1170.1, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452.) The trial court imposed consecutive terms in Russell’s Santa Clara County cases. Further, Russell was sentenced to a 16-month term in Marin County prior to the sentencing hearing in the instant matter. The trial court was therefore required under section 1170.1, subdivision (a) to pronounce an aggregate term of imprisonment that encompassed Russell’s Marin County sentence. By failing to do so, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. (See People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 780 (Chavez) [“When a trial court fails to act within the manner prescribed by such sources of law, it is said to have taken an ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction”], citation omitted.) Thus, the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence. B. Exception to Unauthorized Sentence Rule Notwithstanding the error, we conclude that Russell is estopped from challenging her agreed-upon sentence on appeal. “The rule that defendants may challenge an unauthorized sentence on appeal . . . is itself subject to an exception: Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) “The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process. [Citations].” (Ibid.) “ ‘When a defendant maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which would have required the imposition of a more lenient sentence, yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the defendant waived any rights under such rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 6 As the Attorney General asserts, Russell is estopped from challenging her unauthorized sentence because she received the “benefit of [her] bargain.” Russell agreed to the four-year sentence as part of a negotiated disposition to resolve charges stemming from two different cases. Defense counsel did not object at sentencing when the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence despite the supplemental probation report identifying the Marin County case. Nor can we condone remanding the cases as Russell could attempt to benefit from resentencing. The trial court had fundamental jurisdiction in this case because it had “authority over both the subject matter and the parties.” (Chavez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 780.) Russell does not address this exception to the unauthorized sentence rule, nor does she raise any challenge to the trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction. Notably, Russell did not file a reply brief and therefore fails to address the Attorney General’s contention that she is estopped from challenging her stipulated sentence. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Russell is precluded from challenging the unauthorized sentence on appeal. Accordingly, notwithstanding the trial court’s sentencing error, we affirm the judgment. III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 7 _______________________________ Greenwood, P. J. WE CONCUR: ___________________________________________ Danner, J. ______________________________________ Adams, J. H053963 People v. Russell