People v. Gardner
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketB349188
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B349188
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.24IWCF00376)
v.
ERICK ALEXANDER GARDNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Erick Alex Gardner was charged with robbery (Pen. Code § 211). 1 He
petitioned for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. The petition
was denied and Gardner pled no contest to the robbery charge; he was
sentenced to the low term of two years. Gardner now appeals, arguing his
petition for mental health diversion should have been granted. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2024, Gardner entered a Dollar Tree store and selected four
items: two packages of Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups and two cartons of apple
juice. He then headed for the exit. Seeing and recognizing him as a prior
theft suspect, a store clerk positioned herself between him and the exit.
Gardner drew a machete and ordered her out of his way. She moved, he left,
the police were summoned, and Gardner was apprehended down the street.
He was subsequently charged with robbery.
A. Petition for Diversion
In June 2025, Gardner petitioned for pretrial mental health diversion
under section 1001.36. He submitted a declaration from Dr. Ildiko Tabori,
who said Gardner had schizophrenia, amphetamine use disorder, and
cannabis use disorder. While Tabori did not discuss Gardner’s criminal
history in any detail, he described that history generally as “limited” and
“non-violent in nature.” Tabori concluded it was “unlikely” Gardner posed a
danger to society and said “[i]f treated . . . it is likely Mr. Gardner’s poor life
choices will significantly decrease.”
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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1. Gardner’s Criminal History
The People opposed Gardner’s petition for diversion and provided a
lengthy discussion of his criminal history. That history involves five crimes,
as follows.
In April 2021, Gardner asked an elderly man in a wheelchair for a
dollar. When the man put his phone in his lap to reach for his wallet,
Gardner grabbed the phone and ran. The police were summoned, Gardner
was caught nearby, and the phone was recovered.
In September 2021, Gardner entered a Kentucky Fried Chicken and
reached around behind a soft drink machine to grab an employee’s phone
from the counter. Another employee pursued him and recovered the phone,
but the phone case and an attached debit card were missing. The owner of
the phone then followed Gardner onto a bus, where the card fell out of
Gardner’s pants. The bus driver refused to allow Gardner to remain on the
bus, the police arrived, and Gardner resisted arrest until subdued with a
taser.
In December 2021, Gardner asked someone he knew for a ride, and
subsequently refused to get out of the car unless the driver gave him money.
The driver took the car to a police station parking lot and tried to get
Gardner to leave, first by offering him a few dollars and then by using force.
Gardner produced a hammer, which the driver immediately grabbed to avoid
being hit. During the struggle, Gardner grabbed the driver’s tablet computer.
The driver ran into the police station, and the police apprehended Gardner
walking down the street with the tablet.
In May 2022, Gardner entered a Wing Stop just as a customer was
leaving. Within seconds, the customer realized he had left his phone on the
counter inside, although it was still connected via Bluetooth to his wireless
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earbuds. The customer went back to retrieve the phone, but it wasn’t there.
Gardner then left the store and the signal to the wireless earbuds began to
weaken. The customer followed Gardner and the signal strengthened again.
The customer confronted Gardner, who drew a sharp metal object from his
bag and said, “if you wanna keep following me, I have something for you.”
The customer then called the police, who retrieved the phone; the metal
object turned out to be a flathead screwdriver.
Finally, in May 2024, Gardner approached a bus that was preparing to
leave a stop and had closed its doors. Gardner began yelling and tried to pry
the doors open. When that did not work, Gardner walked around the bus to
the driver’s side, produced a hand axe, and used it to shatter the driver’s
window. Alarmed, the driver drove away and called the police, who detained
Gardner and seized the axe.
2. Oral Argument
At oral argument on his petition, Gardner asserted that he had
successfully completed a court-ordered treatment program in 2023 but had
been immediately dropped from services, causing him to backslide. He
argued the diversion program was different and would be better suited to
help him maintain progress. The prosecution focused on Gardner’s criminal
history. The trial court denied diversion, for two reasons. First, the court
found Gardner unlikely to take necessary medication, especially in light of
the fact that he stopped taking medication after completing his previous
program. Second, the court found Gardner posed an unreasonable risk to
public safety, given his repeated use of weapons and the threat of violence to
commit crimes.
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B. Plea and Judgment
Gardner subsequently pled no contest to the robbery charge. The court
sentenced him to the low term of 2 years in prison. Gardner timely
appealed. 2
DISCUSSION
Gardner argues the trial court erred in finding him unsuitable for
mental health diversion. He suggests the court’s finding that he posed an
unreasonable risk to public safety was unsupported by any evidence. He also
contends the court’s concern that he would not take his medication was an
insufficient reason to deny diversion. We disagree.
I. Governing Law
Section 1001.36, subdivision (a), provides that “the court may, in its
discretion . . . grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . if the defendant
satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in
subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for
that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” A defendant is
eligible for pretrial diversion if (1) he “has been diagnosed with a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” and (2) his “mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd.
(b).) There is no dispute that Gardner is eligible under these criteria.
A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if (1) a qualified mental
health expert opines that the mental disorder at issue would respond to
treatment, (2) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his right to a
2 Gardner’s Request for Judicial Notice, filed April 23, 2026, is granted.
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speedy trial, (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment, and (4) the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, as defined in
section 1170.18. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) Section 1170.18 defines
“unreasonable risk to public safety” as the risk that a defendant will commit
one of the crimes listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), colloquially
known as “super strikes.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449–
450 (Moine).) As relevant here, the list of super strikes includes “[a]ny
homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in
[s]ections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).)
In evaluating whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk to
public safety, the trial court “may consider the opinions of the district
attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider
the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal
history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Because the statute expressly entrusts this determination to the
discretion of the trial court, our review is for abuse of discretion. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (a); Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 448–449.) Abuse of discretion
“is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the
aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact
are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–
712.)
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II. Risk Assessment
The trial court found Gardner “highly, strongly, highly likely” to
commit a super strike in the future because (1) he would not take his
medication and (2) when not on his medication, he committed crimes with
weapons: “machetes, screwdrivers, hammers, and axes.” The court concluded
that if any victim tried to resist or retain their property in a physical way,
they would end up dead or at risk of death. The factual findings underlying
this assessment were supported by substantial evidence.
There was evidence Gardner had undergone a previous treatment
program and promptly stopped his medication, contributing to his two most
recent crimes. From this the court could reasonably conclude that Gardner
would stop his medication as soon as supervision ended. Gardner’s two most
recent crimes each involved the use of a weapon (an axe or a machete),
directed at a person. The two robberies immediately before the treatment
program involved threats to use a weapon (a hammer or a screwdriver) on his
victims. From this information the court could reasonably conclude that
while off his medication, Gardner was likely to arm himself and commit
crimes.
Having reached those factual findings, the court’s decision that
Gardner was likely to commit some form of murder or attempted murder was
neither arbitrary nor capricious. Already one victim had resisted and ended
up struggling with Gardner over a hammer; the bus driver had merely
refused to open the door for Gardner and found an axe coming through his
window. Harm was avoided in those instances, but the trial court was
entitled to determine that it likely would not be avoided in a future incident.
Gardner points out that he has never been convicted of, or even charged
with, a super strike offense. He argues that because his criminal history
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shows “mainly theft and robbery crimes where a weapon was displayed,” the
court could not “legitimately” deny diversion. He relies on People v. Hoffman
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304 (Hoffman) and People v. Williams (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 990 (Williams). Neither case controls.
Hoffman involved a resentencing petition under Proposition 47, not
pretrial diversion. (Hoffman, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1307–1309.) The
defendant in that case was a woman whose sole criminal history was the
offense for which she was incarcerated—stealing her parents’ checkbook at
the age of 19 and using it to write fraudulent checks. (Ibid.) Here, Gardner
has a frequent, recent history of using weapons to accomplish robberies and
other crimes, which in one case ended with a physical struggle over the
weapon.
Williams involved a defendant charged with felony stalking, whose
criminal history consisted entirely of sending threatening emails and letters.
(Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 993–995.) The court of appeal noted
that two mental health professionals assessed the defendant as low risk,
there was no evidence he owned or had access to any weapons, and he had
been released on bond for two years without incident. (Id. at p. 1003.) None
of those facts are present here. 3
Finally, Gardner relies on People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1138, 1155 (Whitmill) for the proposition that the trial court cannot deny
diversion based on the defendant’s past treatment setbacks. This takes
Whitmill too far. There, the defendant was a veteran under treatment for
military sexual trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, who had been
arrested for firing a gun in the air. (Id. at pp. 1142–1144.) The trial court
3 The trial court here noted, as do we, that Tabori’s mental health
assessment barely mentioned Gardner’s criminal history.
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made no finding regarding the defendant’s likelihood of committing a super
strike, and on appeal, the attorney general relied on case law suggesting that
felony probation provided better “motivation” for remaining drug free and
compliant with treatment. (Id. at pp. 1151, 1155.) Whitmill criticized this
rationale as extra-statutory and over-inclusive: if diversion could be denied
because probation provides better motivation to comply with treatment, then
diversion could always be denied and section 1001.36 would be effectively
nullified. (Id. at p. 1155.) Nothing in Whitmill prevents a trial court from
considering the likelihood a defendant will stay on his medication as part of
its evaluation of whether that defendant is likely to commit a super strike.
(See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [“The court may consider . . . any other factors the
court deems appropriate”].)
Due to Gardner’s history of using weapons to commit robberies and
other crimes, and of directing the use of those weapons at other persons, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Gardner likely
to commit a super strike. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not
discuss the attorney general’s alternative argument that the court retains
residual discretion to deny diversion even if the statutory requirements are
met.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
ZUKIN, P.J.
MORI, J. DAUM, J.
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