Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THE PEOPLE, B349188 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.24IWCF00376) v. ERICK ALEXANDER GARDNER, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed. Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Erick Alex Gardner was charged with robbery (Pen. Code § 211). 1 He petitioned for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. The petition was denied and Gardner pled no contest to the robbery charge; he was sentenced to the low term of two years. Gardner now appeals, arguing his petition for mental health diversion should have been granted. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In June 2024, Gardner entered a Dollar Tree store and selected four items: two packages of Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups and two cartons of apple juice. He then headed for the exit. Seeing and recognizing him as a prior theft suspect, a store clerk positioned herself between him and the exit. Gardner drew a machete and ordered her out of his way. She moved, he left, the police were summoned, and Gardner was apprehended down the street. He was subsequently charged with robbery. A. Petition for Diversion In June 2025, Gardner petitioned for pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. He submitted a declaration from Dr. Ildiko Tabori, who said Gardner had schizophrenia, amphetamine use disorder, and cannabis use disorder. While Tabori did not discuss Gardner’s criminal history in any detail, he described that history generally as “limited” and “non-violent in nature.” Tabori concluded it was “unlikely” Gardner posed a danger to society and said “[i]f treated . . . it is likely Mr. Gardner’s poor life choices will significantly decrease.” 1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 1. Gardner’s Criminal History The People opposed Gardner’s petition for diversion and provided a lengthy discussion of his criminal history. That history involves five crimes, as follows. In April 2021, Gardner asked an elderly man in a wheelchair for a dollar. When the man put his phone in his lap to reach for his wallet, Gardner grabbed the phone and ran. The police were summoned, Gardner was caught nearby, and the phone was recovered. In September 2021, Gardner entered a Kentucky Fried Chicken and reached around behind a soft drink machine to grab an employee’s phone from the counter. Another employee pursued him and recovered the phone, but the phone case and an attached debit card were missing. The owner of the phone then followed Gardner onto a bus, where the card fell out of Gardner’s pants. The bus driver refused to allow Gardner to remain on the bus, the police arrived, and Gardner resisted arrest until subdued with a taser. In December 2021, Gardner asked someone he knew for a ride, and subsequently refused to get out of the car unless the driver gave him money. The driver took the car to a police station parking lot and tried to get Gardner to leave, first by offering him a few dollars and then by using force. Gardner produced a hammer, which the driver immediately grabbed to avoid being hit. During the struggle, Gardner grabbed the driver’s tablet computer. The driver ran into the police station, and the police apprehended Gardner walking down the street with the tablet. In May 2022, Gardner entered a Wing Stop just as a customer was leaving. Within seconds, the customer realized he had left his phone on the counter inside, although it was still connected via Bluetooth to his wireless 3 earbuds. The customer went back to retrieve the phone, but it wasn’t there. Gardner then left the store and the signal to the wireless earbuds began to weaken. The customer followed Gardner and the signal strengthened again. The customer confronted Gardner, who drew a sharp metal object from his bag and said, “if you wanna keep following me, I have something for you.” The customer then called the police, who retrieved the phone; the metal object turned out to be a flathead screwdriver. Finally, in May 2024, Gardner approached a bus that was preparing to leave a stop and had closed its doors. Gardner began yelling and tried to pry the doors open. When that did not work, Gardner walked around the bus to the driver’s side, produced a hand axe, and used it to shatter the driver’s window. Alarmed, the driver drove away and called the police, who detained Gardner and seized the axe. 2. Oral Argument At oral argument on his petition, Gardner asserted that he had successfully completed a court-ordered treatment program in 2023 but had been immediately dropped from services, causing him to backslide. He argued the diversion program was different and would be better suited to help him maintain progress. The prosecution focused on Gardner’s criminal history. The trial court denied diversion, for two reasons. First, the court found Gardner unlikely to take necessary medication, especially in light of the fact that he stopped taking medication after completing his previous program. Second, the court found Gardner posed an unreasonable risk to public safety, given his repeated use of weapons and the threat of violence to commit crimes. 4 B. Plea and Judgment Gardner subsequently pled no contest to the robbery charge. The court sentenced him to the low term of 2 years in prison. Gardner timely appealed. 2 DISCUSSION Gardner argues the trial court erred in finding him unsuitable for mental health diversion. He suggests the court’s finding that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety was unsupported by any evidence. He also contends the court’s concern that he would not take his medication was an insufficient reason to deny diversion. We disagree. I. Governing Law Section 1001.36, subdivision (a), provides that “the court may, in its discretion . . . grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if (1) he “has been diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” and (2) his “mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b).) There is no dispute that Gardner is eligible under these criteria. A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if (1) a qualified mental health expert opines that the mental disorder at issue would respond to treatment, (2) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his right to a 2 Gardner’s Request for Judicial Notice, filed April 23, 2026, is granted. 5 speedy trial, (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment, and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) Section 1170.18 defines “unreasonable risk to public safety” as the risk that a defendant will commit one of the crimes listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), colloquially known as “super strikes.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449– 450 (Moine).) As relevant here, the list of super strikes includes “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in [s]ections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).) In evaluating whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety, the trial court “may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Because the statute expressly entrusts this determination to the discretion of the trial court, our review is for abuse of discretion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 448–449.) Abuse of discretion “is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711– 712.) 6 II. Risk Assessment The trial court found Gardner “highly, strongly, highly likely” to commit a super strike in the future because (1) he would not take his medication and (2) when not on his medication, he committed crimes with weapons: “machetes, screwdrivers, hammers, and axes.” The court concluded that if any victim tried to resist or retain their property in a physical way, they would end up dead or at risk of death. The factual findings underlying this assessment were supported by substantial evidence. There was evidence Gardner had undergone a previous treatment program and promptly stopped his medication, contributing to his two most recent crimes. From this the court could reasonably conclude that Gardner would stop his medication as soon as supervision ended. Gardner’s two most recent crimes each involved the use of a weapon (an axe or a machete), directed at a person. The two robberies immediately before the treatment program involved threats to use a weapon (a hammer or a screwdriver) on his victims. From this information the court could reasonably conclude that while off his medication, Gardner was likely to arm himself and commit crimes. Having reached those factual findings, the court’s decision that Gardner was likely to commit some form of murder or attempted murder was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Already one victim had resisted and ended up struggling with Gardner over a hammer; the bus driver had merely refused to open the door for Gardner and found an axe coming through his window. Harm was avoided in those instances, but the trial court was entitled to determine that it likely would not be avoided in a future incident. Gardner points out that he has never been convicted of, or even charged with, a super strike offense. He argues that because his criminal history 7 shows “mainly theft and robbery crimes where a weapon was displayed,” the court could not “legitimately” deny diversion. He relies on People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304 (Hoffman) and People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990 (Williams). Neither case controls. Hoffman involved a resentencing petition under Proposition 47, not pretrial diversion. (Hoffman, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1307–1309.) The defendant in that case was a woman whose sole criminal history was the offense for which she was incarcerated—stealing her parents’ checkbook at the age of 19 and using it to write fraudulent checks. (Ibid.) Here, Gardner has a frequent, recent history of using weapons to accomplish robberies and other crimes, which in one case ended with a physical struggle over the weapon. Williams involved a defendant charged with felony stalking, whose criminal history consisted entirely of sending threatening emails and letters. (Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 993–995.) The court of appeal noted that two mental health professionals assessed the defendant as low risk, there was no evidence he owned or had access to any weapons, and he had been released on bond for two years without incident. (Id. at p. 1003.) None of those facts are present here. 3 Finally, Gardner relies on People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1155 (Whitmill) for the proposition that the trial court cannot deny diversion based on the defendant’s past treatment setbacks. This takes Whitmill too far. There, the defendant was a veteran under treatment for military sexual trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder, who had been arrested for firing a gun in the air. (Id. at pp. 1142–1144.) The trial court 3 The trial court here noted, as do we, that Tabori’s mental health assessment barely mentioned Gardner’s criminal history. 8 made no finding regarding the defendant’s likelihood of committing a super strike, and on appeal, the attorney general relied on case law suggesting that felony probation provided better “motivation” for remaining drug free and compliant with treatment. (Id. at pp. 1151, 1155.) Whitmill criticized this rationale as extra-statutory and over-inclusive: if diversion could be denied because probation provides better motivation to comply with treatment, then diversion could always be denied and section 1001.36 would be effectively nullified. (Id. at p. 1155.) Nothing in Whitmill prevents a trial court from considering the likelihood a defendant will stay on his medication as part of its evaluation of whether that defendant is likely to commit a super strike. (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [“The court may consider . . . any other factors the court deems appropriate”].) Due to Gardner’s history of using weapons to commit robberies and other crimes, and of directing the use of those weapons at other persons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Gardner likely to commit a super strike. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not discuss the attorney general’s alternative argument that the court retains residual discretion to deny diversion even if the statutory requirements are met. DISPOSITION The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION ZUKIN, P.J. MORI, J. DAUM, J. 9